- Priority monism and the emergence of spacetime
- Burgess and the bucket: the emergence of spacetime in classical theories of gravitation
- A functionalist account of truth-grounding: refining Lynch’s view
- The phenomenal evidence argument
- Against generalized comprehension
- Pointless epistemic norms
- Reflective equilibrium: conception, formalization, application—introduction to the topical collection
- Shifting boundaries, extended minds: ambient technology and extended allostatic control
- A note on the semantics of linear regression
- The phenomenal intentionality of mental imagery and seeing-as
- Disorder or distress? The hermeneutical injustices of overdiagnosis within psychiatry
- What makes a kind an artifact kind?
- Measuring the quality of experimental research
- What is active touch?
- Teleology for the twenty-first century: editorial introduction
- The structure of silence in depression
- Status and constitution in psychiatric classification
- The indispensability of relational, adapted, and derived proper functions
- Naturalizing normativity: neopragmatist reflections on mental disorder
- Explanatory norms and interdisciplinary research
- “Tap-dancing around the conversation”: difficulties in an intimate deep moral disagreement
- Effective integration and models of information: lessons from integrative structure modeling
- An inferentialist account of lying
- Of opaque oracles: epistemic dependence on AI in science poses no novel problems for social epistemology
- A quasi-realist approach to rules in inferentialism
- Reproducees, reproducers, and Darwinian individuals
- The oversight of implicature and implicational injustice in doctor-patient communication
- Correction to: On testimony in scenarios with Wigner and Friend
- Supersymmetry in the Seiberg–Witten theory: a window into quantum field theory
- Home as mind: AI extenders and affective ecologies in dementia care
- Concept-formation and deep disagreements in theoretical and practical reasoning
- Bending pharmaceutical science: epistemic diversity and regulation
- Approximations that matter: virtual particles as carriers of interactions
- The hyperintensionality of art
- Problems for ‘standard’ dispositionalist accounts of semantic content
- Synthetic biology: supporting an anti-reductionist view of life
- Dualism leads to Many Minds
- Cognitive offloading and the causal structure of human action
- Can basic perceptual features be learned?
- Varieties of normativity and mental health: an enactive approach
- Axiological hinge commitments
- Intentions in interactions: an enactive reply to expressive communication proposals
- Authority, accommodation, and illocutionary success
- What is the experimentalist challenge to the method of cases?
- Good classification matters: conceptual engineering in data science
- Lexical predicates do substitute in fine-grained attitudes
- On the relationship between epistemology and science: synergies between experience-first epistemologies and agent-centered interpretations of quantum mechanics
- A plea for modelling in ethics
- The debate over proximate and ultimate causation in biology
- Transformative creativity in life: an epigenetic perspective based on biological autonomy
- Deflationary and inflationary roles of truth
- Merely verbal agreement, speaker-meaning, and defective context
- Epistemic health, epistemic self-trust, and bipolar disorder: a case study
- Relevant epistemic logic with state-sensitive topics
- Beyond belief: deep disagreement and conversion in Wittgenstein’s philosophy
- The life project account of eating disorders: agency in the pursuit of dietary goals
- Resolving a puzzle about moral responsibility and logical truth
- What attitude should we take to conceptual engineering?
- “You will live to regret this!”: Transformative choices and predicted regret
- Modality, truth and mere picture thinking
- Has philosophy become more ‘Scientific’? A citation analysis
- Generic episodic memories
- Wronging in believing
- Necessity for finite rational minds– Kant on empirical nomic necessity and the conceptual purposiveness of nature
- Effective theory building and manifold learning
- Epistemic oppression and the concept of coercion in psychiatry
- Two can play at this game: a dual-individuation account of games
- Quotative be like
- The evaluative qualia theory of pleasure and displeasure
- The Monist strategy: Naïve realism and the master argument from hallucination
- The epistemic problem of singular causation
- The puzzle of defeated suspension
- Sellars’s two responses to skepticism
- Lyotard’s Wittgenstein: from deep disagreement to Differend
- Patience, diligence, and humility: epistemic virtues and chemistry in the eighteenth century Dutch Republic
- What is a theory of neural representation for?
