- Deflating Predicativism Against the Small Clause Hypothesis for Proper Names
- Computational Approaches to Concepts Representation: A Whirlwind Tour
- Truthmaker Semantics, Disjunction, and Fundamentals
- The Paradox of Impossible to Know Assertion
- On Functional Plurality: A Taxonomy of Benign and Problematic Functions
- For the Sake of Knowledge: The Epistemic Value of Other-Regarding Epistemic Virtues
- Unconscious Perception, Action, and the Problem of Attribution
- The Principle of Total Evidence: Justification and Political Significance
- Evidential Incognizance
- Moral Generalizations and Moral Explanatory Pluralism
- Doxastic and Epistemic Sources of Offense for Slurring Terms
- A Panpsychist Solution to the Exclusion Problem
- Scientific Realism vs. Evolutionary Epistemology: A Critical Rationalist Approach
- Communication Without Shared Meanings
- From Metaphysics to Methods?: Pluralism in Cancer Research
- Towards a Realist Shifty Semantic Account of Moral Vagueness
- Moral Responsibility in a Vat
- Many Bombers of the Principle of Double Effect: An Analysis of Strategic/Terror Bomber Thought Experiment Variants
- Having a Disposition and Making a Contribution
- Epistemic Bystander
- Truth-Ratios, Evidential Fit, and Deferring to Informants with Low Error Probabilities
- Antipathy as an Emotion
- Knowing What One Likes: Epistemicist Solution to Faultless Disagreement
- False Authorities
- Consequentialism and Its Demands: The Role of Institutions
- Suspension of Judgment, Non-additivity, and Additivity of Possibilities
- Intention, Action, and De Se Indexicality
- Fragmentalism and Tensed Truths
- Pritchard, Luck, Risk, and a New Problem for Safety-Based Accounts of Knowledge
- Identity Theory and Falsifiability
- Social Epistemology and Epidemiology
- Existence Is Not Relativistically Invariant—Part 1: Meta-ontology
- Dead Past, Ad hocness, and Zombies
- Unfamiliarity in Logic? How to Unravel McSweeney’s Dilemma for Logical Realism
- Progress in Understanding Consciousness? Easy and Hard Problems, and Philosophical and Empirical Perspectives
- On Wittgenstein’s Dispensation with “ = ” in the Tractatus and its Philosophical Background. A Critical Study
- The Epistemic Benefits of Ideological Diversity
- How Seemings Resolve Bergmann’s Dilemma for Internalism
- Ficta and Amorphism: a Proposal for a Theory of Fictional Entities
- Della Rocca’s Relations Regress and Bradley’s Relations Regresses
- Acquaintance, Attention, and Introspective Justification
- On Semantic and Ontic Truth
- Defending Pure Moral Deference: an Argument from Rationality
- Justified Evidence Resistance
- On Whether It Is and What It Is
- Tricky Truths: How Should Alethic Pluralism Accommodate Racial Truths?
- Virtue, Self-Narratives, and the Causes of Action
- Non-Factualist Interpretation of the Skeptical Solution and the Self-Refutation Argument
- The Invalidity of the Argument from Illusion and the Argument from Appearance
- Qualification in Philosophy
- What Matters in Survival: Self-Determination and the Continuity of Life Trajectories
- Three Kinds of Arguments for Panpsychism
- Two Concepts of Truthmaking: a Compatibilist Solution to the Controversy Between Substantive and Deflationary Approach
- Epiphenomenalism and the Epistemic Argument
- Motivating (Underdetermination) Scepticism
- Essentialist Arguments for Discernibility are Unsound
- Value Pluralism versus Value Monism
- Carnap and Quine on Explanationism in Ontology
- Knowledge as a Social Kind
- Partially Autonomous Belief
- Correction to: Carroll’s Regress Times Three
- Entity Realism Meets Perspectivism
- A Challenge for Indexical Reliabilism
- Deduction, Abduction, and Creativity
- The Subset View of Realization and the Part-Whole Problem
- Avoiding Strawson’s Crude Opposition: How to Straddle the Participant and Objective Stances
- ACT-Endorsing Libertarianism, Constitutive Luck, and Basic Moral Responsibility
- What is Existence? A Matter of Co(n)text
- Taming Holism: an Inferentialist Account of Communication
- Carroll’s Regress Times Three
- What the Remnant Person Problem Really Implies
- Rescuing Mele/Robb-Style Cases
- Belief Holism and the Scope of Doxastic Norms
- Moral Enhancement Is Irrational
- Curiosity, Checking, and Knowing: a Virtue-Theoretical Perspective
- Analytic Epistemology and Armchair Psychology
- The Cogito, Dreamt Characters, and Unreal Existence
- Replies to the Critics of Knowing and Checking: an Epistemological Investigation
- Value Approaches to Virtue and Vice: Intrinsic, Instrumental, or Hybrid?
