- Illusory checkmates: why chess is not a game
- On the heuristic power of mathematical representations
- Three vulnerability objections to justice as mutual advantage
- An argument against nominalism
- Disagreement and inconsistency: a problem for orthodox expressivism
- Quasi-set theory: a formal approach to a quantum ontology of properties
- On the role of contextual factors in cognitive neuroscience experiments: a mechanistic approach
- You ought to have known: positive epistemic norms in a knowledge-first framework
- Assessing relational quantum mechanics
- Diaphonic pluralism: from truth pluralism to disagreement pluralism
- Truth pluralism without domains
- Has the side-effect effect been cancelled? (No, not yet.)
- A Reassessment of Cantorian Abstraction based on the $$varepsilon $$ ε -operator
- Why homoeopathy is pseudoscience
- Encultured knowing: knowledge transmission and varieties of cultural learning
- How to explain the direction of time
- Considering the exceptions: on the failure of cumulative transitivity for indicative conditionals
- In defense of really statistical explanations
- Strategic injustice, dynamic network formation, and social movements
- In defense of causal eliminativism
- How to make critical rationalism comprehensive and non-paradoxical
- Global expressivism and alethic pluralism
- Correction: Non-classical probabilities invariant under symmetries
- The typicality effect in basic needs
- New foundations of dispositionalism – introduction
- From moral to epistemic responsibility
- On the translation from quantified modal logic to Counterpart Theory
- The fundamentality of fields
- Cognitive ontology and the search for neural mechanisms: three foundational problems
- Truthmaker puzzles for one-level physicalists
- Practical knowledge first
- Maximal motion and minimal matter: Aristotelian physics and special relativity
- A knowledge-first approach to episodic memory
- A proposal for a metaphysics of self-subsisting structures. I. Classical physics
- Structure and applied mathematics
- Aggregating agents with opinions about different propositions
- The safe, the sensitive, and the severely tested: a unified account
- No computation without implementation? A potential problem for the single hierarchy view of physical computation
- A truth-maker semantics for ST: refusing to climb the strict/tolerant hierarchy
- Pandispositionalism and the metaphysics of powers
- Rethinking hereditary relations: the reconstitutor as the evolutionary unit of heredity
- Correction: Towards a theory of abduction based on conditionals
- An object-centric solution to Edelberg’s puzzles of intentional identity
- The varying rationality of weakness of the will: an empirical investigation and its challenges for a unified theory of rationality
- Gaps, gluts, and theoretical equivalence
- Involuntarism impugned?
- Superdeterminism: a reappraisal
- Distributing epistemic and practical risks: a comparative study of communicating earthquake damages
- Pro-Diversity Beliefs and the Diverse Person’s Burden
- Inferentialist semantics for lexicalized social meanings
- Lyotard, the differend and the philosophy of deep disagreement
- Natural language quantification is not polysemous
- Do your own research!
- Ought and agency
- Motivation, counterfactual predictions and constraints: normativity of predictive mechanisms
- The case for eliminativism about words
- Indecision and Buridan’s Principle
- Explaining ambiguity in scientific language
- Internal constraints for phenomenal externalists: a structure matching theory
- The rational dimension of understanding
- MOND and meta-empirical theory assessment
- The problem of closure and questioning attitudes
- Correction to: The determinacy of computation
- Permission to believe is not permission to believe at will
- Conceptual reductions, truthmaker reductive explanations, and ontological reductions
- The information inelasticity of habits: Kahneman’s bounded rationality or Simon’s procedural rationality?
- Open texture, rigor, and proof
- Normativity in social accounts of reasoning: a Rylean approach
- Stop and smell the what? Two kinds of olfactory representation
- Know-how-first anti-intellectualism: Williamson against Williamson
- How much are bold Bayesians favoured?
- Phenomenal transparency and the extended mind
- Is Haslanger’s ameliorative project a successful conceptual engineering project?
