- Interpreting Action with Norms: Responsibility and the Twofold Nature of the Ought‐Implies‐Can Principle
- Punishment Moralism
- The Comparative Account of Tort Reparation
- A New Opening for the Alternative Punishments Debate: Applying the Extended Mind Thesis
- What Is the Ideal Dimension of Law?
- The Balancing Exercise and the Resolution of Rhetorical Antinomies in Judicial Decision‐Making
- The Public Interest: Clarifying a Legal Concept
- On the Exclusionary Scope of Razian Reasons
- Was Hart an Inclusive Positivist?
- The Two Faces of Binding Precedents: A Hohfeldian Look
- Other People’s Liberties
- Partial Reasons
- The Incompatibility of Rawls’s Justice as Fairness and His Just War Approach
- (Mis)Understanding Correlativity in Contractual Relations
- Legal Interpretation, Conceptual Ethics, and Alternative Legal Concepts
- The Weaker Natural Law Thesis
- Against Human Rights Skeptics
- Between Traditionalism and Revisionism: Estlund and Renzo on the Obligation to Obey Orders to Fight in Unjust Wars
- The Rule of Law, Comprehensive Doctrines, Overlapping Consensus, and the Future of Europe
- In Defense of the Standard Picture: Overcoming Death by a Thousand Cuts
- Interpretation, Argumentation, and the Determinacy of Law
- A Theory of Rights Based on Autonomy
- Legal Judgment as Self‐Mastery
- Giovanni Battista Ratti’s Critique of Principles Theory
- Corrigendum to “An Antinomy in Alexy’s Theory of Balancing”
- The Ethical Triage Dilemma: Who Should Receive Medical Care First; Is This the Right Question?
- Argumentative Representation and Democracy: A Critique of Alexy’s Defense of Judicial Review of Legislation
- Conflicts of Rights and Action‐Guidingness
- Concept or Context? The Exchanges between Ross and Kelsen on Valid Law and Efficacy
- Introduction to Brian H. Bix, Svein Eng, and Giorgio Ridolfi on Alf Ross
- Reductionism in Alf Ross’s Early Philosophy: A Comparison with Georges Politzer and Theodor Geiger
- The Morality of Compensation through Tort Law
- Legislative Intentions and Counterfactuals: Or, What One Can Still Learn from Dworkin’s Critique of Legal Positivism
- Alf Ross on the Nature of Law
- An Antinomy in Alexy’s Theory of Balancing
- A Bayesian Improvement of the Proportionality Principle
- “Trialectics” of Legal Interpretation
- Consent, Sovereignty, and Pluralism: Harold Laski’s Doctrine of Allegiance in British Legal Philosophy
- Reviving the Distinction between Positive and Negative Human Rights
- Against the Religious Neutrality Requirement
- Corrigendum to “Between Legal Philosophy and Cognitive Science: The Tension Problem”
- Laments, Remedies, Rights: Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morality through the Prism of Roman Law
- Contract as a Transfer of Ownership and Public Justification: Two Models
- Raz and the Rule of (Authoritative) Law
- Wrongs and Sanctions in the Pure Theory of Law
- Social Entitlements in Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Law: Welfare State Regulations as Legitimizing Institutions
- Between Exception and Normality: Schmittian Dictatorship and the Soviet Legal Order
- Justifying the Imperfect: Differentiated Integration and the Problem of the Second Best
- Constitutional Norms—Erosion, Sabotage, and Response
- Delimiting Legal Interpretation: The Problem of Moral Bias and Political Distortion—the Case of Criminal Intention
- Kelsen’s Metaethics
- Between Legal Philosophy and Cognitive Science: The Tension Problem
- A Pluralistic Virtue‐Centered Theory of Judging
- Bentham as a Theorist of the Rule of Law and His Idea of Universal Interest
- Postema and the Common Law Tradition
- The Limits of the Law
- Lazar on “Moral Sunk Costs” and the “Discount View”
- Utility, Predictability, and Rights: Bentham’s Utilitarianism and Constitutional Entitlements
- Bentham’s Public Utilitarianism and Its Jurisprudential Significance
- Why Benefitting a Person Cannot Constitute a Form of Discrimination
- The Modern‐Day Cicero: An Alternative Interpretation of the Work of Ronald Dworkin
- Two Readings of Bentham’s Theory of Meaning as Applied to Moral and Political Discourse*
- In Defense of Hart’s Supposedly Refuted Theory of Rules
- The Enduring Pertinence of the Basic Principle of Retribution☆
- The Idea of Small Justice
- Janus‐Faced Coherentism and the Forgotten Role of Formal Principles
- In Defense of the Standard Picture: The Basic Challenge
- Constitutive Rules: The Symbolization Account
- Eugenio Bulygin (1931–2021): The Wonderful Russian
- Joseph Raz’s Service Conception and the Limits of Knowability
- What Is Left of European Citizenship?
