- Existentialist risk and value misalignment
- Fictions that don’t tell the truth
- Metanormative regress: an escape plan
- Indiscernibility and the grounds of identity
- Incommensurability and hardness
- Vague perception
- Instrumental divergence
- Knowledge, true belief, and the gradability of ignorance
- Who’s afraid of common knowledge?
- Proximal intentions intentionalism
- Rights reclamation
- Superconditioning
- Why, Delilah? When music and lyrics move us in different directions
- Mind the gap: noncausal explanations of dual properties
- Nativism and empiricism in artificial intelligence
- Quine, evidence, and our science
- Grasp and scientific understanding: a recognition account
- Policing, undercover policing and ‘dirty hands’: the case of state entrapment
- Sufficientarianism and incommensurability
- The semantics of deadnames
- Zetetic indispensability and epistemic justification
- Relevant entailment and logical ground
- Replies to Driver, Johnson King and Markovits
- Why Is Oppression Wrong?
- Inquiry and trust: An epistemic balancing act
- Still no lie detector for language models: probing empirical and conceptual roadblocks
- Contingentism and paraphrase
- Two-step approaches to healthcare allocation: how helpful is parity in selecting eligible options?
- Proportionality and combat trauma
- Pitcovski’s explanation-based account of harm
- In defence of object-given reasons
- Structuring embodied minds: attention and perceptual agency
- Algorithmic profiling as a source of hermeneutical injustice
- Taught rules: Instruction and the evolution of norms
- Ground by Status
- Attention, moral skill, and algorithmic recommendation
- Collective procedural memory
- A trilemma for the lexical utility model of the precautionary principle
- Why bother with so what?
- Epistemic blame as relationship modification: reply to Smartt
- Broad, subjective, relative: the surprising folk concept of basic needs
- Predicative subject matter
- Raz’s appeal to law’s authority
- Implicating fictional truth
- Humean learning (how to learn)
- Vindicating the verifiability criterion
- Hylemorphic animalism and conjoined twins
- Cohesive proportionality
- Difference-making and the control relation that grounds responsibility in hierarchical groups
- Epistemic characterizations of validity and level-bridging principles
- Kamm’s modified causative principle
- On fellowship
- Can we compare health states when our standards change?
- Generics and social justice
- Argumentation-induced rational issue polarisation
- Symmetric relations
- Three sources of social indeterminacy
- Schroeder on reasons, experience, and evidence
- Standpoint moral epistemology: the epistemic advantage thesis
- The politics of past and future: synthetic media, showing, and telling
- Mutual entailment between causation and responsibility
- Response to commentary on “Allocation of scarce resources, disability, and parity”
- Remembering requires no reliability
- No foundations for metaphysical coherentism
- Allocation of scarce resources, disability, and parity
- Stability and equilibrium in political liberalism
- Competitive virtue ethics and narrow morality
- Incommensurability and consistency
- Reasonable standards and exculpating moral ignorance
- Inherent and probabilistic naturalness
- Comparability of health states
- An event algebra for causal counterfactuals
- Against the newer evidentialists
- Partial grounding, identity, and nothing-over-and-aboveness
- Reply to Reasons Latesters
- Does being a ‘bad feminist’ make me a hypocrite? Politics, commitments and moral consistency
- Correction: To Knowing what it is
- Correction to: Animals in the order of public reason
- Precis of ways to be blameworthy: rightness, wrongness, and responsibility
- Limitative computational explanations
- Borderline consciousness, when it’s neither determinately true nor determinately false that experience is present
- Population ethics in an infinite universe
- Evidence, reasons, and knowledge in the reasons-first program
- Capturing the conspiracist’s imagination
- A scoring rule and global inaccuracy measure for contingent varying importance
- Perceptual consciousness and intensional transitive verbs
- Correction to Credence and belief
- Précis of Reasons First
- On the origin of conspiracy theories
- Fairness and risk attitudes
- Agency and aesthetic identity
- A symposium on Thinking and Perceiving: On the malleability of the mind
- Can our reasons determine what it is rational for us to believe?
- Group belief and direction of fit
- Power and activity: a dynamic do-over*
- Too humble for words
- Agentially controlled action: causal, not counterfactual
- Getting machines to do your dirty work
- Fictional force
- Testimonial knowledge and content preservation
- A solution, and a problem, for veritism
- Animals in the order of public reason
- Perceptual malleability: attention, imagination, and objectivity
- Algorithmic fairness and resentment
- The dark side of niche construction
- What we owe to decision-subjects: beyond transparency and explanation in automated decision-making
- Relevance as difference-making: a generalized theory of relevance and its applications
- Irony in song
- Attention and cognitive penetration: reflections on Dustin Stokes’ Thinking and Perceiving
- Will AI avoid exploitation? Artificial general intelligence and expected utility theory
- Should epistemology take the zetetic turn?
- Perceptual expertise, universality, and objectivity
- Belief, blame, and inquiry: a defense of doxastic wronging
- The polysemy of proper names
- A good cause
- Validity as a thick concept
- Issues of Expertise in Perception and Imagination: Commentary on Stokes
- Affect, desire and interpretation
- A new rationalist account of the development of false-belief understanding
- Vice-based accounts of moral evil
- Learning from experience and conditionalization
- Conceptual limitations, puzzlement, and epistemic dilemmas
- Knowing what it is
- Local and global deference
- Correction to: Evidence and truth
- Towards a logic for ‘because’
- Cognitive synonymy: a dead parrot?
