- Death, Value, Gratitude, and Solace – A Response to Bradley, McAleer, and Rosati
- 8-Tracks, The Demands of Gratitude and Harmonious Stews – Comments on Josh Glasgow’s The Solace
- Glasgow on Death’s Badness and Radiant Value
- Comments on Glasgow, The Solace
- Engagement, Experience, and Value – Reply to Critics
- The Solace – A Précis
- Interesting Experiences
- Perception, Justification, and Knowledge – A Response in Defense of Seeing, Knowing, and Doing: A Perceptualist Account
- Do All Interesting Experiences Add to the Quality of Life? – A Response to Lorraine Besser
- Does Knowledge Entail Justifications?
- Reimagining the Quality of Life
- Reasoning and Perceptual Foundationalism – Comments on Robert Audi’s Seeing, Knowing, and Doing: A Perceptualist Account
- Perception, Justification, and Philosophical Truths – A Commentary on Robert Audi’s Seeing, Knowing and Doing: A Perceptualist Account
- Political Normativity as Functional Normativity – A Reply to Erman and Möller
- Précis of Seeing, Knowing, and Doing: A Perceptualist Account
- The Problem of Political Normativity Understood as Functional Normativity
- Still Pessimistic about First-Person Authority – A Response to Doyle and Winokur
- Evidentialism, Rational Deliberation, and the Basing Relation
- Leibniz and the Status of Possible Worlds
- Polarization Measurement, First-Person Authority, and Political Meaning
- The Moral Significance of Agent-Regret
- Integrity, Genericity, and the Limits of Reasons
- Are Cultural Explanations for Racial Disparities Racist?
- An Error Theory for Misanthropy
- Trust, Inquiry and Partiality: Comments on Goldberg’s Conversational Pressure
- Proper Social and Epistemic Expectations In Speech Exchange: Reply to Goldberg
- Reply to Breno Santos
- Reply to Rik Peels
- Reply to Charity Anderson
- Reply to Amy Flowerree
- On What We Owe in Attention
- Entitled to Attention? Cooperativity, Context, and Standing
- Understanding Logical Evidence, With Lessons From The Paradoxes
- Precis of Conversational Pressure
- The Role of Picturing In Sellars’s Practical Philosophy
- Knowing Your Mind by Making Up Your Mind Without Changing Your Mind, Too Much
- There Is Something to the Authority Thesis
- Reliability, Accessibility, and Justified Credence
- Replies to Vrinda Dalmiya and Stacey McElroy-Heltzel
- Epistemic Virtues and Vices as Attitudes: Implications for Empirical Measures and Virtue Interventions
- Measure for Measure: Exploring the Virtues of Vice Epistemology
- Precis of the Mismeasure of the Self
- Descartes on the Unity of the Virtues
- Unlucky on Twin Earth
- Cruelty, Sadism, and the Joy of Inflicting Pain for its Own Sake
- Why We Should Stop Fethishing Democracy
- The Chalmers Trilemma Re-examined
- There’s Something About Authority
- Dinosaurs and Reasonable Disagreement
- Begging the Question Against a Peer?
- How to Do Philosophical Things With Words
- Assertions and Their Function
- Is there a Human Right to Subsistence Goods? – A Dilemma for Practice-based Theorists
- Loyalty, Justice, and Limit-Situations
- On the Cultivation of Civic Friendship
- Was it Polarization or Propaganda?
- Talisse’s Overdoing Democracy and the Inevitability of Conflict
- Synopsis of Overdoing Democracy
- Why we Should Stop Fethishing Democracy
- The Relevance of Noncomparability for Agency
- Our Singular Absurdities
- Misanthropy and Misanthropes
- A Word Against Misanthropy
- The Hope of Meaningful Immortality
- Humankind, Animals and Misanthropy
- Varieties of Philosophical Misanthropy
- On Self-Conceit in Kant and the Limits of Arrogance-Centered Theories of Immorality
- Intellectual Virtues and Biased Understanding
- Al-Ghazālī and Descartes on Defeating Skepticism
- Truthfulness without Truth
- Interactionist Moral Character and the Causal-Constitutive Fallacy
- An Interpretation of Sartre’s Phenomenology of the Image as a Phenomenology of the Sign
- Grounding Deep Friendships – Reconciling the Moralized and Aestheticized Views
- Eudaimonism, Egoism, and Responsibility for Oneself
- The Cartesian Doxastic Argument For Free Will
- Two Conceptions of Omissions
- Can There Be Ineffable Propositional Structures?
- Consciousness and Topology
- Acting with Good Intentions – Virtue Ethics and the Principle that Ought Implies Can
- Complex Akrasia and Blameworthiness
- Purposes, Parts, and Persons
- Welfare-Prior Eudaimonism, Excellence-Prior Eudaimonism, and the Self-Absorption Objection
- Replies to Nancy E. Snow and Jennifer Cole Wright
- What Gary Couldn’t Imagine
- Distributing Welfare and Resources – A Multi-Currency View
- Home and Our Need For It
- Commentary On The Character Gap – A Case For Vice
- Commentary On The Character Gap – Situational Influences and Helping Behavior
- Précis of The Character Gap – How Good Are We?