- Remembering is not a kind of knowing
- Ethical evidence
- Dog whistles, covertly coded speech, and the practices that enable them
- Rethinking conspiracy theories
- Editorial introduction to “Digital Studies of Digital Science”
- Apprehending anxiety: an introduction to the Topical Collection on worry and wellbeing
- Exploring the limits of dissent: the case of shooting bias
- How to minimize ontological commitments: a grounding-reductive approach
- Epistemic anxiety and epistemic risk
- Classifying comparability problems in a way that matters
- Evidential monism, evidential pluralism, or evidential contextualism? An introduction to evidential diversity in the social sciences
- Causality, determination and necessitation in free human action
- The identification game: deepfakes and the epistemic limits of identity
- Tractability and laws
- Correction: Grothendieck’s theory of schemes and the algebra–geometry duality
- Treatment effectiveness, generalizability, and the explanatory/pragmatic-trial distinction
- Prediction with expert advice applied to the problem of prediction with expert advice
- Mindreading, emotion-regulation, and oppression
- Peano’s structuralism and the birth of formal languages
- Doxastic justification through dispositions to cause
- The case for panpsychism: a critical assessment
- Too many cooks
- Diversifying science: comparing the benefits of citizen science with the benefits of bringing more women into science
- Sortals, bodies, and variables. A critique of Quine’s theory of reference
- A causal ontology of objects, causal relations, and various kinds of action
- Negotiating “women”: metalinguistic negotiations across languages
- Can predictive processing explain self-deception?
- Exorcising the Myth of the Given: the idea of doxasticism
- Husserl, hallucination, and intentionality
- Risk-limited indulgent permissivism
- From probabilistic topologies to Feynman diagrams: Hans Reichenbach on time, genidentity, and quantum physics
- Fred’s red: on the objectivity and physicality of mental qualities
- A metaphysical foundation for mathematical philosophy
- A normative comparison of threshold views through computer simulations
- The punctuated equilibrium of scientific change: a Bayesian network model
- The metaphysical burden of Millianism
- Proof-theoretic semantics as a resource for expressing semantic variability
- Words on Kripke’s Puzzle
- Enduring senses
- In defence of the modal account of legal risk
- The tragedy of the AI commons
- Belief merging in absence of reliability information
- What it takes to make a word (token)
- Meaning in time: on temporal externalism and Kripkenstein’s skeptical challenge
- Moral error theory and hypothetical reasons
- Triviality and the logic of restricted quantification
- Improving misrepresentations amid unwavering misrepresenters
- A New Mark of the Cognitive? Predictive Processing and Extended Cognition
- A theory of implicit commitment
- What kinds of groups are group agents?
- Correction to: Social inheritance and the social mind: Introduction to the Synthese topical collection The Cultural Evolution of Human Social Cognition
- Do babies represent? On a failed argument for representationalism
- Causality, determination and free will: towards an anscombean account of free action
- Cook Wilson on knowledge and forms of thinking
- Peirce and Łukasiewicz on modal and multi-valued logics
- Affectivism about intuitions
- Turning the trolley with reflective equilibrium
- John Greco’s The Transmission of Knowledge
- Internal identity is (partly) dispositional identity
- How analogy helped create the new science of thermodynamics
- Two pictures of communication: from content identity to coordination
- Model Transfer and Universal Patterns: Lessons from the Yule Process
- Immodesty and permissivism
- Logical empiricism in Turkish exile: Hans Reichenbach’s research and teaching activities at Istanbul University (1933–1938)
- Two accounts of assertion
- Assertion and the “How do you know?” challenge
- Safety first: making property talk safe for nominalists
- The preferred basis problem in the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics: why decoherence does not solve it
- The epistemic significance of non-epistemic factors: an introduction
- Seeing colours unconsciously
- The relational calibration of fear
- Hearing chimeras
- The paradigm response to skepticism
- Transparency and the truth norm of belief
- Undermining versus rebutting: options for responding to evolutionary debunking arguments
- Exit & isolation: Rousseau’s state of nature
- Anscombe and Intentional Agency Incompatibilism (for human and animal agents)
- Explaining costly religious practices: credibility enhancing displays and signaling theories
- Indeterminacy and impotence
- What philosophical disagreement and philosophical skepticism hinge on
- Goals shape means: a pluralist response to the problem of formal representation in ontic structural realism
- Vertical-horizontal distinction in resolving the abstraction, hierarchy, and generality problems of the mechanistic account of physical computation
- Epistemic reasons for action: a puzzle for pragmatists
- The early days of contemporary philosophy of science: novel insights from machine translation and topic-modeling of non-parallel multilingual corpora
- Suspicious conspiracy theories
- Panpsychism and AI consciousness
- Fine-tuning and Humean laws: fine-tuning as argument for a non-governing account of laws rather than for God or multiverse
- Mutual translatability, equivalence, and the structure of theories
- Entering the valley of formalism: trends and changes in mathematicians’ publication practice—1885 to 2015
- Does illusionism imply skepticism of animal consciousness?
