- EPI volume 19 issue 3 Cover and Back matter
- EPI volume 19 issue 3 Cover and Front matter
- EPI volume 19 issue 2 Cover and Front matter
- EPI volume 19 issue 2 Cover and Back matter
- EPI volume 19 issue 1 Cover and Front matter
- EPI volume 19 issue 1 Cover and Back matter
- EPI volume 18 issue 4 Cover and Front matter
- EPI volume 18 issue 4 Cover and Back matter
- EPI volume 18 issue 3 Cover and Front matter
- EPI volume 18 issue 3 Cover and Back matter
- Coherence as Competence
- The Interested Expert Problem and the Epistemology of Juries
- From Impossibility to Evidentialism?
- The Paradox of Empathy
- Normative Principles are Synthetic A Priori
- Dr Livingstone, I Presume?
- Preemptive Authority: The Challenge From Outrageous Expert Judgments
- EPI volume 18 issue 2 Cover and Back matter
- EPI volume 18 issue 2 Cover and Front matter
- EPI volume 18 issue 1 Cover and Back matter
- EPI volume 18 issue 1 Cover and Front matter
- EPI volume 17 issue 4 Cover and Back matter
- EPI volume 17 issue 4 Cover and Front matter
- Speak No Evil: Understanding Hermeneutical (In)justice
- Wrongful ways to raise the epistemic standard
- How Racial Injustice Undermines News Sources and News-Based Inferences
- Epistemic Dependence and Oppression: A Telling Relationship
- Echo Chambers and Audio Signal Processing
- No Epistemic Norm or Aim Needed
- EPI volume 17 issue 3 Cover and Front matter
- EPI volume 17 issue 3 Cover and Back matter
- Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Value of Presence
- Deep Disagreement, Hinge Commitments, and Intellectual Humility
- Reconsidering the Rule of Consideration: Probabilistic Knowledge and Legal Proof
- Williamson on Defining Knowledge
- In Defence of Non-Ideal Political Deference
- The Bias Paradox: Are Standpoint Epistemologies Self-contradictory?
- What is the Function of Reasoning? On Mercier and Sperber’s Argumentative and Justificatory Theories
- Are There Any Epistemic Consequentialists?
- Explanatory Obligations
- Agent Reliabilism and Inferential Knowledge from Gettiered Belief
- Social Epistemic Normativity: The Program
- Knowledge is Believing Something Because It’s True
- EPI volume 17 issue 2 Cover and Back matter
- EPI volume 17 issue 2 Cover and Front matter
- William James on Risk, Efficacy, and Evidentialism
- Is Conspiracy Theorizing Really Epistemically Problematic?
- Appraising the Epistemic Performance of Social Systems: The Case of Think Tank Evaluations
- Assertions, Handicaps, and Social Norms
- The Case for Modelled Democracy
- The Gift of Testimony
- Are Epistemic Norms Fundamentally Social Norms?
- Toward a Lockean Unification of Formal and Traditional Epistemology
- An Interactionist Approach to Cognitive Debiasing
- The Ontogenetic Foundations of Epistemic Norms
- Demarginalizing Standpoint Epistemology
- A Probabilistic Approach to Epistemic Safety from the Perspective of Ascribers
- EPI volume 17 issue 1 Cover and Back matter
- EPI volume 17 issue 1 Cover and Front matter
- The Threshold Problem, the Cluster Account, and the Significance of Knowledge
- Prime Cuts and the Method of Recombination
- How Intellectual Communities Progress
- The Priority of the Epistemic
- Finding Closure for Safety
- Polycentric Limited Epistocracy: Political Expertise and the Wiki-Model
- Conspiracy Theories and Religion: Reframing Conspiracy Theories as Bliks
- EPI volume 16 issue 4 Cover and Back matter
- EPI volume 16 issue 4 Cover and Front matter
- The Arbitrariness Objection Against Permissivism
- A Defence of Lichtenberg
- Direct Inference, Reichenbach’s Principle, and the Sleeping Beauty Problem
- When Evidence Isn’t Enough: Suspension, Evidentialism, and Knowledge-first Virtue Epistemology
- Esoteric Reliabilism
- How to get Certain Knowledge from Fallible Justification
- Reflection and Security
- Easy Knowledge, Circularity, and the Puzzle of Reliability Knowledge
- Aiming at Aptness
- Recognizing Levels of Justification: To Add or to Subtract
- Knowing Full Well from Testimony?
