- Elgin on understanding: How does it involve know-how, endorsement and factivity?
- Mental causation as joint causation
- Norwood Russell Hanson’s account of experience: an untimely defense
- From many-valued consequence to many-valued connectives
- Collective ignorance: an information theoretic account
- An invitation to approximate symmetry, with three applications to intertheoretic relations
- Resolutions, salient reasons, and weakness of will
- Science, realism, and unconceived alternatives: introduction to the special issue on unconceived alternatives
- Elgin’s community-oriented steadfastness
- Reconceiving rationality: situating rationality into radically enactive cognition
- In memoriam: Bob Hale
- Doubting Pritchard’s account of hinge propositions
- Tracking and managing deemed abilities
- Prospects of enactivist approaches to intentionality and cognition
- Gibson and Gestalt: (re)presentation, processing, and construction
- The embedded view, its critics, and a radically non-representational solution
- The multiple realizability of general relativity in quantum gravity
- Existence, really? Tacit disagreements about “existence” in disputes about group minds and corporate agents
- Screams for explanation: finetuning and naturalness in the foundations of physics
- Dynamic and stochastic systems as a framework for metaphysics and the philosophy of science
- Autopoietic theory, enactivism, and their incommensurable marks of the cognitive
- Nothingness, Meinongianism and inconsistent mereology
- Vital anti-mathematicism and the ontology of the emerging life sciences: from Mandeville to Diderot
- Part of nature and division in Margaret Cavendish’s materialism
- A bitter pill for closure
- Is believing for a normative reason a composite condition?
- Constraining (mathematical) imagination by experience: Nieuwentijt and van Musschenbroek on the abuses of mathematics
- On the empirical inaccessibility of higher-level modality and its significance for cosmological fine-tuning
- Basing for the Bayesian
- Existentialism, aliens and referentially unrestricted worlds
- Descartes on the limited usefulness of mathematics
- Empress vs. Spider-Man: Margaret Cavendish on pure and applied mathematics
- A puzzle about desire
- A metarepresentational theory of intentional identity
- Imagination, metaphysics, mathematics: Descartes’s arguments for the Vortex Hypothesis
- Diagrammatic carriers and the acceptance of Newton’s optical theory
- An epistemic approach to paraconsistency: a logic of evidence and truth
- What I’ve learned from the early moderns
- A plea for minimally biased naturalistic philosophy
- Do the EPR correlations pose a problem for causal decision theory?
- The uses and abuses of mathematics in early modern philosophy: introduction
- Unification beyond justification: a strategy for theory development
- New problems for defining animal communication in informational terms
- The problem of evaluating automated large-scale evidence aggregators
- Evidence amalgamation, plausibility, and cancer research
- Ethics of the scientist qua policy advisor: inductive risk, uncertainty, and catastrophe in climate economics
- Impossible worlds and partial belief
- The triviality argument against presentism
- Knowledge, belief, and egocentric bias
- Bad company objection to Joongol Kim’s adverbial theory of numbers
- In defense of meta-analysis
- The variety-of-evidence thesis: a Bayesian exploration of its surprising failures
- No evidence amalgamation without evidence measurement
- Radical interpretation, scepticism, and the possibility of shared error
- Extrapolation and the Russo–Williamson thesis
- Vindicating methodological triangulation
- Causal identifiability and piecemeal experimentation
- Amalgamating evidence of dynamics
- Multiple realization and the commensurability of taxonomies
- Against external validity
- Between symmetry and asymmetry: spontaneous symmetry breaking as narrative knowing
- Reflection on natural kinds. Introduction to the special issue on natural kinds: language, science, and metaphysics
- Thermal substances: a Neo-Aristotelian ontology of the quantum world
- The Forever War: understanding, science fiction, and thought experiments
- Responsible research and innovation: coming to grips with an ambitious concept
- Correction to: On Lewis against magic: a study of method in metaphysics
- Correction to: Rethinking natural kinds, reference and truth: towards more correspondence with reality, not less
- Correction to: Questions as information types
- Having a look at the Bayes Blind Spot
- Knowledge-first believing the unknowable
- Negative expertise in conditions of manufactured ignorance: epistemic strategies, virtues and skills
- Visual phenomenology versus visuomotor imagery: How can we be aware of action properties?
