- The Myth of the Aesthetic
- On the Alleged Incommensurability of Newtonian and Relativistic Mass
- The Offload Response for Low-Level Theorists
- Intellectual Humility: Beyond the Learner Paradigm
- Beyond Individualism and Holism: Integrated Information Theory as Formal Framework for the Gradation of Social Structure
- On the Non-identity Causal Theory of Spacetime from Causal Set Theory
- Flow and Athletic Experts
- Connexive Exclusion
- Baby Logic – a Hinge Epistemology
- Non-Representational Models and Objectual Understanding
- Tip-of-the-Tongue Experiences as Cognitive Phenomenology
- Epistemically Vicious Knowledge
- Failure to Comprehend Determinism or Failure to Measure Comprehension? Methodological Issues in Experimental Philosophy of Free Will
- Confabulations in Korsakoff’s Syndrome: Defending an Error-Based Account
- Transformative Rationality and the Problem of ‘Creeping Rationalism’
- A Puzzle About the Unity and Normativity of Structural Rationality
- On Logical and Scientific Strength
- Beyond Semantic Pollution: Towards a Practice-Based Philosophical Analysis of Labelled Calculi
- Of Hopes and Hinges: Peirce, Epistemic Constraints on Truth, and the Normative Foundations of Inquiry
- Intertranslatability and Ground-Equivalence
- An A Priori Refutation of the Classical Pessimistic Induction
- A Problem for Autonomous Know-How
- Generalized Identity, Zero-Ground, and Necessity
- Unification, T-theoreticity, and Testing: The Case of Fitness in Natural Selection
- Biological Antecedents Essentialism
- Perceptual Modes of Presentation as Object Files
- A Dilemma for the Russo–Williamson Thesis
- Theory Choice and Social Choice: Two Proposals to Escape from Arrovian Impossibility for ‘Large Scale’ Theory Choices Based on Kuhn’s Criteria
- The Reliable Route from Nonmoral Evidence to Moral Conclusions
- Evidential Support and Contraposition
- Explanatory Contextualism about Episodic Memory: Towards A Diagnosis of the Causalist-Simulationist Debate
- On the Origin of Negation
- Abductivism as a New Epistemology for Logic?
- Non-propositionalism and the Suppositional Rule
- Pritchard’s Epistemology and Necessary Truths
- On the Top-Down Argument for the Ability to Do Otherwise
- Correction to: A Bayesian View on the Dr. Evil Scenario
- Psychology and Neuroscience. The (New) Autonomy Question
- p-Hacking: Its Costs and When It Is Warranted
- The Varieties of Russellianism
- Moral Facts Do Not Supervene on Non-moral Qualitative Facts
- Meaning, Communal Use and Deference to Experts
- Should Theories of Logical Validity Self-Apply?
- A Generic Solution to the Sorites Paradox
- Safety and Pluralism in Mathematics
- Conspiracy Theories are Not Beliefs
- The Intransparency of Parentheticalism
- The Roots of the Paradox of Predictability: A Reply to Gijsbers
- Sleeping Beauty and the Evidential Centered Principle
- Blameworthiness and Causal Outcomes
- Right Reason Accounts of the Norm of Assertion
- A Non-Vacuist Response to the Counterpossible Terrible Commands Objection
- Does Panpsychism Explain Mental Causation?
- Why the qua Problem has not Been Dissolved: Reply to Deutsch
- Is Radical Doubt Morally Wrong?
- Matching Theories with Evidence: A Logic for Demanding Knowing Why
- Varieties of Second-Personal Reason
- How to be a Monist about Ground: A Guide for Pluralists
- Two Physicalist Arguments for Microphysical Manyism
- When Should Popular Views be Included in a Reflective Equilibrium?
- Graded causation and moral responsibility
- Critical Math Kinds: A Framework for the Philosophy of Alternative Mathematics
- The Relational Analysis of Belief Ascriptions and Schiffer’s Puzzle
- Cardinal Composition
- Physicalism, Infinite Decomposition, and Constitution
- Immanence in Abundance
- Bridge Principles and Epistemic Norms
- Why We Need to Talk About Preferences: Economic Experiments and the Where-Question
- Meta-inductive Justification of Inductive Generalizations
- Successful Intuition vs. Intellectual Hallucination: How We Non-Accidentally Grasp the Third Realm
- Too Much Self-Control?
- Public Charades, or How the Enactivist Can Tell Apart Pretense from Non-pretense
- Reverse-Engineering Risk
- Informational Models of the Phenomenon of Consciousness and the Mechanistic Project in Neuroscience
- William Bechtel and Linus Ta-Lun Huang, Philosophy of Neuroscience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2022), 94 pp., $20.00 (Paperback)
- Reflective Awareness, Phenomenal Conservatism, and Phenomenal Explanationism
- No Trespassing! Abandoning the Novice/Expert Problem
- The Mess We Make: On the Metaphysics of Artifact Kinds
- Fortune
- First-Person Perspective in Experience: Perspectival De Se Representation as an Explanation of the Delimitation Problem
- Formal Issues of Trope-Only Theories of Universals
- On the Prerequisites for Improving Prejudiced Ranking(s) with Individual and Post Hoc Interventions
- Grounding and the Epistemic Regress Problem
- How Simplicity Can be a Virtue in Philosophical Theory-Choice
- Methodological Naturalism, Analyzed
- Finite Additivity, Complete Additivity, and the Comparative Principle
- Preferences, Proxies, and Rationality
- On Compulsive Talkers
- Betting on Conspiracy: A Decision Theoretic Account of the Rationality of Conspiracy Theory Belief
- Internalism and Culpable Irrationality
- Propositions as Made of Words
- On the Necessity of Priority Monism
- A Game of Perspectives: On the Role of Imagination in Thought Experiments
- Rewriting History: Backwards Causation and Conflicting Declarations Among Institutional Facts
- Against Symmetry Fundamentalism
- A Teleosemantic Response to Burge’s Attack on Semantic Reductionism
- On Aspects, Identity Theory, and the Dual Aspect Account
- Beyond ‘All or Some’: Reframing the Debate Between Local and Global Expressivists
- Virtual Properties: Problems and Prospects
- Bad Feelings, Best Explanations: In Defence of the Propitiousness Theory of the Low Mood System
- On the Nature (and Irrationality) of Non-religious Faith
- From Dispositions to Possible Worlds
- Dated Truths Without Dated Powers
- Suspension, Entailment, and Presupposition
- The Explanatory Role of Machine Learning in Molecular Biology
- How to Know That You’re Not a Zombie
- Correction: Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence
- Graded Abilities and Action Fragility
- Normative Reference as a Normative Question
- A Higher-Order Account of the Phenomenology of Particularity
- Premium Economy: A Transparency Account of Knowledge of Perception
- The Practical Bearings of Truth as Correspondence
- Interrogatives, inquiries, and exam questions
- Why are Actions but not Emotions Done Intentionally, if both are Reason-Responsive Embodied Processes?