- Relief, time-bias, and the metaphysics of tense
- Relevant propositional dynamic logic
- The transcendental deduction of Integrated Information Theory: connecting the axioms, postulates, and identity through categories
- Grothendieck’s theory of schemes and the algebra–geometry duality
- Deep learning and synthetic media
- The realist and selectionist explanations for the success of science
- Brutalist fundamentalism: radical and moderate
- Can truth relativism account for the indeterminacy of future contingents?
- An evaluation of the autopoietic account of interests
- Correction to: Econometric methods and Reichenbach’s principle
- Using a two-dimensional model from social ontology to explain the puzzling metaphysical features of words
- Coversheet for social inheritance and the social mind: Introduction to the synthese topical collection on the cultural evolution of human social cognition
- Delusions and madmen: against rationality constraints on belief
- Everyday anxious doubt
- Dispositional realism without dispositional essences
- Betting blind: coping with uncertainty through redundancy
- Statistical significance and its critics: practicing damaging science, or damaging scientific practice?
- Can thought experiments solve problems of personal identity?
- Making it precise—Imprecision and underdetermination in linguistic communication
- Shopping for experts
- Quiddities and repeatables: towards a tripartite analysis of simple predicative statements
- Loving truly: An epistemic approach to the doxastic norms of love
- Geometrization vs. unification: the Reichenbach–Einstein quarrel about the Fernparallelismus field theory
- Anti-exceptionalism and the justification of basic logical principles
- Reversing logical nihilism
- Externalism, transparency, and diagonal propositions
- False-belief task know-how
- Speak no ill of the dead: the dead as a social group
- Correction to: What is logical deflationism? Two non-metalinguistic conceptions of logic
- Acknowledgments-based networks for mapping the social structure of research fields. A case study on recent analytic philosophy
- Moral underdetermination and a new skeptical challenge
- Towards a theory of abduction based on conditionals
- Does anti-exceptionalism about logic entail that logic is a posteriori?
- An account of overt intentional dogwhistling
- Epistemic redress
- Cognitive diversity and the contingency of evidence
- Organizational complexity in big science: strategies and practices
- Disagreement in metametaphysical dispute
- Jan Łukasiewicz’s program of the logicization of philosophy: its genesis, content and realizations
- Computer verification for historians of philosophy
- The introduction of topology into analytic philosophy: two movements and a coda
- Mapping representational mechanisms with deep neural networks
- Anti-exceptionalism and methodological pluralism in logic
- Not so distinctively mathematical explanations: topology and dynamical systems
- Variable relativity of causation is good
- Simple Remembering
- The epistemology of thought experiments without exceptionalist ingredients
- Situated self-awareness in expert performance: a situated normativity account of riken no ken
- Structuralism, indiscernibility, and physical computation
- Is forensic science in crisis?
- A forgotten logical expressivist: Strawson’s philosophy of logic and its challenges
- Hinge commitments and common knowledge
- Econometric methods and Reichenbach’s principle
- Correction to: What ought probably means, and why you can’t detach it
- Strengthening the Russellian argument against absolutely unrestricted quantification
- Can thoughts be read from the brain? Neuroscience Contra Wittgenstein
- The problem of presentations: how it is that one object is perceptually given in multiple ways
- Is the HYPE about strength warranted?
- Reference by proxy
- Philosophical reasoning about science: a quantitative, digital study
- Skilled performance in Contact Improvisation: the importance of interkinaesthetic sense of agency
- The necessity of conceivability
- What does causality have to do with necessity?
- Cognitive extra-mathematical explanations
- Intelligence and scientific expertise
- The silver bullet: justice as mutual advantage and the vulnerability objection
- Re-engineering contested concepts. A reflective-equilibrium approach
- Correction to: Oswald revisited: the effect of focus and context
- Johnston versus Johnston
- Natural kinds, mind-independence, and unification principles
- Group belief reconceived
- Knot much like tonk
- Inappropriate emotions, marginalization, and feeling better
- On testimonial knowledge and its functions
- Correction to: Grounding, conceivability, and the mind-body problem
- There is overlap in letters: a mereological definition of word types
- Why kinship is progeneratively constrained: Extending anthropology
- Limits to evidential pluralism: multi-method large-N qualitative analysis and the primacy of mechanistic studies
- Language games and the emergence of discourse
- A new solution to the safety dilemma
- The a-theory of time, temporal passage, and comprehensiveness
- Minimal contents, lying, and conventions of language
- Aesthetic perception and the puzzle of training
- Argumentation and the problem of agreement
- Moral Intuitions: seeming or believing?
