- Intrinsic Properties and the Problem of “Other Things”
- Organisms, agency and Aristotle
- Four false dichotomies in the study of teleology
- Rejecting norms of standing for private blame
- The property of goal‐directedness: Lessons from the dispositions debate
- The limits of compromise
- Prime matter emergentism: Unity without reduction
- What is narrativity?
- Life is strongly emergent
- Relational properties: Definition, reduction, and states of affairs
- Repugnance at the limit
- Critical notice: The science of virtue: A framework for research By Blaine J. Fowers, Nathan D. Leonhardt, & Bradford Cokelet, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2024. pp. vii + 394. $39.99 (pbk). ISBN : 9781108779968
- Lesser transgressions and loss of standing to blame
- ‘I don’t know my way about’: Mirror reversal as a curiously instructive analogue of philosophical perplexity
- Corruptio boni: An alternative to the privation theory of evil
- On the concept of ‘actively working at making a living’
- Organisational teleology 2.0: Grounding biological purposiveness in regulatory control
- Dualism about undercutting defeat
- The perceptual model: Emotions as possessed reasons
- Recalcitrant emotions: The problems of perceptual theories
- Knowing with
- Relaxed realism, robust realism, and the truthmaker challenge
- Mathematical structuralism and bundle theory
- Knowability paradox, decidability solution?
- Gettier and the a priori
- Introduction—A return to form
- Dynamic all the way down
- The trolley problemBy Hallvard Lillehammer (Ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2023. ix + 267 pp. £74.99 (hb)/£26.99 (pb) ISBN: 9781009255592
- Structure, essence and existence in chemistry
- From individual to general experience
- Kant and the king: Lying promises, conventional implicature, and hypocrisy
- The limits of the just‐too‐different argument
- Delineating beauty: On form and the boundaries of the aesthetic
- The significance of skepticism
- Putting properties first: A platonic metaphysics for natural modalityBy Matthew Tugby. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2022. xii + 275 pp. £65.00. ISBN: 978‐0‐19‐885510‐1
- Deflating the hard problem of consciousness by multiplying explanatory gaps
- Are there essential forms in the social domain?
- Alethic desires, framing effects, and deflationism: Reply to Asay
- Contingency, arbitrariness, and the basis of moral equality
- Computing in the nick of time
- What analytic metaphysics can do for scientific metaphysics
- Memory belief is weak
- Ruth Barcan Marcus and Minimal Essentialism
- A Socratic essentialist defense of non‐verbal definitional disputes
- Luck egalitarianism and non‐overlapping generations
- Aristotle on unity in Metaphysics Z.12 and H.6
- Sharing
- On the alleged explanatory impotence/conceptual vacuity of substance dualism
- Does the Kantian state dominate?: Freedom and majoritarian rule
- Is swearing morally innocent?
- A substantial problem for priority monism
- How to be an antirealist about metaphysical explanation
- Value relations sans evaluative grounds
- Causal theories of the moving spotlight
- Trust the process? Hyloenergeism and biological processualism
- Is Colour incompatibility analytic?
- Other minds, other people, and human opacity
- Rule‐consequentialism, procreative freedom, and future generations
- Correctly responding to reasons while being means‐end incoherent
- Meaning and beauty
- The open future: Why future contingents are all false by Patrick Todd Oxford University Press, 2021, $70.00, xi+212 pp.
- Fairness and close personal relationships
- Fairness as comparative desert
- Deep personal relationships and well‐being: A response to Hooker
- Holding points of view does not amount to knowledge
- Hooker’s rule‐consequentialism, disasters, demandingness, and arbitrary distinctions
- From Brad to worse: Rule‐consequentialism and undesirable futures
- Reasons for Rule Consequentialists
- Hooker’s rule‐consequentialism and Scanlon’s contractualism—A re‐evaluation
- Deep personal relationships, value, merit, and change
- Three problems for the evolutionary debunking argument
- The comparison problem for approximating epistemic ideals
- Why disregarding hypocritical blame is appropriate
- Are superintelligent robots entitled to human rights?
- A trilemma for naturalized metaphysics
- Sincerity in bulk
- Against resultant moral luck
- Ignorance, truth, and falsehood
- On being angry at oneself
- Deflationism, truth, and desire
- Artefacts from tomorrow: Future dilemmas of the parahistorian
- Value after death
- ‘Actually’ again
- Eternalism and the problem of hyperplanes
- A puzzle about meaning and luck
- How to explain the possibility of wholesale moral error: a reply to Akhlaghi
- Branching time and doomsday
- Responsibility and the recursion problem
- Trust and the appreciation of art
- Norms and Necessity by Amie L. Thomasson New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2020, $74, xi+232 pp.
