- Educating for ignorance
- Complexity begets crosscutting, dooms hierarchy (another paper on natural kinds)
- Feyerabend and manufactured disagreement: reflections on expertise, consensus, and science policy
- What’s wrong with the minimal conception of innateness in cognitive science?
- Conformity in scientific networks
- Too much of a good thing: decision-making in cases with infinitely many utility contributions
- Structural and indicator representations: a difference in degree, not kind
- Computational domestication of ignorant entities
- The intrinsic value of risky prospects
- Practical reasoning, rule-following and belief revision: an account in terms of Jeffrey’s rule
- Reliability of mathematical inference
- Joint actions, commitments and the need to belong
- Intrinsic local distances: a mixed solution to Weyl’s tile argument
- Grounding principles for (relevant) implication
- Ignorance, misconceptions and critical thinking
- Mereology and ideology
- Interactive biorobotics
- As below, so before: ‘synchronic’ and ‘diachronic’ conceptions of spacetime emergence
- Pluralistic perspectives on logic: an introduction
- Requiem for logical nihilism, or: Logical nihilism annihilated
- The C account of assertion: a negative result
- The neo-Carnapians
- Motivating dualities
- What does it take to be a brain disorder?
- Disjunction and distality: the hard problem for purely probabilistic causal theories of mental content
- Realism, perspectivism, and disagreement in science
- Are the open-ended rules for negation categorical?
- How groups persist
- A perceptual theory of moods
- Subjective causal networks and indeterminate suppositional credences
- Between vision and action: introduction to the special issue
- Neural phase: a new problem for the modal account of epistemic luck
- Knot is not that nasty (but it is hardier than tonk)
- Evidentialism and belief polarization
- Non-Boolean classical relevant logics I
- Empathy for a reason? From understanding agency to phenomenal insight
- Does perceptual psychology rule out disjunctivism in the theory of perception?
- Contrastive mental causation
- Why can’t what is true be valuable?
- Properties in sight and in thought
- Scepticism and Epistemic Angst , Redux
- Against ‘functional gravitational energy’: a critical note on functionalism, selective realism, and geometric objects and gravitational energy
- Judgementalism about normative decision theory
- Can massive modularity explain human intelligence? Information control problem and implications for cognitive architecture
- Similarity-based cognition: radical enactivism meets cognitive neuroscience
- Kant and the forms of realism
- Better virtuous than safe
- (Un)reasonable doubt as affective experience: obsessive–compulsive disorder, epistemic anxiety and the feeling of uncertainty
- In the Space of Reasonable Doubt
- Deontological decision theory and lesser-evil options
- Heritability, causal influence and locality
- Scientific understanding and felicitous legitimate falsehoods
- Normative uncertainty and probabilistic moral knowledge
- Group understanding
- Epistemic norms, all things considered
- In defense of pluralist theory
- Paradoxical hypodoxes
- What are social groups? Their metaphysics and how to classify them
- Is group agency a social phenomenon?
- In defense of an epistemic probability account of luck
- Reminiscing together: joint experiences, epistemic groups, and sense of self
- Collective mental time travel: remembering the past and imagining the future together
- The heuristic function of duality
- Just another article on Moore’s paradox, but we don’t believe that
- Kornblith versus Sosa on grades of knowledge
- Expanding the vector model for dispositionalist approaches to causation
- Emotional sharing and the extended mind
- The ontology of social groups
- Why the social sciences are irreducible
- General ecological information supports engagement with affordances for ‘higher’ cognition
- Models as signs: extending Kralemann and Lattman’s proposal on modeling models within Peirce’s theory of signs
- Can parts cause their wholes?
