- Spinoza and the Poetic Imagination: Replies
- Practical Imagination in Spinoza: Opposing Imagination and Reason Once Again
- The Poetic Art of Making Philosophy Practical
- Limiting the Political Imagination: Spinoza’s Prohibition of Novelty in the Political Treatise
- Intuitive Science, Poetic Thought
- Spinoza the Classicist: A Response to Susan James’s ‘Spinoza and the Poetic Imagination’
- Poetry Beyond Philosophy? Ibn Tufayl’s Alternative Schema
- Spinoza, Poetry, and Human Bondage
- Spinoza and Poetic Thinking
- Spinoza and the Poetic Imagination
- Function, Explanation, and Other Biological Concerns
- Let’s Get to Work: A Response to Our Commentators
- Are Biological Traits Explained by Their ‘Selected Effect’ Functions?
- Function in the Light of Frequency-dependent Selection
- Selected Effects and Comparative Propensities
- Niche-construction: Environmental Heterogeneity as a Selected Effect
- Pressing Christie, Brusse, et al.’s Objection: Why Single Out Selected Effects?
- Can a Theory of Content Rely on Selected Effect Functions? Response to Christie, Brusse, et al.
- What are Functions Good For?
- Changing the Subject? Christie, Brusse, et al. on the Selected Effects Account of Biological Function
- Rescuing Proper Functions
- Affect Against Ineffect: Comments on Vardoulakis’s Idea of the ‘Ineffectual’
- ‘Art Completes Nature’: Commentary on Dimitris Vardoulakis, ‘Toward a Critique of the Ineffectual’
- Toward a Critique of the Ineffectual: Heidegger’s Reading of Aristotle and the Construction of an Action Without Ends
- Ends Without a Cause: A Response to Dimitris Vardoulakis
- The Effectual: Replying to Responses
- For the Sake of Dasein: Praxis, Self-understanding, and Life
- On Dimitris Vardoulakis, ‘Toward a Critique of the Ineffectual: Heidegger’s Reading of Aristotle and the Construction of an Action Without Ends’
- The End of Instrumentality? Heidegger on Phronēsis and Calculative Thinking
- Willing the Means: Vardoulakis on Aristotle’s Ethics and Ineffectual Causation
- Aristotle’s End of Action in Itself and the Determination of Character: A Reply to Vardoulakis
- Heidegger on the Calculability of Time
- Help! Virtue Profiles and Horses for Courses
- Creativity and the Value of Virtue
- What Virtue Adds to Value
- In Defence of the Proportionality Principle
- Commentary on Glen Pettigrove’s ‘What Virtue Adds to Value’
- Virtues and Values, Without Disproportion or Dysfunction
- Commentary on ‘What Virtue Adds to Value’
- Virtue, Dependence, and Value: Commentary on Glen Pettigrove’s ‘What Virtue Adds to Value’
- What Does Virtue Add to Value? Comments on Pettigrove
- Discriminate Virtue
- Virtue, Dependence, and Value: Commentary on Glen Pettigrove’s ‘What Virtue Adds to Value’
- I, You, and We: Beyond Individualism and Collectivism
- Grace Andrus de Laguna: A Perspective from the History of Linguistics
- Grace de Laguna’s Evolutionary Critique of Pragmatism
- Grace de Laguna as a Grandmother of Analytic Philosophy: Her Philosophy of Science and A.N. Whitehead’s
- Grace de Laguna as Continental Philosopher?
- Grace de Laguna: Why Forgotten as a Philosopher?