- How to be an aesthetic realist
- Virtues are excellences
- Moral realism, quasi‐realism and moral steadfastness
- Why illusionism about consciousness is unbelievable
- Existential risk from AI and orthogonality: Can we have it both ways?
- The later Wittgenstein and moral philosophy Benjamin de Mesel, Cham, Springer, 2018, € 50.28, vii+186 pp
- Exclusion, subset realization, and part‐whole relations
- Discursive paternalism
- Broad‐spectrum conceptual engineering
- Why de dicto desires are fetishistic
- Controlling hope
- Knowledge norms of belief and belief formation: When the time is ripe to actualize one’s epistemic potential
- The social ontology of promising
- Knowledge‐norms in a common‐law crucible
- On the possibility of wholesale moral error
- Emergent quantum indeterminacy
- Debunking the argument from queerness
- The causal theory of knowledge revisited: An interventionist approach
- Introducing a new elusive reason
- Bare‐difference methodology and the scientific analogy
- Permissivism and self‐fulfilling propositions
- Moral disagreement scepticism leveled
- Quietist metaethical realism and moral determination
- Retributivism and the proportionality dilemma
- Inductive knowledge and lotteries: Could one explain both ‘safely’?
- Negation, denial and falsity: Logic’s negative trio
- Do affective desires provide reasons for action?
- Is there such a thing as literary cognition?
- Dispositional monism and the ontological distinction between unmanifested and manifested powers
- Reasoning with heuristics
- Veritism and the normativity of logic
- Self‐deception and pragmatic encroachment: A dilemma for epistemic rationality
- Externalism, internalism, and meaningful lives
- Acting rightly: Three dimensions of moral conduct
- On a neglected feature of moral agency
- In search of the soul: A philosophical essay John Cottingham Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2020, £18.99, xii+174 pp.
- Age and ageing: What do they mean?
- Shame and moral autonomy
- Ontological Soufflé
- Black magic and respecting persons—Some perplexities
- Conceptual engineering as concept preservation
- Is backing grounding?
- Evaluating the multiple proposition strategy
- Moral philosophy’s moral risk
- Nostalgia reconsidered
- Time in a one‐instant world
- Events, processes, and the time of a killing
- Disagreement with a bald‐faced liar
- Knowing what you are doing: Action‐demonstratives in unreflective action
- On the relation between conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics
- What use has approved
- Love, reason and morality
- Medicalization and linguistic agency
- The knowledge norm of assertion in dialectical context
- Morality, reasoning and upbringing
- How permissive consent works
- The big shill
- Reasoning’s relation to bodily action
- The problem with descriptive correctness
- Metasemantic ethics
- Knowledge, reasoning, and deliberation
- Conservative speech
- The persuasiveness puzzle about bootstrapping
- Standard and alternative error theories about moral reasons
- Guilt feelings and the intelligibility of moral duties
- Interpreting our emotions
- Flexible moral theories: Complexity, domination, and indeterminacy
- Alien worlds, alien laws, and the Humean conceivability argument
- The fairness of Hell
- Character and Causation: Hume’s Philosophy of Action, Constantine Sandis, Routledge, New York, 2019, ₤88.95, xiii+148 pp.
- Dangerous liaisons
- Character and Causation: Hume’s Philosophy of Action, Constantine Sandis, Routledge, New York, 2019, ₤88.95, xiii+148 pp.
- Character and Causation: Hume’s Philosophy of Action, Constantine Sandis, Routledge, New York, 2019, ₤88.95, xiii+148 pp.
- Predication and cognitive context: Between minimalism and contextualism
- Infinite barbarians
- Naturalness constraints on best systems accounts of laws
- Dangerous Liaisons
- Hope as an irreducible concept
- Modest meta‐philosophical skepticism
- Secondary self‐deception
- Liberalism’s Religion, Cécile Laborde, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2017, ₤25.95, 337 pp.
- Darwinizing debunking arguments
- The argument from agreement: How universal values undermine moral realism
- The dynamics of moral progress
- Objectivist conditions for defeat and evolutionary debunking arguments
- What can debunking do for us (sceptics and nihilists)?
- Regarding a Risk‐Pooling System of compensation
- Excuses, exemptions, and derivative norms
- The weight of facts: A puzzle about perception, reasons and deliberation
- Ethical objectivity: The test of time
- Striking coincidences: How realists should reason about them
- Liberalism’s Religion, Cécile Laborde, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2017, ₤25.95, 337 pp.
- Liberalism’s Religion, Cécile Laborde, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2017, ₤25.95, 337 pp.