- Axiomatic rationality and ecological rationality
- Knowledge first, stability and value
- Asymmetry as a challenge to counterfactual accounts of non-causal explanation
- Betting against the Zen Monk: on preferences and partial belief
- Hume’s principle: a plea for austerity
- History and epistemology of plant behaviour: a pluralistic view?
- The later Wittgenstein’s guide to contradictions
- From Euclidean geometry to knots and nets
- A psychologistic theory of metaphysical explanation
- The feeling of grip: novelty, error dynamics, and the predictive brain
- Does semantic information need to be truthful?
- Perceptual presence: an attentional account
- The bifurcated conception of perceptual knowledge: a new solution to the basis problem for epistemological disjunctivism
- Announcement as effort on topological spaces
- Possible predicates and actual properties
- Bolzano and Kim on grounding and unification
- Axiomatizations of arithmetic and the first-order/second-order divide
- Ambiguous signals, partial beliefs, and propositional content
- Aggregating incoherent agents who disagree
- A measure of inferential-role preservation
- Evolutionary debunking: the Milvian Bridge destabilized
- The challenge of many logics: a new approach to evaluating the role of ideology in Quinean commitment
- Second-order logic: properties, semantics, and existential commitments
- Stereotypes, theory of mind, and the action–prediction hierarchy
- The modality and non-extensionality of the quantifiers
- The middle ground-ancestral logic
- Past, present and future modally introduced
- The limitations of inertial frame spacetime functionalism
- We don’t know we don’t know: asserting ignorance
- A theory of change for prioritised resilient and evolvable software systems
- Against etiological function accounts of interests
- On atomic composition as identity
- Accuracy, conditionalization, and probabilism
- A note on mathematical pluralism and logical pluralism
- Artifacts and affordances
- Affective representation and affective attitudes
- No work for a theory of epistemic dispositions
- Correction to: Happily entangled: prediction, emotion, and the embodied mind
- Linguistics and the explanatory economy
- In the quagmire of quibbles: a dialectical exploration
- Word choice in mathematical practice: a case study in polyhedra
- Can Church’s thesis be viewed as a Carnapian explication?
- Money and mental contents
- On radical solutions in the philosophy of biology: What does “individuals thinking” actually solve?
- Ground-theoretic equivalence
- Four grades of ignorance-involvement and how they nourish the cognitive economy
- A fresh look at research strategies in computational cognitive science: The case of enculturated mathematical problem solving
- A dilemma about kinds and kind terms
- Quantum entanglement: a hylomorphic account
- Mistakes as revealing and as manifestations of competence
- Objects, seeing, and object-seeing
- Whales, fish and Alaskan bears: interest-relative taxonomy and kind pluralism in biology
- On representation hungry cognition (and why we should stop feeding it)
- A methodological argument against scientific realism
- On the proper formulation of conditionalization
- Deflationism and truthmaking
- Fundamental truthmakers and non-fundamental truths
- Correction to: Self-referential propositions
- Does the solar system compute the laws of motion?
- Data science and molecular biology: prediction and mechanistic explanation
- Tarskian consequence relations bilaterally: some familiar notions
- Scaling up; scaling down: What’s missing?
- Catherine Elgin on peerhood and the epistemic benefits of disagreement
- Propositional complexity and the Frege–Geach Point
- A classification of Newcomb problems and decision theories
- Does the temporal asymmetry of value support a tensed metaphysics?
