- Adaptive abilities
- Freedom, foreknowledge, and betting
- Practical understanding
- Freedom, moral responsibility, and the failure of universal defeat
- A timid response to the consequence argument
- Reasons‐responsiveness, control and the negligence puzzle
- Free will and self expression: A compatibilist garden of forking paths
- Responsibility and iterated knowledge
- Practical reasons to believe, epistemic reasons to act, and the baffled action theorist
- Incompatibilism and the garden of forking paths
- Epistemic control without voluntarism
- “Free will” is vague
- Determination from Above
- From responsibility to causation: The intransitivity of causation as a case study
- Agency and responsibility: The personal and the political
- Why history matters for moral responsibility: Evaluating history‐sensitive structuralism
- A new solution to the problem of luck
- Higher‐order omissions and the stacked view of agency
- It would be bad if compatibilism were true; therefore, it isn’t
- Flickering the W‐Defense
- I didn’t think of that
- Libertarianism and agentive experience
- Agency: Let’s mind what’s fundamental
- List for Epistemology volume
- Public artifacts and the epistemology of collective material testimony
- Valuable and pernicious collective intellectual self‐trust1
- On the Independence of belief and credence
- TRUST AS PERFORMANCE
- Responsibility in epistemic collaborations: Is it me, is it the group or are we all to blame?
- Radical Internalism
- Epistemic bootstrapping as a failure to use an independent source
- Socio‐Functional Foundations In Science: The Case Of Measurement
- Collective practical Knowledge is a Fragmented Interrogative capacity
- Group‐deliberative competences and group knowledge
- Outlaw epistemologies: Resisting the viciousness of country music’s settler ignorance
- Scaffolding Knowledge
- Belief as emotion
- Collective and extended knowledge
- Epistemic institutions: A joint epistemic action‐based account
- Challenging the ability intuition: From personal to extended to distributed belief‐forming processes
- Group agential epistemic injustice: Epistemic disempowerment and critical defanging of group epistemic agency
- Defeat and proficiencies
- Knowing failably and Moorean assertions
- Understanding phenomena: From social to collective?
- Why group mental states are not exhaustively determined by member states
- Skepticism, Naturalism, Pyrrhonism
- Towards an epistemology of cultural learning
- Group evidence
- List for Law and Epistemology volume
- Norms of criminal conviction
- Opacity of Character: Virtue Ethics and the Legal Admissibility of Character Evidence
- Statistical evidence and incentives in the law
- Toward a normative theory of parole grounded in agency
- Pragmatic encroachment and legal proof
- Eleven angry men
- Epistemic ambivalence in law
- Rethinking the wrong of rape1
- The pragmatist school in analytic jurisprudence
- Justification, excuse, and proof beyond reasonable doubt
- Proof Paradoxes, Agency, and Stereotyping
- Standards and values
- Grounding legal proof
- A probabilistic analysis of cross‐examination using Bayesian networks
- Political action, epistemic detachment, and the problem of white‐mindedness
- The state’s right to evidence and duties of citizenship
- Realizing the value of public input: Mini‐public consultation on agency rulemaking1
- Does legal epistemology rest on a mistake? On fetishism, two‐tier system design, and conscientious fact‐finding
- Justice in epistemic gaps: The ‘proof paradox’ revisited
- Rigidity, symmetry and defeasibility: On Weisberg’s puzzle for perceptual justification
- Rigidity, symmetry and defeasibility: On weisberg’s puzzle for perceptual justification
- Naive realism, representationalism, and the rationalizing role of visual perception
- The puzzle of the laws of appearance
- Adam Marushak on the hypothetical given
- Non‐epistemic perception as technology
- Internalism, phenomenal conservatism, and defeat
- A priori perceptual entitlement, knowledge‐first
- Dretske & McDowell on perceptual knowledge, conclusive reasons, and epistemological disjunctivism
- Do looks constitute our perceptual evidence?
- Appearance and reality
- Perception, discrimination, and knowledge
- Perception of continued existence unperceived
- Concepts and predication from perception to cognition
- Do you see what I know? On reasons, perceptual evidence, and epistemic status
- Two dogmas of empirical justification
- Perceptual consciousness plays no epistemic role
- Recognitional competence and knowing what things look like
- Evidential support and best explanations
- Perceptual evidence: Against the view of the vulgar
- Reading the bad news about our minds
- Multisensory evidence
- Responses to Brewer, Gupta, and Siegel
- Empirical reason: Questions for Gupta, Mcdowell, and Siegel
- Comments on Brewer, Gupta, and Siegel
- Replies to Brewer, Gupta, and McDowell
- Empirical reason: Answers to Gupta, McDowell, and Siegel
- The uneasy heirs of acquaintance
- Experience and its rational significance II: Replies to Brewer, McDowell, and Siegel
- Experience and its rational significance I: Contributions to a debate
- Guidance, epistemic filters, and non‐accidental ought‐doing
- Tales from an apostate
- Beyond accuracy: Epistemic flaws with statistical generalizations
- Radical moral encroachment: The moral stakes of racist beliefs
- Why is warrant normative?