- Précis on Knowing and Checking: an Epistemological Investigation
- Relativism and Intracultural Conflict
- Descartes vs. the Scholastics: Lessons from Contemporary Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience
- Checking and the Argument from Inquiry
- The Classic Inherence Theory of Attributes: Its Theses and Their Errors
- The Cognitive Basis of the Conditional Probability Solution to the Value Problem for Reliabilism
- A Quinean Reformulation of Fregean Arguments
- Bayesians Still Don’t Learn from Conditionals
- Why Be Rational?
- Norms of Constatives
- A Note on Knowing and Checking
- Sensitivity: Checking into Knowing?
- Checking out Checking
- Blocking Kripke’s Argument Against the Type-Identity Theory of Mind
- On the Cardinality Argument Against Quidditism
- Some Remarks on the Notion of Paradox
- Common Ground and Charity in Conflict
- Do the Standards of Rationality Depend on Resource Context?
- Explaining Higher-order Defeat
- Timeless Causation?
- The Gruesome Truth About Semantic Dispositionalism
- Naïve Realism Face to Face with the Time Lag Argument
- Bradley’s Relation Regress and the Inadequacy of the Relata-Specific Answer
- Musical Types and Musical Flexibility
- The Putnam-Goodman-Kripke Paradox
- Safety, Evidence, and Epistemic Luck
- Correction to: Epistemic Luck and Knowledge
- Relationism and the Problem of Order
- Why Contingentist Actualists Should Endorse the Barcan Formula
- Consciousness, Neuroscience, and Physicalism: Pessimism About Optimistic Induction
- Disagreement, Points of View, and Truth-Relativism
- A Problem in Standard Presentations of the Mere Addition Paradox
- Epistemic Luck and Knowledge
- Epistemic Contradictions Do Not Threaten Classical Logic
- The Root of the Third Dogma of Empiricism: Davidson vs. Quine on Factualism
- Causation in Physics and in Physicalism
- Fair Countable Lotteries and Reflection
- A Remark on the Bank Cases
- Truth and Knowledge in F. P. Ramsey’s Essays: a Pragmatic Overview
- Sensitivity Unmotivated
- Contrastive Explanation, Efforts of Will, and Dual Responsibility
- Collective Epistemic Luck
- The Virtues and Limitations of Randomized Experiments
- Dennettian Panpsychism: Multiple Drafts, All of Them Conscious
- Knowledge as Objectively Justified Belief
- Correction to: Structural Disjunctivism, Indistinguishability and Introspection
- Markosian’s Sideways Music and Aesthetic Value Gluts
- A Coherentist Justification of Epistemic Principles and Its Merits
- Evidence, Epistemic Luck, Reliability, and Knowledge
- Rationality, Success, and Luck
- Scientific Evidence and the Internalism–Externalism Distinction
- More than Just a Passing Cognitive Show: a Defence of Agentialism About Self-knowledge
- Consciousness and Intentionality in Franz Brentano
- A Kierkegaardian Anti-Luck Epistemology
- Varieties of Epistemic Risk
- The Non-saying of What Should Have Been Said
- Is Fallible Knowledge Attributable?
- Skill, Luck, and Epistemic Probability
- Correction to: On the Lewisian Principle of Recombination and Quidditism
- Necessitism, Contingentism, and Lewisian Modal Realism
- Illusionism: an Argument for Its Incoherence
- A Dilemma for Globalized Safety
- Anti-Luminous Mental States: Logical, Psychological and Epistemic Problems
- Properties, Concepts and Empirical Identity
- Naïve Realism with Many Fundamental Kinds
- Knowing Falsely: the Non-factive Project
- Manifestation and Unrestricted Dispositional Monism
- Lowe vs Lewis vs Lowe on Temporary Intrinsics
- Frege’s Puzzle and Act-based Propositions
- Can We Have Physical Understanding of Mathematical Facts?
- Epistemic Reasons Are Not Normative Reasons for Belief
- What We Can Learn From Literary Authors
- RECkoning with the Stakes in Overcoming Representation-Hungry Problem Domains
- The Fundamentality of Fundamental Powers
- Two Norms of Intention: a Vindication of Williamson’s Knowledge-Action Analogy
- On the Content of Information Systems Ontologies
- Monism, Spacetime, and Aristotelian Substances
- Cognitive Focus
- The Prejudice of Freedom: an Application of Kripke’s Notion of a Prejudice to our Understanding of Free Will
- Re-defending Feline Liberty: a Response to Fischer
- What Does It Take to Know that You Know?
