- Pain without inference
- Judging for ourselves
- Against anti‐fanaticism
- Dialetheism and the countermodel problem
- The duty to listen
- Better guesses
- Bilateralism, coherence, and incoherence
- Heidegger’s argument for fascism
- Intellectual humility without limits: Magnanimous humility, disagreement and the epistemology of resistance
- Moral agency under oppression
- Save the five: Meeting Taurek’s challenge
- I expect you to be happy, so I see you smile: A multidimensional account of emotion attribution
- Welfare and autonomy under risk
- Slurring silences
- What is social organizing?
- Justification, normalcy and randomness
- Attention as selection for action defended
- What is conceptual engineering good for? The argument from nameability
- Absence and objectivity
- Emotion, attention, and reason
- Treating people as individuals and as members of groups
- Précis of The World According to Kant―Appearances and Things in Themselves in Critical Idealism, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2021
- Kantian appearances and intentional objects
- Grounding empirical in transcendental reality
- Ontologically grounding appearances in experience: Transcendental Idealism according to Anja Jauernig’s The World According to Kant
- Intentional objects and experience ―Response to my critics
- Number nativism
- What the golden rule teaches us about ethics
- Awareness by degree
- Bad faith as true contradiction: On the dialetheist interpretation of Sartre
- Prudential Value and Impersonal Value
- Brute ignorance
- Moral equality and social hierarchy
- Are there subintentional actions?
- Getting back in shape: Persistence, shape, and relativity
- Credences for strict conditionals
- Determinism, deliberation, and responsibility
- Indirect evaluative voluntarism
- A causal modeler’s guide to double effect reasoning
- Chance, ability, and control
- Inquiry for the mistaken and confused
- Two concepts of directed obligation
- Infinite inference and mathematical conventionalism
- How to make up your mind
- Why better safe than sensitive
- Naturalized knowledge‐first and the epistemology of groups
- Engineering social concepts: Feasibility and causal models
- Responding to second‐order reasons
- Perspectives and good dispositions
- States of affairs and our connection with the good
- The identity of what? Pluralism, practical interests, and individuation
- What is philosophical progress?
- Why prevent human extinction?
- Internalizing rules
- Precis of belief, inference, and the self‐conscious mind
- Some challenges raised by unconscious belief
- Marcus on self‐conscious knowledge of belief
- Marcus on forms of judgment and the theoretical orientation of the mind
- Replies to Leite, Shaw, and Campbell
- Regions, extensions, distances, diameters
- Probability discounting and money pumps
- Parity and Pareto
- Resolving to believe: Kierkegaard’s direct doxastic voluntarism
- Of seeming disagreement
- Replies to Alex Byrne, Mike Martin, and Nico Orlandi
- Seeing or Saying?
- Précis of Seeing and Saying
- Language and representationalism1
- Episodic imagining, temporal experience, and beliefs about time
- Leibniz as a virtue ethicist
- The new evil demon problem at 40
- Knowledge‐by‐Acquaintance First
- Causal modeling in multilevel settings: A new proposal
- Commonsense morality and contact with value
- Autonomy and aesthetic valuing
- Abstraction and grounding
- Comparative opinion loss
- On behalf of the moral realist
- Realism, disagreement, and explanation
- Replies to Rosen, Leiter, and Dutilh Novaes
- Précis of morality and mathematics
- The relevance of salience for the epistemology of mathematics
- Inquiry beyond knowledge
- The unity of knowledge
- The Geach‐Kaplan sentence reconsidered
- Why Mary left her room
- Causal decision theory, context, and determinism
- Embracing self‐defeat in normative theory
- Practical wisdom as conviction in Aristotle’s ethics
- On Sarah McGrath’s Moral Knowledge
- Moral knowledge precis
- Moral knowledge replies to critics
- The sources of moral knowledge
- Where does moral knowledge come from?
- Comments on McGrath
- How to be minimalist about shared agency
- Standing up for supervenience
- Making sense of things: Moral inquiry as hermeneutical inquiry
- Will intelligent machines become moral patients?
- Is truth inconsistent?