- On who may be blameworthy, and how: Comments on Elinor Mason’s Ways to be Blameworthy
- Informational richness and its impact on algorithmic fairness
- Autonomised harming
- Survivor guilt
- The causal efficacy of composites: a dilemma for interventionism
- Grounding, necessity, and relevance
- A new challenge for contingentists
- What we know when we act
- Epistemic Normativity & Epistemic Autonomy: The True Belief Machine
- A puzzle about first-person imagination
- Correction To: Credence and belief
- Can a single account of supererogation handle both finite and infinite cases?
- The problem of collective impact: why helping doesn’t do the trick
- Epistemic norms on evidence-gathering
- Resultant moral luck and the scope of moral responsibility
- The bases of truths
- Curry and context: truth and validity
- Risk-taking and tie-breaking
- “Grasping” Morality
- Epistemic Health, Epistemic Immunity and Epistemic Inoculation
- The weight of reasons
- The meta-grounding theory of powerful qualities
- Merely statistical evidence: when and why it justifies belief
- The iterative solution to paradoxes for propositions
- A new defense of Tarski’s solution to the liar paradox
- Justification and gradability
- Why fittingness is only sometimes demand-like
- A puzzle about moral responsibility
- Understanding blame
- Should expressivists go global?
- Against relationalism about modality
- Acceptance and the ethics of belief
- Moral Encroachment, Symmetry, and Believing Against the Evidence
- Conventions without knowledge of conformity
- The subtleties of fit: reassessing the fit-value biconditionals
- Good guesses as accuracy-specificity tradeoffs
- Guidance and mainstream epistemology
- Fragmentation, metalinguistic ignorance, and logical omniscience
- The many ‘oughts’ of deliberation
- Dispositional essentialism and the necessity of laws: a deflationary account
- Atoms, combs, syllables and organisms
- Precis of being rational and being right
- Desire and motivation in desire theories of well-being
- Meta-uncertainty and the proof paradoxes
- Branching actualism and cosmological arguments
- Open borders via natural resource egalitarianism: a failed route
- (Im)moral theorizing?
- Subject-matter and intensional operators I: conditional-agnostic analytic implication
- The procreation asymmetry asymmetry
- Russellian Physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong
- Resisting the epistemic argument for compatibilism
- Scepticism about epistemic blame
- The structure of moral encroachment
- Conventionalism and contingency in promissory powers
- Persons, Animals, and Psychological Unity
- Correction To: ‘Book Symposium: Julia Staffel’s Unsettled Thoughts’
- Why do people represent time as dynamical? An investigation of temporal dynamism and the open future
- Hybrid theories, psychological plausibility, and the human/animal divide
- Reply to Comesaña
- Robustly embodied imagination and the limits of perspective-taking
- Group agents, moral competence and duty-bearers: the update argument
- In defense of teleological intuitions
- Who’s afraid of reverse mereological essentialism?
- The independence solution to grue
- The Zhuangzi, creativity, and epistemic virtue
- Evidence, experience and decision
- Hornets, pelicans, bobcats, and identity: the problem of persistence of temporal abstract objects
- The problem of unarticulated truths
- The aesthetics of coming to know someone
- Intellectual courage and inquisitive reasons
- Correction to: Practical knowledge without practical expertise: the social cognitive extension via outsourcing
- Two conceptions of absolute generality
- Six questions for Professor Sturgeon
- On Plantation Politics: Citizenship and Antislavery Resistance in Douglass’s My Bondage and My Freedom
- Rationally irresolvable disagreement
- Persistence and Structure
- On Sturgeon’s “The rational Mind”
- Experientialism Unidealized
- Referential intentions and ordinary names in fiction
- Evidence and truth
- A Humean Non-Humeanism
- Strict dominance and symmetry
- Defending Moderate De Se Skepticism
- A new circularity in explanations by Humean laws of nature
- On group background beliefs
- Do good lives make good stories?
- Making desires satisfied, making satisfied desires
- Intentional action and knowledge-centered theories of control
- Responsibility, Free Will, and the Concept of Basic Desert
- The possibility of undistinguishedness
- External world scepticism and self scepticism
- Jadedness: A philosophical analysis
- Plural harm: plural problems
- Welfare comparisons within and across species
- Practical knowledge without practical expertise: the social cognitive extension via outsourcing
- Explaining Harm
- Moral principle explanations of supervenience
- Correction to: Embodied mind sparsism
- Manipulation, machine induction, and bypassing
- Valuable ignorance: delayed epistemic gratification
- Political etiquette
- Reasons for action: making a difference to the security of outcomes
- Why the manipulation argument fails: determinism does not entail perfect prediction
- Reasons-responsiveness, modality and rational blind spots
- Was evolution worth it?
- Acting for reasons and the metaphysics of time
- Supervenience, expressivism and theistic ethics
- Perceptual warrant and internal access
- Philosophical producers, philosophical consumers, and the metaphilosophical value of original texts
- Plumbing metaphysical explanatory depth
- Correction to: An acquaintance alternative to self-representationalism
- Expressivism about explanatory relevance
- It was not supposed to happen like that: blameworthiness, causal deviance and luck
- Handling rejection
- Work and social alienation
- Credence and belief
- Williamson on conditionals and testimony
- Consequentialism and our best selves
- An Acquaintance alternative to Self-Representationalism
- Sor juana dreams of freedom: some comments on Dr. Aspe
- Emotion and attention
- On being able to intend
- The mind-body problem and the color-body problem
- Dilemmatic gaslighting
- Assertion remains strong
- Degrees of incoherence, Dutch bookability & guidance value
- Reply to ‘attempts’: a non-davidsonian account of trying sentences
- Supersubstantivalism and vague location
- Agentive Duality reconsidered
- The medical model, with a human face
- Knowledge, individualised evidence and luck
- What do we see in pictures? The sensory individuals of picture perception
- Moral criticism, hypocrisy, and pragmatics
- Correction to: Second-order relations and nomic regularities
- Consistency, possibility, and Gödel: a reply to Pruss
- Can we outsource all the reasons?