- Uncommon Legislative Attitudes: Why a Theory of Legislative Intent Needs Nontrivial Aggregation
- European Values: Solidarity*
- Access to Justice: Dynamic, Foundational, and Generative
- Overcoming Judicial Supremacy through Constitutional Amendment: Some Critical Reflections*
- European “Freedoms”: A Critical Analysis
- The Causal Mechanism Theory of Legal Causation
- Law and Coercion: Some Clarification
- European Values in the Charter of Fundamental Rights: An Introduction
- Migrants, State Responsibilities, and Human Dignity
- Integrative Jurisprudence: Legal Scholarship and the Triadic Nature of Law
- In Concreto Antinomies, Predictability, and Lawmaking
- Index to Volume 33 (2020)
- Political Representation as Interpretation: A Contribution to Deliberative Constitutionalism
- Moral Failure and the Law
- Fair Play, Reciprocity, and Natural Duties of Justice
- Why a Hedgehog Cannot Have Political Obligations
- The Dual‐Nature Thesis: Which Dualism?
- The Irrelevance of History: In Defense of a Pure Functionalist Theory of Territorial Jurisdiction
- The Claim to Correctness, Rights, and the Ideal Dimension of Law: A Short Reply
- Legality and the Legal Relation
- The Right to Justification of Contract
- Resuscitation of a Phantom? On Robert Alexy’s Latest Attempt to Save His Concept of Principle
- “Something More Lively and Animated Than the Law”: Institutionalism and Formalism in Santi Romano’s Jurisprudence
- The Legal and the Social in Romano’s Institutionalism
- Collective Reason, the Rationality Gap, and Political Leadership
- The Right to Justification of Contract*
- The Nature of Law and Potential Coercion
- Robert Alexy and the Dual Nature of Law
- A Critique of Alexy’s Claim to Correctness
- Authentic Interpretation
- Retraction
- Preface to a Debate
- On the Connection between Law and Morality: Some Doubts about Robert Alexy’s View
- The Indigenous Rights State
- The Political Literacy of Experts
- The Potential of Abductive Legal Reasoning
- Totemism of the Modern State: On Hans Kelsen’s Attempt to Unmask Legal and Political Fictions and Contain Political Theology
- A Kantian Interpretation of Kelsen’s Basic Norm
- Debating Sociological Jurisprudence: A Reply
- Durkheim in World Society: Roger Cotterrell’s Concept of Transnational Law
- How to Be a Transnational Jurist: Reflections on Cotterrell’s Sociological Jurisprudence
- Thoughts on Sociological Jurisprudence: Juristic Thought and Social Inquiry (Roger Cotterrell)
- Ralf Dreier: In Memoriam
- Secret Law Revisited
- What Is the Will Theory of Rights?
- Human Dignity as a Sui Generis Principle
- Impunity and Hope
- Soldiers as Public Officials: A Moral Justification for Combatant Immunity
- The Common Core between Human Rights Law and International Criminal Law: A Structural Account
- International Crimes and the Right to Punish
- The Inner Logic of Exclusivism (and Inclusivism): Shapiro’s Shadowing
- In Defense of the Practice Theory
- The Force of Norms? The Internal Point of View in Light of Experimental Economics
- Outsiders’ Responsibility to Answer for Crime
- Against Parochialism in Contract Theory: A Response to Brian Bix
- The Intrinsic Good of Justice
- Global Luck Egalitarianism and Border Control
- Traditional Local Justice, Women’s Rights, and the Rule of Law: A Pluralistic Framework
- Affirmative Action: Well‐Being, Justice, and Qualifications
- The Medical Exception to the Prohibition of Killing: A Matter of the Right Intention?