- Sign and Object : Quine’s forgotten book project
- The essence of grounding
- Fundamental disagreements and the limits of instrumentalism
- Thinking (about) groups: a special issue of Synthese
- Arational belief convergence
- Generic inferential rules for slurs: Dummett and Williamson on ethnic pejoratives
- Two conceptions of the sources of conservatism in scientific research
- Radical embodied cognitive science and “Real Cognition”
- Two traditions in abstract valuational model theory
- Prosthetic embodiment
- Ignorance as a productive response to epistemic perturbations
- Flexible yet fair: blinding analyses in experimental psychology
- Mathematical cognition and enculturation: introduction to the Synthese special issue
- Limits to levels in the methodological individualism–holism debate
- A challenge to the new metaphysics: deRosset, Priority, and explanation
- Getting it: A predictive processing approach to irony comprehension
- Easy Ontology, quantification, and realism
- A new perspective on the relationship between metacognition and social cognition: metacognitive concepts as socio-cognitive tools
- Ambiguity aversion behind the veil of ignorance
- Everettian theory as pure wave mechanics plus a no-collapse probability postulate
- The impact of culture on mindreading
- Epistemic autonomy and group knowledge
- A dynamical systems approach to causation
- Cognitive confinement: theoretical considerations on the construction of a cognitive niche, and on how it can go wrong
- Illocution and accommodation in the functioning of presumptions
- Super-Humeanism and free will
- Fundamental non-qualitative properties
- Empirical incoherence and double functionalism
- Explaining unification in physics internally
- Structure by proxy, with an application to grounding
- Are there epistemic conditions necessary for demonstrative thought?
- Subjective values should be sharp
- The internal morality of medicine: a constructivist approach
- From ‘Intersex’ to ‘DSD’: a case of epistemic injustice
- Understanding why, knowing why, and cognitive achievements
- Why Reid was no dogmatist
- Might-beliefs and asymmetric disagreement
- The structure of sensorimotor explanation
- A case for a certainty norm of assertion
- Mapping the continuum of research strategies
- Constructing reality with models
- Equivalence: an attempt at a history of the idea
- Financializing epistemic norms in contemporary biomedical innovation
- Infertility, epistemic risk, and disease definitions
- A puzzle for epistemic WAMs
- Medical knowledge in a social world: Introduction to the special issue
- Logical expressivism, logical theory and the critique of inferences
- Faithfulness for naive validity
- Philosophers on drugs
- Explanatory schema and the process of model building
- Implicit trust in clinical decision-making by multidisciplinary teams
- Mechanisms and generative material models
- Twin Earth and perceptual content
- Causal decision theory’s predetermination problem
- Fictional reports
- In what sense is understanding an intellectual virtue?
- You are just being emotional! Testimonial injustice and folk-psychological attributions
- Spatial experience, spatial reality, and two paths to primitivism
- Correction to: The disvalue of knowledge
- A bundle theory of words
- Reassessing equilibrium explanations: When are they causal explanations?
- Seemings, truth-makers, and epistemic justification
- What type of Type I error? Contrasting the Neyman–Pearson and Fisherian approaches in the context of exact and direct replications
- An integrative design? How liberalised modal empiricism fails the integration challenge
- Is morality a gadget? Nature, nurture and culture in moral development
- Frege and the origins of model theory in nineteenth century geometry
- A predictive processing theory of motivation
- Veritism refuted? Understanding, idealization, and the facts
- Ignorance, norms and instrumental pluralism: Hayekian institutional epistemology
- Reliability of molecular imaging diagnostics
- Scientific representation and dissimilarity
- (Meta)inferential levels of entailment beyond the Tarskian paradigm
- Don’t forget forgetting: the social epistemic importance of how we forget
- Intellectual virtues and the epistemic value of truth
- Partial truth versus felicitous falsehoods
- A dialogical route to logical pluralism
- Two types of epistemic instrumentalism