- Constitutivism and cognitivism
- No Grounds for Fictionalism
- Correction to: On Believing Indirectly for Practical Reasons
- Correction to: Greatest surprise reduction semantics: an information theoretic solution to misrepresentation and disjunction
- Defense with dignity: how the dignity of violent resistance informs the Gun Rights Debate
- Are the folk utilitarian about animals?
- Mananas, flusses and jartles: belief ascriptions in light of peripheral concept variation
- People and Their Animal Companions: Navigating Moral Constraints in a Harmful, Yet Meaningful World
- Veritism and ways of deriving epistemic value
- The Nonconsequentialist Argument from Evil
- Second-order relations and nomic regularities
- Panpsychism and ensemble explanations
- Maladjustment
- Reconceptualizing solidarity as power from below
- Fittingness first?: Reasons to withhold belief
- The epistemic normativity of conjecture
- The harmony of grounding
- Malleable character: organizational behavior meets virtue ethics and situationism
- Paradox and context shift
- The IKEA effect and the production of epistemic goods
- The optionality of supererogatory acts is just what you think it is: a reply to Benn
- Rules of disengagement: a Kantian account of the relationship between former friends
- Against commitment
- Remarks on staffel on full belief
- When and why to empathize with political opponents
- Aesthetic Animism
- Coherence in Science: A Social Approach
- Kantianism for humans, utilitarianism for nonhumans? Yes and no
- Sensory fields: the visual and the bodily
- Intrinsicality and determinacy
- Replies to Fitelson and Konek
- Précis for Unsettled Thoughts
- Moral worth, right reasons and counterfactual motives
- Perceptual capacitism: an argument for disjunctive disunity
- Indeterminacy and collective harms
- Vague connectives
- The phenomenon objection to conceptual engineering
- Sparse Causation and Mere Abundant Causation
- Names vs nouns
- Lying: Knowledge or belief?
- Value-based accounts of normative powers and the wishful thinking objection
- Amodal completion and relationalism
- Contextology
- The case for egalitarian consciousness raising in higher education
- “Attributionism and degrees of Praiseworthiness”
- Three and a half ways to a hybrid view in animal ethics
- Egalitarian vs. Elitist Plenitude
- Definition
- Replies to Fratantonio and Lasonen-Aarnio; Goldberg; Greco; Kelp, Carter and Simion; Littlejohn; and Williamson
- Defeat, pluralism, and indispensable goods
- Imperative inference and practical rationality
- Who cares if we’re not fully real? Comments on Kris McDaniel’s The Fragmentation of Being
- Is ‘cause’ ambiguous?
- Fundamentality and minimalist grounding laws
- At least you tried: The value of De Dicto concern to do the right thing
- The moral value of feeling-with
- In defense of fact-only grounding
- How can you be so sure? Illusionism and the obviousness of phenomenal consciousness
- Seeing-as, seeing-o, and seeing-that
- When normal is normative: The ethical significance of conforming to reasonable expectations
- Halfway proportionality
- Agents of change: temporal flow and feeling oneself act
- That solution to Prior’s puzzle
- A justification for excuses: Brown’s discussion of the knowledge view of justification and the excuse manoeuvre
- Metaphysical Nihilism and Modal Logic
- The laws of modality
- The only ethical argument for positive δ? Partiality and pure time preference
- Genericity generalized
- Agnosticism as settled indecision
- In search of doxastic involuntarism
- On Cotnoir’s two notions of proper parthood
- How to be an infallibilist
- From the analogy of being to modes of being?
- Refuting two dilemmas for infallibilism
- Epistemic Blame and the New Evil Demon Problem
- The problem of mixed beings
- Précis of The Fragmentation of Being
- On the necessity of essence
- Structural causes of citation gaps
- Precis of fallibilism: evidence and knowledge
- Brown on infallibilism’s problem with testimony
- Self supporting evidence
- Deferentialism: Soames on legal interpretation
- In defense of Countabilism
- Ramified structure
- Still guilty
- Unrestricted quantification and ranges of significance
- Theorizing about evidence
- Aesthetic knowledge
- Flat mechanisms: a reductionist approach to levels in mechanistic explanations
- Normative concepts and the return to Eden
- Pluralities, counterparts, and groups
- Attitudes toward risk are complicated: experimental evidence for the re-individuation approach to risk-attitudes
- Belief in robust temporal passage (probably) does not explain future-bias
- Things dreamt: a response to Berislav Marusic
- Moral laws and moral worth
- Entrapment, temptation and virtue testing
- Quantum correlations and the explanatory power of radical metaphysical hypotheses
- Sellars on compatibilism and the consequence argument
- A pluralistic account of degrees of control in addiction
- Radical epistemology, structural explanations, and epistemic weaponry
- Responses to Herman Cappelen and Jennifer Nado
- Précis of philosophy within its proper bounds
- Group epistemic value
- Everything but the kitchen sink: how (not) to give a plenitudinarian solution to the paradox of flexible origin essentialism
- Philosophizing out of bounds
- Experimental philosophy without intuitions: an illustration of why it fails
- The diachronic threshold problem
- Wondering about the future
- Accuracy, probabilism, and the insufficiency of the alethic
- Correction to: Metaphysical analyticity and the epistemology of logic
- Too far beyond the call of duty: moral rationalism and weighing reasons
- Reasons, basing, and the normative collapse of logical pluralism
- Explanation and the A-theory
- Animal rights Pacifism
- Problems with purely pragmatic belief
- Dual processes, dual virtues
- Philosophy and its children: logic, computation, and the emergence of natural and social science
- Unjust combatants, special authority, and “transferred responsibility”
- Unrestricted quantification and extraordinary context dependence?