- Suspending is believing
- On symmetry and duality
- Ecumenical epistemic instrumentalism
- Radical views on cognition and the dynamics of scientific change
- A plea for KR
- Metalinguistic negotiation and logical pluralism
- The Enhanced Indispensability Argument, the circularity problem, and the interpretability strategy
- Teleology and mentalizing in the explanation of action
- The myth and fallacy of simple extrapolation in medicine
- Functional explanation in mathematics
- Realism without representationalism
- Essentialist modal rationalism
- Complex demonstratives, hidden arguments, and presupposition
- Mirrors without warnings
- How to conceive of science for the benefit of society: prospects of responsible research and innovation
- How to co-exist with nonexistent expectations
- Unrevisability
- Disagreement or denialism? “Invasive species denialism” and ethical disagreement in science
- Four Dthats
- The (un)detectability of absolute Newtonian masses
- Against Radical Enactivism’s narrowmindedness about phenomenality
- Temporal ontology: tenselessness and quantification
- Framing cognition: Dewey’s potential contributions to some enactivist issues
- Goals and targets: a developmental puzzle about sensitivity to others’ actions
- Reflecting on what philosophy of epidemiology is and does, as the field comes into its own: Introduction to the Special Issue on Philosophy of Epidemiology
- Computational enactivism under the free energy principle
- Epistemic norms: truth conducive enough
- Against the disappearance of spacetime in quantum gravity
- An ecological approach to disjunctivism
- Experimental phenomenology: What it is and what it is not
- On structural contraction and why it fails
- Integrating computation into the mechanistic hierarchy in the cognitive and neural sciences
- Wittgenstein’s challenge to enactivism
- Reassessing truth-evaluability in the Minimalism-Contextualism debate
- The role of syntactic representations in set theory
- Scientific modelling with diagrams
- Cultural evolutionary theory as a theory of forces
- On the spatiotemporal extensiveness of sense-making: ultrafast cognition and the historicity of normativity
- Distribution and ignorance
- A taxonomy of types of epistemic dependence: introduction to the Synthese special issue on epistemic dependence
- The cerebral, extra-cerebral bodily, and socio-cultural dimensions of enculturated arithmetical cognition
- The material reasoning of folding paper
- Rational understanding: toward a probabilistic epistemology of acceptability
- Mathematicians writing for mathematicians
- Social constructionism, concept acquisition and the mismatch problem
- Absence perception and the philosophy of zero
- What we cannot learn from analogue experiments
- Error possibility, contextualism, and bias
- Some fallibilist knowledge: Questioning knowledge-attributions and open knowledge
- Causal concepts and temporal ordering
- Explaining the behaviour of random ecological networks: the stability of the microbiome as a case of integrative pluralism
- An ecumenical notion of entailment
- Hinge epistemology and the prospects for a unified theory of knowledge
- Knowledge and the permissibility of action
- Infinitesimal idealization, easy road nominalism, and fractional quantum statistics
- Infinity and the foundations of linguistics
- Naïve realism about unconscious perception
- Deduction and definability in infinite statistical systems
- Semantic relativism and ways of knowing
- Minimal approximations and Norton’s dome
- The structure of asymptotic idealization
- The role of idealizations in the Aharonov–Bohm effect
- Discontinuities and singularities, data and phenomena: for Referentialism
- The paradox of phase transitions in the light of constructive mathematics
- Is open-mindedness truth-conducive?
- Combining finite and infinite elements: Why do we use infinite idealizations in engineering?
- Infinite lies and explanatory ties: idealization in phase transitions
- Point-particle explanations: the case of gravitational waves
- Stars and steam engines: To what extent do thermodynamics and statistical mechanics apply to self-gravitating systems?
- On the paradox of reversible processes in thermodynamics
- From deed to word: gapless and kink-free enactivism
- Exercising abilities
- Proof-theoretic pluralism
- Across the great divide: pluralism and the hunt for missing heritability
- How is the asymmetry between the open future and the fixed past to be characterized?
- Commercial interests, agenda setting, and the epistemic trustworthiness of nutrition science
- From a boson to the standard model Higgs: a case study in confirmation and model dynamics
- Climate change denial and beliefs about science
- Testimonial worth
- Experimental individuation and philosophical retail arguments
- Measure development and the hermeneutic task
- Gestalt psychology, frontloading phenomenology, and psychophysics
- A new argument for the incompatibility of content externalism with justification internalism
- Recombining non-qualitative reality
- How to be an uncompromising revisionary ontologist
- Making AI meaningful again
- Direct inference and the sleeping beauty problem
- How to identify wholes with their parts
- Composition as identity: pushing forward
- The where of bodily awareness
- Broadening the scope of our understanding of mechanisms: lessons from the history of the morning-after pill
- The structure of audio–visual consciousness
- Species are, at the same time, kinds and individuals: a causal argument based on an empirical approach to species identity
- A representationalist reading of Kantian intuitions
- Bodily structure and body representation
- What is a logical theory? On theories containing assertions and denials
- Let’s not agree to disagree: the role of strategic disagreement in science
- Structured propositions and the logical form of predication
- A general argument against structured propositions
- If structured propositions are logical procedures then how are procedures individuated?
- ‘Ought’ implies ‘can’ against epistemic deontologism: beyond doxastic involuntarism
- Anatomy of a proposition
- Unity through truth
- Introduction: primitivism versus reductionism about the problem of the unity of the proposition
- From the unity of the proposition to linguistic idealism
- The imprecise impermissivist’s dilemma
- Denial and retraction: a challenge for theories of taste predicates
- Believing the best: on doxastic partiality in friendship
- On propositions and fineness of grain (again!)
