- Building bridges with words: an inferential account of ethical univocity
- Freedom and the value of games
- Moral priorities under risk
- Intention as action under development: why intention is not a mental state
- The unity of moral attitudes: recipe semantics and credal exaptation
- Solving the problem of creeping minimalism
- Why conceptual competence won’t help the non-naturalist epistemologist
- Expressivism, meaning, and all that
- Relativism and the expressivist bifurcation
- Human rights without human supremacism
- On Parfit’s Ontology
- Coin trials
- Imaginative resistance as imagistic resistance
- The argument from surprise
- A gradual reformation: empirical character and causal powers in Kant
- Ethical intuitionism and the linguistic analogy
- Justice in migration
- Resisting for other reasons
- Fictionalism about musical works
- Epistemic buck-passing and the interpersonal view of testimony
- Modal structuralism simplified
- Why cognitivism?
- An epistemology for practical knowledge
- Deliberating in the presence of manipulation
- The moral virtue of open-mindedness
- Emotionally guiding our actions
- Critical Notice of Thomas Sattig, The Double Lives of Objects: An Essay in the Metaphysics of the Ordinary World (Oxford: Oxford University Press) xi, 259 ISBN 978-0-19-968301-7
- Critical Notice: Thomas Sattig’s The Double Lives of Objects: An Essay in the Metaphysics of the ordinary world, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015
- Critical Notice of James A. Harris, Hume: An Intellectual Biography. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2015. Pp. xii + 621
- Critical Notice: James A Harris’ Hume: an intellectual biography, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015
- Critical Notice: Peter Ludlow’s Living Words
- Critical Notice: Peter Ludlow’s Living Words: Meaning Underdetermination and he Dynamic Lexicon, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014
- Occurrent states
- An agentive non-intentionalist theory of self-deception
- Desire satisfaction, death, and time
- Beliefs do not come in degrees
- Normative realism and ontology: reply to Clarke-Doane, Rosen, and Enoch and McPherson
- Scanlon’s modal metaphysics
- Objectivity and reliability
- What do you mean “This isn’t the question”?
- Love and Justice: a Paradox?