- Analytic anachronism in The world philosophy made
- Correction to: Oughts and ends
- Precis: the world philosophy made
- The hard problem of intertheoretic comparisons
- Correction to: The diachronic threshold problem
- Indicative conditionals: probabilities and relevance
- The procreative asymmetry and the impossibility of elusive permission
- A new principle of plural harm
- Correction to: Relief from rescue
- Ability, relevant possibilities, and the fixity of the past
- Respect and the reality of apparent reasons
- Categoricity by convention
- The fundamental reason for reasons fundamentalism
- A puzzle about enkratic reasoning
- Is higher-order evidence evidence?
- What decision theory can’t tell us about moral uncertainty
- One: but not the same
- Paradoxes of truth-in-context-X
- Nonconsensual neurocorrectives, bypassing, and free action
- What’s positive and negative about generics: a constrained indexical approach
- Noncognitivism and agent-centered norms
- Can redescriptions of outcomes salvage the axioms of decision theory?
- On believing indirectly for practical reasons
- Being and holding responsible: Reconciling the disputants through a meaning-based Strawsonian account
- One or two? A Process View of pregnancy
- Blaming friends
- Grounding and the luck objection to agent-causal libertarianism
- Correction to: Accuracy-dominance and conditionalization
- A heterodox defense of the actualist higher-order thought theory
- Building blocks for a cognitive science-led epistemology of arithmetic
- Supererogation and conditional obligation
- Is the brain an organ for free energy minimisation?
- Independent alternatives
- Real and ideal rationality
- What the doctor should do: perspectivist duties for objectivists about ought
- From relational equality to personal responsibility
- Précis of narrow content
- Thanks for being, loving, and believing
- Being in a position to know
- The essential superficiality of the voluntary and the moralization of psychology
- Paradoxes of validity
- The matter of motivating reasons
- Slurs under quotation
- Wanting what’s not best
- Knowledge is a mental state (at least sometimes)
- A Bayesian analysis of debunking arguments in ethics
- Knowledge from multiple experiences
- The problem of insignificant hands
- Qualitative properties and relations
- Global expressivism as global subjectivism
- The ethics of emergencies
- Correction to: Material scarcity and scalar justice
- Respecting the oppressed in the personal autonomy debate
- What it means to respect individuality
- The subject and its apparatus: are they ontological trash?
- What is involved in the primacy of metaphysics?
- Correction to: Regrettable beliefs
- Peacocke on magnitudes and numbers
- Cognitive penetration and informational encapsulation: Have we been failing the module?
- Saving the armchair by experiment: what works in economics doesn’t work in philosophy
- Frege and saving substitution
- The prospects of emotional dogmatism
- Correction to: Anaphora and negation
- An ability-based theory of responsibility for collective omissions
- Explaining value: on Orsi and Garcia’s explanatory objection to the fitting-attitude analysis
- The bodily-attitudinal theory of emotion
- Christopher Peacocke on the relationship between language and metaphysics
- Relief from Rescue
- Non-ideal prescriptions for the morally uncertain
- Bayesian sensitivity principles for evidence based knowledge
- The parallelism argument and the problem of moral luck
- Speciesism and tribalism: embarrassing origins
- How to modify the strength of a reason
- Moral rights without balancing
- Perceiving as knowing in the predictive mind
- Arbitrary grounding
- Living without microphysical supervenience
- Even if it might not be true, evidence cannot be false
- Normative principles and the nature of mind-dependence
- Emotions as modulators of desire
- Rational supererogation and epistemic permissivism
- Indeterminacy and reference: comments on Roads to Reference
- Presentism and times as propositions
- What if ideal advice conflicts? A dilemma for idealizing accounts of normative practical reasons
- A puzzle about accommodation and truth
- Quantifier variance, semantic collapse, and “genuine” quantifiers
- What is morality?
- There is no dilemma for conceptual engineering. Reply to Max Deutsch
- The incentives account of feasibility
- Correction to: Quasirealism as semantic dispensability
- Difference-making and deterministic chance
- Material scarcity and scalar justice
- Regrettable beliefs
- The transitivity of de jure coreference: a case against Pinillos
- Explicit nonconceptual metacognition
- Quasirealism as semantic dispensability
- Falsifying generic stereotypes
- Awful noises: evaluativism and the affective phenomenology of unpleasant auditory experience
- Roads to anti-descriptivism (about reference fixing): replies to Soames, Raatikainen, and Devitt
- Correction to: Avowals and the project of inferentialism
- On the (in)significance of Hume’s Law
- The ins and outs of conscious belief
- Moral judgment and the content-attitude distinction
- Précis of Roads to reference
- Anti-descriptivism 2.0
- The irrelevance of intentions to refer: demonstratives and demonstrations
- Adverbialism and objects
- Against (modified) buffer cases
- Believing on eggshells: epistemic injustice through pragmatic encroachment
- Attempts
- Luck egalitarianism without moral tyranny
- Knowledge of future contingents
- Punitive intent
- Laying ghosts to rest
- Setting the story straight: fictionalism about grounding
- Epistemology without guidance
- Metaphysical explanations and the counterfactual theory of explanation
- Legal proof and statistical conjunctions
- Infinite options, intransitive value, and supererogation
- Alienation or regress: on the non-inferential character of agential knowledge
- Perceptual transparency and the temporal structure of experience
- Two roles for reasons: Cause for divorce?
