- A familiar dilemma for the subset theory of realization
- Varieties of conceptual analysis
- Way and Whiting on Elusive Reasons
- Teleological powers
- Practical reasons for belief without stakes☆
- Against normativism about mental attitudes
- Lacking, needing, and wanting
- Quotational and other opaque belief reports
- ‘Paraphrase, categories, and ontology’
- Epistemic insouciance, souciance, and hypersouciance
- Experiencing left and right in a non‐orientable world
- Whole multiple location and universals
- Perceptual illusionism
- Overpunishment and the punishment of the innocent
- Collecting truths: A paradox in two guises
- Fine‐tuning, weird sorts of atheism and evidential favouring
- Knowledge as a collective status
- Naïve realism and the problem of illusion
- Williams on the self and the future
- Presentism, truthmaking, and the nature of truth
- Compatibilism from the inside out1
- Priority Monism and Junk
- Contextual analyticity
- Evans on intellectual attention and memory demonstratives
- Perceiving properties versus perceiving objects
- Self and World Revisited
- Embodied subjectivity and objectifying self‐consciousness: Cassam and phenomenology
- Revisiting Quassim Cassam’s Self and World
- Introduction: Sensing the self in world
- Slurs, neutral counterparts, and what you could have said
- Response to Schwenkler
- How can there be reasoning to action?
- Grounding, metaphysical laws, and structure
- Indeterminacy: Deep but not Rock Bottom
- Dual carving and minimal rationalism
- Micro credit and the threshold of praiseworthiness
- Philosophy and its History: An Essay in the Philosophy of Philosophy
- Unity and objectivity in Strawson and Cassam
- Treating like a child
- Supervaluationism and branching indeterminacy
- The ethics of believing out loud
- The KK principle and rotational symmetry
- Borgesian maps
- An argument against Jago’s theory of truth
- The defeat of evil and the norms of hope
- ‘That’s the Guy Who Might Have Lost’
- Should agents be immodest?
- Neither pardon nor blame: Reacting in the wrong way
- Indeterminate identities, supervaluationism, and quantifiers
- Plato’s doxa
- Philosophy and its history: An essay in the philosophy of philosophy
- A Stereotype Semantics for Syntactically Ambiguous Slurs
- A Troublesome Case of Backward Causation for Lewis’s Counterfactual Theory
- The Problem of Peer Demotion, Revisited and Resolved
- On Minimal Morality
- Stability Challenges for Moehler’s Second‐Level Social Contract
- Minimal Morality, Bargaining Power, and Moral Constraint: Replies to D’Agostino, Thrasher, Morris, and Vanderschraaf
- Pluralism, Prudence, and Political Theory: Comments on Minimal Morality by Michael Moehler
- Morality’s Many Parts
- Stability Challenges for Moehler’s Second‐Level Social Contract
- Wittgenstein, Peirce, and Paradoxes of Mathematical Proof
- Nature and the Good
- Inference as Consciousness of Necessity
- Knowing What an Experience Is Like and the Reductive Theory of Knowledge‐wh
- Objectually Understanding Informed Consent
- Can Truth‐Conditional Theorists of Content Do Without ‘That’‐Clause Ascriptions?
- Non‐uniformism about the Epistemology of Modality: Strong and Weak
- Two Sorts of Constitutivism
- Are Desires Beliefs about Normative Reasons?
- Modeling Truth for Semantics
- Characterising Theories of Time and Modality
- On the Global Ambitions of Phenomenal Conservatism
- If Time Can Pass, Time Can Pass at Different Rates
- On Perceptual Confidence and “Completely Trusting Your Experience”
- Beware of Safety
- Use Your Illusion: Spatial Functionalism, Vision Science, and the Case Against Global Skepticism
- Truthmaking, Second‐Order Quantification, and Ontological Commitment
- Pejorative Verbs and the Prospects for a Unified Theory of Slurs
- Against the Middle Ground: Why Russellian Monism is Unstable
- Rampant Non‐Factualism: A Metaphysical Framework and its Treatment of Vagueness
- Exiting The Consequentialist Circle: Two Senses of Bringing It About
- On the Study of Imaginative Resistance
- Unfollowed Rules and the Normativity of Content
- An Indexical Theory of Racial Pejoratives
- Presentism and Modal Realism
- Method in the Service of Progress
- Fatalism and Future Contingents
- The Presentational Use of Descriptions
- Testimonial Injustice, Pornography, and Silencing
- Affective Experience, Desire, and Reasons for Action
- The Challenge to Nihilism
- First Principles as General, First Principle 7 as Special
- Reid on Perception, Knowledge, and Will: Replies to Hill, Rysiew, and Yaffe
- Problems From Reid, By James Van Cleve Oxford University Press, 2016 (550 + Xiv Pages)
- A Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief
- Van Cleve on Reid on Exertion and Incompatibilism
- Unconscious Perception Reconsidered
- Why Parfit Cannot Generalize From Fission
- Kind‐Dependent Grounding
- Intending is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism
- The Regress Objection to Reflexive Theories of Consciousness
- Naïve Realism and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception
- The Razor and the Laser
- Normalizing Slurs and Out‐group Slurs: The Case of Referential Restriction
- Normative Judgment and Rational Requirements: A Reply to Ridge
- Because There Is a Reason to Do It: How Normative Reasons Explain Action
- What’s Wrong With Brute Supervenience? A Defense of Horgan on Physicalism and Superdupervenience
- Essence with Ground
- Note on Definition and Impossibility
- Definition and Impossibility
- Knowledge Dethroned
- Linguistic Convention and the Architecture of Interpretation
- Against Non-Ludovician Time
- Is Grounding a Hyperintensional Phenomenon?
- Three Concerns for Structural Hylomorphism
- Lessons on Truth from Kant
- Pejoratives and Ways of Thinking
- G.E.M. Anscombe on the Analogical Unity of Intention in Perception and Action
- Self-Knowledge and the Guise of the Good
- The Basic Argument and Modest Moral Responsibility
- History of Philosophy and Conceptual Cartography
- What Makes Threats Wrong?
- How Does Epistemic Rationality Constrain Practical Rationality?
- Perceptual Confidence and Categorization
- Re-Examining Descartes’ Algebra and Geometry: An Account Based on the Reguale
- Precision, Not Confidence, Describes the Uncertainty of Perceptual Experience: Comment on John Morrison’s “Perceptual Confidence”
- Metaphysical Disputes and Metalinguistic Negotiation