- Frege’s platonism and mathematical creation: some new perspectives
- Medical paternalism, anorexia nervosa, and the problem of pathological values
- Perspectival realism and frequentist statistics: the case of Jerzy Neyman’s methodology and philosophy
- Meaning and understanding in large language models
- Faith is weakly positive
- On the non-substantiality of logic: a case study
- The individuation of mathematical objects
- Husserl and the marks of the mental
- The folk concept of art
- Theories without models: uncontrolled idealizations in particle physics
- Knowing that as knowing how: a neurocognitive practicalism
- Philosophical implications of derealization disorder
- Preregistration and predictivism
- Solving the inclusion problem: gender without representationalism
- Correction to: The neurotic and the dogmatist
- Getting lost with levels: the sociological micro-macro problem
- Truth and correspondence in the Tractatus
- Retrodictive and predictive attentional modulation in temporal binding
- Willful ignorance in law and epistemology
- Acquaintance, knowledge, and luck
- Correction to: How sceptics teach us to know
- The problem of too many mental tokens reconsidered
- A causal theory of confirmation for Bayesians
- Cohen’s convention, the seriousness of errors, and the body of knowledge in behavioral science
- How is empirical content possible? Sellars after McDowell
- Digitally extended knowledge
- An enactivist response to the challenge from dreams
- Driftability and niche construction
- Monothematic delusions are misfunctioning beliefs
- Re-remembering
- Engrams as mental files
- Knowledge first: the argument from development
- The reasonableness of doubt: phenomenology and scientific realism
- The open texture of functions: a framework for analyzing functional concepts in molecular biology
- Promising stabs in the Dark: theory virtues and pursuit-worthiness in the Dark Energy problem
- Against cross-world anchoring
- Order, organization, and randomness: on the mathematical formulation of life
- Correction to: Grounding, conceivability, and the mind-body problem
- Revisiting an argument against identity
- Non-assertoric speech acts: Introduction to the topical collection
- Achievements, free will, and meaning in life
- The ‘NeuroGate’: neuromorphic intelligence, extended mind, and neurorights
- RUM leads to noise: the significance of finding the sources of variability between experimental runs
- Unfinished speech acts
- Delving into depth: an empirical investigation of the ordinary concepts of depth and profundity
- Matraversian skepticism and models of memory
- Imagination and fiction in modelling; an epistemic critique
- Implicit knowledge in unawareness structures
- A Sellarsian argument for nonlinguistic conceptual capabilities
- Questions, justification requests, inference, and definition
- Formal models and justifications of democracy
- How are ethical theories explanatory?
- How sceptics teach us to know
- The co-evolution of virtue and desert: debunking intuitions about intrinsic value
- The neurotic and the dogmatist
- Temporal externalist descriptivism on natural kind terms: beyond the causal–historical analysis
- The Manipulationist Threat to moral responsibility
- Minimal metaphysics in moral and political philosophy
- Higher-order misinformation
- Distinguishing two kinds of fictionalism: metaphor, autism, and the imagination
- The role of causal manipulability in the manifestation of time biases
- The traversal of the infinite: considering a beginning for an infinite past
- Taking the public seriously: the role of respect in interactions between scientific experts and lay publics
- Belief in truthmaker semantics
- Neuroidealism, perceptual acquaintance and the Kantian roots of predictive processing
- The perils of approximate ontology
- Multiple belief states in social learning: an evidence tokens model
- The ontology of videogames
- Is validity circular?
- 3D/4D metaphysical equivalence: lessons from the species debate for the metaphysics of change and persistence
- Staying on-shell: manifest properties and reformulations in particle physics
- On testimony in scenarios with Wigner and Friend
- What we mean as what we said or would have said
- For values in science: Assessing recent arguments for the ideal of value-free science
- Shared emotion without togetherness: the case of shared grief
- Epistemic instrumentalism and the problem of epistemic blame
- Skilled metacognitive self-regulation toward interpretive norms: a non-relativist basis for the social constitution of mental health and illness
- Person-first and identity-first approaches to Autism: metaphysical and linguistic implications
- A dispositional account of technical functions
- Remembering as the same
- The exactness of communication
- Correction to: Deep disagreement across moral revolutions
- The normativity objection and the coloring strategy
- Naïve realism and sensorimotor theory
- Life, sense-making, and subjectivity. Why the enactive conception of life and mind requires phenomenology
- What’s wrong with the counterfactual-based objection to CORNEA?
- The epistemic objection against perdurantism
- Hedging in Discourse
- Partners in crime? Radical scepticism and malevolent global conspiracy theories
- Gricean insinuation and the fake one-way mirror effect
- Do opaque algorithms have functions?
- Epistemic logic with partial grasp
- Macrostructural explanation in the social sciences
- Affective injustice, sanism and psychiatry
- Authenticity in algorithm-aided decision-making
- Persistence conditions: what they are, and what it is to have them
- A non-causalist account of the explanatory autonomy in the psychological sciences
- Realism and the detection of dark matter
- Computational psychiatry and the evolving concept of a mental disorder
- Breaking the stigma around autism: moving away from neuronormativity using epistemic justice and 4E cognition
- Making sense of the doxastic approach to thought insertion
- Must depression be irrational?