- Is the world a heap of quantum fragments?
- Rational monism and rational pluralism
- Infinite aggregation: expanded addition
- Russellian physicalism and its dilemma
- Centering the Principal Principle
- Public war and the requirement of legitimate authority
- Unification and mathematical explanation
- What’s wrong with epistemic trespassing?
- Are strikes extortionate?
- An impossibility result on methodological individualism
- Interpretative expressivism: A theory of normative belief
- The impossibility of a satisfactory population prospect axiology (independently of Finite Fine-Grainedness)
- The way things go: moral relativism and suspension of judgment
- Agential capacities: a capacity to guide
- The best thing about the deflationary theory of truth
- When do nudges undermine voluntary consent?
- Quantum indeterminacy and the double-slit experiment
- Reference and incomplete descriptions
- Thanks, We’re good: why moral realism is not morally objectionable
- Anaphora and negation
- Counterfactual theories of causation and the problem of large causes
- Identifying finite cardinal abstracts
- Invariance as a basis for necessity and laws
- On making a difference: towards a minimally non-trivial version of the identity of indiscernibles
- Reflections on Mirror Man
- Should explanation be a guide to ground?
- A simple theory of rigidity
- Narrative testimony
- Social kinds are essentially mind-dependent
- Correction to: Privacy rights and ‘naked’ statistical evidence
- What theoretical equivalence could not be
- Manipulation and liability to defensive harm
- Symmetry fundamentalism in quantum mechanics
- Superexplanations for counterfactual knowledge
- Unconscious perception and central coordinating agency
- Mental imagery: pulling the plug on perceptualism
- The phenomenology and metaphysics of the open future
- Power-ing up neo-aristotelian natural goodness
- Correction to: Reconsidering the dispositional essentialist canon
- Recognition trust
- Privacy rights and ‘naked’ statistical evidence
- Accuracy-dominance and conditionalization
- What’s so naïve about naïve realism?
- Against triggering accounts of robust reason-giving
- Being implicated: on the fittingness of guilt and indignation over outcomes
- Daylight savings: what an answer to the perceptual variation problem cannot be
- Why animalism matters
- Still the same dilemma for conceptual engineers: reply to Koch
- Responsibility and the ‘Pie Fallacy’
- Liability, culpability, and luck
- Two notions of fusion and the landscape of extensionality
- What is it to be located?
- ‘The moral irrelevance of moral coercion’
- Costly authority and transferred responsibility
- The Limits of Self-Effacement: A Reply to Wittwer
- Two grounds of liability
- Reflective Situated Normativity
- You say you want a revolution: two notions of probabilistic independence
- Reconsidering the Dispositional Essentialist Canon
- The concept of responsibility in the ethics of self-defense and war
- An intrapersonal, intertemporal solution to an interpersonal dilemma
- Modal paradox II: essence and coherence
- Blur and interoceptive vision
- The normality of error
- Illusory attitudes and the playful stoic
- The epistemic status of the imagination
- Function essentialism about artifacts
- Inquiry and the epistemic
- Abstraction without exceptions
- Inflated effect sizes and underpowered tests: how the severity measure of evidence is affected by the winner’s curse
- What is a relational virtue?
- Illusionism and definitions of phenomenal consciousness
- A dilemma for evolutionary debunking arguments
- Moral motivation and the affective appeal
- Realism and the logic of conceivability
- Dynamic consistency in the logic of decision
- Transformative experience and the shark problem
- How to be a deontic buck-passer
- Moral encroachment and reasons of the wrong kind
- A puzzle about rates of change
- Mathematical surrealism as an alternative to easy-road fictionalism
- Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief
- Moral responsibility and manipulation: on a novel argument against historicism
- Ontological commitment and ontological commitment s
- That -clauses and propositional anaphors
- Reasonable expectations, moral responsibility, and empirical data
- Middle ground on liability for costs?
- Sentimental perceptualism and the challenge from cognitive bases
- Consequentialism and the causal efficacy of the moral
- Moral error theory, explanatory dispensability and the limits of guilt
- Famine, affluence, and philosophers’ biases
- Real world theory, complacency, and aspiration
- Aphantasia, imagination and dreaming
- Just because it’s a phobia doesn’t mean you shouldn’t be afraid
- Précis of the primacy of metaphysics
- Akratic (epistemic) modesty
- Objective falsity is essential to lying: an argument from convergent evidence
- Frege’s puzzle and the ex ante Pareto principle
- Correction to: Thanks, We’re good: why moral realism is not morally objectionable
- The intoxicating effects of conciliatory omniscience
- Precis of Utopophobia: on the limits (if any) of political philosophy
- The possibility of wildly unrealistic justice and the principle/proposal distinction
- A solution to the many attitudes problem
- A fixed-population problem for the person-affecting restriction
- No escape from Allais: reply to Buchak
- Tipper is ready but he is not strong enough: minimal proposition, question under discussion, and what is said
- Are thought experiments “disturbing”? The case of armchair physics
- Classical recapture and maximality
- A pluralist account of the basis of moral status
- Graded epistemic justification
- Uttering Moorean Sentences and the pragmatics of belief reports
- The overlap problem
- The many-property problem is your problem, too
- The curious case of spacetime emergence
- Hume’s theory of justice and Vanderschraaf’s vulnerablity objection
- Illocutionary harm
- Convention, correlation and consistency
- Realizing race
- Debunking arguments and metaphysical laws
- Epistemic injustice and deepened disagreement
- Is mutual advantage a general theory of justice? More domain worries
- Avowals and the project of inferentialism
- Escaping the natural attitude about gender
- Are Gettier cases disturbing?