- The epistemic insignificance of phenomenal force
- Reply to Bhandary, Fowler, Laden, Quong, and Weithman
- Fair equality of opportunity and the gendered division of labor
- Précis: Liberalism, neutrality, and the gendered division of labor
- Comprehensive autonomy, political neutrality, and the case for gender equality
- On the diverse priorities of autonomous women
- Comment on Gina Schouten
- Arguments philosophical and political
- Partiality, Asymmetries, and Morality’s Harmonious Propensity
- The Dworkin–Williams debate: Liberty, conceptual integrity, and tragic conflict in politics
- Two kinds of curiosity
- In defense of guilt‐tripping
- Regulative rules: A distinctive normative kind
- Pessimism and procreation
- De Se Names
- Rational risk‐aversion: Good things come to those who weight
- Charitable matching and moral credit
- Overbooking: Permissible when and only when scaled up
- Faith and rational deference to authority
- Moral Worth and Skillful Action
- Accessibilism without consciousness
- Replies to Feldman, Greco, and Malmgren
- Beliefs as dispositions to make judgments
- Smithies on higher‐order evidence
- The epistemic role of consciousness
- Hume’s skeptical philosophy and the moderation of pride
- On Penance
- Philosophy’s Past: Cognitive Values and the History of Philosophy
- Two sorts of biological kind terms: The cases of ‘rice’ and ‘Rio de janeiro Myrtle’
- THE AIM OF INQUIRY?
- Recalibrating evolutionary debunking
- Theories of Perceptual Content and Cases of Reliable Spatial Misperception
- The good fit
- Responses to Darwall, Watson, Arneson, and Helmreich
- Margaret Gilbert on “Rights and Demands”
- Legal Rights and Joint Commitment
- On Margaret Gilbert’s Rights and Demands
- Precis of Rights and Demands: A Foundational Inquiry
- Chloe and Fern, Cam and Donna: The denial of moral demand‐rights. Comments on Margaret Gilbert’s Rights and Demands: a Foundational Inquiry
- Why bounded rationality (in epistemology)?
- An attempt at a general solution to the problem of deviant causal chains
- Doncaster pandas and Caesar’s armadillo
- On proper presupposition
- Intellectual humility: A no‐distraction account
- Ethics without numbers
- Counterfactual skepticism is (just) skepticism
- Précis of articulating the moral community
- Moral powers and the moral community: Comment on Richardson
- Replies to Cruft, Radzik, and Misak
- Richardson on the construction of moral norms
- Richardson on moral innovation
- Restricting the T‐schema to solve the liar
- The Euthyphro challenge in metasemantics
- The selective advantage of representing correctly
- Resistance to Evidence and the Duty to Believe
- Internalist Semantics: Comments on Paul Pietroski, Conjoining Meanings
- Meaning without Information: Comments on Paul Pietroski’s Conjoining Meanings
- Precis of Conjoining Meanings
- Epistemic probabilities are degrees of support, not degrees of (rational) belief
- Foundationalism and empirical reason: On the rational significance of observation
- Expressivism and moral independence
- Third‐personal evidence for perceptual confidence
- Bias, Norms, Introspection, and the Bias Blind Spot
- Desert of Blame
- Noncognitivism without expressivism
- Decision, Causality, and Predetermination
- Vows Without a Self
- Grounding identity in existence
- Varieties of Moral Mistake
- Pascal’s birds: Signs and significance in nature
- Précis of Karen Neander’s A Mark of the Mental
- Kolors Without Colors, Representation Without Intentionality
- Neander on a Mark of the Mental
- Response to Neander’s Critics
- The elusive role of normal‐proper function in cognitive science
- Erratum to Chance and the Continuum Hypothesis
- Symmetric relations, symmetric theories, and Pythagrapheanism
- Entitlement and misleading evidence
- Conditionalism, Intrinsicalism, and Pleasure in the Bad
- A new problem for rules
- Suffering as Experiential – A Response to Jennifer Corns
- Gendered affordance perception and unequal domestic labour
- Causal counterfactuals without miracles or backtracking
- The Asymmetry, Uncertainty, and the Long Term
- Semiotics in the head: Thinking about and thinking through symbols
- Increasing the risk that someone will die without increasing the risk that you will kill them
- Humans, animals, and the world we share
- Précis of fellow creatures: Our obligations to the other animals
- Valuing animals, nature, and our own animal nature: A reply to Maclean, Schapiro, and Wallace
- Mattering, value, and our obligations to the animals
- Animal nature within and without: A comment on Korsgaard’s Fellow Creatures
- Trust and Trustworthiness
- Languages and language use
- Excessive Testimony: When Less Is More
- Locke’s Aristotelian theory of quantity
- Personal ideals and the ideal of rational agency
- Dutch‐Booking Indicative Conditionals
- The epistemic imagination revisited
- The Metaphysics of Gender is (Relatively) Substantial
- Shame & Guilt: From Deigh to Strawson & Hume, and now to the Stoics
- Principles of Proportionate Punishment: Comments on John Deigh, From Psychology to Morality: Essays in Ethical Naturalism
- The Utility of a Psychoanalytic Theory of Law
- Précis of From Psychology to Morality: Essays in Ethical Naturalism
- Replies to Sherman, Nussbaum, and Berman
- Foreknowledge requires determinism
- Sensible individuation
- What’s the Coincidence in Debunking?