- Grace A. de Laguna’s Theory of Universals: A Powers Ontology of Properties and Modality
- Grace Andrus de Laguna’s New Naturalism
- Perspectivism and Behaviourism: A Response to Katzav
- Response to Commentary on ‘Grace de Laguna’s Analytic and Speculative Philosophy’
- Grace de Laguna’s Analytic and Speculative Philosophy
- On Explaining Temporally Asymmetric Experiences
- The practical arrow
- The Flow of time: Rationalism vs. empiricism
- The Open Universe: Totality, Self-reference and Time
- Ethical Practitioners and Intellectual Commentators
- Comment on Kwong-loi Shun, ‘Anger, Compassion, and the Distinction between First and Third Person’
- Anger, Compassion, and the Distinction between First and Third Person
- The ‘Psychological Dynamics’ for Sentiments: Seeing Confucian Emotions through Hume’s Analysis
- Why We Need Empathy
- Anger, Compassion, and One Body
- Comment on ‘Anger, Compassion and the Distinction between First and Third Person’
- Grounding Confucian Moral Psychology in Rasa Theory: A Commentary on Shun Kwong-loi’s ‘Anger, Compassion, and the Distinction between First and Third Person’
- The Transformation of Emotion: First and Third Person Perspectives in Developmental Context
- Benevolent Situations and Gratitude
- Anger, Detachment and the First Person
- The Conversational Character of Oppression
- What a ‘Boo’ Can Do: Adam Goodes, Discrimination, and Norm (R)evolution
- Sometimes, It Is Just Words: Norm-Setting as Negotiation
- ‘Discrimination Preferred’: How Ordinary Verbal Bigotry Harms
- Does Public Racist Speech Constitute Hostile Discrimination? Comments on McGowan
- Hateful Speech and Hostile Environments
- Commentary on Mary Kate McGowan’s ‘Just Words: On Speech and Hidden Harm: An Overview and an Application’
- Just Words: On Speech and Hidden Harm: An Overview and an Application
- Just Words? Hate Speech, Harm, and the Justifiability of Legal Regulation
- Rationality versus Normativity
- Rationality as Reasons-Responsiveness
- Broome’s Too-Quick Objection
- Rationality and Supervenience: A Comment on Broome (and Lord)
- Four Notes on John Broome’s ‘Rationality versus Normativity’
- Property Identity and Reification
- Normativity from Rationality: A Comment on John Broome
- Responses to Commentaries on ‘Rationality Versus Normativity’
- Rationality and Kinds of Reasons
- Comments on Broome’s ‘Rationality versus Normativity’
- Rationality and Responsibility
- On Broome’s Notion of Normativity
- The Politics of Being Part of Nature
- The Barking Dog and the Mind of God
- Reconsidering Spinoza’s ‘Rationalism’
- Introduction: Spinoza Today
- Knowledge Beyond Reason in Spinoza’s Epistemology: Scientia Intuitiva and Amor Dei Intellectualis in Spinoza’s Epistemology
- A Qualified Defence of Rationalism: On the Role of the Analogical Imagination in Spinoza
- Sin and Sensibility: A Response to Genevieve Lloyd’s Reconsideration of Spinoza’s Rationalism
- Spinoza’s Reason Revisited
- Interrogating Understanding in Conatus: A Commentary on Genevieve Lloyd’s ‘Reconsidering Spinoza’s “Rationalism”’
- Dennett and Spinoza
- Property Identity and Relevant Conditionals
- Properties, Propositions and Conditionals
- A Bit of Connexivity Around the Field of Ordinary Conditionals
- Reply to Zach Weber
- Proofs and Models in Naive Property Theory: A Response to Hartry Field’s ‘Properties, Propositions and Conditionals’
- Reply to Shawn Standefer, Rohan French, and Greg Restall
- Reply to Luis Estrada-González and Elisángela Ramírez-Cámara
- Curitorial Introduction: Hartry Field, ‘Properties, Propositions and Conditionals’
- Political Philosophy as Love of Wisdom
- Political Philosophy and What People Think
- Public Values in the Right Context
- Public Reflective Equilibrium: A Reply
- Public Reflective Disequilibrium
- Political Philosophy and its Limits: A Response to de Shalit
- Justice, Democracy, and the Role of Political Philosophy