- Seeking a reflective equilibrium in the face of disagreement
- Just pluralism: thinking about concepts of mental disorder in global context
- Quantum field theory and the limits of reductionism
- Polarization is epistemically innocuous
- I am no abstract object: a novel challenge to mind uploading
- Event completion: a test case for theories of reference in memory
- Physical vs. numerical approximation in Isaac Newton’s Principia
- Origins of biological teleology: how constraints represent ends
- Knowing how and being able
- Why and how to construct an epistemic justification of machine learning?
- Credo in unam credentiam: religious beliefs are standard beliefs
- Deep disagreement across moral revolutions
- Large language models and linguistic intentionality
- Memory-based reference and immunity to error through misidentification
- Category theory in consciousness science: going beyond the correlational project
- Smellscapes and diachronic olfaction
- Intentional action, knowledge, and cognitive extension
- Scientific understanding in biomedical research
- What does it mean for a duty to be directed in joint action?
- Time traveler confirms five minute hypothesis!
- The private life of the brain: issues and promises in the neuroscientific study of internal states
- The weight of truth
- Having a concept has a cost
- Deferred reference, meaning transfer or coercion? Toward a new principle of accounting for systematic uses of proper names
- Inquiry and reasons
- Journalism and public trust in science
- More than just principles: revisiting epistemic systems
- Non-spatial matters on the possibility of non-spatial material objects
- Event plenitude
- Can contemporary cognitive science coherently accommodate itself?
- To reform or to eliminate an attractor?
- Correction to: The teleological modal profile and subjunctive background of organic generation and growth
- Conjunctive explanations: when are two explanations better than one?
- Ambient smart environments: affordances, allostasis, and wellbeing
- Physicalism and fundamental mentality
- Powered properties, modal continuity, and the patchwork principle
- Natures, ideas, and essentialism in Kant
- The metaphysics and epistemology of conscious perception
- Against global aims for science: values, epistemic priority, and a local aims approach
- A logic of trust-based beliefs
- The representation and determinable structure of quantum properties
- Salient semantics
- Beliefs, delusions, hinge commitments
- Plain alethic pluralism: the human face of truth
- Imagining as a skillful mental action
- Individual values and inductive risk: remotivating the Bayesian alternative
- A triviality worry for the internal model principle
- A localist solution to the problem of mixed inferences by juxtaposition
- Beyond prediction: a new paradigm for understanding suicide risk
- McDowell’s overlooked argument for disjunctivism – realism, self-consciousness, and knowledge
- The reliability of evidential pluralism in drug regulation
- The metaphysics of mechanisms: an ontic structural realist perspective
- Reflexive awareness and reflexivity: an identity model of reflexive awareness with Korta and Perry’s reflexive-referential theory of content (RRT)
- Mandevillian vices
- Strategic justice, conventions, and game theory: introduction to a Synthese topical collection
- In defense of humean non-universal laws
- Exploring the transition: biology, technology, and epistemic activities
- An all-purpose framework for affordances. Reconciling the behavioral and the neuroscientific stories
- Singular concepts
- Introduction temporal reasoning and tensed truths
- Alternatives to the self-indication assumption are doomed
- “The value-free ideal, the autonomy thesis, and cognitive diversity”
- Extended mentality and ascriptive authority
- Indeterministic grounding
- Are generics quantificational?
- Emotion against reason? Self-control conflict as self-modelling rivalry
- The representation, quantification, and nature of genetic information
- Mental filing, continued
- Compositionality, communication, and commitments
- Salmón, Schiffer and Frege’s Constraint
- Deepfakes: a survey and introduction to the topical collection
- Carving teleology at its joints
- Towards a pragmatist epistemology for theory choice in logic
- Wittgenstein and the liar
- Sounds are broad events
- Indistinguishability as a constraint on priors
- Actions, reasons, and becauses
- Is the fine-tuning evidence for a multiverse?
- The intrapersonal normative twin earth argument
- An invitation to conventionalism: a philosophy for modern (space-)times
- Your red isn’t my red! Connectionist Structuralism and the puzzle of abstract objects
- Present records of the Past Hypothesis
- Developing appropriate emotions
- The power of social norms: Why conceptual engineers should care about implementation
- Once upon a time in superspace: the diegetic ideal for the interpretation of physical theories
- Are generics and negativity about social groups common on social media? A comparative analysis of Twitter (X) data
- Mental causation, interventionism, and probabilistic supervenience
- A story of consistency: bridging the gap between Bentham and Rawls foundations
- Don’t imagine junk! Positive conceivability and modal illusion in mereology
- Learning how to learn by self-tuning reinforcement
- A logic of higher-order preferences
- A logical challenge to correlationism: the Church–Fitch paradox in Husserl’s account of fulfilment, truth, and meaning
- Linguistic politeness in social networks
- What’s so bad about fanaticism?