- Knowledge, safety, and gettierized lottery cases: Why mere statistical evidence is not a (safe) source of knowledge
- Expanding the scope of reflective knowledge: From mine to ours
- Do epistemic reasons bear on the ought simpliciter?
- The capacity to know and perception
- Skepticism and epistemic asymmetry
- Belief, desire and the prediction of behaviour
- Demoting promoting objections to epistemic consequentialism
- Checking again
- How to respond rationally to peer disagreement: The preemption view
- Vice epistemology has a responsibility problem
- Credences and suspended judgments as transitional attitudes
- Knowledge‐first functionalism
- On fundamental responsibility
- Skepticism: Impractical, therefore implausible
- Testimonial hinges
- A normative account of epistemic luck
- THE SIMPLE ARGUMENT FOR SUBCLASSICAL LOGIC
- ADDENDA
- AN OBJECT‐BASED TRUTHMAKER SEMANTICS FOR MODALS
- INTUITIONS AS INFERENTIAL JUDGMENTS*
- IN PRAISE OF A LOGIC OF DEFINITIONS THAT TOLERATES Ω‐INCONSISTENCY
- PARADOXES AND STRUCTURAL RULES FROM A DIALOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
- DELIMITING THE BOUNDARIES OF INFERENCE
- LOGICAL NIHILISM: COULD THERE BE NO LOGIC?*
- ANTIOBJECTS
- LOGICAL NON‐COGNITIVISM
- ON THE EXPLANATORY POWER OF TRUTH IN LOGIC
- VARIETIES OF INFERENCE?
- SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF LOGICAL OMNISCIENCE
- DUMMETT ON INDEFINITE EXTENSIBILITY
- ALTERNATIVE LOGICS AND APPLIED MATHEMATICS
- PARADOXICAL PROPOSITIONS
- FIRST‐ORDER LOGICAL VALIDITY AND THE HILBERT‐BERNAYS THEOREM
- A PROBABILISTIC EPISTEMOLOGY OF PERCEPTUAL BELIEF
- IS THERE A RELIABILITY CHALLENGE FOR LOGIC?
- FROM LOGICAL EXPRESSIVISM TO EXPRESSIVIST LOGIC: SKETCH OF A PROGRAM AND SOME IMPLEMENTATIONS1
- RATIONALLY DETERMINABLE CONDITIONS
- The Naïve Conception of Properties
- Sophisticated Modal Primitivism
- The World is the Totality of Facts, Not of Things
- Part and Whole, Again1
- Ground by Law
- Errata for Philosophical Issues, Volume 26
- Is There a Humean Account of Quantities?
- Personal Volatility*
- Anything I Can Do (With Respect to Truthmaking), You Can Do Better (or Just As Well): Truthmaking and Non-Presentist Dynamism*
- Metaphysics and Conceptual Negotiation
- Real Definitions
- Phenomenal Feel as Process1
- Copredication and Property Inheritance
- Naive Metaphysics
- Constitutive Explanation
- Normative Accounts of Fundamentality
- How to Be a Substantivalist Without Getting Shifty About It*
- Laws for Metaphysical Explanation
- Free Will and Ultimate Explanation
- To Have and to Hold*
- Ideology in a Desert Landscape*
- Norms of Belief
- Evidentialism, Transparency, and Commitments
- Mind Misreading
- Knowing Our Own Hearts: Self-Reporting and the Science of Love
- An Argument for Uniqueness About Evidential Support
- How Understanding People Differs from Understanding the Natural World
- Against Emotional Dogmatism
- Unconscious Evidence
- Against the Taking Condition
- Simulation and Understanding Other Minds
- Incompatibilist Commitment and Moral Self-Knowledge: The Epistemology of Libertarianism
- Practical Perception and Intelligent Action
- Safety, Explanation, Iteration
- No State A Priori Known to Be Factive is Mental*
- How to be an Infallibilist*
- The Essential Connection Between Epistemology and the Theory of Reference
- Empiricist Pragmatism
- Is There a Problem With Cognitive Outsourcing?
- Testimonial Knowledge: A Unified Account
- Good Looking*
- Belief and Self-Knowledge: Lessons From Moore’s Paradox
- Redefining Illusion and Hallucination in Light of New Cases