- Precis of Strategic justice: convention and problems of balancing divergent interests
- Physicalism without supervenience
- The psychological speciesism of humanism
- Reliabilism and imprecise credences
- Explanatory priority monism
- To lie or to mislead?
- Explaining essences
- Tamers, deniers, and me
- The theory of games as a tool for the social epistemologist
- Skepticism and the principle of sufficient reason
- From theism to idealism to monism: a Leibnizian road not taken
- Explaining contingent facts
- “Do identity and distinctness facts threaten the PSR?”
- Revisionist reporting
- The fundamental and the brute
- Could a middle level be the most fundamental?
- The explanation of logical theorems and reductive truthmakers
- When Lingens meets Frege: communication without common ground
- The governance of laws of nature: guidance and production
- Cultural appropriation and aesthetic normativity
- The self-effacing functionality of blame
- Disability: a justice-based account
- Taste, traits, and tendencies
- From the fixity of the past to the fixity of the independent
- Interspecies justice: agency, self-determination, and assent
- The explanatory objection to the fitting attitude analysis of value
- Misinformation, subjectivism, and the rational criticizability of desire
- How Humeans can make normative beliefs motivating
- “What do we epistemically owe to each other? A reply to Basu”
- An honest look at hybrid theories of pleasure
- Intrinsicality and the classification of uninstantiable properties
- Attitudinal strength as distance to withholding
- The experience requirement on well-being
- Circular and question-begging responses to religious disagreement and debunking arguments
- Sensitivity, safety, and impossible worlds
- Exploding stories and the limits of fiction
- Correction to: Immunity, thought insertion, and the first-person concept
- Imagining stories: attitudes and operators
- A note on deterministic updating and van Fraassen’s symmetry argument for conditionalization
- Don’t make a fetish of faults: a vindication of moral luck
- Explanation impossible
- Breaking the explanatory circle
- Normative disagreement: a functional account for inferentialists
- Responsibility for testimonial injustice
- Scaffolded practical knowledge: a problem for intellectualism
- Permissivism, Margin-for-Error, and Dominance
- A puzzle about Moorean metaphysics
- Thick credence and pragmatic encroachment
- Indefinite extensibility and the principle of sufficient reason
- Belief gambles in epistemic decision theory
- Counterfactuals, counteractuals, and free choice
- Rational requirements for suspended judgment
- Correction to: Transformative experience and the shark problem
- The psychological basis of collective action
- Normative metaphysics for accountants
- Can time flow at different rates? The differential passage of A-ness
- Dynamic absolutism and qualitative change
- The variation problem
- Color and a priori knowledge
- Double-counting and the problem of the many
- The sentience argument for experientialism about welfare
- In defense of exclusionary reasons
- Demystifying metaphor: a strategy for literal paraphrase
- Quinean predicativism
- Naturalism and normative cognition
- Reasons to act, reasons to require, and the two-level theory of moral explanation
- Aboutness and ontology: a modest approach to truthmakers
- The varieties of impartiality, or, would an egalitarian endorse the veil?
- Retraction and testimonial justification: a new problem for the assurance view
- How should we accommodate our future misbehavior? The answer turns on how bad it will be
- Immunity, thought insertion, and the first-person concept
- Speaker’s reference, stipulation, and a dilemma for conceptual engineers
- Correction to: The structure of epistemic probabilities
- Individuation and explanation: a problem for dispositionalism
- Surviving, to some degree
- Contractualism and the paradox of deontology
- Are women adult human females?
- The limits of perceptual phenomenal content
- Talking about appearances: the roles of evaluation and experience in disagreement
- Just too different: normative properties and natural properties
- Yablo on subject-matter
- Fixing pornography’s illocutionary force: Which context matters?
- Are the categorical laws of ontology metaphysically contingent?
- Two-state solution to the lottery paradox
- Can we end the feminist ‘sex wars’ now? Comments on Linda Martín Alcoff, Rape and resistance: Understanding the complexities of sexual violation
- Correction to: Variations on intra-theoretical logical pluralism: internal versus external consequence
- What the forms are not: Plato on conceptualism in Parmenides 132b–c
- Blameworthiness and constitutive control
- Contingency inattention: against causal debunking in ethics
- Does my total evidence support that I’m a Boltzmann Brain?
- Theories as recipes: third-order virtue and vice
- Survivor experience and the norm of self-making: comments on Rape and Resistance
- In whose interests? A response to Aaron Zimmerman’s Belief: A Pragmatic Picture
- The metaphysics of intersectionality
- Don’t know, don’t care?
- Epistemically blameworthy belief
- Does gratitude to R for ϕ-ing imply gratitude that R ϕ-ed?
- The structure of epistemic probabilities
- In defense of a pragmatic picture of belief
- Assimilation and control: belief at the lowest levels
- Decolonizing the demarcation of the ethical
- Why Ockham’s Razor should be preferred to the Laser
- Alcoff’s Rape and Resistance : A Précis
- Counterfactuals versus conceivability as a guide to modal knowledge
- Minimal disturbance: in defence of pragmatic reasons of the right kind
- Structural problems for reductionism
- The epistemic impact of theorizing: generation bias implies evaluation bias
- Why horizontalism
- Moral luck and the unfairness of morality
- Replies to Niko Kolodny, Debra Satz, and Steven Wall
- Why equality of treatment and opportunity might matter
- The morality of creating and eliminating duties
- Diversity, stability, and social contract theory
- Precis of why does inequality matter?