- The Function of the Philosopher and the Public in W.E.B. Du Bois’s Political Thought
- What Makes the Public Special? Political Philosophy, Methodology and Politically Motivated Research
- The People versus Political Philosophy
- Political Philosophy and Political Persuasion
- Women and Republicanism in the Eighteenth Century: Completing the Historical Record
- Women and the History of Republicanism
- De Grouchy, Wollstonecraft, and Smith on Sympathy, Inequality, and Rights
- On the Philosophical Significance of Eighteenth-Century Female ‘Republicans’
- Revolution and Republicanism: Women Political Philosophers of Late Eighteenth-Century France and Why They Matter
- Republicanism and Religious Optimism in Mary Wollstonecraft and Germaine de Staël
- Equality and Difference in Olympe de Gouges’ Les droits de la femme. A La Reine
- Alternate Currents in Women’s Republicanism During the French Revolution
- Negotiating Context: How to Ensure Women’s Works Remain Their Own
- Excluding Manners and Deference from the Post-Revolution Republic: Sophie de Grouchy’s Letters on Sympathy on the Conditions of Non-Domination
- The Practices of Forgiving: Replies
- From Proto-Forgiveness to Minimal Forgiveness
- Expanding Moral Understanding
- Permission, Blame, and Forgiveness
- Stories of Forgiveness
- On Ordered Pluralism
- Attitudes and Practices
- Messy Forgiveness: A Reply to Fricker
- The Priority of Gifted Forgiveness: A Response to Fricker
- Forgiveness—An Ordered Pluralism
- ‘Learning’ and Learning at Euthydemus 275d–278d
- Who’s Who and What’s What? A Response to Commentators on ‘First Chop Your Logos … ’
- Teleology and Sophistic Endeavour in the Euthydemus
- Isocrates’ Pragmatic Reflective Life at Euthydemus 304d–306e
- Fine-grained and Coarse-grained Knowledge in Euthydemus 293b7–d1
- Legein to What End?
- The Importance of Being Erroneous
- Some Aspects of Aspect: Reflections on M.M. McCabe’s ‘First Chop Your Logos: Socrates and the Sophists on Language, Logic and Development’
- Eristic Combat at Euthydemus 285e–286b
- First Chop Your Logos … : Socrates and the Sophists on Language, Logic and Development
- Says Who? Modes of Speaking in the Euthydemus
- Coordination and the Need for Culture
- Practice of Cognitive Estrangement
- Agency within Structures and Warranted Resistance: Response to Commentators
- Ideology and Social Cognition: The Challenge of Theorizing ‘Speciesism’
- Cognition as an Enculturated and Extended Social Skill
- Another Cog in the Ideological Machine? Social Cognition, Ideology and the First-Personal Perspective
- Giving Flesh to Culture: An Enactivist Interpretation of Haslanger
- Cognition as a Social Skill
- Social Coordination or Social Cooperation? Ambiguities of Haslanger’s Approach to Social Life
- Why We Cannot Recognise Ideology
- Mind-making, Affective Regulation, and Resistance
- Mindshaping is Inescapable, Social Injustice is not: Reflections on Haslanger’s Critical Social Theory
- Embodiment and Oppression: Reflections on Haslanger
- Moral Apprehension and Cognition as a Social Skill
- Hegel’s Reading of the Logic of Indian Philosophy
- Modernity and the Inner-Outer Problem
- On Idealism: Responses to Markus Gabriel, James Kreines, Christopher Yeomans, Purushottama Bilimoria, Gene Flenady, Lorenzo Sala, and Jonathan Shaheen
- Reading Hegel (Anti-)Metaphysically
- Systematicity and Philosophical Interpretation: Hegel, Pippin, and Changing Debates
- Transcendental Ontology and Apperceptive Idealism
- Hegel’s Cocktail: From Metaphysics to Logic and Back Again
- That Great Foe of Immediacy? Intellectual Intuition in Pippin’s Reading of Hegel
- Reading Hegel
- Robert Pippin’s Hegel as an Analytically Approachable Philosopher
- The Tractatus On Unity
- Response to Commentaries on ‘The Tractatus on Unity’
- Zalabardo on Semantic Unity and Metaphysical Unity
- Wittgensteinian Facts as Ultimate Items of Tractarian Ontology?