- The Relation Between Moral Reasons and Moral Requirement
- Spectral Reflectances and Commensurateness
- Conceivability, Kripkean Identity, and S5: A Reply to Jonathon VandenHombergh
- Moving Past Conventionalism About Multilevel Selection
- A Defence of Manipulationist Noncausal Explanation: The Case for Intervention Liberalism
- Relative Interpretation Between Logics
- The Value of Evidence and Ratificationism
- Verbal Disagreement and Semantic Plans
- Sharing Our Concepts with Machines
- Why is Generative Grammar Recursive?
- Rational Coordination Without Beliefs
- The Common Kind Theory and The Concept of Perceptual Experience
- Certainty and Our Sense of Acquaintance with Experiences
- Patient Similarity in the Era of Precision Medicine: A Philosophical Analysis
- Explicit Cancelability, Semantic Content, and Metalinguistic Coding
- Evidentialism and Occurrent Belief: You Aren’t Justified in Believing Everything Your Evidence Clearly Supports
- Visual Experience and The Laws of Appearance
- Rethinking Integration of Epistemic Strategies in Social Understanding: Examining the Central Role of Mindreading in Pluralist Accounts
- Proper Function and Ethical Judgment Towards A Biosemantic Theory of Ethical Thought and Discourse
- A Lewisian Argument Against Platonism, or Why Theses About Abstract Objects Are Unintelligible
- Belief: What is it Good for?
- First-Order Representationalist Panqualityism
- Some Problems for the Phenomenal Approach to Personal Identity
- Must Choices and Decisions be Uncaused by Prior Events or States of the Agent?
- How the Lewisian can Account for Kit Fine’s Essentialist Beliefs
- Towards an Understanding of the Principle of Variable Embodiments
- Pyow-Hack: Ordered Compositions in Lewis-Skyrms Signaling Games
- The Value of Naturalness
- Hesse’s Condition for Transitivity of Probabilistic Support: A Friendly Reminder
- Causal Proportionality as an Ontic and Epistemic Concept
- Self-Reference, Self-Representation, and the Logic of Intentionality
- Norms2: Norms About Norms
- How to Think about Indirect Confirmation
- Review of: Knauff, M., & Spohn, W. (Eds.), 2021, The Handbook of Rationality, MIT Press
- Physicalism, Foundationalism, and Infinite Descent
- Expressivism, but at a Whole Other Level
- Evolutionary Debunking Arguments, Explanationism and Counterexamples to Modal Security
- Am I Socially Related to Myself?
- Biological Purposes Beyond Natural Selection: Self-Regulation as a Source of Teleology1
- Same but Different: Providing a Probabilistic Foundation for the Feature-Matching Approach to Similarity and Categorization
- Towards a Deflationary Truthmakers Account of Social Groups
- The Silence of Physics
- Axioms and Postulates as Speech Acts
- Compressing Graphs: a Model for the Content of Understanding
- Derivative Indeterminacy
- Truth is One (No Need for Pluralism)
- ‘Lessons from Blur’
- Necessity, Essence, and Explanation
- Semantic Information and the Complexity of Deduction
- What is Intuitionistic Arithmetic?
- Epistemological Disjunctivism and Anti-luminosity Arguments
- A New Minimality Condition for Boolean Accounts of Causal Regularities
- Confirming Mathematical Conjectures by Analogy
- Information and Explanatory Goodness
- Serious Actualism, Typography, and Incompossible Sentences
- Causal Bayes Nets and Token-Causation: Closing the Gap between Token-Level and Type-Level
- An Improved Argument for Superconditionalization
- A Problem for Extensional Articulations of Physicalism
- Reductive Representationalism and the Determination of Phenomenal Properties
- Antiluminosity, Excuses and the Sufficiency of Knowledge for Rational Action
- The Unmeasurability of Absolute Velocities from the Point of View of Epistemological Internalism
- No-‘How’ Privileged Self-Knowledge
- Game Theory and Demonstratives
- Epistemic Libertarian Paternalism
- Sets and Probability
- Sympathetic Joy
- Necessary and Sufficient Conditions, Counterfactuals and Causal Explanations
- Credences are Beliefs about Probabilities: A Defense from Triviality
- Features and Bugs in Schnieder’s Theory of Properties
- Understanding in Medicine
- A Rational Agent With Our Evidence
- Correction to: The Intransparency of Parentheticalism
- Mathematical Pluralism and Indispensability
- Are There “Aesthetic” Judgments?
- Imagining a Way Out of Dream Skepticism
- Time Travel, Freedom, and Incompatibilism
- Actual Causation and the Challenge of Purpose
- Correction to: Evidential Support and Contraposition
- Risk, Rationality and (Information) Resistance: De-rationalizing Elite-Group Ignorance
- Reference Magnetism Does Not Exist
- The Timing Problem for Dualist Accounts of Mental Causation
- Experiences of Silence in Mood Disorders
- Notational Variants and Cognition: The Case of Dependency Grammar
- Why Your Causal Intuitions are Corrupt: Intermediate and Enabling Variables
- Over What Range Should Reliabilists Measure Reliability?
- Decision Theory and De Minimis Risk
- Aggregation in an Infinite, Relativistic Universe
- A Logic of Temporal Contingency
- Testimonial Reliance
- Lying and What is Said
- Provisional Universality
- Hyperintensionality and Ontological Categories
- Luck and Proportions of Infinite Sets
- Know Your Way Out of St. Petersburg: An Exploration of “Knowledge-First” Decision Theory
- What is the Fallacy of Approximation?
- From Paradoxicality to Paradox
- Knowledge-Action Principles and Threshold-Impurism
- Manuscript Title: A Plea for Exemptions
- Do Lefty and Righty Matter More Than Lefty Alone?