- Accountability and the thoughts in reactive attitudes
- Knowledge-yielding communication
- Pleonastic propositions and de re belief
- What is conditionalization, and why should we do it?
- The relation between subjects and their conscious experiences
- Grounding at a distance
- Disagreement about logic from a pluralist perspective
- Debugging the case for creationism
- Evidentialism in action
- Belief’s minimal rationality
- No hope for the Irrelevance Claim
- Frankfurt cases and the Newcomb Problem
- Olfactory imagery: is exactly what it smells like
- Grounding-based formulations of legal positivism
- How to balance Balanced Reporting and Reliable Reporting
- An objection of varying importance to epistemic utility theory
- The sense of temporal flow: a higher-order account
- ‘Ought’-contextualism beyond the parochial
- Operator arguments revisited
- Essence and logical properties
- Jeffrey conditionalization: proceed with caution
- Correction to: Teleological epistemology
- Equality, political fairness and desert
- Two solutions to the neural discernment problem
- Scanlon on the diversity of objections to inequality
- Quantum metaphysical indeterminacy
- Statistics and suspension
- We talk to people, not contexts
- Imprecise evidence without imprecise credences
- Epistemology and the law: why there is no epistemic mileage in legal cases
- Self-deception and selectivity
- The fundamental: Ungrounded or all-grounding?
- Experimental ethics, intuitions, and morally irrelevant factors
- A puzzle about seeing for representationalism
- The recognition of nothingness
- Prioritizing Platonism
- Epistemic akrasia and higher-order beliefs
- The puzzles of ground
- Perdurantism, fecklessness and the veil of ignorance
- Art and achievement
- Greatest surprise reduction semantics: an information theoretic solution to misrepresentation and disjunction
- Requirements of intention in light of belief
- Betterness of permissibility
- On behalf of a bi-level account of trust
- Material through and through
- Conjoined twinning & biological individuation
- The good of today depends not on the good of tomorrow: a constraint on theories of well-being
- The fitting resolution of anger
- Weighing epistemic and practical reasons for belief
- A defense of the very idea of moral deference pessimism
- Is epistemic circularity a fallacy?
- Two Strawsonian strategies for accounting for morally responsible agency
- Manipulation and constitutive luck
- Moore, Brentano, and Scanlon: a defense of indefinability
- Mereology and time travel
- Perl and Schroeder’s presuppositional error theory
- In defense of the possibilism–actualism distinction
- Moore’s proof, theory-ladenness of perception, and many proofs
- A note on Dasgupta’s Generalism
- Set-theoretic pluralism and the Benacerraf problem
- Explaining identity and distinctness
- Science, substance and spatial appearances
- Experimental philosophy and the fruitfulness of normative concepts
- Bad bootstrapping: the problem with third-factor replies to the Darwinian Dilemma for moral realism
- Temporal existence and temporal location
- The existence of personites
- A new argument for the phenomenal approach to personal persistence
- Soames on ethics: A new vision for the future of analytic philosophy?
- Draining the pond: why Singer’s defense of the duty to aid the world’s poor is self-defeating
- Getting what you want
- Semantic dispositionalism without exceptions
- Two theories of group agency
- The agential perspective: a hard-line reply to the four-case manipulation argument
- Explanationism provides the best explanation of the epistemic significance of peer disagreement
- Implicit bias and social schema: a transactive memory approach
- Metaphysically explanatory unification
- The logic of probabilistic knowledge
- Peer disagreement and counter-examples
- Animals and the agency account of moral status
- Vehicle-representationalism and hallucination
- Do constitutive norms on belief explain Moore’s Paradox?
- The analytic tradition in philosophy: volume 2—a new vision
- Causation in terms of production
- Justification, knowledge, and normality
- Some highs and lows of hylomorphism: on a paradox about property abstraction
- The richness of our tradition: replies to Preston, Gomez-Torrente, and Hanks
- The imagination model of implicit bias
- Defending truth values for indicative conditionals
- Harming and failing to benefit: a reply to purves
- Promises as invitations to trust
- Global obligations, collective capacities, and ‘ought implies can’
- Soames on the Tractatus
- Unknown pleasures
- Soames on the logical empiricists on truth, meaning, convention, and logical truth
- A strike against a striking principle
- Distinctive duress
- Correction to: The irreducibility of collective obligations
- What it takes to believe
- Supertasks and arithmetical truth
- What is a slur?
- Attending to blame
- Sex crimes and misdemeanours
- Should we be dogmatically conciliatory?
- Representing credal imprecision: from sets of measures to hierarchical Bayesian models
- What’s new in the new ideology critique?
- What is the point of helping?
- Epistemic perceptualism, skill and the regress problem
- The transparent failure of norms to keep up standards of belief
- Explaining historical moral convergence: the empirical case against realist intuitionism
- Attributing error without taking a stand
- The audience in shame
- Value ascriptions: rethinking cognitivism
- The radical account of bare plural generics
- Is there a supervenience problem for robust moral realism?
- Moral supervenience and distinctness: comments on Dreier
- Motivating propositional gratitude
- Evaluative predicates as classificatory devices?
- Moral perception, inference, and intuition
- Deceiving without answering
- Options must be external
- The irreducibility of collective obligations
- Individuating quantities
- A response to Chisholm’s paradox
- A dilemma for non-naturalists: irrationality or immorality?