- Zalabardo on Wittgenstein and the Unity of the Proposition
- Depiction in the Tractatus: The Dissolution of the Problem of Unity
- Commentary on José Zalabardo’s ‘The Tractatus on Unity’
- Zalabardo on Wittgenstein’s Programme, and the Resolute and Ineffabalist Readings
- ‘Ultimate’ Facts? Zalabardo on the Metaphysics of Truth
- Wittgenstein on Truth and Meaning
- Theory, Practice, and Non-reductive (Meta)Science
- Phenomenology and Cognitive Neuroscience: Can a Process Ontology Help Resolve the Impasse?
- Agency and the Metaphysics of Nature
- Phenomenology and Cognitive Science: Don’t Fear the Reductionist Bogey-man
- ‘I Can’ vs. ‘I Want’: What’s Missing from Gallagher’s Picture of Non-reductive Cognitive Science
- Phenomenology, Naturalism and Non-reductive Cognitive Science
- Rethinking Nature: Phenomenology and a Non-reductionist Cognitive Science
- Remarks on Gallagher’s Enactivist Philosophy of Nature
- Perception Is Not Always and Everywhere Inferential
- A Tale of Two Gaps
- Rethinking Again
- The Hand of Nature in the Glove of Phenomenology: Reply to Gallagher
- Minding Nature: Gallagher and the Relevance of Phenomenology to Cognitive Science
- Irreducible Aspects of Embodiment: Situating Scientist and Subject
- Context-Sensitive Ontologies for a Non-reductionist Cognitive Neuroscience
- The Role of Non-reductive Naturalism: Cognitive Science or Phenomenology?
- Embracing the Meta-Copernican Turn: Non-decomposition and Mechanistic Explanations
- Gallagher on Non-Reductive Naturalism: Complementarity, Integration or Multiscale Science?
- Philosophies of the Transindividual: Spinoza, Marx, Freud
- Transindividuality in Dispute: A Response to my Readers
- Balibar and Transindividuality
- Conflict as the Quasi-Transcendental: Or, Why Spinoza’s Theologcal Political Treatise Matters for Transindividuality
- Response to Étienne Balibar, ‘Philosophies of the Transindividual: Spinoza, Marx, Freud’
- Identification with Authority and the Transindividual in Rousseau: Critical Comments on Balibar’s Concept of the Transindividual
- On Étienne Balibar’s ‘Philosophies of the Transindividual’
- Freud’s Mass Hypnosis with Spinoza’s Superstitious Wonder: Balibar’s Multiple Transindividuality
- From the Transindividual to the Imaginal: A Response to Balibar’s ‘Philosophies of the Transindividual: Spinoza, Marx, Freud’
- The Transindividual Unconscious
- A Vindication of Simondon’s Political Anthropology
- Disparate Politics: Balibar and Simondon
- Property’s Props: A Response to Étienne Balibar’s ‘Philosophies of the Transindividual’
- Balibar’s Transindividualism: What Kind of Via Negativa?
- Materialist Politics of Fetishism: Balibar’s Critique of Transindividuality’s Cryptonormativity
- Implying a Self and Implying Myself
- Mental Time Travel and Attention: Replies to Commentators
- Mental Time Travel and Attention
- Candrakīrti on Deflated Episodic Memory: Response to Endel Tulving’s Challenge
- Candrakīrti on Deflated Episodic Memory: Response to Endel Tulving’s Challenge
- The Structure of Episodic Memory: Ganeri’s ‘Mental Time Travel and Attention’
- The Structure of Episodic Memory: Ganeri’s ‘Mental Time Travel and Attention’
- Is Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel Inextricably Linked to the Self?