- Emergentist Integrated Information Theory
- Testimony by Presupposition
- Evidence and Cognition
- The Varieties of Moral Vice: An Aristotelian Approach
- Extremists are more confident
- Backwards Causation in Social Institutions
- Inter-level Causal Compatibility Without Identity
- Arne Næss’s experiments in truth
- Hybrid Modal Realism Debugged
- Trusting What Ought to Happen
- Varieties of Metaphysical Coherentism
- Higher-Order Evidence and the Dynamics of Self-Location: An Accuracy-Based Argument for Calibrationism
- Quine’s Underdetermination Thesis
- The Object-Activity Theory of Events
- Models as Fundamental Entities in Set Theory: A Naturalistic and Practice-based Approach
- Structured Meanings and the Dynamic Role of Variables: A Dilemma for Pickel and Rabern
- Processual Emergentism
- Taking Skepticism Seriously
- Save (a Small Proportion of) the Children
- A Monist Proposal: Against Integrative Pluralism About Protein Structure
- Ancestor simulations and the Dangers of Simulation Probes
- Cats are not necessarily animals
- Bald-Faced Lies, Blushing, and Noses that Grow: An Experimental Analysis
- Future and Negation
- Computational Modelling for Alcohol Use Disorder
- Priority Perdurantism
- Moral Encroachment and Positive Profiling
- The Importance of Understanding Deep Learning
- Does Property-Perception Entail the Content View?
- Does Macbeth See a Dagger? An Empirical Argument for the Existence-Neutrality of Seeing
- How to Choose a Gauge? The Case of Hamiltonian Electromagnetism
- Sander Verhaegh: Working from Within: The Nature and Development of Quine’s Naturalism
- Public Conceptions of Scientific Consensus
- Janina Hosiasson-Lindenbaum on Analogical Reasoning: New Sources
- The Propagation of Suspension of Judgment.
- Hypothetical Frequencies as Approximations
- Feeling the Unknown: Emotions of Uncertainty and Their Valence
- Objective Phenomenology
- A Disjunctive Argument Against Conjoining Belief Impermissivism and Credal Impermissivism
- Review of Dolf Rami’s ‘Names and Context: A Use-Sensitive Philosophical Account’
- In Defence of the Normative Account of Ignorance
- Biological Individuality and the Foetus Problem
- Correction to: Intelligent Behaviour
- Imperfection, Accuracy, and Structural Rationality
- Updating on Biased Probabilistic Testimony
- Preemptive Omissions
- Eulerian Routing in Practice
- Nature Does Not Yet Say No to Inner Awareness: Reply to Stoljar
- Paraconsistent Belief Revision: An Algebraic Investigation
- Russellian Representationalism and the Stygian Hues
- Frames and Games: Intensionality and Equilibrium Selection
- Measuring up the World in Size and Distance Perception
- Responsibility for Forgetting To Do
- Why and When is Pure Moral Motivation Defective
- Experiential Attitudes are Propositional
- The Future of the Present
- A Qualitative Approach to Conceptual Spaces: Prototypes as Qualitative Atoms
- Radical Pooling and Imprecise Probabilities
- One Heresy and One Orthodoxy: On Dialetheism, Dimathematism, and the Non-normativity of Logic
- Disjunctivism and the Causal Conditions of Hallucination
- Making Sense of Vicarious Responsibility: Moral Philosophy Meets Legal Theory
- On Unexplained (Modal) Patterns
- Epistemic Modals in Hypothetical Reasoning
- Transformative Experiences, Cognitive Modelling and Affective Forecasting
- Cognitive Projects and the Trustworthiness of Positive Truth
- Emotions and Their Correctness Conditions: A Defense of Attitudinalism
- Semanticism and Ontological Commitment
- It Takes a Village to Trust Science: Towards a (Thoroughly) Social Approach to Public Trust in Science
- The Explanatory Power of Deflationary Truth
- Using Quotas as a Remedy for Structural Injustice
- Newtonian Equivalence Principles
- Value Promotion and the Explanation of Evidential Standards
- The Logical Development of Pretense Imagination
- Longings in Limbo: A New Defence of I-Desires
- An Axiomatic Approach to the Quantified Argument Calculus
- Possibility Precedes Actuality
- Correction to: The Silence of Physics
- Extended Implicit Bias: When the Metaphysics and Ethics of Implicit Bias Collide
- The Denotation of Copredicative Nouns
- Abilities and Obligations: Lessons from Non-agentive Groups
- What is a Beautiful Experiment?
- When Doublespeak Goes Viral: A Speech Act Analysis of Internet Trolling
- Applying Ramseyfication to Infrared Spectroscopy
- Future Contingency and Classical Indeterminism
- Constitutivity in Flavour Perception
- Accessing Self-Control
- Correction to: Better Scared than Sorry: The Pragmatic Account of Emotional Representation
- Phenomenal Holism and Cognitive Phenomenology
- Anti-Haecceitism and Fundamentality
- Trust and Confidence: A Dilemma for Epistemic Entitlement Theory
- How Truth-Making Distributes
- Conjectures and Disconfirmations: Confirming the Standard Model Higgs
- Undetermined Choices, Luck and the Enhancement Problem
- The Ways of Presentness
- An Easy Road to Multi-contra-classicality
- The Metaphysics of Decoherence
- A Dilemma for Reductive Compatibilism
- Better Scared than Sorry: The Pragmatic Account of Emotional Representation
- Elgin on Science, Art and Understanding
- Intuitions About Free Will and the Failure to Comprehend Determinism
- Explicating Exact versus Conceptual Replication
- What is a Conspiracy Theory?
- In Defense of Cognitive Phenomenology: Meeting the Matching Content Challenge
- The Four-Case Argument and the Existential/Universal Effect
- “Absent Contrary Indication”: On a Pernicious Form of Epistemic Luck, and its Epistemic Agency Antidote
- Why Conceptual Engineers Should Not Worry About Topics
- Climate Uncertainty, Real Possibilities and the Precautionary Principle
- The Precautionary Principle and Expert Disagreement
- Assertion: The Constitutive Rule Account and the Engagement Condition Objection
- Making New Tools From the Toolbox of Metaphysics
- A Virtue Reliabilist Error-Theory of Defeat
- A Permissivist Defense of Pascal’s Wager
- Higher-Order Awareness of What?
- The Grounds and the Components of Concepts
- Which Concept of Concept for Conceptual Engineering?
- A Step-by-Step Argument for Causal Finitism
- Naturalness is Not an Aim of Belief
- Linguistic Mistakes
- Plenty of Room for Multilocation
- Propositionalism and Questions that do not have Correct Answers
- Are Infinite Explanations Self-Explanatory?