- The disvalue of knowledge
- New perspectives in metaontology: introduction to the special issue
- Evidentialism doesn’t make an exception for belief
- Lying and knowing
- The spontaneousness of skill and the impulsivity of habit
- Historical inductions, Old and New
- Generalised Reichenbachian common cause systems
- Exploring the fruitfulness of diagrams in mathematics
- Truth in the Investigations
- Smelling objects
- Group disagreement: a belief aggregation perspective
- Inductive explanation and Garber–Style solutions to the problem of old evidence
- Dilemmic Epistemology
- Towards a theory of singular thought about abstract mathematical objects
- Meno’s paradox and medicine
- Accommodation, prediction and replication: model selection in scale construction
- Extending the argument from unconceived alternatives: observations, models, predictions, explanations, methods, instruments, experiments, and values
- A pragmatic argument against equal weighting
- Unconceived alternatives and the cathedral problem
- Ontological commitments of frame-based knowledge representations
- The Snow White problem
- Unconceived alternatives and conservatism in science: the impact of professionalization, peer-review, and Big Science
- Saying a bundle: meaning, intention, and underdetermination
- Demographic statistics in defensive decisions
- Explaining how to perceive the new: causal-informational teleosemantics and productive response functions
- Nominalism, contingency, and natural structure
- Hearing meanings: the revenge of context
- Show me the numbers: a quantitative portrait of the attitudes, experiences, and values of philosophers of science regarding broadly engaged work
- Elgin on understanding: How does it involve know-how, endorsement and factivity?
- Mental causation as joint causation
- Norwood Russell Hanson’s account of experience: an untimely defense
- From many-valued consequence to many-valued connectives
- Collective ignorance: an information theoretic account
- An invitation to approximate symmetry, with three applications to intertheoretic relations
- Resolutions, salient reasons, and weakness of will
- Science, realism, and unconceived alternatives: introduction to the special issue on unconceived alternatives
- Elgin’s community-oriented steadfastness
- Reconceiving rationality: situating rationality into radically enactive cognition
- In memoriam: Bob Hale
- Doubting Pritchard’s account of hinge propositions
- Tracking and managing deemed abilities
- Prospects of enactivist approaches to intentionality and cognition
- Gibson and Gestalt: (re)presentation, processing, and construction
- The embedded view, its critics, and a radically non-representational solution
- The multiple realizability of general relativity in quantum gravity
- Existence, really? Tacit disagreements about “existence” in disputes about group minds and corporate agents
- Screams for explanation: finetuning and naturalness in the foundations of physics
- Dynamic and stochastic systems as a framework for metaphysics and the philosophy of science
- Autopoietic theory, enactivism, and their incommensurable marks of the cognitive
- Nothingness, Meinongianism and inconsistent mereology
- Vital anti-mathematicism and the ontology of the emerging life sciences: from Mandeville to Diderot
- Part of nature and division in Margaret Cavendish’s materialism
- A bitter pill for closure
- Is believing for a normative reason a composite condition?
- Constraining (mathematical) imagination by experience: Nieuwentijt and van Musschenbroek on the abuses of mathematics
- On the empirical inaccessibility of higher-level modality and its significance for cosmological fine-tuning
- Basing for the Bayesian
- Existentialism, aliens and referentially unrestricted worlds
- Descartes on the limited usefulness of mathematics
- Empress vs. Spider-Man: Margaret Cavendish on pure and applied mathematics
- A puzzle about desire
- A metarepresentational theory of intentional identity
- Imagination, metaphysics, mathematics: Descartes’s arguments for the Vortex Hypothesis
- Diagrammatic carriers and the acceptance of Newton’s optical theory
- An epistemic approach to paraconsistency: a logic of evidence and truth
- What I’ve learned from the early moderns
- A plea for minimally biased naturalistic philosophy
- Do the EPR correlations pose a problem for causal decision theory?