- Rationality: What difference does it make?
- Forever fitting feelings
- Risky belief
- Letting go of blame
- Searching for social properties
- Deviating from the ideal
- A‐Rational Epistemological Disjunctivism
- A sensible experientialism?
- A new well‐being atomism
- Contrastive consent and secondary permissibility1
- Reference and morphology
- Epistemic advantage on the margin: A Network Standpoint Epistemology
- The distinct moral importance of acting together
- Cullity on The Foundations of Morality
- Précis: Concern, Respect, and Cooperation
- Foundations, Derivations, Applications: Replies to Bykvist, Arpaly, Steele, and Tenenbaum
- Comments on Cullity
- Cullity’s system‐building
- Living with absurdity: A Nobleman’s guide
- Thinking and being sure*
- Précis of Conscious Experience: A Logical Inquiry#
- Gupta has built a magnificent mansion, but can we live in it?
- A Counter‐Reformation
- Overthrow the Orthodoxy! Replies to Hill, Titus, and Sosa
- Implications of the substantive nature of empirical reason
- Epistemic entitlement, epistemic risk and leaching
- Death and existential value: In defence of Epicurus
- Normality, safety and knowledge
- Categorical phenomenalism about sexual orientation*
- Meta‐Skepticism
- A metalinguistic and computational approach to the problem of mathematical omniscience
- Eliminating epistemic rationality#
- In the spirit of Hegel?
- Notes on A Spirit of Trust
- Replies to Honneth, McDowell, Pippin, and Stern
- Demoralizing Recognition
- Précis of A Spirit of Trust: A Reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology
- “All for one and one for all”
- Imagination as a Process
- Complaints and tournament population ethics
- Seeing and visual reference
- Representation and rationality
- Immunity to error through misidentification in observer memories: A moderate separatist account
- Procedural chances and the equality of claims
- Epistemic Feedback Loops (Or: How Not to Get Evidence)
- Permissivism, the value of rationality, and a convergence‐theoretic epistemology
- An Explanationist Account of Genealogical Defeat
- Perceptual attribution and perceptual reference
- Inheritance: Professor Procrastinate and the logic of obligation1
- Prior’s puzzle generalized
- Practical conflicts as a problem for epistemic reductionism about practical reasons
- Suffering as significantly disrupted agency
- Updating incoherent credences ‐ Extending the Dutch strategy argument for conditionalization
- Is Identity Non‐Contingent?
- Neopragmatist semantics
- Deciding for Others: An Expressivist Theory of Normative Judgment
- Time’s arrow and self‐locating probability
- The end of explanation: Kant on the unconditioned
- Classification procedures as the targets of conceptual engineering
- Aggregation Without Interpersonal Comparisons of Well‐Being
- Banks, Bosses, and Bears: A Pragmatist Argument Against Encroachment
- Good Guesses
- Epicureans and Stoics on the Rationality of Perception
- Risk aversion and elite‐group ignorance
- Something is true
- Précis of Physics Avoidance
- Realism Without Rigidity?
- When the Concrete is Hard
- Metaphysics Avoidance: Mark Wilson and Ernst Cassirer*
- Smithian sympathy and the emergence of norms
- The puzzle of learning by doing and the gradability of knowledge‐how
- Why So Serious? The Nature and Value of Play*
- Expressivism, Inferentialism and the Simulation Game
- Nietzschean Autonomy and the Meaning of the “Sovereign Individual”*
- What Makes Something Surprising?