- On the Contingency of Universalism
- (Mere) Verbalness and Substantivity Revisited
- Mereological Destruction and Relativized Parthood: A Reply to Costa and Calosi
- Agency and the Successive Structure of Time-Consciousness
- Lockean Beliefs, Dutch Books, and Scoring Systems
- Metaphysical Foundationalism and Theoretical Unification
- Can Machine Learning Provide Understanding? How Cosmologists Use Machine Learning to Understand Observations of the Universe
- Knowing How and the Argument from Pervasive Inability
- How Knowing-That and Knowing-How Interface in Action: The Intelligence of Motor Representations
- The Moral Irrelevance of Constitutive Luck
- Experimental Explications for Conceptual Engineering
- Skeptical Arguments and Deep Disagreement
- The Metaphysical Possibility of Time Travel Fictions
- Logic of Justified Beliefs Based on Argumentation
- Physical Theories are Prescriptions, not Descriptions
- Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence
- A New Argument for the Non-Instrumental Value of Truth
- A Dual-Aspect Theory of Artifact Function
- Review of Bayesian Philosophy of Science
- Epistemic Consequentialism, Veritism, and Scoring Rules
- Easy Ontology, Regress, and Holism
- Should the Number of Overlapping Experiencers Count?
- A New Argument for the Groundedness of Grounding Facts
- Is There a “Qua Problem” for a Purely Causal Account of Reference Grounding?
- On the Costs of Classical Logic
- A Counterexample to Deflationary Nominalism
- Conceptual (and Hence Mathematical) Explanation, Conceptual Grounding and Proof
- Explanation Within Arm’s Reach: A Predictive Processing Framework for Single Arm Use in Octopuses
- Paradoxicality Without Paradox
- Bare Particulars, Modes, and the Varieties of Dependence
- Ways to Knowledge-First Believe
- What Can Our Best Scientific Theories Tell Us About The Modal Status of Mathematical Objects?
- Mereological Singularism and Paradox
- What Killed Your Plant? Profligate Omissions and Weak Centering
- Is There a Persuasive Argument for an Inner Awareness Theory of Consciousness?
- The Wrong Understanding of Praise
- Øystein vs Archimedes: A Note on Linnebo’s Infinite Balance
- Moral Relativism, Metalinguistic Negotiation, and the Epistemic Significance of Disagreement
- Publicity and Common Commitment to Believe
- How to Believe Long Conjunctions of Beliefs: Probability, Quasi-Dogmatism and Contextualism
- On Metaphysics’ Independence from Truthmaking. Or, Why Humean Supervenience is Compatible with the Growing Block Universe
- Modal Structuralism with Theoretical Terms
- Eliminating Spacetime
- Musical Works as Structural Universals
- Russellian Monism and Structuralism About Physics
- Historical Moral Responsibility and Manipulation via Deletion
- Rules, Equilibria and Virtual Control: How to Explain Persistence, Resilience and Fragility
- The Ups and Downs of Mechanism Realism: Functions, Levels, and Crosscutting Hierarchies
- Explaining Away Kripke’s Wittgenstein
- Resolutions Against Uniqueness
- Diagnostic Overshadowing in Psychiatric-Somatic Comorbidity: A Case for Structural Testimonial Injustice
- Why the Pictorial Needs the Motoric
- Somewhere Together: Location, Parsimony and Multilocation
- The Truth About Better Understanding?
- Calibration in Consciousness Science
- The significance of epistemic blame
- How to (Blind)Spot the Truth: An Investigation on Actual Epistemic Value
- Signaling in an Unknown World
- Truth and Falsity in Communication: Assertion, Denial, and Interpretation
- Constructing the Abstract Individual
- Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Risk
- Epistemic Collaborativeness as an Intellectual Virtue
- Against Methodological Gambling
- Correction to: Comparativism and the Measurement of Partial Belief
- On Equivalence Relations Between Interpreted Languages, with an Application to Modal and First-Order Language
- The Paradox of Predictability
- A New Condition for Transitivity of Probabilistic Support
- The Liar Without Relativism
- Anti-Realism and Modal-Epistemic Collapse: Reply to Marton
- Another Look at Reflection
- The Vertical-Horizontal Illusion
- How to Interpret Belief Hierarchies in Bayesian Game Theory: A Dilemma for the Epistemic Program
- Powers, Processes, and Time
- Lies, Common Ground and Performative Utterances
- Science & Speculation
- Semidisquotation and the infinitary function of truth
- The Material Conditional is Sufficient to Model Deliberation
- Safely Denying Phenomenal Conservatism
- Linguistic Understanding and Testimonial Warrant
- Bayesian Updating When What You Learn Might Be False (Forthcoming in Erkenntnis )
- Knowledge as Justified True Belief
- Why is There Something Rather than Nothing? The Substantivity of the Question for Quantifier Pluralists
- Permissivism and the Truth-Connection
- A Hyperintensional Theory of (Empty) Names
- A Defense of Truth as a Necessary Condition on Scientific Explanation
- Self-Determination in Plenitude
- Consciousness and Categorical Properties
- A Tale of Two Reds
- The Social Dimension of Open-Mindedness
- Ordinary Parts and Their Complements: Together They Rise, Together They Fall
- Comment on Artiga’s “Teleosemantics and Pushmi-Pullyu Representations”
- Pragmatic Encroachment and the Threshold Problem
- The Empirical Under-Determination Argument Against Scientific Realism for Dual Theories
- The Evidential Conditional
- The Tragedy of the Risk Averse
- Degrees of Doxastic Justification
- Noncognitivism in Metaethics and the Philosophy of Action
- Semantic Relativism and Logical Implication
- Connexivity and the Pragmatics of Conditionals
- Riemann’s Scale: A Puzzle About Infinity
- On Putnam’s Proof of the Impossibility of a Nominalistic Physics
- Modal Realism is a Newcomb Problem
- Resentment, Parenting, and Strawson’s Compatibilism
- Inferentialism, Context-Shifting and Background Assumptions
- Bayesian Networks and Causal Ecumenism
- The Indeterminacy of the Distinction between Objects and Ways of Being
- Generative Models
- A Mathematical Analysis of an Election System Proposed by Gottlob Frege
- Counterfactual Knowledge, Factivity, and the Overgeneration of Knowledge
- The Motivating Role of Truth in Reasoning: A Defence of Object-Dependent Fregean Senses
- Emotion: More like Action than Perception
- Non-Humean Laws and Scientific Practice
- The Growing Block and What was Once Present
- Robot Ethics 2.0. From Autonomous Cars to Artificial Intelligence—Edited by Patrick Lin, Keith Abney, Ryan Jenkins. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp xiii + 421
- The Subject-Dependency of Perceptual Objects
- Comparativism and the Measurement of Partial Belief
- Emotions, Actions and Inclinations to Act
- Correction to: Scientific Mind and Objective World: Thomas Kuhn Between Naturalism and Apriorism
- Reconciling Rigor and Intuition
- The Normative Autonomy of Logic
- Strengthening Weak Emergence
- The Sense of Agency and the Epistemology of Thinking
- Nihilism, But Not Necessarily
- Authoritative Knowledge
- The Hardest Paradox for Closure
- The Significance of Value Additivity
- The Cognitive Philosophy of Reflection
- Another Look at Mode Intentionalism
- Why the Self Does Not Extend
- Quantifier Variance, Mathematicians’ Freedom and the Revenge of Quinean Indispensability Worries
- Learning from Non-Causal Models
- Correction to: Explaining Why There is Something Rather than Nothing
- Indeterminacy and Normativity
- The Modal Logic of Potential Infinity: Branching Versus Convergent Possibilities
- Trolleys, Transplants and Inequality: An Egalitarian Proposal
- An Extensional Mereology for Structured Entities
- Non-metric Propositional Similarity
- Tropes, Unmanifested Dispositions and Powerful Qualities
- What is Intelligence For? A Peircean Pragmatist Response to the Knowing-How, Knowing-That Debate
- Natural Analogy: A Hessean Approach to Analogical Reasoning in Theorizing
- Finding True Clusters: On the Importance of Simplicity in Science
- The Type-B Moral Error Theory
- Content Extraction, Ontological Mootness and Nominalism: Difficulties on the Easy Road
- Lotteries, Possible Worlds, and Probability
- Interpreting Supersymmetry
- General Relativity, Mental Causation, and Energy Conservation
- Expressivism and Explaining Irrationality: Reply to Baker
- Is Skill a Kind of Disposition to Action-Guiding Knowledge?
