- Stabilization of phenomenon and meaning
- An antidote for hawkmoths: on the prevalence of structural chaos in non-linear modeling
- What distinguishes data from models?
- On the interpretation of Feynman diagrams, or, did the LHC experiments observe H → γγ ?
- A refinement to the general mechanistic account
- Understanding does not depend on (causal) explanation
- Two challenges for a boolean approach to constitutive inference
- Epistemology for interdisciplinary research – shifting philosophical paradigms of science
- Multiple Realizability as a design heuristic in biological engineering
- In defense of Newtonian induction: Hume’s problem of induction and the universalization of primary qualities
- Why computer simulations are not inferences, and in what sense they are experiments
- Water has a microstructural essence after all
- Variation of information as a measure of one-to-one causal specificity
- The division of advisory labour: the case of ‘mitochondrial donation’
- Modeling creative abduction Bayesian style
- Symmetry arguments against regular probability: A reply to recent objections
- From ontic structural realism to metaphysical coherentism
- What we (should) talk about when we talk about fruitfulness
- Autopoiesis, biological autonomy and the process view of life
- Explaining the modal force of natural laws
- “So … who is your audience?”
- The division of cognitive labor: two missing dimensions of the debate
- EPSA17: Selected papers from the biannual conference in Exeter
- Correction to: “Dealing with the changeable and blurry edges of living things: a modified version of property-cluster kinds”
- ‘Physics is a kind of metaphysics’: Émile Meyerson and Einstein’s late rationalistic realism
- Scientific polarization
- Correction to: Multiple diversity concepts and their ethical-epistemic implications
- Methodological empiricism and the choice of measurement models in social sciences
- “Dealing with the changeable and blurry edges of living things: a modified version of property-cluster kinds”
- The in-principle inconclusiveness of causal evidence in macroeconomics
- Explanation and abstraction from a backward-error analytic perspective
- Multiple diversity concepts and their ethical-epistemic implications
- Interpreting theories without a spacetime
- The limits of Humeanism
- The Janus head of Bachelard’s phenomenotechnique: from purification to proliferation and back
- Definition in mathematics
- Integrative taxonomy and the operationalization of evolutionary independence
- The objectivity of Subjective Bayesianism
- Justifying the principle of indifference
- The wave-function as a multi-field
- Histories in quantum mechanics: distinguishing between formalism and interpretation
- The Infinity from Nothing paradox and the Immovable Object meets the Irresistible Force
- Physics’ silence on time
- Induction and knowledge-what
- Correction to John D. Norton “How to build an infinite lottery machine”
- The economy of nature: the structure of evolution in Linnaeus, Darwin, and the modern synthesis
- Explanatory integration
- Abstraction in ecology: reductionism and holism as complementary heuristics
- Euler’s Königsberg: the explanatory power of mathematics
- Token physicalism and functional individuation
- Stop making sense of Bell’s theorem and nonlocality?
- Editors’ letter
- A (Fatal) Trilemma for best theory realism
- The turn of the valve: representing with material models
- Frames and concepts in the philosophy of science
- Fine-tuning in the context of Bayesian theory testing
- Are computer simulations experiments? And if not, how are they related to each other?
- Simplified models: a different perspective on models as mediators
- Values and evidence: how models make a difference
- Against fields
- Erratum to: How to build an infinite lottery machine
- On the justification of deduction and induction
- Conceptual clarification and implicit-association tests: psychometric evidence for racist attitudes
- Synthetic biology and the search for alternative genetic systems: Taking how-possibly models seriously
- Michelangelo’s stone: an argument against platonism in mathematics
- Modeling the social organization of science
- Relationalism about mechanics based on a minimalist ontology of matter
- Does the counterfactual theory of explanation apply to non-causal explanations in metaphysics?
- Dutch Books and nonclassical probability spaces
- On the presumed superiority of analytical solutions over numerical methods
- Aporia of power: On the crises, science, and internal dynamics of the mental health field
- Variety-of-evidence reasoning about the distant past
- Epistemology of causal inference in pharmacology
- How to built an infinite lottery machine
- Surrealistic Bohmian trajectories appraised
- What’s so special about empirical adequacy?
- A condition for transitivity in high probability
- The philosophical significance of Stein’s paradox
- Robustness analysis and tractability in modeling
- Theoretical fertility McMullin-style
- Scientific explanation and understanding: unificationism reconsidered
- Conceptual fragmentation and the rise of eliminativism
- Presentism and black holes
- What can polysemy tell us about theories of explanation?
- Regularity and infinitely tossed coins
- Using conceptual spaces to exhibit conceptual continuity through scientific theory change
- Using science, making policy: what should we worry about?
- Reconstructing the upward path to structural realism
- Evo-devo: a science of dispositions
- Pattern as observation: Darwin’s ‘great facts’ of geographical distribution
- Malfunctions and teleology
- Inference to the best explanation as a theory for the quality of mechanistic evidence in medicine