- Structuring Wellbeing*
- Ground and Grain
- The content of indexical belief
- Transparency is Surveillance
- Moral Worth and Knowing How to Respond to Reasons
- Desire and Goodness
- On Preferring that Overall, Things are Worse: Future‐Bias and Unequal Payoffs
- Psychological eudaimonism and the natural desire for the good: Comments on Rachana Kamtekar’s Plato’s Moral Psychology
- Comments on Rachana Kamtekar, Plato’s Moral Psychology
- Plato’s Moral Psychology (PMP) distinguishes two theses that might be taken as foundational to Plato’s psychologizing
- Involuntary Wrongdoing and Responsibility in Plato
- Replies to Lear, Meyer and Vasiliou
- Oppressive Things*
- Doubts about Duty as a Secondary Motive
- Mushy Akrasia: Why Mushy Credences Are Rationally Permissible
- Dependent reliability: Why And How Conditional Reliability Should Be Replaced By It
- Composition as Identity and the Innocence of Mereology
- Just Words: Intentions, Tolerance and Lexical Selection*
- Pragmatic Particularism
- Intention Persistence
- Epistemic Akrasia and Belief‐Credence Dualism
- Resisting Pessimism Traps: The Limits of Believing in Oneself*
- Devoting ourselves to the manifestly unattainable*
- Is the Universe Indifferent? Should We Care
- The Unity of Normative Thought
- Practical Wisdom, Well‐Being, and Success
- Humility for Everyone: A No‐Distraction Account
- The Mind’s Presence to Itself: In Search of Non‐intentional Awareness
- Of Witches and White Folks*
- Assurance and Disjunctivism
- Precis of The Exchange of Words
- Telling as Joint Action: comments on Richard Moran’s The Exchange of Words
- Resisting easy inferences1
- Replies to Lawlor, Goldberg, and Pritchard
- What Do Easy Inferences Get Us?
- Telling and the reasons of testimony*
- Basic knowledge and the normativity of knowledge: The awareness‐first solution
- Forgiving, Committing, and Un‐forgiving
- Moral Knowledge by Deduction
- The Question of Iterated Causation
- Pragmatic Skepticism
- Headaches for epistemologists
- Should the Non‐Classical Logician be Embarrassed?*
- Hard and Blind: On Wittgenstein’s Genealogical View of Logical Necessity
- One Desire Too Many1
- Aspiration and Internalism*
- Sexual Consent and Lying About One’s Self
- Critique of Agnes Callard, Aspiration
- Aspiring to be rational
- Review of Agnes Callard, Aspiration
- Precis
- The Shape of the Kantian Mind
- Perception and Probability
- Group Action Without Group Minds
- Trivializing Informational Consequence
- Aesthetic Learners and Underachievers: Symposium on Dom Lopes’s Being for beauty
- Précis of Being for Beauty: Aesthetic agency and value
- Expertise and Evaluation
- Normativity, Agency, and Value: A view from aesthetics
- Punting on the aesthetic question
- Plural Identity
- On anti‐abortion violence
- The fragmentation of phenomenal character
- Channels for Common Ground
- Promises, obligation, and reliance
- The Ineffability of Induction
- Externalism and exploitability
- Natural goodness without natural history
- The Independence Solution to the Problem of Theological Fatalism
- The Vices of Perception*
- Comment on Susanna Siegel, The Rationality of Perception
- Classical Opacity*
- Other‐Sacrificing Options*
- Subjectivism about Future Reasons or The Guise of Caring *
- Empathy and the Value of Humane Understanding
- Transcendental Philosophy As Capacities‐First Philosophy
- Reasons‐sensitivity and degrees of free will
- Degrees of Assertability
- Precis of The Rationality of Perception
- Self‐Knowledge: Expression without Expressivism
- Jonardon Ganeri’s Transcultural Philosophy of Attention
- Too much attention, too little self
- PPR Symposium on Attention, Not Self
- A Problem for Ganeri’s Buddhaghosa
- Chance and the Continuum Hypothesis
- Global Constraints on Imprecise Credences: Solving Reflection Violations, Belief Inertia, and Other Puzzles
- The Arationality of Perception: Comments on Susanna Siegel
- The Rationality of Perception: Replies to Lord, Railton, and Pautz
- Isolation, not locality
- Practical knowledge and error in action
- Moral demands and the far future*
- Absolutely general knowledge*
- Are we all exploiters?*
- There is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame
- Coerced Consent with an Unknown Future*
- The Right Wrong‐Makers
- Aesthetic practices and normativity
- Infinite Reasoning
- Spinoza on the Limits of Explanation
- Theory of inquiry
- Resisting easy inferences
- Limits of Abductivism About Logic
- How literature expands your imagination
- Normative explanation unchained
- The Ineliminability of Epistemic Rationality*
- Doxastic divergence and the problem of comparability. Pragmatism defended further
- Forgetting memory skepticism
- How Valuable Could a Person Be?*
- The Inelimninability of Epistemic Rationality*
- Gender Policing: Comments on Down Girl
- Why I Don’t Believe in Patriarchy: Comments on Kate Manne’s Down Girl
- Down Girl Précis
- Misogyny and Ideological Logic
- Infinite Prospects*
- The Moral Grounds of Reasonably Mistaken Self‐Defense
- Norms in Counterfactual Selection
- Oppressive Things
- Knowledge of Objective ‘Oughts’: Monotonicity and the New Miners Puzzle
- From metasemantics to analyticity
- How Particular Is Perception?