- A Dynamical Perspective on the Generality Problem
- There is Still a Problem of Consistent Incompatibility: a Response to Coren
- Spatial Relations Are External
- On the Lewisian Principle of Recombination and Quidditism
- Individually Sufficient and Disjunctively Necessary Conditions for Moral Responsibility
- No Problem of Consistent Incompatible Desires: a Reply to Baumann
- Determinables in Frames
- Anti-Exceptionalism About Requirements of Epistemic Rationality
- A New Argument for the Rationality of Perception
- The Aporia of Future Directed Beliefs
- Extending the Transparency Method beyond Belief: a Solution to the Generality Problem
- The Role of Certainty
- Slurs and Expressive Commitments
- Innate Mind Need Not Be Within
- A Probabilistic Framework for Formalizing Epistemic Shifts
- A Contrastivist Response to Gerken’s Arguments for False Positives
- Political Epistemology: Debating the Burning Issue(s)
- Commitment, Norm-Governedness and Guidance
- The Surprising Truth About Disagreement
- The Logic of Aspect-Perception and Perceived Resemblance
- On Inadvertently Made Tables: a Brockean Theory of Concrete Artifacts
- Rules of Belief and the Normativity of Intentional Content
- An Empirical Investigation of the Role of Direction in our Concept of Time
- Keep Your Cats Indoors: a Reply to Abbate
- Notational Differences
- Reliabilism and the New Evil Demon Problem
- Thinking Animals or Thinking Brains?
- Thinking with Others: A Radically Externalist Internalism
- Moral Rationalism and Moral Motivation
- Eventful Conversations and the Positive Virtues of a Listener
- Reference-Securing Belief and Content Externalism
- Structural Disjunctivism, Indistinguishability and Introspection
- Slurs, Stereotypes and Insults
- Why Physicalism Seems to Be (and Is) Incompatible with Intentionality
- A Mind Selected by Needs: Explaining Logical Animals by Evolution
- Correction to: Trading Ontology for Ideology (and Vice Versa)
- What the Debasing Demon Teaches Us About Wisdom
- The Mark of a Good Informant
- Trading Ontology for Ideology (and Vice Versa)
- An Argument for Existentialism
- Assertion and Practical Reasoning, Fallibilism and Pragmatic Skepticism
- Is Metaphysics Immune to Moral Refutation?
- Epistemic Emotions and the Value of Truth
- Against Conjunctive Properties
- Moorean Assertions and Their Normative Function
- Resisting the Remnant-Person Problem
- A Defense of Free-Roaming Cats from a Hedonist Account of Feline Well-being
- Absolutism About Taste and Faultless Disagreement
- Sentimentalist Contractualism—the First Steps
- The Nature and Moral Status of Manipulation
- Acting Upon Uncertain Beliefs
- Hi-individuals and Where to Find Them—Towards a Hi-world Semantics for Quantified Modal Logic
- Back to the (Branching) Future
- Primitive Directionality and Diachronic Grounding
- The Inductive Route Towards Necessity
- Musical Ontology and the Question of Persistence
- On Reading
- The Value Problem of A Priori Knowledge
- Critiques of Axiological Realism and Surrealism
- Concessive Conditionals Without Even if and Nonconcessive Conditionals with Even if
- Desert, Control, and Moral Responsibility
- Inferentialism on Meaning, Content, and Context
- Pejorative Terms and the Semantic Strategy
- Moral Ambivalence: Relativism or Pluralism?
- In Defense of Color Realism
- Interpretations of Probability and Bayesian Inference—an Overview
- Factory Farming and Ethical Veganism
- Social Cognition: a Normative Approach
- Bulletproof Grandfathers, David Lewis, and ‘Can’t’-Judgements
- Correction to: In Defence of the Shareability of Fregean Self-Thought
- A Non-substantial Meta-semantics for Global Expressivism
- A Puzzle About Knowledge, Blame, and Coherence
- Has Smith Solved the Moral Problem?
- Feldman on the Epistemic Value of Truth
- Philosophical Accounts of First-Order Logical Truths
- Structure and Completeness: A Defense of Factualism in Categorial Ontology
- Hylomorphism: a Critical Analysis
- Knowledge How, Procedural Knowledge, and the Type-Token Action Clause
- In Defence of the Shareability of Fregean Self-Thought
- Garrett on the Irrationality of Pure Time Preferences
- Why Don’t Philosophers Do Their Intuition Practice?
- Mental Files and Naïve Semantic Accounts of Substitution Failure
- What Does the Zombie Argument Prove?
- Varieties of Justification—How (Not) to Solve the Problem of Induction
- Johansson on Fission
- Lewis and Taylor as Partners in Sin
- Can Emotional Feelings Represent Significant Relations?