- Reasons and Beliefs
- What the Humean Theory of Motivation Gets Wrong
- On Armstrong’s Difficulties with Adequate Truthmaking Restrictions
- Doxastic Responsibility is Owed to Others – Against Subjectivism
- How Lewis Can Meet the Integration Challenge
- The Social Dimension of Responsible Belief: Response to Sanford Goldberg
- Three Transparency Principles Examined
- Classification of Disjunctivism about the Phenomenology of Visual Experience
- Responsible Belief, Influence, and Control: Response to Stephen White
- Against Voluntarism about Doxastic Responsibility
- A Phenomenal Defense of Reflective Equilibrium
- Disavowing Hate – Group Egotism From Westboro to the Klan
- The Substance-attributes Relationship in Cartesian Dualism
- Aristotle on the Indetermination of Accidental Causes and Chance
- Uncovering a Tension – Democracy, Immigration, and the Nation-State
- Dispositional Essentialism, Directedness, and Inclination to an End
- On a Misguided Argument for the Necessity of Identity
- Making Sense of the Sentence – Nicomachean Ethics I.2.1094a18–22
- Objections to Jeremy Simon’s Response to Lucretius’s Symmetry Argument
- Kripkenstein on Belief
- Dependency Care before Pizza – A Reply to Narveson
- Epistemic Environmentalism
- Epistemic Insouciance
- Bhandary on Liberal Care Provision
- Is There Anything to the Authority Thesis?
- Even Worse Than It Seems – Transformative Experience and the Selection Problem
- What Is Wrong With a Thumping Liar
- The Character of the Hypocrite
- Deep Epistemic Vices
- Intellectual Servility and Timidity
- Rescuing Nietzsche From Constitutivism
- Normative Pragmatism, Interpretationism, and Discursive Recognition
- Context and Logical Consequence
- Can’t Buy Me Love – A Reply to Brennan and Jaworski
- Hard-heartedness and Libertarianism Again – A Rejoinder to Double
- The Hard-Heartedness of some Libertarians – A Reply to John Lemos
- Markets in Votes, Voter Liberty, and the Burden of Justification
- Fictional Realism, Linguistic Indeterminacy, and Criteria of ‘Identity’
- Death and Other Untimely Events
- What’s Done, Is Done
- Traditional Compatibilism Reformulated and Defended
- Counterfactuals of Freedom and the Luck Objection to Libertarianism
- The Actual and the Possible
- An Analysis of Reliance
- Collective Action and Rational Choice Explanations
- Reasoning with Unconditional Intention
- A New Puzzle For Hedonistic Theories of Value
- Heterogeneous Rationality and Reasonable Disagreement in the Original Position
- Rescue, Beneficence, and Contempt for Humanity
- A Natural Fit – Natural Law Theory, Virtue Epistemology, and the Value of Knowledge
- Knowing-that, Knowing-how, or Knowing-to? – Wang Yangming’s Conception of Moral Knowledge (Liangzhi)
- Bound Cognition
- Bifurcated Sceptical Invariantism – Between Gettier Cases and Saving Epistemic Appearances
- On the Alleged Exceptional Nature of Thought in Spinoza
- Liberal Dependency Care
- Achilles, the Tortoise, and the Time Machine – A Carrollian Dialogue
- Due Measure and the Dialectical Method in Plato’s Statesman
- Epistemology Without Certainty or Necessity
- The Human – Neither “Man” Nor God
- The Structure of Accountability – An Analysis Applied to Animals
- Kamm’s Doctrine of Triple Effect and Non-State-of-Mind Principle
- Motivational Judgement Internalism and the Problem of Supererogation
- Intentionality and Sensory Consciousness in Kant
- Brandom’s Account of Reasoning – Nonmonotonic, But Does Not Allow Entitlement Recovery
- Cinematic Realism Revisited – A Kantian Perspective
- The Overturning of Heidegger’s Fundamental Ontology
- Cartesian Passions – Our (Imperfect) Natural Guides Towards Perfection
- Pritchard’s Reasons
- Culpable Ignorance – A Reply to Robichaud
- Reply to Blackson
- Can Consequentialism Require Selfishness?
- Epistemological Disjunctivism – Responses to My Critics
- Comments on Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism
- Rule Consequentialism and Moral Relativism
- The Legacy of Salomon Maimon – Philosophy as a System Actualized In Freedom
- In Defense of Tracing
- Morality or “False Consciousness”? How Moral Naturalists Can Answer Thrasymachus’s Challenge
- Transcendence and Non-Contradiction
- A Counterexample to the Breckenridge-Magidor Account of Instantial Reasoning
- The Indispensability and Irreducibility of Intentional Objects
- How Holy is the Disjunctivist Grail?
- “Technology” as the Critical Social Theory of Human Technicity
- Précis of Epistemological Disjunctivism
- Against Weatherson on How to Frame a Decision Problem
- Sellars, Meillassoux, and the Myth of the Categorial Given – A Sellarian Critique of “Correlationism” and Meilassoux’s “Speculative Realism”