- The uses and abuses of mathematics in early modern philosophy: introduction
- Unification beyond justification: a strategy for theory development
- New problems for defining animal communication in informational terms
- The problem of evaluating automated large-scale evidence aggregators
- Evidence amalgamation, plausibility, and cancer research
- Ethics of the scientist qua policy advisor: inductive risk, uncertainty, and catastrophe in climate economics
- Impossible worlds and partial belief
- The triviality argument against presentism
- Knowledge, belief, and egocentric bias
- Bad company objection to Joongol Kim’s adverbial theory of numbers
- In defense of meta-analysis
- The variety-of-evidence thesis: a Bayesian exploration of its surprising failures
- No evidence amalgamation without evidence measurement
- Radical interpretation, scepticism, and the possibility of shared error
- Extrapolation and the Russo–Williamson thesis
- Vindicating methodological triangulation
- Causal identifiability and piecemeal experimentation
- Amalgamating evidence of dynamics
- Multiple realization and the commensurability of taxonomies
- Against external validity
- Between symmetry and asymmetry: spontaneous symmetry breaking as narrative knowing
- Reflection on natural kinds. Introduction to the special issue on natural kinds: language, science, and metaphysics
- Thermal substances: a Neo-Aristotelian ontology of the quantum world
- The Forever War: understanding, science fiction, and thought experiments
- Responsible research and innovation: coming to grips with an ambitious concept
- Correction to: On Lewis against magic: a study of method in metaphysics
- Correction to: Rethinking natural kinds, reference and truth: towards more correspondence with reality, not less
- Correction to: Questions as information types
- Having a look at the Bayes Blind Spot
- Knowledge-first believing the unknowable
- Negative expertise in conditions of manufactured ignorance: epistemic strategies, virtues and skills
- Visual phenomenology versus visuomotor imagery: How can we be aware of action properties?
- Axiomatic rationality and ecological rationality
- Knowledge first, stability and value
- Asymmetry as a challenge to counterfactual accounts of non-causal explanation
- Betting against the Zen Monk: on preferences and partial belief
- Hume’s principle: a plea for austerity
- History and epistemology of plant behaviour: a pluralistic view?
- The later Wittgenstein’s guide to contradictions
- From Euclidean geometry to knots and nets
- A psychologistic theory of metaphysical explanation
- The feeling of grip: novelty, error dynamics, and the predictive brain
- Does semantic information need to be truthful?
- Perceptual presence: an attentional account
- The bifurcated conception of perceptual knowledge: a new solution to the basis problem for epistemological disjunctivism
- Announcement as effort on topological spaces
- Possible predicates and actual properties
- Bolzano and Kim on grounding and unification
- Axiomatizations of arithmetic and the first-order/second-order divide
- Ambiguous signals, partial beliefs, and propositional content
- Aggregating incoherent agents who disagree
- A measure of inferential-role preservation
- Evolutionary debunking: the Milvian Bridge destabilized
- The challenge of many logics: a new approach to evaluating the role of ideology in Quinean commitment
- Second-order logic: properties, semantics, and existential commitments
- Stereotypes, theory of mind, and the action–prediction hierarchy
- The modality and non-extensionality of the quantifiers
- The middle ground-ancestral logic
- Past, present and future modally introduced
- The limitations of inertial frame spacetime functionalism
- We don’t know we don’t know: asserting ignorance
- A theory of change for prioritised resilient and evolvable software systems
- Against etiological function accounts of interests
- On atomic composition as identity
- Accuracy, conditionalization, and probabilism
- A note on mathematical pluralism and logical pluralism
- Artifacts and affordances
- Affective representation and affective attitudes
- No work for a theory of epistemic dispositions
- Correction to: Happily entangled: prediction, emotion, and the embodied mind
- Linguistics and the explanatory economy
- In the quagmire of quibbles: a dialectical exploration
- Word choice in mathematical practice: a case study in polyhedra
- Can Church’s thesis be viewed as a Carnapian explication?
- Money and mental contents
- On radical solutions in the philosophy of biology: What does “individuals thinking” actually solve?