- Epistemic Slurs: A Novel Explicandum and Adequacy Constraint for Slur Theories
- The Myth of Generic Grounding
- Physicalism Without Fundamentality
- A Refutation of Memory Circularity
- Knowing How to Know That
- Free Will, Control, and the Possibility to do Otherwise from a Causal Modeler’s Perspective
- On Different Ways of Being Equal
- Big Bounce or Double Bang? A Reply to Craig and Sinclair on the Interpretation of Bounce Cosmologies
- Explaining Why There is Something Rather than Nothing
- A Hypersequent Solution to the Inferentialist Problem of Modality
- Presentism, Continuous Time-Travel and the Phenomenology of Passage
- Assertion, Stakes and Expected Blameworthiness: An Insensitive Invariantist Solution to the Bank Cases
- The Prospects for a Monist Theory of Non-causal Explanation in Science and Mathematics
- An Empirical Solution to the Puzzle of Macbeth’s Dagger
- Parts of Falling Objects: Galileo’s Thought Experiment in Mereological Setting
- On Luck and Modality
- Really Complex Demonstratives: A Dilemma
- Hazardous Conditions Persist
- Sander Verhaegh: Working from Within : The Nature and Development of Quine’s Naturalism
- A Peculiar and Perpetual Tendency: An Asymmetry in Knowledge Attributions for Affirmations and Negations
- Reichenbachian Common Cause Clusters
- Navigation and Indexical Thought
- Evidence and Knowledge from Computer Simulation
- Psychology and Neuroscience: The Distinctness Question
- Unsuccessful Remembering: A Challenge for the Relational View of Memory
- An Improved Dutch Book Theorem for Conditionalization
- Chalmers’ Argument from Relativity
- Epistemic Collaborations: Distributed Cognition and Virtue Reliabilism
- Feminism Without Metaphysics or a Deflationary Account of Gender
- What Is the Function of Confirmation Bias?
- On the Difference Between Realistic and Fantastic Imagining
- Atomism and Fundamentality
- Methodological Deflationism and Semantic Theories
- Is an Increase in Probability Always an Increase in Evidential Support?
- Panqualityism, Awareness and the Explanatory Gap
- Irresolvable Disagreement, Objectivist Antirealism and Logical Revision
- The Parallel Goods of Knowledge and Achievement
- Ontological Pluralism and the Generic Conception of Being
- Doing and Allowing in the Context of Physician-Assisted Suicide
- In Defense of Ordinary Moral Character Judgment
- Backing Without Realism
- Problems for Predictive Information
- Preface Special Issue GAP.10
- Francesco Guala: Understanding Institutions—The Science and Philosophy of Living Together
- The Lycan–Stich Argument and the Plasticity of “Belief”
- Dispositionalism, Causation, and the Interaction Gap
- Towards a Bayesian Account of Perceptual Competence
- Attention, Gestalt Principles, and the Determinacy of Perceptual Content
- The Multi-location Trilemma
- Sensitivity Theorists Aren’t Unhinged
- Group Inquiry
- We Need Non-factive Metaphysical Explanation
- Safety and Necessity
- Naive Realism for Unconscious Perceptions
- Materiality, parthood, and possibility
- The Real Myth of Coherence
- Knowledge and the Many Norms on Action
- Two Problems for the Constitution View of Omissions: A Reply to Palmer
- An Evolutionary Sceptical Challenge to Scientific Realism
- Towards Collective Self-knowledge
- Grounding from a Syntactic Point of View: A Sentential-Logical Approach
- A Generic Figures Reconstruction of Peirce’s Existential Graphs (Alpha)
- What Ought a Fruitful Explicatum to be?
- Naive Russellians and Schiffer’s Puzzle
- Historical Case Studies: The “Model Organisms” of Philosophy of Science
- Disjunction and the Logic of Grounding
- Bayesian Beauty
- Structural Stability in Causal Decision Theory
- Bivs, Space and ‘In’
- Epistemology and the Structure of Language
- Topological Models of Columnar Vagueness
- Explicating ‘Explication’ via Conceptual Spaces
- On the Methodological Restriction of the Principle of Characterization
- The Support Interval
- What Not to Make of Recalcitrant Emotions
- Conventionalism in Early Analytic Philosophy and the Principle of Relativity
- The Intermediate Scope of Consciousness in the Predictive Mind
- Anti-individualism and Phenomenal Content
- Deep Fried Logic
- Emotional Actions Without Goals
- Choice Sequences and the Continuum
- Bayesianism for Non-ideal Agents
- E.T. Jaynes’s Solution to the Problem of Countable Additivity
- Why do the Laws Support Counterfactuals?
- The Likelihood Ratio Measure and the Logicality Requirement
- Physicalism and the Identity of Identity Theories
- Conceptual Engineering and Ways of Believing
- The Polysemy Theory of Sound
- Objectivity and Perspectival Content
- Intending Recalcitrant Social Ends
- How Rich is the Illusion of Consciousness?
- Powerful Problems for Powerful Qualities
- Programming Infinite Machines
- Some Remarks on Popper’s Qualitative Criterion of Verisimilitude
- Rigour and Intuition
- How to Tell If Animals Can Understand Death
- Co-filing and De Jure Co-referential Thought in the Mental Files Framework
- Troubles with Phenomenal Intentionality
- Coordination in Thought
- Not Wanted: On Scharp’s Solution to the Liar
- A Stochastic Graphs Semantics for Conditionals
- Internalism, Externalism, and the KK Principle
- What are Implicit Definitions?