- Artifactual normativity
- Lie for me: the intent to deceive fails to scale up
- Sharing with the vulnerable? The Vulnerability Objection and Vanderschraaf’s theory of justice as mutual advantage
- The transparency of expressivism
- Introspective knowledge by acquaintance
- Intelligence involves intensionality: An explanatory issue for radical enactivism (again)
- Invariance, intrinsicality and perspicuity
- Confirming (climate) change: a dynamical account of model evaluation
- Expressing logical disagreement from within
- Broad Medical Uncertainty and the ethical obligation for openness
- Imagination as a skill: A Bayesian proposal
- The pragmatist domestication of Heidegger: Dreyfus on ‘skillful’ understanding
- Approaching probabilistic truths: introduction to the Topical Collection
- A dual proposal of minimal conditions for intentionality
- Same-tracking real kinds in the social sciences
- Computational modeling in philosophy: introduction to a topical collection
- Unsettledness in times of change
- The Good, the bad and the insignificant—assessing Concept functions for conceptual Engineering
- What is it like to be a chimpanzee?
- What do propositions explain? Inflationary vs. deflationary perspectives and the case of singular propositions
- Episodic memory and the feeling of pastness: from intentionalism to metacognition
- Lightweight and heavyweight anti-physicalism
- A critique of strong Anti-Archimedeanism: metaethics, conceptual jurisprudence, and legal disagreements
- Philosophy’s gender gap and argumentative arena: an empirical study
- Unmanifested powers and universals
- Łukasiewicz’s concept of logic and anti-psychologism
- The structuralist approach to underdetermination
- No practical reasons for belief: the epistemic significance of practical considerations
- Introduction: exploring the limits of imagination
- Does loudness represent sound intensity?
- Dualism all the way down: why there is no paradox of phenomenal judgment
- Cut-off points for the rational believer
- Knowledge and decision
- Meaning change and changing meaning
- Propping up the causal theory
- In defense of Aristotelian universals
- Practical reasons, theoretical reasons, and permissive and prohibitive balancing
- A contemporary example of Reichenbachian coordination
- Relativizing proportionality to a domain of events
- Frequentist statistical inference without repeated sampling
- What are mathematical diagrams?
- Epistemic injustice and data science technologies
- A limitation on agency in judgment
- The paradox paradox
- Active inference models do not contradict folk psychology
- Motor representation in acting together
- The epistemic benefits of generalisation in modelling II: expressive power and abstraction
- How can a line segment with extension be composed of extensionless points?
- Criteria for naturalness in conceptual spaces
- Science, responsibility, and the philosophical imagination
- The Boolean Many-Valued Solution to the Sorites Paradox
- Irreducibly collective existence and bottomless nihilism
- “Let’s build an Anscombe box”: assessing Anscombe’s rebuttal of the statistics objection against indeterminism-based free agency
- Similarity in the making: how folk psychological concepts facilitate development of psychological concepts
- Demystifying the myth of sensation: Wilfrid Sellars’ adverbialism reconsidered
- The semantic view of computation and the argument from the cognitive science practice
- Paradoxicality in Kripke’s theory of truth
- Abductive reasoning in cognitive neuroscience: weak and strong reverse inference
- Group intellectual transparency: a novel case for non-summativism
- Taming vagueness: the philosophy of network science
- Don’t worry, be happy?
- Causation comes in degrees
- Disagreement without discovery and the epistemological argument for freedom from poverty
- Robust passage phenomenology probably does not explain future-bias
- Preventive and curative medical interventions
- The mathematical stance
- Truthmaking for Meinongians
- A novel understanding of the nature of epistemic vice
- When is an ensemble like a sample? “Model-based” inferences in climate modeling
- Underdetermination, holism, and feminist philosophy of science
- Authentication, scale-relativity, and relational kindhood
- Behavioural modernity, investigative disintegration & Rubicon expectation
- Temporal binding: digging into animal minds through time perception
- Attitudes, deliberation and decisions
- Are we free to make the laws?
- Complex demonstratives, singular thought, and belief attributions
- What is so special about episodic memory: lessons from the system-experience distinction
- Diachronic trends in the topic distributions of formal epistemology abstracts
- Understanding and scientific progress: lessons from epistemology
- The value of common knowledge
- On luck and significance
- Predictive minds can think: addressing generality and surface compositionality of thought
- Refitting the mirrors: on structural analogies in epistemology and action theory
- Structuralist approaches to Bohmian mechanics
- Williamson on indicatives and suppositional heuristics
- Ostrich tropes
- Causal fundamentality
- Getting counterfactuals right: the perspective of the causal reasoner
- The public relevance of philosophy
- Logical form and logical space in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus
- Trusting scientific experts in an online world
- Are ABM explanations in the social sciences inevitably individualist?