- Perceptual Capacities, Success, and Content
- Précis of The Unity of Perception
- The Diversity of Experiences
- Capacities First
- Singular troubles with singleton socrates
- The Sequential Dominance Argument for the Independence Axiom of Expected Utility Theory
- The nature of perceptual constancies
- Propositions as Structured Cognitive Event‐Types
- Rational Moral Ignorance
- Reasons Fundamentalism and Rational Uncertainty – Comments on Lord, The Importance of Being Rational
- The Importance of Being in a Position to Know
- Replies to Schafer, Schroeder, and Staffel
- Précis of The Importance of Being Rational
- The Scenic Route? On Errol Lord’s The Importance of Being Rational
- Could Charge and Mass be Universals?
- Where is the “Dis” in Disability? A Review of The Minority Body: A Theory of Disability by Elizabeth Barnes
- Precis of The Minority Body
- Replies to Commentaries
- Disability as solidarity: political not (only) metaphysical
- Metaphysics for Minorities
- From rights to prerogatives
- Are the Natural Numbers Fundamentally Ordinals?
- Deviance and Vice: Strength as a Theoretical Virtue in the Epistemology of Logic
- Reasons, Coherence, and Group Rationality
- Colour Relations in Form
- Can Skeptics Earn Their Keep?
- Direct Versus Indirect: Control, Moral Responsibility, and Free Action
- Can Pragmatists Be Moderate?
- Evidential Preemption
- On The Hypothetical Given
- Anchoring versus Grounding: Reply to Schaffer
- Constraints, Causes and Necessity: Where do Symmetries Fit?
- Explanation, Abstraction, and Difference‐Making
- On Constraints, Context, and Spatiotemporal Explanation
- Precis of Because Without Cause: Non‐Causal Explanations in Science and Mathematics
- Anchoring as Grounding: On Epstein’s the Ant Trap
- Replies to Heron and Knox, Morrison, and Strevens
- Hard and Blind: On Wittgenstein’s Genealogical View of Logical Necessity
- Relational Primitivism
- The Cognitive Role of Fictionality
- Sexual Consent and Lying About One’s Self
- The Feeling of Bodily Ownership
- Can Hardcore Actualism Validate S5?
- Knowing our Reasons: Distinctive Self‐Knowledge of Why We Hold Our Attitudes and Perform Actions
- Temporal Fictionalism for a Timeless World
- One Desire Too Many
- The Fallacy of Calibrationism
- On Liking Aesthetic Value
- On Ivanhoe on Oneness
- Précis of Oneness
- The Oneness Hypothesis and Aesthetic Obligation
- Is Oneness an Over‐belief?
- Inquiry and the Transmission of Knowledge
- Noncognitivism and the Frege‐Geach Problem in Formal Epistemology
- Modal Security
- Evaluational adjectives
- Do We Love For Reasons?
- PLURAL IDENTITY
- Personal Bonds: Directed Obligations without Rights
- Unrestricted Quantification and The Structure of Type Theory
- Unrestricted Quantification and the Structure of Type Theory
- Seeing Seeing
- Rehabilitating Statistical Evidence
- Respecting the Game: Blame and Practice Failure
- The Moral Worth of Intentional Actions
- Is Iconic Memory Iconic?
- What is an Extended Simple Region?
- Other‐Sacrificing Options
- Subjectivism about Future Reasons or The Guise of Caring
- Empathetic Understanding and Deliberative Democracy
- Précis of Ontology Made Easy
- Comments on Ontology Made Easy by Amie Thomasson
- Replies to Comments on Ontology Made Easy
- Amie Thomasson’s Easy Approach to Ontology
- Easy Ontology without Deflationary Metaontology
- History and Persons
- Triviality Results for Probabilistic Modals
- The Undesirable & the Adesirable
- Is Kant’s I think Unique?
- Précis of I, Me, Mine
- Longuenesse on Self and Body
- A Freudian Naturalization of Kantian Philosophy
- Consciousness of Oneself as Subject
- Why Truthmaking Is Not a Case of Grounding
- Classical Opacity
- Bertrand’s Paradox and the Maximum Entropy Principle
- Troubles with Theoretical Virtues: Resisting Theoretical Utility Arguments in Metaphysics
- Varieties of Risk
- Moral Testimony: Transmission Versus Propagation
- Permissive Situations and Direct Doxastic Control
- Four Questions of Iterated Grounding
- Structural Indeterminacy
- Fuzziness in the Mind: Can Perception be Unconscious?