- Debunking leftward progress
- How to avoid begging the question against evolutionary debunking arguments
- Demarcating depression
- From an axiological standpoint
- Consciousness and no self?
- Attention norms in Siegel’s The Rationality of Perception
- Object reidentification and the epistemic role of attention
- Extreme Betting
- Attention as a means of self‐dissolution and reformation
- Buddhist global fictionalism?
- When ignorance excuses
- A non‐normative account of assertion
- One standard to rule them all?
- Is consciousness reflexively self‐aware? A Buddhist analysis
- On the alleged normative significance of a platitude
- On correctly responding to all decisive reasons we have
- Some remarks on a problem in Madhyamaka philosophy of language
- Attention and self in Buddhist philosophy of mind
- Egalitarian nonconsequentialism and the levelling down objection
- Intending, believing, and supposing at will
- The puzzle of hyper‐change
- Inference and the Taking Condition
- Access, phenomenology and sorites
- Lucky achievement: Virtue epistemology on the value of knowledge
- The Paradox of Decrease and Dependent Parts
- Julius Rocca (ed.) Teleology In The Ancient World: Philosophical And Medical Approaches (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017) xv+331 pp. £75.00, ISBN 9781107036635.
- The axiological solution to divine hiddenness
- Knowledge-lies re-examined
- Knowledge‐lies re‐examined
- A Brief Argument For Consciousness Without Access
- Catherine Wilson, Metaethics from a First Person Standpoint: An Introduction to Moral Philosophy. OpenBook Publishers, Cambridge, 2016, £29.95 (hb), £14.95 (pb), 122 pp.
- On Ground as a Guide to Realism
- Self-Control as a Normative Capacity
- Caring: A Pluralist Account
- The Challenge of Amoralism
- A Naturalist Ontology of Instantiation
- Can Character Traits Be Based on Brute Psychological Facts?
- Why Externalist Representationalism is a Form of Disjunctivism
- The problem with moralism
- Vindicating the Absent Qualia Objection
- Stereotypical Inferences: Philosophical Relevance and Psycholinguistic Toolkit
- How Not to Characterise a Hard Choice
- Stereotypes, Conceptual Centrality and Gender Bias: An Empirical Investigation
- Imogen Dickie, Fixing Reference (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), x+333 pp., £37.50 hb.
- Presentism, Redemption, and Moral Development
- Does Experimental Philosophy Have a Role to Play in Carnapian Explication?
- Act Versus Impact: Conservatives and Liberals Exhibit Different Structural Emphases in Moral Judgment
- Can Subjects Be Proper Parts of Subjects? The De-Combination Problem
- Can Subjects Be Proper Parts of Subjects? The De‐Combination Problem
- Naturalist Political Realism and the First Political Question
- Disagreement, Credences, and Outright Belief
- Why Hope is not a Moral Virtue: Aquinas’s Insight
- Avoiding the Asymmetry Problem
- Formulating Emergence
- Elizabeth Barnes, The Minority Body: A Theory of Disability (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 224, £25.
- Agency and Embodiment: Groups, Human–Machine Interactions, and Virtual Realities
- Why Intentions?
- David J. Stump, Conceptual Change and the Philosophy of Science: Alternative Interpretations of the A Priori (New York & London: Routledge, 2015), xviii + 176 pp., £85.
- Indirect Realism with a Human Face
- Form as Structure: It’s not so Simple
- Creativity and Meaning in Life
- Found Guilty by Association: In Defence of the Quinean Criterion
- Is Open-mindedness a Moral Virtue?
- Diary of a Telepathic Solipsist
- What Kind of Theory is the Humean Theory of Motivation?
- Co-Hyperintensionality
- Entailments are Cancellable
- Why do True Beliefs Differ in Epistemic Value?
- Is it Safe to Disagree?
- Why Doomsday Arguments are Better than Simulation Arguments
- Vicarious Apologies as Moral Repair
- Intrinsic Value and the Last Last Man
- Understanding without Justification or Belief
- Induction, Normality and Reasoning with Arbitrary Objects
- Subject-Relative Reasons for Love
- A New Group Dutch Book Argument
- Pride and Moral Responsibility
- What’s Special about Moral Ignorance?
- Belief is Contingently Involuntary
- Particularism about Composition
- The Possibility of a Fair Play Account of Legitimacy
- A Partial Defense of Permissivism
- Mental Causation is Not Just Downward Causation
- Grounding, Contingency and Transitivity
- Objective Consequentialism and the Rationales of ‘ “Ought” Implies “Can” ’
- Is There Such a Thing as Relative Analyticity?