- Ground-theoretic equivalence
- Four grades of ignorance-involvement and how they nourish the cognitive economy
- A fresh look at research strategies in computational cognitive science: The case of enculturated mathematical problem solving
- A dilemma about kinds and kind terms
- Quantum entanglement: a hylomorphic account
- Mistakes as revealing and as manifestations of competence
- Objects, seeing, and object-seeing
- Whales, fish and Alaskan bears: interest-relative taxonomy and kind pluralism in biology
- On representation hungry cognition (and why we should stop feeding it)
- A methodological argument against scientific realism
- On the proper formulation of conditionalization
- Deflationism and truthmaking
- Fundamental truthmakers and non-fundamental truths
- Correction to: Self-referential propositions
- Does the solar system compute the laws of motion?
- Data science and molecular biology: prediction and mechanistic explanation
- Tarskian consequence relations bilaterally: some familiar notions
- Scaling up; scaling down: What’s missing?
- Catherine Elgin on peerhood and the epistemic benefits of disagreement
- Propositional complexity and the Frege–Geach Point
- A classification of Newcomb problems and decision theories
- Does the temporal asymmetry of value support a tensed metaphysics?
- Suspending is believing
- On symmetry and duality
- Ecumenical epistemic instrumentalism
- Radical views on cognition and the dynamics of scientific change
- A plea for KR
- Metalinguistic negotiation and logical pluralism
- The Enhanced Indispensability Argument, the circularity problem, and the interpretability strategy
- Teleology and mentalizing in the explanation of action
- The myth and fallacy of simple extrapolation in medicine
- Functional explanation in mathematics
- Realism without representationalism
- Essentialist modal rationalism
- Complex demonstratives, hidden arguments, and presupposition
- Mirrors without warnings
- How to conceive of science for the benefit of society: prospects of responsible research and innovation
- How to co-exist with nonexistent expectations
- Unrevisability
- Disagreement or denialism? “Invasive species denialism” and ethical disagreement in science
- Four Dthats
- The (un)detectability of absolute Newtonian masses
- Against Radical Enactivism’s narrowmindedness about phenomenality
- Temporal ontology: tenselessness and quantification
- Framing cognition: Dewey’s potential contributions to some enactivist issues
- Goals and targets: a developmental puzzle about sensitivity to others’ actions
- Reflecting on what philosophy of epidemiology is and does, as the field comes into its own: Introduction to the Special Issue on Philosophy of Epidemiology
- Computational enactivism under the free energy principle
- Epistemic norms: truth conducive enough
- Against the disappearance of spacetime in quantum gravity
- An ecological approach to disjunctivism
- Experimental phenomenology: What it is and what it is not
- On structural contraction and why it fails
- Integrating computation into the mechanistic hierarchy in the cognitive and neural sciences
- Wittgenstein’s challenge to enactivism
- Reassessing truth-evaluability in the Minimalism-Contextualism debate
- The role of syntactic representations in set theory
- Scientific modelling with diagrams
- Cultural evolutionary theory as a theory of forces
- On the spatiotemporal extensiveness of sense-making: ultrafast cognition and the historicity of normativity
- Distribution and ignorance
- A taxonomy of types of epistemic dependence: introduction to the Synthese special issue on epistemic dependence
- The cerebral, extra-cerebral bodily, and socio-cultural dimensions of enculturated arithmetical cognition
- The material reasoning of folding paper
- Rational understanding: toward a probabilistic epistemology of acceptability
- Mathematicians writing for mathematicians
- Social constructionism, concept acquisition and the mismatch problem
- Absence perception and the philosophy of zero
- What we cannot learn from analogue experiments
- Error possibility, contextualism, and bias
- Some fallibilist knowledge: Questioning knowledge-attributions and open knowledge
- Causal concepts and temporal ordering
- Explaining the behaviour of random ecological networks: the stability of the microbiome as a case of integrative pluralism
- An ecumenical notion of entailment
- Hinge epistemology and the prospects for a unified theory of knowledge
- Knowledge and the permissibility of action
- Infinitesimal idealization, easy road nominalism, and fractional quantum statistics
- Infinity and the foundations of linguistics
- Naïve realism about unconscious perception
- Deduction and definability in infinite statistical systems
- Semantic relativism and ways of knowing
- Minimal approximations and Norton’s dome
- The structure of asymptotic idealization
- The role of idealizations in the Aharonov–Bohm effect
- Discontinuities and singularities, data and phenomena: for Referentialism
- The paradox of phase transitions in the light of constructive mathematics
- Is open-mindedness truth-conducive?