- Disagreement in philosophy
- A reductive analysis of statements about universals
- A fixed-point problem for theories of meaning
- Oswald revisited: the effect of focus and context
- Wavefunction realism does not ‘privilege position’
- Indeterminacy, coincidence, and “Sourcing Newness” in mathematical research
- Model robustness in economics: the admissibility and evaluation of tractability assumptions
- What is logical deflationism? Two non-metalinguistic conceptions of logic
- Possibility, relevant similarity, and structural knowledge
- Tough enough? Robust satisficing as a decision norm for long-term policy analysis
- Knowing more (about questions)
- Interests from and in conventions
- Deliberation and confidence change
- Dependent philosophical majorities and the skeptical argument from disagreement
- The determinacy of computation
- Against telic monism in logic
- Having a disagreement: expression, persuasion and demand
- Collaborative knowledge: Where the distributed and commitment models merge
- Counterfactuals, indeterminacy, and value: a puzzle
- In defence of epistemic vices
- Contraries, oppositions, and contradictions: a species/genus account of humean contrariety
- Alethic pluralism for pragmatists
- Conventions, morals and strategy: Greta’s dilemma and the incarceration game
- Conceptual challenges for interpretable machine learning
- Substructural approaches to paradox: an introduction to the special issue
- Belief and rational indeterminacy
- Belief does not entail a reasoning disposition
- Varieties of Humeanism: an introduction
- Integrated HPS? Formal versus historical approaches to philosophy of science
- Evolutionary stability of ambiguity in context signaling games
- Why moods change: their appropriateness and connection to beliefs
- Future bias in action: does the past matter more when you can affect it?
- Grounding theories of powers
- Effective theories and infinite idealizations: a challenge for scientific realism
- Does rationality demand higher-order certainty?
- A response to the problem of wild coincidences
- Beyond linear conciliation
- Reference for neo-Fregeans
- Understanding a communicated thought
- An analysis of the disagreement about added value by regional climate models
- Disbelief is a distinct doxastic attitude
- Knowledge and normality
- Objective consequentialism and the plurality of chances
- Corporeal composition
- Avoiding Dutch Books despite inconsistent credences
- An ontology of weak entity realism for HPC kinds
- The process of linguistic understanding
- Correction to: A response to the problem of wild coincidences
- Expected utility theory, Jeffrey’s decision theory, and the paradoxes
- On Ramsey’s reason to amend Principia Mathematica’s logicism and Wittgenstein’s reaction
- Alethic pluralism and the value of truth
- Technologically scaffolded atypical cognition: the case of YouTube’s recommender system
- Introduction: knowing the unknown
- Introduction to the topical collection “True enough? Themes from Elgin”
- Classifying and characterizing active materials
- The value of truth: introduction to the topical collection
- Correction to: Fundamental mentality in a physical world
- Correction to: Disagreement lost
- Correction to: How to count biological minds: symbiosis, the free energy principle, and reciprocal multiscale integration
- Against the disappearance of spacetime in quantum gravity
- Spatial experience, spatial reality, and two paths to primitivism
- In memoriam: Bob Hale
- Correction to: Practices of remembering a movement in the dance studio: evidence for (a radicalized version of) the REC framework in the domain of memory
- Correction to: Thinking embodiment with genetics: epigenetics and postgenomic biology in embodied cognition and enactivism
- Correction to: Social epistemological conception of delusion
- Explaining “spatial purport of perception”: a predictive processing approach
- Simplicity of what? A case study from generative linguistics
- Distinguishing topological and causal explanation
- Composition, identity and plural ontology
- When clarity and consistency conflicts with empirical adequacy: conceptual engineering, anthropology, and Evans-Pritchard’s ethnography
- Bayesian coherentism
- Towards a socially constructed and objective concept of mental disorder
- The problem of creation and abstract artifacts
- Measuring the present: What is the duration of ‘now’?
- The multiple relation theory and Schiffer’s puzzle
- Invasive species and natural function in ecology
- Algorithmic bias: on the implicit biases of social technology
- A social solution to the puzzle of doxastic responsibility: a two-dimensional account of responsibility for belief
- Single-domain free logic and the problem of compositionality
- Sensory modalities and novel features of perceptual experiences
- Free will and control: a noncausal approach
- McDowell’s infallibilism and the nature of knowledge
- Debunking conspiracy theories
- Interpretationism and judgement-dependence
- Virtue signalling is virtuous