- Reducing Contrastive Knowledge
- The Second Person Perspective
- Mental Causation, Autonomy and Action Theory
- Truth and Conformity on Networks
- Entity Realism About Mental Representations
- A Coherentist Justification of Induction
- Odd Objects: LEM Violations and Indeterminacy
- Fundamentality, Scale, and the Fractional Quantum Hall Effect
- A New Look at ‘Levels of Organization’ in Biology
- Discovering Patterns: On the Norms of Mechanistic Inquiry
- Indeterminism in Physics, Classical Chaos and Bohmian Mechanics: Are Real Numbers Really Real?
- How to Do Things with Theory: The Instrumental Role of Auxiliary Hypotheses in Testing
- Dualism About Possible Worlds
- Is the Reality Criterion Analytic?
- Hoping for Metanormative Realism
- Interworld Disagreement
- Exclusion Criteria in Experimental Philosophy
- Multilocation Without Time Travel
- Whose (Extended) Mind Is It, Anyway?
- Neutral Predication
- Perceptual Existentialism Sustained
- Reconsidering Devitt on Realism and Truth
- Verisimilitude and Truthmaking
- A Justification for the Quantificational Hume Principle
- Moral Responsibility for Actions and Omissions: The Asymmetry Thesis Rejected
- Is that a Threat?
- Mathematics and Explanatory Generality: Nothing but Cognitive Salience
- Composition as Identity, Universalism, and Generic Quantifiers
- The Diversity of Fiction and Copredication: An Accommodation Problem
- On Understanding and Testimony
- Can Every Option Be Rationally Impermissible?
- Absolutism, Relativism and Metaepistemology
- Counterexamples to Some Characterizations of Dilation
- The Deontic Transfer Principle
- Developing Dark Pessimism Towards the Justificatory Role of Introspective Reports
- The Explanatory Role of Concepts
- Cognitive and Computational Complexity: Considerations from Mathematical Problem Solving
- Is Logic Distinctively Normative?
- Why the Empirical Study of Non-philosophical Expertise Does not Undermine the Status of Philosophical Expertise
- The Basis of Debasing Scepticism
- The Logic of Imagination Acts: A Formal System for the Dynamics of Imaginary Worlds
- Chomskyan Arguments Against Truth-Conditional Semantics Based on Variability and Co-predication
- Possibilist Explanation: Explaining How-Possibly Through Laws
- Timothy Williamson’s Coin-Flipping Argument: Refuted Prior to Publication?
- Calibration for Epistemic Causality
- Twofold Pictorial Experience
- On the Proper Treatment of the Churchlands
- The Lump and the Ledger: Material Coincidence at Little-to-No Cost
- The Logic of Fast and Slow Thinking
- What’s Wrong with Modal Conceptions of Luck and Risk
- A Note on Lange on Contingent Necessity-Makers
- Token-Distinctness and the Disjunctive Strategy
- In Defense of Idealization in Public Reason
- Economics, Equilibrium Methods, and Multi-Scale Modeling
- Moral Fixed Points, Rationality and the ‘Why Be Moral?’ Question
- The Geometry of Otto Selz’s Natural Space
- Knowing Possibilities and the Possibility of Knowing: A Further Challenge for the Anti-Realist
- Dualism and Exclusion
- Two Theories of Transparency
- Causal Decision Theory is Safe from Psychopaths
- The Innocence of Truth in Semantic Paradox
- Doxastic Deontology and Cognitive Competence
- Three Varieties of Growing Block Theory
- The Identity Theory of Powers Revised
- Moore’s Paradox: An Evansian Account
- Impermissible Self-Rationalizing Pessimism: In Defence of a Pragmatic Ethics of Belief
- Introspection Without Judgment
- On Dummett’s Pragmatist Justification Procedure
- Moral Hazard, the Savage Framework, and State-Dependent Utility
- What Should we Believe About Free Will?
- The Counterfactual Structure of the Consequence Argument
- Concepts, Conceptions and Self-Knowledge
- No Surprises
- Why Explanatory Considerations Matter
- It Takes More than Moore to Answer Existence-Questions
- Epistemic-State Parallelism: Translating Between Probabilities and Ranks
- Kinds as Universals: A Neo-Aristotelian Approach
- Russell’s Eccentricity
- A Stalnaker Semantics for McGee Conditionals
- Free Will and Desire
- Anchoring in Deliberations
- Metaphysical Explanation: The Kitcher Picture
- Is Objectual Identity Really Dispensable?
- The Speaker Authority Problem for Context-Sensitivity (Or: You Can’t Always Mean What You Want)
- Zoomorphism
- How Science and Semantics Settle the Issue of Natural Kind Essentialism
- Non-eliminative Structuralism, Fregean Abstraction, and Non-rigid Structures
- Confirmation and Meaning Holism Revisited
- Mechanisms and Relations
- Twofileness. A Functionalist Approach to Fictional Characters and Mental Files
- Rawls’s Self-Defeat: A Formal Analysis
- Counterfactuals and Non-exceptionalism About Modal Knowledge
- Indirectly Free Actions, Libertarianism, and Resultant Moral Luck
- Approaching Truth in Conceptual Spaces
- Analytic Metaphysics Versus Naturalized Metaphysics: The Relevance of Applied Ontology
- What is the Point of Reduction in Science?
- Grounding Pluralism: Why and How
- Moral Responsibility Without Personal Identity?