- Force cancellation
- Regress, unity, facts, and propositions
- On cancellation
- Propositions as Cognitive Acts
- Continuity of change in Kant’s dynamics
- Act theories and the attitudes
- What propositional structure could not be
- The Platonic conception of intellectual virtues: its significance for virtue epistemology
- Some lessons from simulations of scientific disagreements
- The functions of institutions: etiology and teleology
- An encoding approach to Ante Rem structuralism
- Charting the landscape of interpretation, theory rivalry, and underdetermination in quantum mechanics
- Natural kinds and dispositions: a causal analysis
- Modal rationalism and the demonstrative reply to the scrutability argument against physicalism
- Does logical pluralism imply, or suggest, truth pluralism, or vice versa?
- Hale’s argument from transitive counting
- Time travel and counterfactual asymmetry
- What real progress has metaphysics made since the time of Kant? Kant and the metaphysics of grounding
- Quantum probability: a reliable tool for an agent or a reliable source of reality?
- The field and landscape of affordances: Koffka’s two environments revisited
- Free will fallibilism and the “two-standpoints” account of freedom
- Knowledge-how and the problems of masking and finkishness
- The C-word, the P-word, and realism in epidemiology
- Austrian economics without extreme apriorism: construing the fundamental axiom of praxeology as analytic
- Judging machines: philosophical aspects of deep learning
- Can a relational substance ontology be hylomorphic?
- Many, but one
- Knowledge-how and false belief
- Knowledge, evidence, and multiple process types
- The causal situationist account of constitutive relevance
- Getting Gettier straight: thought experiments, deviant realizations and default interpretations
- A pluralistic and socially responsible philosophy of epidemiology field should actively engage with social determinants of health and health disparities
- The epistemic norm of inference and non-epistemic reasons for belief
- Intellectualizing know how
- Epistemic norms, closure, and No-Belief hinge epistemology
- Consciousness, belief, and the group mind hypothesis
- Is self-identity essential to objects?
- Introduction: systematicity, the nature of science?
- The nature of science. A dialogue
- Systematicity theory meets Socratic scientific realism: the systematic quest for truth
- Systematicity is necessary but not sufficient: on the problem of facsimile science
- Tolerance and the distributed sorites
- Axiomatizing non-deterministic many-valued generalized consequence relations
- Modelling deep indeterminacy
- On the explanatory demands of the Special Composition Question
- Bodily awareness and novel multisensory features
- The interpretation of uncertainty in ecological rationality
- Closure, credence and rationality: a problem for non-belief hinge epistemology
- The overlooked ubiquity of first-person experience in the cognitive sciences
- How (not) to think about theory-change in epidemiology
- Epidemiology is ecosystem science
- Approval-directed agency and the decision theory of Newcomb-like problems
- Part, slot, ground: foundations for neo-Aristotelian mereology
- Is the folk concept of luck normative?
- Rethinking natural kinds, reference and truth: towards more correspondence with reality, not less
- Dreaming of a stable world: vision and action in sleep
- Multiscale integration: beyond internalism and externalism
- Evaluating epistemic virtues
- Conservative translations of four-valued logics in modal logic
- Limiting logical pluralism
- Quine on naturalism, nominalism, and philosophy’s place within science
- Why logical pluralism?
- Generalizing empirical adequacy II: partial structures
- Information elaboration and epistemic effects of diversity
- Defeasible normative reasoning
- Enactivism, other minds, and mental disorders
- Fixed-point solutions to the regress problem in normative uncertainty
- Vertical versus horizontal: What is really at issue in the exclusion problem?
- Abduction versus conceiving in modal epistemology
- What we can (and can’t) infer about implicit bias from debiasing experiments
- The ant colony as a test for scientific theories of consciousness
- No universalism without gunk? Composition as identity and the universality of identity
- Aesthetics and action: situations, emotional perception and the Kuleshov effect
- Abduction and styles of scientific thinking
- Logic without metaphysics
- Productive theory-ladenness in fMRI
- Psychophysiological approach to the Liar paradox: Jean Buridan’s virtual entailment principle put to the test
- Intuition, intelligence, data compression
- Towards a dual process epistemology of imagination
- Memory without content? Radical enactivism and (post)causal theories of memory
- World enough and form: why cosmology needs hylomorphism
- Moral disagreement and non-moral ignorance
- Affect, motivational states, and evaluative concepts
- Pragmatism, enactivism, and ecological psychology: towards a unified approach to post-cognitivism
- Kuhn’s two accounts of rational disagreement in science: an interpretation and critique
- Do mathematical explanations have instrumental value?