- Cognitive self-management requires the phenomenal registration of intrinsic state properties
- Conspiracy theories, impostor syndrome, and distrust
- The problems of transformative experience
- Immoral realism
- Sense, reference and substitution
- A second-order intervention
- What we epistemically owe to each other
- Humble trust
- Precis: Enactivist Interventions
- Trust, distrust, and affective looping
- The identity of experiences and the identity of the subject
- Re-doing the math: making enactivism add up
- Cultural appropriation and the intimacy of groups
- Enactivism, pragmatism…behaviorism?
- Replies to Barrett, Corris and Chemero, and Hutto
- The ordinary language argument against skepticism—pragmatized
- Utilitarianism about animals and the moral significance of use
- Cultural appropriation and oppression
- Revenge is sweet
- What we can do
- Interactionism for the discerning mind?
- Ground grounded
- Interpretivism and norms
- Desperately seeking sourcehood
- Theorizing about truth outside of one’s own language
- Evidence and rationalization
- Variations on intra-theoretical logical pluralism: internal versus external consequence
- Why can’t I change Bruckner’s Eighth Symphony ?
- Substitution in a sense
- The semantic plights of the ante-rem structuralist
- Philosophers should prefer simpler theories
- Material objects and essential bundle theory
- Scalar consequentialism the right way
- Quantum monism: an assessment
- A critical assessment of Pereboom’s Frankfurt-style example
- Direct perception and the predictive mind
- Intentions and instability: a defence of causal decision theory
- Viewing-as explanations and ontic dependence
- Vigilance and control
- The dispositional account of credence
- Correction to: The varieties of impartiality, or, would an egalitarian endorse the veil?
- Enkrasia or evidentialism? Learning to love mismatch
- An axiomatic approach to axiological uncertainty
- Locke, Nozick and the state of nature
- Why purists should be infallibilists
- Meaning, moral realism, and the importance of morality
- Moral conflict and the logic of rights
- Conservative deflationism?
- Epistemic dilemmas and rational indeterminacy
- What’s wrong with vote buying
- Can expressivism have it all?
- Explaining enkratic asymmetries: knowledge-first style
- Against predicativism about names
- Correction to: The fitting attitudes analysis of value: an explanatory challenge
- Demonstratives, definite descriptions and non-redundancy
- Grounding the normative: a problem for structured non-naturalism
- Complicity and the responsibility dilemma
- Are epistemic reasons perspective-dependent?
- Factive knowability and the problem of possible omniscience
- Freedom, self-prediction, and the possibility of time travel
- On the fragmentalist interpretation of special relativity
- Priority monism, dependence and fundamentality
- The fitting attitudes analysis of value: an explanatory challenge
- Joint know-how
- Implicit attitudes and the ability argument
- Measuring the hedonimeter
- The demon that makes us go mental: mentalism defended
- Propositions on the cheap
- Panpsychism, intuitions, and the great chain of being
- Tragedy and the constancy of norms: towards an Anscombian conception of ‘ought’
- Towards a semantics for metanormative constructivism
- Can probability theory explain why closure is both intuitive and prone to counterexamples?
- Defending stance voluntarism
- Being realistic about motivation
- Compartmentalized knowledge
- Normalcy, justification, and the easy-defeat problem
- Against the iterative conception of set
- Understanding as compression
- In defense of unfair compromises
- On snubbing proximal intentions
- How race travels: relating local and global ontologies of race
- It only takes two to tango: against grounding morality in interaction
- Preferences, reasoning errors, and resource egalitarianism
- Aboutness in imagination
- Appropriate emotions and the metaphysics of time
- In defence of single-premise closure
- Strange-but-true: a (quick) new argument for contextualism about ‘know’
- Prudence and past selves
- A weak symmetry condition for probabilistic measures of confirmation
- Responsibility and the limits of good and evil
- Harming as making worse off
- Humean laws, explanatory circularity, and the aim of scientific explanation
- Non-branching personal persistence
- Talking our way to systematicity
- On representationalism, common-factorism, and whether consciousness is here and now
- We cannot infer by accepting testimony
- In defence of utterly indiscernible entities
- Modal epistemology made concrete
- Correction to: Rational social and political polarization
- Perpetuating the patriarchy: misogyny and (post-)feminist backlash
- Empirical moral rationalism and the social constitution of normativity
- When and why is it disrespectful to excuse an attitude?
- Belief and credence: why the attitude-type matters
- The wrongs of racist beliefs
- Fish and microchips: on fish pain and multiple realization
- Julius Caesar and the numbers
- Impossible obligations and the non-identity problem
- The Identity-Enactment Account of associative duties
- Semantic self-knowledge and the vat argument
- Where are virtues?
- Rational social and political polarization
- Why not be a desertist?
- Descriptions and non-doxastic attitude ascriptions
- The objects of moral responsibility
- Erratum to: New data on the representation of women in philosophy journals: 2004–2015
- Does reliabilism have a temporality problem?
- Against epistemic partiality in friendship: value-reflecting reasons
- Higher order ignorance inside the margins
- Précis of The Boundary Stones of Thought
- Reply to Crispin Wright and Richard Zach
- Weak speech reports
- Moral pickles, moral dilemmas, and the obligation preface paradox
- Naïve realism: a simple approach
- Flexible occurrent control
- How high the sky? Rumfitt on the (putative) indeterminacy of the set-theoretic universe
- Imprecise lexical superiority and the (slightly less) Repugnant Conclusion
- The epistemic significance of political disagreement
- Rumfitt on truth-grounds, negation, and vagueness
- Evans on transparency: a rationalist account
- Against reductive ethical naturalism
- Second best epistemology: fallibility and normativity
- The myth of the myth of supervenience