- Metaphysical and Conceptual Grounding
- Prediction Error Minimization as a Framework for Social Cognition Research
- Admissibility Troubles for Bayesian Direct Inference Principles
- The Termination Risks of Simulation Science
- Perceptual Knowledge, Discrimination, and Closure
- Non-contractability and Revenge
- Quine’s Intuition: Why Quine’s Early Nominalism is Naturalistic
- Analyzing Theories in the Frame Model
- Instrumental Rationality Without Separability
- A Minimality Constraint on Grounding
- The Irreducibility of Emotional Phenomenology
- The Self-Hollowing Problem of the Radical Sceptical Paradox
- In Defense of Donnellan on Proper Names
- The Neural Dynamics of Seeing-In
- Faultless Disagreement, Realism and Moral Objectivity
- Realists Waiting for Godot? The Verisimilitudinarian and the Cumulative Approach to Scientific Progress
- Consciousness, Conceivability, and Intrinsic Reduction
- Against Grue Mysteries
- How to Be a Pluralist in Substance Ontology
- Interventionism and Mental Surgery
- The Real Issue with Recalcitrant Emotions: Reply to Grzankowski
- Epistemic Authority, Philosophical Explication, and the Bio-Statistical Theory of Disease
- Causal Emergence and Epiphenomenal Emergence
- Moderate Skeptical Invariantism
- Denialism as Applied Skepticism: Philosophical and Empirical Considerations
- The Replication Argument for Incompatibilism
- Scientific Philosophy and the Critique of Metaphysics from Russell to Carnap to Quine
- The Impossibility of Mere Animal Knowledge for Reflective Subjects
- Undesigned Coincidences and Coherence for an Hypothesis
- Toward a Theory of Concept Mastery: The Recognition View
- Classical Harmony and Separability
- Mind-Brain Dichotomy, Mental Disorder, and Theory of Mind
- Horizontal Surgicality and Mechanistic Constitution
- Propositional Quantification in Bimodal $$mathbf {S5}$$ S 5
- Self-Intimation, Infallibility, and Higher-Order Evidence
- Theories of Fairness and Aggregation
- ISR is Still a Digital Ontology
- Knowledgeably Responding to Reasons
- Relativism and Conservatism
- What Determines the Reference of Names? What Determines the Objects of Thought
- Visual Endurance and Auditory Perdurance
- No Pain, No Gain (in Darwinian Fitness): A Representational Account of Affective Experience
- Self-Deception and the Second Factor: How Desire Causes Delusion in Anorexia Nervosa
- Temporal Ontology and the Metaphysics of Perspectives
- Omissions: The Constitution View Defended
- Four Ways in Which Theories of Belief Revision Could Benefit from Theories of Epistemic Justification
- The Compatibility of Differential Equations and Causal Models Reconsidered
- Cognition and the Web: Extended, Transactive, or Scaffolded?
- On the Nature of Presupposition: A Normative Speech Act Account
- Passing Time
- Why Intentionalism Cannot Explain Phenomenal Character
- On the Argument from Physics and General Relativity
- A Renewed Challenge to Anti-criterialism
- Scientific Mind and Objective World: Thomas Kuhn Between Naturalism and Apriorism
- Variety of Evidence
- Hopeful Monsters: A Note on Multiple Conclusions
- Reconciling Enkrasia and Higher-Order Defeat
- On the Ramsey Test Analysis of ‘Because’
- Willful Ignorance and Bad Motives
- The Actual Future is Open
- Metaphysical Explanation by Constraint
- An Automatic Ockham’s Razor for Bayesians?
- Traditional Internalism and Foundational Justification
- Transcendental Arguments in Scientific Reasoning
- An Alternative Interpretation of Statistical Mechanics
- Monty Hall Saves Dr. Evil: On Elga’s Restricted Principle of Indifference
- Narrative and Characterization
- Logical Principles of Agnosticism
- Actualism, Presentism and the Grounding Objection
- Simplicity and the Meaning of Mental Association
- On the Pareto Condition on Permissible Belief
- Epistemic Self-Trust and Doxastic Disagreements
- What Jancis Robinson Didn’t Know May Have Helped Her
- Are Sensory Concepts Learned by “Abstraction” from Experience?
- An Ontology of Words
- Is the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness Compatible with Russellian Panpsychism?
- Counterfactual Reasoning, Realism and Quantum Mechanics: Much Ado About Nothing?
- Barbara Vetter: Potentiality: From Dispositions to Modality
- Free Will and Two Local Determinisms
- Contested Institutional Facts
- Evolutionary Hypotheses and Moral Skepticism
- Collective Essence and Monotonicity
- The Whence and Whither of Experience
- Faithfulness, Coordination and Causal Coincidences
- Responsibility in Context
- Seeing the Invisible: How to Perceive, Imagine, and Infer the Minds of Others
- Bayesian Convergence and the Fair-Balance Paradox
- The Reasons-Responsiveness Account of Doxastic Responsibility and the Basing Relation
- A Puzzle about Further Facts
- The Implicit Commitment of Arithmetical Theories and Its Semantic Core
- Observations on the Trivial World
- Defining Qualitative Properties
- Generic Generalizations in Science
- Decision and Intervention
- Puzzling Pierre and Intentional Identity
- Against Sider on Fundamentality
- Risk Sensitive Credit
- New Data on the Linguistic Diversity of Authorship in Philosophy Journals
- Against Cognitivism About Personhood
- Old Problems for the Agency Theory of Causal Discourse
- Kitcher, Mathematics, and Apriority
- Putnam’s Diagonal Argument and the Impossibility of a Universal Learning Machine
- Testimonial Knowledge-How
- Two Approaches to Belief Revision
- Philosophical Issues Concerning Phase Transitions and Anyons: Emergence, Reduction, and Explanatory Fictions
- Learning is a Risky Business
- Simple Hyperintensional Belief Revision
- Failures of Warrant Transmission: The Role of Presupposition
- Free Will is Not a Testable Hypothesis
- Big Systems Versus Stocky Tangles: It Can Matter to the Details
- Freedom and the Phenomenology of Agency
- How the Modalities Come into the World
- The Claims of Future Persons
- Group Assertion
- Implications of Intensional Perceptual Ascriptions for Relationalism, Disjunctivism, and Representationalism About Perceptual Experience
- Objectivity, Ambiguity, and Theory Choice
- Iñigo González-Ricoy and Axel Gosseries (eds.): Institutions for Future Generations
- Quantity Tropes and Internal Relations
- Names and Their Kind of Rigidity
- Determination and Uniformity: The Problem with Speech-Act Theories of Fiction
- What Work the Fundamental?
- The Powers View of Properties, Fundamental Ontology, and Williams’s Arguments for Static Dispositions
- Subjectivity and Mineness
- Would the Existence of CTCs Allow for Nonlocal Signaling?
- Presentism Remains
- Entities Without Identity: A Semantical Dilemma
- Method Coherence and Epistemic Circularity
- Impossible Worlds and the Logic of Imagination
- Minds Within Minds: An Infinite Descent of Mentality in a Physical World
- The Ontology of Digital Physics
- The Myth of Mere Movement
- Deontic Modals: Why Abandon the Default Approach
- Inherent Dignity, Contingent Dignity and Human Rights: Solving the Puzzle of the Protection of Dignity
- Non-literal Lies
- Action Is Enabled by Systematic Misrepresentations
- The Explication Defence of Arguments from Reference
- An Isolation Objection to Phenomenal Conservatism
- Fitting Attitude Theory and the Normativity of Jokes
- Ramsey Equivalence
- Moral Responsibility, Luck, and Compatibilism
- Chance, Resiliency, and Humean Supervenience
- A New Method for Establishing high-level Visual Content: The Conflict cross-modal Approach
- Cognitive Penetration and Memory Colour Effects
- Gunky Objects, Junky Worlds, and Weak Mereological Universalism
- Agent-Awareness in Reflective Knowledge
- Godehard Bruntrup and Ludwig Jaskolla (eds): Panpsychism—Contemporary Perspectives
- Dynamics and Diversity in Epistemic Communities
- Four Meta-methods for the Study of Qualia
- Against Virtual Selves
- Uniqueness, Rationality, and the Norm of Belief
- Newman’s Objection and the No Miracles Argument
- Bent, Not Broken: Why Exemplification Simpliciter Remains a Problem for Eternalist Endurantism
- Sustainability and the Infinite Future: A Case Study of a False Modeling Assumption in Environmental Economics
- Metaphysics and the Vera Causa Ideal: The Nun’s Priest’s Tale
- The Moral Objection to Modal Realism
- E=K and The Gettier Problem: A Reply to Comesaña and Kantin
- Do Compatibilists Need Alternative Possibilities?