- What Kind of Ontological Categories for Geo-ontologies?
- Eliminativism: the Problem of Representation and Carnapian Metametaphysics
- A High Token Indicativity Account of Knowledge
- Self-Inquisitiveness: the Structure and Role of an Epistemic Virtue
- Justification, Justifying, and Leite’s Localism
- Higher-Order Beliefs and the Undermining Problem for Bayesianism
- Anaphoric Deflationism, Primitivism, and the Truth Property
- Towards an Account of Epistemic Luck for Necessary Truths
- A (Different) Virtue Responsibilism: Epistemic Virtues Without Motivations
- Rescuing the Assertability of Measurement Reports
- Relevance and Non-Factive Knowledge Attributions
- Educating for Good Questioning: a Tool for Intellectual Virtues Education
- Testimonial Knowledge and Context-Sensitivity: a New Diagnosis of the Threat
- What Does Davidson Reject When He Rejects Conceptual Schemes?
- Understanding, Problem-Solving, and Conscious Reflection
- Some Problems with the Russellian Open Future
- Linking Necessity to Apriority
- Core and Ancillary Epistemic Virtues
- Corroboration: Sensitivity, Safety, and Explanation
- “What Counts as an Insult?”
- Getting a Grasp of the Grasping Involved in Understanding
- Blum’s Puzzle and the Analiticity of Kripkean Identity Statements
- On Crane’s Psychologistic Account of Intentionality
- An Informational Theory of Counterfactuals
- Negative Properties—Negative Objects?
- Getting It Together: Psychological Unity and Deflationary Accounts of Animal Metacognition
- Does Non-Moral Ignorance Exculpate? Situational Awareness and Attributions of Blame and Forgiveness
- Experience and Time
- Conceptual Role Semantics and Rationality
- A ‘Mere Cambridge’ Test to Demarcate Extrinsic from Intrinsic Properties
- Actualism and Modal Semantics
- Interest-Relative Invariantism and Indifference Problems
- Criteria for Nontrivial General Term Rigidity
- The Downward Path to Epistemic Informational Structural Realism
- Lewis’ Conditional Analysis of Dispositions Revisited and Revised
- What is the Problem of Explanation and Modeling?
- A Uniform Account of Regress Problems
- Appropriate Slurs
- Bare Particulars Laid Bare
- Existence as a Property
- Linguistic Understanding and Knowledge of Truth-Conditions
- Do Events Have Their Parts Essentially?
- Existence and Strong Uncountability
- Alternate Possibilities and Moral Asymmetry
- A Posteriori Physicalism and the Discrimination of Properties
- Trivial Languages
- A Notion of Logical Concept Based on Plural Reference
- Self-Knowledge, Deliberation, and the Fruit of Satan
- Modal Truthmakers, Truth Conditions, and Analyses: or, How to Avoid the Humphrey Objection
- Epistemic Conditions on “Ought”: E=K as a Case Study
- The Categorical-Dispositional Distinction, Locations and Symmetry Operations
- Non-Realist Cognitivism, Truth and Objectivity
- Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and the Importance of Alternative Possibilities
- The Uniformity Principle vs. the Disuniformity Principle
- Fregean Facts
- A Reverse Interpretation Model of Testimony
- What Norm of Assertion?
- Confirmation, Increase in Probability, and the Likelihood Ratio Measure: a Reply to Glass and McCartney
- Perceptual Experience and Aspect
- The Ambiguity Theory of “Knows”
- A Note on Belief Reports and Context Dependence
- Transcendental Kantianism, Naturalized Kantianism, and the Bounds of Psychology
- Necessarily Incompatible Consistent Wants
- Extended Modal Dimensionalism
- Reconstructed Empiricism
- Files for Fiction
- Mechanisms and Difference-Making
- A Deeper Defense of the Deep Rationality Theory of Wisdom: A Reply to Fileva and Tresan
- Human Cognitive Closure and Mysterianism: Reply to Kriegel
- Hale on the Absoluteness of Logical Necessity
- Physicalist and Dispositionalist Views on Colour: a Physiological Objection
- Knowledge of Abstract Objects in Physics and Mathematics
- Bolzano’s Argument for the Existence of Substances: a Formalization with Two Types of Predication
- Frankfurt-Style Cases and the Explanation Condition for Moral Responsibility: a Reply to Swenson
- Possible World Semantics and the Complex Mechanism of Reference Fixing
- Pritchard, Revisionism and Warranted Assertability
- Physical Intentionality, Extrinsicness, and the Direction of Causation
- Borderline Cases and the Project of Defining Art
- On the Coherence of Wittgensteinian Constructivism
- An Old Solution to the Problem of Mixed Atomics