- Dispossessing Defeat
- Presentism and the Spans of Time
- The Two Faces of Mental Imagery
- Avoidable Harm
- The Epistemology of Testimonal Trust
- Radical Interpretation and The Aggregation Problem
- Holistic Conditionalization and Underminable Perceptual Learning
- Are the Questions of Metaphysics More Fundamental Than Those of Science?
- Deflationism, Creeping Minimalism, and Explanations of Content
- Coincidences and the Grain of Explanation
- The Metaphysics of Mental Files
- Response to Janet Levin and Michael Strevens
- Précis of Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds
- Philosophy Unbound: Comments on Edouard Machery’s Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds
- A Case for the Method of Cases: Comments on Edouard Machery, Philosophy Within its Proper Bounds
- Causes As Difference‐Makers For Processes
- Non‐Classical Knowledge
- The Value of Perception
- Why Nearly Everything Is Knowable A Priori
- Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain
- Conditional Heresies
- Might Moral Epistemologists Be Asking The Wrong Questions?
- Modal Virtue Epistemology
- The Duty to Object
- Reliabilism without Epistemic Consequentialism
- Selfhood, Agency, and Responsibility: Reflections on John Doris’ Talking to Our Selves: Reflection, Ignorance, and Agency
- Précis of Talking to Our Selves
- Making Do Without (Reflection): A (Very Partial) Response to Arpaly, Tiberius, and Kane
- Comments on John Doris, Talking to Our Selves: Reflection, Ignorance, and Agency
- Comments on Talking to Our Selves by John Doris
- Junk Beliefs and Interest‐Driven Epistemology
- How Physicalists Can—and Cannot—Explain the Seeming “Absurdity” of Physicalism
- Attitudinal and Phenomenological Theories of Pleasure
- Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Meet Evolutionary Science
- Co‐Identification and Fictional Names
- Teleological Suspensions In Fear and Trembling
- Social Structures and the Ontology of Social Groups
- Are My Temporal Parts Agents?
- Toward a Perceptual Account of Mindreading
- The epistemic value of expert autonomy
- Précis of Emotions, Values, and Agency
- Comments on Emotions, Values, and Agency by Christine Tappolet
- Emotions, Reasons, and Epistemology
- The Value of Reactive Attitudes: Critical Response to Christine Tappolet’s Emotions, Values and Agency
- Manifesting Emotion
- The Evil Demon Inside
- Agency, Teleological Control and Robust Causation
- Accidentally Doing the Right Thing
- The Institutionality Of Legal Validity
- A Plea for Falsehoods
- Hyman on Knowledge and Ability
- Précis of Action, Knowledge, and Will
- Acts According to Hyman
- Replies to My Critics
- Mereological Nominalism
- Constitutive Rules: Games, Language, and Assertion
- Import‐Export and ‘And’
- Ways of Using Words: On Semantic Intentions
- Not All Partial Grounds Partly Ground: Some Useful Distinctions in the Theory of Grounding
- Surreal decisions
- A Theory of Perceptual Objects
- Against Creativity
- Quasi Indexicals
- Impossible Odds
- What’s Aristotelian about neo‐Aristotelian Virtue Ethics?
- What’s Aristotelian about neo‐Aristotelian Virtue Ethics?
- Truth‐Sensitivity and Folk Epistemology
- Self‐Locating Evidence and the Metaphysics of Time
- Frege’s Puzzle is About Identity After All
- Being More Realistic About Reasons: On Rationality and Reasons Perspectivism
- Locke’s Theory of Demonstration and Demonstrative Morality
- Précis of Accuracy and the Laws of Credence
- Replies to commentators on Accuracy and the Laws of Credence
- Comments on Richard Pettigrew’s Accuracy and the Laws of Credence
- The Dominance Principle in Epistemic Decision Theory
- Remarks on Richard Pettigrew’s Accuracy and the Laws of Credence
- Reasons, Coherence, And Group Rationality
- Deviance And Vice: Strength As A Theoretical Virtue In The Epistemology Of Logic
- Are The Natural Numbers Fundamentally Ordinals?