- Legitimacy as Public Willing: Kant on Freedom and the Law
- Flaws and Virtues of An Artifact Theory of Law
- Legal Hypocrisy
- Whose Constitution? Constitutional Self‐Determination and Generational Change
- A Pragmatic Reconstruction of Law’s Claim to Authority
- Why Legal Formalism Is Not a Stupid Thing
- Raz’s Definition of a Right
- Group Vulnerability, Asymmetrical Balance, and Multicultural Recognition
- Index to Volume 31 (2018)
- Representative Legislatures, Grammars of Political Representation, and the Generality of Statutes
- Apology for the Theory of the State and Law: A New Concept of Law and Justice in Modern Legal Communication
- Hart and the Metaphysics and Semantics of Legal Normativity
- “Constitution (Written or Unwritten)”: Legitimacy and Legality in the Thought of John Rawls
- On the Role of Normative Hierarchies in Constitutional Reasoning: A Survey of Some Paradigmatic Cases
- The Possibility of Interimperial Law
- Why Be Just? The Problem of Motivation in Hegel and Rawls
- Is International Law a Hartian Legal System?
- The Purity Thesis
- Theoretical Disagreement, Legal Positivism, and Interpretation
- The Special Case Thesis and the Dual Nature of Law
- Human Rights: Existential, Not Metaphysical
- Overcoming Doctrinal School Thought: A Unifying Approach to Human Dignity
- Time in Law’s Domain
- Two Rights of Free Speech
- Ownership, Use, and Exclusivity: The Kantian Approach
- On The‐Law Property Ascriptions to the Facts
- Toward a Theory of Reasonableness
- The Senility of Group Solidarity and Contemporary Multiculturalism: A Word of Warning from a Medieval Arabic Thinker
- The People and Populism
- Antagonism, Natality, A-Legality: A Phenomenological Itinerary on the Democratic Transgression of Politico-Legal Orders
- Why Dictatorial Authority Did Good, and not Harm, to the Roman Republic. Dictatorship and Constitutional Change in Machiavelli
- Coordination Cannot Establish Political Authority
- Legal Positivism and Deontic Detachment
- No Right to Classified Public Whistleblowing
- One Myth of the Classical Natural Law Theory: Reflecting on the “Thin” View of Legal Positivism
- Index to Volume 30 (2017)
- Legal Reasoning for Hedgehogs
- The Syntax of Principles: Genericity as a Logical Distinction between Rules and Principles
- Canberra-Style Analysis and Law: A Critique of Andrei Marmor’s Farewell to Conceptual Analysis
- The Tapestry of Reason: Generality, Specificity and Legal Philosophy
- Intention in Criminal Law: The Challenge from Non-Observational Knowledge
- The Promise and Problems of Universal, General Theories of Contract Law
- The Role and Value of Coherence in Theories of Legal Reasoning
- The Arendtian Dread: Courts with Power
- More Reasons Why Jurisprudence Is Not Legal Philosophy
- Replies to Critics
- Civic Conscience, Selective Conscientious Objection and Lack of Choice
- Law and Precaution in the European Risk Society: The Case of EU Environmental Policy
- Legal Arguments from Scholarly Authority
- Risk, Precaution, Responsibility, and Equal Concern
- A Rational Reconstruction of United Nations Human Rights Law
- When Trumps Clash: Dworkin and the Doctrine of Proportionality
- What Is the Opposite of Injustice?
- Some Remarks about Social Ontology and Law: An Interview with John R. Searle
- Legal Power: The Basic Definition
- I Should Not Be a Free Rider, nor Am I Obligated to Obey
- The “Discourse” of International Law and Humanitarian Intervention
- From a Pluralism of Grounds to Proto-Legal Relations: Accounting for the Grounds of Obligations of Justice
- Raz on Rights: Human Rights, Fundamental Rights, and Balancing
- Responsibility and Global Justice
- Necessary and Universal Truths about Law?
- Self-Determination And Sovereignty over Natural Resources
- Immigration and Equal Ownership of the Earth
- The Distinctive Significance of Systemic Risk
- Climate Change Mitigation Techniques and International Law: Assessing the Externalities of Reforestation and Geoengineering
- Luck Egalitarianism and the Rights of Immigrants
- Theory of Custom, Dogmatics of Custom, Policy of Custom: On the Threefold Approach of Polish-Russian Legal Realism
- Realism about the Nature of Law