- Spinoza on the Conditions that Nominally Define the Human Condition
- William King’s Influence on Locke’s Second Edition Change of Mind about Human Action and Freedom
- Anne Conway and Henry More on Freedom
- Selfhood and Self-government in Women’s Religious Writings of the Early Modern Period
- Disagreement, Dogmatism, and the Bounds of Philosophy
- The Inner Work of Liberty: Cudworth on Desire and Attention
- Gabrielle Suchon, Freedom, and the Neutral Life
- The Method of Cases in Context
- Response to Akagi, Hughes, and Springle
- Precis of Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds
- Finding the Bounds of Machery’s Critique
- A Kantian-brandomian View of Concepts and The Problem of a Regress of Norms
- A Kantian-Brandomian View of Concepts and The Problem of a Regress of Norms
- Editors’ Introduction to ‘Hegel and Sellars’: A Special Issue of International Journal of Philosophical Studies
- Between Causes and Reasons: Sellars, Hegel (and Lewis) on “Sensation”
- A New Theory of Stupidity
- Structure Disclosed. Replete Moments and Aesthetic Experience in Reading Novels
- On Empathy
- Constructivism, Intersubjectivity, Provability, and Triviality
- Hegel and Sellars on the Unity of Things
- The Contribution of Empathy to Ethics
- Kant on Acting from Juridical Duty
- The Myth of the Taken: Why Hegel Is Not a Conceptualist
- Rethinking Sellars’ Myth of the Given: From the Epistemological to the Modal Relevance of Givenness in Kant and Hegel
- The Normative Underpinnings of Democracy and the Balance between Morality and Legitimacy
- Pathophobia, Vices, and Illness
- The Non-Conceptual Dimension of Social Mediation: Toward a Materialist Aufhebung of Hegel
- The Empathetic Soldier
- Empathy, Vulnerability and Anxiety
- The Relational Value of Empathy
- Beyond Empathy: Vulnerability, Relationality and Dementia
- No Empathy for Empathy: An Existential Reading of Husserl’s Forgotten Question
- Finding Empathy: How Neuroscientific Measures, Evidence and Conceptualizations Interact
- Language, Behaviour, and Empathy. G.H. Mead’s and W.V.O. Quine’s Naturalized Theories of Meaning
- Verbs, Times and Objects
- Relational Empathy
- Empathy, Respect, and Vulnerability
- Scientism and Scientific Imperialism
- Place and Displacement: Towards a Distopological Approach
- Phenomenology, Naturalism and Science: A Hybrid and Heretical Proposal
- The Nature of Emotions
- Does History Make Sense? Hegel on the Historical Shapes of Justice
- An Excess of Excellence: Aristotelian Supererogation and the Degrees of Virtue
- Factualism and the Scientific Image
- Substances
- The Disappearance of Change: Towards a Process Account of Persistence
- Self-Defeating Beliefs and Misleading Reasons
- Between Factualism and Substantialism: Structuralism as a Third Way
- Of Facts and Things
- Temporary and Contingent Instantiation as Partial Identity
- Substances, Facts and the Problem of Complexity
- Expressivism without Mentalism in Meta-Ontology
- Operators Solve the Many Categories Problem with Universals
- Can Metaphysical Structuralism Solve the Plurality Problem?
- Response to Critics: The Influence Account of Responsible Belief Defended
- Peels on Ignorance as a Moral Excuse
- Control over Our Beliefs? A Response to Peels
- Responsible Belief: A Theory in Ethics and Epistemology, by Rik Peels, New York, Oxford University Press, 2017