- Contractualism for Us As We Are
- A Near-Term Bias Reconsidered
- A Near‐Term Bias Reconsidered
- Rethinking Propaganda and Ideology: Some Comments on Jason Stanley’s How Propaganda Works
- How Propaganda Works, Precis
- Distinguishing Knowledge Possession and Knowledge Attribution: The Difference Metaphilosophy Makes
- The Epistemology of Propaganda
- Acting and Believing Under the Guise of Normative Reasons
- Against Right Reason
- Not Only a Messenger: Towards an Attitudinal‐Representational Theory of Pain
- Understanding, Self‐Evidence, and Justification
- Political Authority and Unjust Wars
- Understanding, Self-Evidence, and Justification
- Not Only a Messenger: Towards an Attitudinal-Representational Theory of Pain
- Knowing in the “Executive Way”: Knowing How, Rules, Methods, Principles and Criteria
- Inquiry And The Transmission Of Knowledge
- Permissivism and the Value of Rationality A Challenge to the Uniqeueness Thesis
- Permissivism and the Value of Rationality A Challenge to the Uniqueness Thesis
- The Ineffable and the Ethical
- Hard Problems Between Minds and Bodies
- Précis of Senses of the Subject
- Melancholy Whiteness (or, Shame-Faced in Shadows)
- Reply from Judith Butler
- Triviality Results For Probabilistic Modals
- The Non‐Occurrence Of Events
- The Non-Occurrence Of Events
- History And Persons
- Perceptual Skill And Social Structure
- The Undesirable & The Adesirable
- Dickie’s Epistemic Theory of Reference
- Precis of Fixing Reference
- Aboutness and Justification
- Reply to Hofweber and Ninan
- Cognitive Hunger: Remarks on Imogen Dickie’s Fixing Reference
- The Logic of Opacity
- Diachronic Dutch Books and Evidential Import
- A Puzzle Concerning Blame Transfer
- Rational Inference: The Lowest Bounds
- Why Take Both Boxes?
- Beyond Words: Inarticulable Reasons And Reasonable Commitments
- Quantifier Variance and the Demand for a Semantics
- Phenomenal, Normative, And Other Explanatory Gaps: A General Diagnosis
- Grounding, Essence, And Identity
- Frauds, Posers And Sheep: A Virtue Theoretic Solution To The Acquaintance Debate
- Good Selves, True Selves: Moral Ignorance, Responsibility, And The Presumption Of Goodness
- Emotional Justification
- Non-Classical Knowledge
- Knowledge From Forgetting
- Basic-Know And Super-Know
- Racial Profiling And Cumulative Injustice
- Monsters and the theoretical role of context
- Social Constraints On Moral Address
- How To Be A Reliabilist
- Epistemic Utility Theory and the Aim of Belief
- Against Radical Quantum Ontologies
- There Is No Pure Empirical Reasoning
- Grounding the Unreal
- The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning
- ‘Ought Implies Can’: Not So Pragmatic After All
- Sensing, the Senses, and Attention
- Reply to Critics
- The Perceptual Representation of Objects and Natural Kinds: Comments on Speaks
- Jeff Speaks: The Phenomenal and the Representational
- Précis of The Phenomenal and the Representational
- Lies, Harm, And Practical Interests
- The Defeasibility of Knowledge-How
- The Truth About Deception
- A Deliberative Approach to Causation
- Love and the Moral Error Theory: Is Love a Mistake?
- Consequence and Normative Guidance
- Skilled Action and the Double Life of Intention
- Outside Color from Just Outside
- M. Chirimuuta’s Adverbialism about Color
- Précis of Outside Color
- Realism, Relativism, Adverbialism: How Different are they? Comments on Mazviita Chirimuuta’s Outside Color
- Must Good Reasoning Satisfy Cumulative Transitivity?
- Policy Externalism
- Berkeley on Inconceivability and Impossibility
- Causes As Difference-Makers For Processes
- Descartes and the Curious Case of the Origin of Sensory Ideas
- You Didn’t Build That: Equality and Productivity in a Complex Society
- Hume’s Fork, and his Theory of Relations
- Rightholding, Demandingness of Love, and Parental Licensing
- Do Parental Licensing Schemes Violate the Rights of Biological Parents?