- Coincidence as parthood
- An evidentialist account of hinges
- Composition as identity, Leibniz’s Law, and slice-sensitive emergent properties
- First person epidemiological measures: vehicles for patient centered care
- Make up your mind: octopus cognition and hybrid explanations
- Counterpossibles for modal normativists
- Extended mathematical cognition: external representations with non-derived content
- Some remarks on the mentalistic reformulation of the measurement problem: a reply to S. Gao
- Metaphysical and absolute possibility
- Kant on the epistemic role of the imagination
- Conceptual engineering, truth, and efficacy
- Against logical generalism
- Externalism and critical reasoning: a reconsideration
- From potency to act: hyloenergeism
- Induction and explanatory definitions in mathematics
- The transmission of knowledge and garbage
- The nonclassical mereology of olfactory experiences
- Experimental ordinary language philosophy: a cross-linguistic study of defeasible default inferences
- Counterfactual knowability revisited
- Authority without privilege: How to be a Dretskean conciliatory skeptic on self-knowledge
- Essence and the inference problem
- Safety, domination, and differential support
- Forces in a true and physical sense: from mathematical models to metaphysical conclusions
- Evil twins and the multiverse: distinguishing the world of difference between epistemic and physical possibility
- Counterfactual reasoning within physical theories
- Ideology and its role in metaphysics
- The polysemy of ‘part’
- Is there a neutral metalanguage?
- Hyperintensional logics for everyone
- A debunking argument against speciesism
- Reliable group belief
- The possibility of fitting love: irreplaceability and selectivity
- Infinite idealizations in science: an introduction
- Intuitionistic mereology
- A conflict between van Inwagen’s metaontology and his ontology
- Free actions as a natural kind
- The illusion of conscious experience
- Lying, fast and slow
- What’s new: innovation and enculturation of arithmetical practices
- Mathematical developments in the rise of Yang–Mills gauge theories
- A meaning explanation for HoTT
- Is Weak Supplementation analytic?
- Underdetermination of infinitesimal probabilities
- Scientific realism with historical essences: the case of species
- Analysis and decomposition in Peirce
- Historiographic narratives and empirical evidence: a case study
- New frontiers in ground, essence, and modality: introduction
- Putting responsible research and innovation into practice: a case study for biotechnology research, exploring impacts and RRI learning outcomes of public engagement for science students
- The original sin of proof-theoretic semantics
- Reading as a source of knowledge
- The epistemic effects of close entanglements between research fields and activist movements
- Why inference to the best explanation doesn’t secure empirical grounds for mathematical platonism
- How to be an adverbialist about phenomenal intentionality
- How to Ekman a Crabbé-Tennant
- Philosophical methods under scrutiny: introduction to the special issue philosophical methods
- Strange bedfellows: on Pritchard’s disjunctivist hinge epistemology
- Is parthood identity?
- Processes, pre-emption and further problems
- Intensional biases in affordance perception: an explanatory issue for radical enactivism
- Epistemic conservatism and bare beliefs
- Correcting credences with chances
- Structural properties, mereology, and modal magic
- Quasi-canonical systems and their semantics
- Observer memory and immunity to error through misidentification
- The word of a reluctant convert
- Is composition identity?
- On the essence of empty properties
- Why ‘scaffolding’ is the wrong metaphor: the cognitive usefulness of mathematical representations
- How and why we reason from is to ought
- Affordances, context and sociality
- Predictive processing and the representation wars: a victory for the eliminativist (via fictionalism)
- Market epistemology
- Consciousness and the limits of memory
- Lexical-rule predicativism about names
- Paraconsistency in classical logic
- Physicalism and the sortalist conception of objects
- Lessons from the Large Hadron Collider for model-based experimentation: the concept of a model of data acquisition and the scope of the hierarchy of models
- Structures, dynamics and mechanisms in neuroscience: an integrative account
- Brandom and the brutes
- What inductive explanations could not be
- Mental causation via neuroprosthetics? A critical analysis
- Deontology defended
- The response model of moral disgust
- Methodological reflections on Kant’s ethical theory
- Pre-emption cases may support, not undermine, the counterfactual theory of causation
- Scientific deceit
- How does the consideration of Indigenous identities in the US complicate conversations about tracking folk racial categories in epidemiologic research?