- Combining finite and infinite elements: Why do we use infinite idealizations in engineering?
- Infinite lies and explanatory ties: idealization in phase transitions
- Point-particle explanations: the case of gravitational waves
- Stars and steam engines: To what extent do thermodynamics and statistical mechanics apply to self-gravitating systems?
- On the paradox of reversible processes in thermodynamics
- From deed to word: gapless and kink-free enactivism
- Exercising abilities
- Proof-theoretic pluralism
- Across the great divide: pluralism and the hunt for missing heritability
- How is the asymmetry between the open future and the fixed past to be characterized?
- Commercial interests, agenda setting, and the epistemic trustworthiness of nutrition science
- From a boson to the standard model Higgs: a case study in confirmation and model dynamics
- Climate change denial and beliefs about science
- Testimonial worth
- Experimental individuation and philosophical retail arguments
- Measure development and the hermeneutic task
- Gestalt psychology, frontloading phenomenology, and psychophysics
- A new argument for the incompatibility of content externalism with justification internalism
- Recombining non-qualitative reality
- How to be an uncompromising revisionary ontologist
- Making AI meaningful again
- Direct inference and the sleeping beauty problem
- How to identify wholes with their parts
- Composition as identity: pushing forward
- The where of bodily awareness
- Broadening the scope of our understanding of mechanisms: lessons from the history of the morning-after pill
- The structure of audio–visual consciousness
- Species are, at the same time, kinds and individuals: a causal argument based on an empirical approach to species identity
- A representationalist reading of Kantian intuitions
- Bodily structure and body representation
- What is a logical theory? On theories containing assertions and denials
- Let’s not agree to disagree: the role of strategic disagreement in science
- Structured propositions and the logical form of predication
- A general argument against structured propositions
- If structured propositions are logical procedures then how are procedures individuated?
- ‘Ought’ implies ‘can’ against epistemic deontologism: beyond doxastic involuntarism
- Anatomy of a proposition
- Unity through truth
- Introduction: primitivism versus reductionism about the problem of the unity of the proposition
- From the unity of the proposition to linguistic idealism
- The imprecise impermissivist’s dilemma
- Denial and retraction: a challenge for theories of taste predicates
- Believing the best: on doxastic partiality in friendship
- On propositions and fineness of grain (again!)
- Force cancellation
- Regress, unity, facts, and propositions
- On cancellation
- Propositions as Cognitive Acts
- Continuity of change in Kant’s dynamics
- Act theories and the attitudes
- What propositional structure could not be
- The Platonic conception of intellectual virtues: its significance for virtue epistemology
- Some lessons from simulations of scientific disagreements
- The functions of institutions: etiology and teleology
- An encoding approach to Ante Rem structuralism
- Charting the landscape of interpretation, theory rivalry, and underdetermination in quantum mechanics
- Natural kinds and dispositions: a causal analysis
- Modal rationalism and the demonstrative reply to the scrutability argument against physicalism
- Does logical pluralism imply, or suggest, truth pluralism, or vice versa?
- Hale’s argument from transitive counting
- Time travel and counterfactual asymmetry
- What real progress has metaphysics made since the time of Kant? Kant and the metaphysics of grounding
- Quantum probability: a reliable tool for an agent or a reliable source of reality?