- Suspension as Spandrel
- The Epistemology of Disagreement: Why Not Bayesianism?
- One More Twist ~ Knowledge How and Ability
- Imagination Cannot Justify Empirical Belief
- Entitlement, Epistemic Risk, and Scepticism
- Epistemic Existentialism
- Shared Epistemic Responsibility
- The Myth of Stochastic Infallibilism
- Reflective Access, Closure, and Epistemological Disjunctivism
- The Stability of Philosophical Intuitions: Failed Replications of Swain et al. (2008)
- EPI volume 16 issue 3 Cover and Front matter
- EPI volume 16 issue 3 Cover and Back matter
- A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism
- A Corpus Study of “Know”: On The Verification of Philosophers’ Frequency Claims about Language
- In Pursuit of the Non-Trivial
- Achievement and the Value of Knowledge
- Rejecting the New Statistical Solution to the Generality Problem
- Why Disagreement-Based Skepticism cannot Escape the Challenge of Self-Defeat
- Against epistemic pessimism about moral testimony
- EPI volume 16 issue 2 Cover and Front matter
- EPI volume 16 issue 2 Cover and Back matter
- Educating for Intellectual Virtue: A Critique from Action Guidance
- The Reliability of Memory: An Argument from the Armchair
- Semantic Awareness for Skeptical Pragmatic Invariantism
- Epistemic Objectification as the Primary Harm of Testimonial Injustice
- DISAGREEMENT AND EASY BOOTSTRAPPING
- TWO QUESTIONS, ONE ANSWER: UNAMBIGUOUS RATIONALITY
- THREE THINGS TO DO WITH KNOWLEDGE ASCRIPTIONS
- THE NO FREE LUNCH THEOREM: BAD NEWS FOR (WHITE’S ACCOUNT OF) THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION
- DOXASTIC RESPONSIBILITY, GUIDANCE CONTROL, AND OWNERSHIP OF BELIEF
- BELIEFS OVER AVOWALS: SETTING UP THE DISCOURSE ON SELF-KNOWLEDGE
- THE META-INDUCTIVE JUSTIFICATION OF INDUCTION
- EPI volume 16 issue 1 Cover and Front matter
- EPI volume 16 issue 1 Cover and Back matter
- DOXASTICISM: BELIEF AND THE INFORMATION-RESPONSIVENESS OF MIND
- EXPERTISE AND AUTHORITY
- RE-EVALUATING THE CREDIBILITY OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: THE MISINFORMATION EFFECT AND THE OVERCRITICAL JUROR
- REPRESENTATION IN MODELS OF EPISTEMIC DEMOCRACY
- INABILITY AND OBLIGATION IN INTELLECTUAL EVALUATION
- THE RIGHT SIDE OF HISTORY AND HIGHER-ORDER EVIDENCE
- EPISTEMIC INTERNALISM AND TESTIMONIAL JUSTIFICATION
- WHAT IS JUSTIFIED CREDENCE?
- EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM: NEO-WITTGENSTEINIAN AND MODERATE NEO-MOOREAN
- IMPROVING DELIBERATIONS BY REDUCING MISREPRESENTATION EFFECTS
- LOOKING BEYOND REDUCTIONISM AND ANTI-REDUCTIONISM
- SUBJECT-SENSITIVE INVARIANTISM, HIGH-STAKES/LOW-STAKES CASES, AND PRESUPPOSITION SUSPENSION
- CONTEXTUALISM AND THE AMBIGUITY THEORY OF ‘KNOWS’
- PROPOSITIONAL LEARNING: FROM IGNORANCE TO KNOWLEDGE
- THE IRRATIONALITY OF PLURALISTIC IGNORANCE
- CHILDREN AND TESTIMONIAL INJUSTICE: A RESPONSE TO BURROUGHS AND TOLLEFSEN
- EPI volume 15 issue 4 Cover and Back matter
- EPI volume 15 issue 4 Cover and Front matter
- ECHO CHAMBERS AND EPISTEMIC BUBBLES
- FAITH AND EPISTEMOLOGY
- IS TRUE BELIEF REALLY A FUNDAMENTAL EPISTEMIC VALUE?