- In Defense of Vasubandhu’s Approach to Episodic Phenomenology
- Ownership, Memory, Attention: Commentary on Ganeri
- No-Self and Episodic Memory
- The Self and What Lies Beyond the Self: Remarks on Ganeri’s ‘Mental Time Travel and Attention’
- The Self and What Lies Beyond the Self: Remarks on Ganeri’s ‘Mental Time Travel and Attention’
- Aspects of Mental Time Travel Within Historical Research
- Mental Time Travel and Joint Reminiscing
- Analogy and Comparatism: A Response to G.E.R. Lloyd, Fortunes of Analogy
- Lloyd’s ‘Fortunes of Analogy’ and Popper’s Epistemology
- Lloyd’s ‘Fortunes of Analogy’ and Popper’s Epistemology
- From Lloyd’s Analogy to a Proposal of Hermeneutic Mechanism
- Imaginary Analogies: Commentary on G.E.R. Lloyd’s ‘Fortunes of Analogy’
- Analogical Investigations
- Imaginary Analogies: Commentary on G.E.R. Lloyd’s ‘Fortunes of Analogy’
- Heuristic Analogies in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, Semantic Stretch of Terms, and Soundness or Fallaciousness of Analogies
- Philosophy, Certainty and Semantic Stretch
- Lloyd and the Logicians: The Analogies in our Reasoning
- Fortunes of Analogy: Replies to Commentators
- Analogy and Being
- Bohr, Quantum Physics and the Laozi
- Thoughts about Lloyd’s Multidimensionality of Reality
- Fortunes of Analogy
- Reflections on Analogical Thinking: The Centrality of Discretion
- The Limits of Subtraction
- The Problem of (Fully) Empty Predicates
- If-Thenism—A Nominalistic Account of Talk About Abstracta?
- Is There an Incremental Reading of Conditionals?
- The Prospects for If-Thenism
- Dissolving Yablo’s Hostage Crisis: In Defence of Defiance
- Reasoning Under a Presupposition and the Export Problem: The Case of Applied Mathematics
- If-Thenism and Fictionalism
- Yablovian ‘If-Thenism’
- If-Thenism, Arithmetic and Remainders
- A Note on Surplus Content
- The Inaccuracy of Partial Truths in Yablovian ‘If-Thenism’
- What Can we Take Away from Easy Arguments?
- Replies to Comments on If-Thenism
- If-Thenism
- Constructing Aesthetic Value: Responses to My Commentators
- The Pleasure of Art
- Restorative Aesthetic Pleasures and the Restoration of Pleasure
- Pleasure’s Place
- Comments on Mohan Matthen’s ‘The Pleasure of Art’
- Comments on Mohan Matthen’s ‘The Pleasure of Art’
- Desire and Aesthetic Pleasure
- On the Uses and Abuses of Pleasure for Art
- Value First: Comments on Mohan Matthen’s ‘The Pleasure of Art’
- Value First: Comments on Mohan Matthen’s ‘The Pleasure of Art’
- From Kantianism to Aesthetic Hedonism: Aesthetic Pleasure Revised
- Straddling the Senses of a Contested Term: A Comment on the Use of ‘Aesthetic’ in Mohan Matthen’s ‘The Pleasure of Art’
- Pleasure of Art and Pleasure of Nature: A response to Matthen
- Pleasure, Art, Culture: Remarks on Mohan Matthen’s ‘The Pleasure of Art’
- A Complex of Pleasures: Comment on ‘The Pleasure of Art’ by Mohan Matthen
- Straddling the Senses of a Contested Term: A Comment on the Use of ‘Aesthetic’ in Mohan Matthen’s ‘The Pleasure of Art’
- Pleasure, Art, Culture: Remarks on Mohan Matthen’s ‘The Pleasure of Art’