- A Note on Morato on Modality and Explanation
- Cognitive Penetration Lite and Nonconceptual Content
- Reconciling Contrastive and Non-contrastive Explanation
- Balint’s Syndrome, Visual Motion Perception, and Awareness of Space
- Mathematical Explanations that are Not Proofs
- Personal Identity, Substantial Change, and the Significance of Becoming
- Comments on Stephen Yablo’s Aboutness
- The Sense and Reality of Personal Identity
- Russell and the Temporal Contiguity of Causes and Effects
- No Interpretation of Probability
- What is Wrong with Self-Grounding?
- Epistemic Modals and Alternative Possibilities
- Explication, H-D Confirmation, and Simplicity
- Constitution and Identity
- Perspectival Tenses and Dynamic Tenses
- What Makes Evolution a Defeater?
- Blurring Boundaries: Carnap, Quine, and the Internal–External Distinction
- The Collapse of Logical Pluralism has been Greatly Exaggerated
- An Argument for Shape Internalism
- Experience and Justification: Revisiting McDowell’s Empiricism
- Counting on Strong Composition as Identity to Settle the Special Composition Question
- Boltzmannian Immortality
- Against Naturalized Cognitive Propositions
- Unjustified Defeaters
- Time Scales and Levels of Organization
- Contextualism, Relativism and the Liar
- A Multiply Qualified Conditional Analysis of Disposition Ascription: Mapping the Conceptual Topography of Ceteris Paribus
- Compatibilism and Retributivist Desert Moral Responsibility: On What is of Central Philosophical and Practical Importance
- Epistemic Authority: Preemption or Proper Basing?
- The Reality of Field’s Epistemological Challenge to Platonism
- Neuropsychology and the Criminal Responsibility of Psychopaths: Reconsidering the Evidence
- Size and Function
- Disquotation and Infinite Conjunctions
- Counterfactual Skepticism and Multidimensional Semantics
- Normal Causes for Normal Effects: Reinvigorating the Correspondence Hypothesis About Judgments of Actual Causation
- Communicating Egocentric Beliefs: Two-Content Accounts
- Abstract Objects, Causal Efficacy, and Causal Exclusion
- The Coincidentalist Reply to the No-Miracles Argument
- Social Knowledge and Supervenience Revisited
- Hempel, Grue and the Logical Empiricist Baseline
- Unity As An Epistemic Virtue
- Expression and Guidance in Schroeder’s Expressivist Semantics
- The Lottery, the Preface, and Conditions on Permissible Belief
- Probabilistic Approaches to Vagueness and Semantic Competency
- Nominalism and Comparative Similarity
- Intuition Talk is Not Methodologically Cheap: Empirically Testing the “Received Wisdom” About Armchair Philosophy
- Intergenerational Rights and the Problem of Cross-Temporal Relations
- Responding to Skepticism About Doxastic Agency
- Enduring Through Gunk
- Machery’s Alternative to Concepts and the Problem of Content
- Actuality, Tableaux, and Two-Dimensional Modal Logics
- Singular Thought, Cognitivism, and Conscious Attention
- Goals and the Informativeness of Prior Probabilities
- Learning and Pooling, Pooling and Learning
- Why is There Something Rather Than Nothing? A Logical Investigation
- Three Questions About Immunity to Error Through Misidentification
- Learning from Simple Indicative Conditionals
- “That Will Do”: Logics of Deontic Necessity and Sufficiency
- Content Externalism and Quine’s Criterion are Incompatible
- Why Truth-Conditional Semantics in Generative Linguistics is Still the Better Bet
- The Fragility of Common Knowledge
- Three Cheers for Dispositions: A Dispositional Approach to Acting for a Normative Reason
- The Contingency Problem for Neo-Conventionalism
- Intensional Perceptual Ascriptions
- Language from the Ground Up: A Study of Homesign Communication
- The Real Trouble with Recalcitrant Emotions
- Derivational Robustness and Indirect Confirmation
- Dretske on Self-Knowledge and Contrastive Focus: How to Understand Dretske’s Theory, and Why It Matters
- Who is Afraid of Commitment? On the Relation of Scientific Evidence and Conceptual Theory
- Persons, Stages, and Tensed Belief
- The Problem of Error: The Moral Psychology Argument for Atheism
- The Moral Agency of Group Agents
- Modal Platonism and the Problem of Negativity
- Objectivity, Historicity, Taxonomy
- The Brave Officer Rides Again
- From Geometry to Conceptual Relativity
- On Theory Construction in Physics: Continuity from Classical to Quantum
- Emergence, Dependence, and Fundamentality
- Carnap’s Relevance Measure as a Probabilistic Measure of Coherence
- Simon Friederich: Interpreting Quantum Theory: A Therapeutic Approach
- Against the Complex versus Simple Distinction
- Decision Theoretic Model of the Productivity Gap
- Combining Analogical Support in Pure Inductive Logic
- The Developmental Challenge to the Paradox of Pain
- Material Constitution is Ad Hoc
- On Ian Hacking’s Notion of Style of Reasoning
- Freedom with Causation
- Probabilism, Representation Theorems, and Whether Deliberation Crowds Out Prediction
- Internalism and the Problem of Stored Beliefs
- Understanding the Intentions Behind the Referential/Attributive Distinction
- A Theory of Epistemic Supererogation
- Verbal Disputes and the Varieties of Verbalness
- A Role for Judgment Aggregation in Coauthoring Scientific Papers
- Inclusive Fitness Theory and the Evolution of Mind and Language
- Vagueness and Aggregation in Multiple Sender Channels
- Selection in a Complex World: Deriving Causality from Stable Equilibrium
- Why Live Forever? What Metaphysics Can Contribute
- Kant, Schlick and Friedman on Space, Time and Gravity in Light of Three Lessons from Particle Physics