- The field and landscape of affordances: Koffka’s two environments revisited
- Free will fallibilism and the “two-standpoints” account of freedom
- Knowledge-how and the problems of masking and finkishness
- The C-word, the P-word, and realism in epidemiology
- Austrian economics without extreme apriorism: construing the fundamental axiom of praxeology as analytic
- Judging machines: philosophical aspects of deep learning
- Can a relational substance ontology be hylomorphic?
- Many, but one
- Knowledge-how and false belief
- Knowledge, evidence, and multiple process types
- The causal situationist account of constitutive relevance
- Getting Gettier straight: thought experiments, deviant realizations and default interpretations
- A pluralistic and socially responsible philosophy of epidemiology field should actively engage with social determinants of health and health disparities
- The epistemic norm of inference and non-epistemic reasons for belief
- Intellectualizing know how
- Epistemic norms, closure, and No-Belief hinge epistemology
- Consciousness, belief, and the group mind hypothesis
- Is self-identity essential to objects?
- Introduction: systematicity, the nature of science?
- The nature of science. A dialogue
- Systematicity theory meets Socratic scientific realism: the systematic quest for truth
- Systematicity is necessary but not sufficient: on the problem of facsimile science
- Tolerance and the distributed sorites
- Axiomatizing non-deterministic many-valued generalized consequence relations
- Modelling deep indeterminacy
- On the explanatory demands of the Special Composition Question
- Bodily awareness and novel multisensory features
- The interpretation of uncertainty in ecological rationality
- Closure, credence and rationality: a problem for non-belief hinge epistemology
- The overlooked ubiquity of first-person experience in the cognitive sciences
- How (not) to think about theory-change in epidemiology
- Epidemiology is ecosystem science
- Approval-directed agency and the decision theory of Newcomb-like problems
- Part, slot, ground: foundations for neo-Aristotelian mereology
- Is the folk concept of luck normative?
- Rethinking natural kinds, reference and truth: towards more correspondence with reality, not less
- Dreaming of a stable world: vision and action in sleep
- Multiscale integration: beyond internalism and externalism
- Evaluating epistemic virtues
- Conservative translations of four-valued logics in modal logic
- Limiting logical pluralism
- Quine on naturalism, nominalism, and philosophy’s place within science
- Why logical pluralism?
- Generalizing empirical adequacy II: partial structures
- Information elaboration and epistemic effects of diversity
- Defeasible normative reasoning
- Enactivism, other minds, and mental disorders
- Fixed-point solutions to the regress problem in normative uncertainty
- Vertical versus horizontal: What is really at issue in the exclusion problem?
- Abduction versus conceiving in modal epistemology
- What we can (and can’t) infer about implicit bias from debiasing experiments
- The ant colony as a test for scientific theories of consciousness
- No universalism without gunk? Composition as identity and the universality of identity
- Aesthetics and action: situations, emotional perception and the Kuleshov effect
- Abduction and styles of scientific thinking
- Logic without metaphysics
- Productive theory-ladenness in fMRI
- Psychophysiological approach to the Liar paradox: Jean Buridan’s virtual entailment principle put to the test
- Intuition, intelligence, data compression
- Towards a dual process epistemology of imagination
- Memory without content? Radical enactivism and (post)causal theories of memory
- World enough and form: why cosmology needs hylomorphism
- Moral disagreement and non-moral ignorance
- Affect, motivational states, and evaluative concepts
- Pragmatism, enactivism, and ecological psychology: towards a unified approach to post-cognitivism
- Kuhn’s two accounts of rational disagreement in science: an interpretation and critique
- Do mathematical explanations have instrumental value?
- Coincidence as parthood
- An evidentialist account of hinges
- Composition as identity, Leibniz’s Law, and slice-sensitive emergent properties
- First person epidemiological measures: vehicles for patient centered care
- Make up your mind: octopus cognition and hybrid explanations
- Counterpossibles for modal normativists
- Extended mathematical cognition: external representations with non-derived content