- The Supply Side of Love
- Précis for The Right to Be Loved
- Human Rights and The Right to be Loved
- Brentano’s Empiricism and the Philosophy of Intentionality
- Closure and Epistemic Modals
- Infinite Value and the Best of All Possible Worlds
- Philosophical Analysis: The Concept Grounding View
- Exceptions in Nonderivative Value
- In Defence of Radical Restrictionism
- The Elusive Case for Relationalism about the Attitudes: Reply to Rattan
- Metaphysical Ambitions in the Ontology of Objects
- Précis of Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics
- Replies to Bennett, Rayo, and Sattig
- Recent Publications
- Language, Ontology, and Metaphysics
- Hofweber’s Philosophy of Mathematics
- Issue Information
- Phenomenal Externalism’s Explanatory Power
- Valence and Value
- How Physicalists Can—and cannot—Explain the Seeming “Absurdity” of Physicalism
- Strong Contextual Felicity and Felicitous Underspecification
- Embodied Agency
- Constructivism, Strict Compliance, and Realistic Utopianism
- On the Inadmissibility of Some Historical Information
- Junk Beliefs and Interest-Driven Epistemology
- Neo-pragmatism, Representationalism and the Emotions
- What Makes a Person Liable to Defensive Harm?
- The Unique Groundability of Temporal Facts
- Truths qua Grounds
- Knowledge as a Non-Normative Relation
- Hume’s Internalist Epistemology in EHU 12
- Social Construction and Grounding
- Seeing and Conceptualizing: Modularity and the Shallow Contents of Perception
- Mirror Self-Recognition and Self-Identification
- In Defense of De Se Content
- K ⊈ E
- Upward Grounding
- Propositions are not Simple
- Aesthetic Testimony and the Test of Time
- Motherhood and Mistakes about Defeasible Duties to Benefit
- What is (Dis)Agreement?
- Essentialism and the Nonidentity Problem
- Grief’s Rationality, Backward and Forward
- The Predicative Predicament
- Extended Preferences and Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-being
- Changing One’s Mind: Self-Conscious Belief and Rational Endorsement
- Natural Properties, Necessary Connections, and the Problem of Induction
- One’s Modus Ponens: Modality, Coherence and Logic
- Belief as Question-Sensitive
- The Logical Problem and the Theoretician’s Dilemma
- Do Not Revise Ockham’s Razor Without Necessity
- Remembering Events: A Reidean Account of (Episodic) Memory
- An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence
- The Will to Make-Believe: Religious Fictionalism, Religious Beliefs, and the Value of Art
- Intellectual Humility as Attitude
- Brentano’s Dual-Framing Theory of Consciousness
- The Adequacy of Resemblance Nominalism about Perfect Naturalness
- Change of Logic, Change of Meaning
- Evidence and Inference
- Epistemic Elitism and Other Minds
- Descartes on Free Will and Moral Possibility
- On The Intellectual Conditions for Responsibility: Acting for the Right Reasons, Conceptualization, and Credit
- Grounding Entails Counterpossible Non-Triviality
- Simple Probabilistic Promotion
- Maximalism and Moral Harmony
- Ressentiment, Imaginary Revenge, and the Slave Revolt
- Putting Pluralism in its Place
- Four Kinds of Perspectival Truth
- What is Good Reasoning?
- Manipulation Arguments and the Freedom to do Otherwise
- Irrelevant Influences
- Fichte on Conscience
- Looks and Perceptual Justification
- Are Propositions Mere Measures Of Mind?
- Self-Knowledge and Rational Agency: A Defense of Empiricism
- Transparency and Partial Beliefs
- How Is Wishful Seeing Like Wishful Thinking?
- Knowledge of Our Own Beliefs
- Corporate Crocodile Tears? On the Reactive Attitudes of Corporate Agents
- Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle about Rationality
- Vagueness and the Laws of Metaphysics
- Defending Exclusivity
- The Problem of Self-Torture: What’s Being Done?
- The Metaphysical Consequences of Counterfactual Skepticism
- Moral Testimony Pessimism and the Uncertain Value of Authenticity
- Sensitivity Actually
- Identity in Fiction
- Activating the Mind: Descartes’ Dreams and the Awakening of the Human Animal Machine
- Causal Exclusion and Causal Bayes Nets
- ‘Not’ Again! Another Essay on the Metaphysics of Material Objects
- Inductive Learning in Small and Large Worlds
- Semantic Normativity and Semantic Causality
- The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence
- What Was the Syntax-Semantics Debate in the Philosophy of Science About?
- The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding
- Aesthetic Adjectives: Experimental Semantics and Context-Sensitivity
- Intellectual Humility: Owning Our Limitations
- Permissive Rationality and Sensitivity
- Indexicals and Reference-Shifting: Towards a Pragmatic Approach
- Experimental Explication
- How Narrow is Aristotle’s Contemplative Ideal?