- EPI volume 15 issue 3 Cover and Front matter
- EPI volume 15 issue 3 Cover and Back matter
- THE VIRTUE OF CURIOSITY
- REAL WORLD PROBLEMS
- EVIDENCE, COHERENCE AND EPISTEMIC AKRASIA
- RATIONAL STABILITY UNDER PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT
- ARROGANCE, TRUTH AND PUBLIC DISCOURSE
- ON PROVIDING EVIDENCE
- INTERESTS, EVIDENCE AND GAMES
- CLOSED-MINDEDNESS AND DOGMATISM
- NEW WORDS FOR OLD WRONGS
- DELIBERATIONALLY USELESS CONDITIONALS
- MEDICAL MECHANISMS AND THE RESILIENCE OF PROBABILITIES
- INTRASPECIES IMPERMISSIVISM
- NO KNOWLEDGE REQUIRED
- ENVIRONMENTAL LUCK AND THE STRUCTURE OF UNDERSTANDING
- A PUZZLE ABOUT EXPERTS, EVIDENTIAL SCREENING-OFF AND CONDITIONALIZATION
- NO SAFE HAVEN FOR THE VIRTUOUS
- EPI volume 15 issue 2 Cover and Front matter
- EPI volume 15 issue 2 Cover and Back matter
- JUSTIFIED GROUP BELIEF IS EVIDENTIALLY RESPONSIBLE GROUP BELIEF
- EPISTEMIC AKRASIA AND EPISTEMIC REASONS
- SITUATING FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY
- CAN THE LOTTERY PARADOX BE SOLVED BY IDENTIFYING EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION WITH EPISTEMIC PERMISSIBILITY?
- EPISTEMIC CORRUPTION AND EDUCATION
- ON A NO DEFEAT EVIDENCE PRINCIPLE OF TAL AND COMESAÑA
- EPI volume 15 issue 1 Cover and Front matter
- EPI volume 15 issue 1 Cover and Back matter
- PUBLIC REASON’S CHAOS THEOREM
- HOW TO SOLVE HUME’S PROBLEM OF INDUCTION
- INTERSUBJECTIVE BELIEF
- INFINITISM AND SCEPTICISM
- IT’S OK TO MAKE MISTAKES: AGAINST THE FIXED POINT THESIS
- AGENTIAL INSENSITIVITY AND SOCIALLY SUPPORTED IGNORANCE
- AGAINST THE ITERATED KNOWLEDGE ACCOUNT OF HIGH-STAKES CASES
- BRAINS IN VATS? DON’T BOTHER!
- EVIDENCE AND FALLIBILITY
- BOTTOM UP JUSTIFICATION, ASYMMETRIC EPISTEMIC PUSH, AND THE FRAGILITY OF HIGHER ORDER JUSTIFICATION
- HOPE FOR INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY
- COULD KNOWLEDGE-TALK BE LARGELY NON-LITERAL?
- IS EVIDENCE OF EVIDENCE EVIDENCE? SCREENING-OFF VS. NO-DEFEATERS
- TESTIMONY, RECOVERY AND PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY: A RESPONSE TO PEET
- EXPERT-ORIENTED ABILITIES VS. NOVICE-ORIENTED ABILITIES: AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT OF EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY
- MYSTERY AND THE EVIDENTIAL IMPACT OF UNEXPLAINABLES
- THE INSTABILITY OF JOHN RAWLS’S “STABILITY FOR THE RIGHT REASONS”
- LIMITED EPISTOCRACY AND POLITICAL INCLUSION
- SECRECY AND CONSPIRACY
- A HIGHER-ORDER APPROACH TO DISAGREEMENT
- A NEW STATISTICAL SOLUTION TO THE GENERALITY PROBLEM
- WHY NOT ALL EVIDENCE IS SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
- FOOL ME ONCE: CAN INDIFFERENCE VINDICATE INDUCTION?
- KNOWLEDGE-HOW: INTERROGATIVES AND FREE RELATIVES
- A DILEMMA FOR THE KNOWLEDGE DESPITE FALSEHOOD STRATEGY
- C. I. LEWIS AND THE BENACERRAF PROBLEM
- AN EXPLANATORY CHALLENGE FOR EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM
- SELF-REGULATION AND KNOWLEDGE HOW
- CONCILIATIONISM AND MORAL SPINELESSNESS
- INDEPENDENCE AND NEW WAYS TO REMAIN STEADFAST IN THE FACE OF DISAGREEMENT
- FOLK ATTRIBUTIONS OF UNDERSTANDING: IS THERE A ROLE FOR EPISTEMIC LUCK?
- HOW TO INSULT AND COMPLIMENT A TESTIFIER
- ACCESSIBILISM DEFINED