- Merleau-Ponty and the radical sciences of mind
- A new proposal how to handle counterexamples to Markov causation à la Cartwright, or: fixing the chemical factory
- Special issue: Inferentialism in philosophy of science and in epistemology—introduction
- It’s one thing to rule them all and another thing to bind them
- A Kantian virtue epistemology: rational capacities and transcendental arguments
- Mindless accuracy: on the ubiquity of content in nature
- Truthmaking and the is–ought gap
- Desirability foundations of robust rational decision making
- The externalist challenge to conceptual engineering
- On experiencing moral properties
- Against global method safety
- Merleau-Ponty’s implicit critique of the new mechanists
- Extensionality for fusions and pluralities
- Correction to: Deduction and definability in infinite statistical systems
- What the progressive aspect tells us about processes
- Truthmaker maximalism and the truthmaker paradox
- A functional naturalism
- Friedman on suspended judgment
- Correction to: Non-rational action in the face of disagreement: an argument against (strong) non-conformism
- Correction to: “Till at last there remain nothing”
- Strategy and the pursuit of truth
- Representationalism is a dead end
- Epistemic harm and virtues of self-evaluation
- Erratum to: Scientific revolutions, specialization and the discovery of the structure of DNA: toward a new picture of the development of the sciences
- Time travel, hyperspace and Cheshire Cats
- Women and ‘the philosophical personality’: evaluating whether gender differences in the Cognitive Reflection Test have significance for explaining the gender gap in Philosophy
- Beyond cognitive myopia: a patchwork approach to the concept of neural function
- Explanatory autonomy: the role of proportionality, stability, and conditional irrelevance
- Causal explanation and the periodic table
- JuDAS: a theory of rational belief revision
- Scientific explanation, unifying mathematics, and indispensability arguments (A new Cicada MES)
- Gestalt structures in multi-person intersubjectivity
- Polarization in groups of Bayesian agents
- Is Hume’s Principle analytic?
- Aristotelian diagrams for semantic and syntactic consequence
- String theory, non-empirical theory assessment, and the context of pursuit
- The two visual systems hypothesis and contrastive underdetermination
- How numerals support new cognitive capacities
- Truthlikeness: old and new debates
- Epistemic injustice in mathematics
- Folk teleology drives persistence judgments
- Action-based versus cognitivist perspectives on socio-cognitive development: culture, language and social experience within the two paradigms
- Replacement and reasoning: a reliabilist account of epistemic defeat
- Inquiry and the doxastic attitudes
- Knowledge of consequences: an explanation of the epistemic side-effect effect
- In defense of the semantic view of computation
- The problem of future contingents: scoping out a solution
- Defining a crisis: the roles of principles in the search for a theory of quantum gravity
- Deep disagreement and hinge epistemology
- Russellians can solve the problem of empty names with nonsingular propositions
- The joint aggregation of beliefs and degrees of belief
- Higher-order defeat and intellectual responsibility
- Peripersonal perception in action
- Correction to: Cognitive penetration and the cognition–perception interface
- The principle of equivalence as a criterion of identity
- Belief, credence, and evidence
- Evidentially embedded epistemic entitlement
- Constitutive principles versus comprehensibility conditions in post-Kantian physics
- Substructural logics, pluralism and collapse
- Critical epidemiological literacy: understanding ideas better when placed in relation to alternatives
- Deducing false propositions from true ideas: Nieuwentijt on mathematical reasoning
- Varieties of responsibility: two problems of responsible innovation
- The epistemological objection to modal primitivism
- Sensorimotor expectations and the visual field
- Stealing Harman’s Thought : knowledge saboteurs and dogmatists
- A partial consequence account of truthlikeness
- The turbulent age of innovation
- Empiricism without magic: transformational abstraction in deep convolutional neural networks
- Knowledge, justification, and (a sort of) safe belief
- Logical pluralism without the normativity
- Contingent composition as identity
- Is risk aversion irrational? Examining the “fallacy” of large numbers
- Representation and the active consumer
- Hyperintensional semantics: a Fregean approach