- Knowing who occupies an office: purely contingent, necessary and impossible offices
- Types of testimony and their reliability
- Two Ships of Theseus
- Values in public health: an argument from trust
- Social learning in models and minds
- Gradual de-idealisation and progress in political science: a case study
- How to act on what you know
- On informational injustice and epistemic exclusions
- The role of scenarios in paradoxes
- Correction to: Motivational pessimism and motivated cognition
- Overlap: on the relation between perceiving and believing
- Normative uncertainty meets voting theory
- The problem of extrinsic grounding
- Naturalness, veritism, and epistemic significance
- Life-mind continuity: untangling categorical, extensional, and systematic aspects
- Logical abductivism on abductive logic
- Consciousness and Perspectival De Se content
- The epistemic value of doombehaviour: beyond the prudential consequences of doomscrolling, doomchecking, and doomsurfing
- Meaning change you can make
- The Monstrous Conclusion
- Safety and dream scepticism in Sosa’s epistemology
- Anti-luminosity and anti-realism in metaethics
- Against zetetic encroachment
- An epistemic distinction among essences, its metaphysical ground, and the role of philosophy
- The nature and difficulty of physical efforts
- “Humanity is another corporeity”: The evolution of human bodily appearance and sociality
- Temporalism and eternalism reconsidered: perceptual experience, memory, and knowledge
- Inquiry, value, and some peculiarities of the Pyrrhonist’s psychology
- How slurs enact norms, and how to retract them
- A credence-based theory-heavy approach to non-human consciousness
- Does the no miracles argument apply to AI?
- Defending internalism about unconscious phenomenal character
- Defining the method of reflective equilibrium
- The sensitivity of legal proof
- If presentism is false, then I don’t exist. On common-sense presentism
- The two ideals shaping the content of modern science
- Perceptual justification and objectual attitudes
- Values, bias and replicability
- Factivity, hallucination, and justification
- Epistemic ownership and the practical/epistemic parallelism
- Representationalism and rationality: why mental representation is real
- What is mental health and disorder? Philosophical implications from lay judgments
- Gatekeeping should be conserved in the open science era
- The function argument for ascribing interests
- The Adequacy of purposes for data: a paleoecological case study
- Scrutinizing the foundations: could large language models be solipsistic?
- Metaphysical laws and the directionality of grounding
- The puzzle of plausible deniability
- Natural language syntax complies with the free-energy principle
- Rethinking core affect: the role of dominance in animal behaviour and welfare research
- Enacted institutions, participatory sense-making and social norms
- Correction: Legal concepts and legal expertise
- Introduction to the topical collection ‘locating representations in the brain: interdisciplinary perspectives’
- No hope for conciliationism
- Expertise, moral subversion, and climate deregulation
- Singular thought without temporal representation?
- On metaphors of mathematics: Between Blumenberg’s nonconceptuality and Grothendieck’s waves
- Variational propensities: development and ultimate causes
- Can video games be philosophical?
- Metrics in biodiversity conservation and the value-free ideal
- Reflective equilibrium in practice and model selection: a methodological proposal from a survey experiment on the theories of distributive justice
- On the gradability of knowledge how, and its relationship to motor representations and ability
- Bridgman and the normative independence of science: an individual physicist in the shadow of the bomb
- Anatomy’s role in mechanistic explanations of organism behaviour
- ‘I knew all along’: making sense of post-self-deception judgments
- Testimonial justification under epistemic conflict of interest
- Probabilistic epistemic logic based on neighborhood semantics
- The Humean theory of motivation: much ado about nothing?
- Defending the pure causal-historical theory of reference fixing for natural kind terms
- Restricted nominalism about number and its problems
- The metaphysics of puns
- Can episodic memory deter cheating and promote altruism?
- Perceptual occlusion and the differentiation condition
- Logicality and the picture theory of language
- How to lose your memory without losing your money: shifty epistemology and Dutch strategies
- Lagrangian possibilities
- Moving from the mental to the behavioral in the metaphysics of social institutions
- Belief revision in psychotherapy
- Motivational pessimism and motivated cognition
- Bald-faced lying to institutions: deception or manipulation
- The playing field of empirical facts: on the interrelations between moral and empirical beliefs in reflective equilibrium
- The impoverishment problem
- Correction to: Lying by explaining: an experimental study
- Hyperintensionality and overfitting
- Memory-based modes of presentation
- Reliabilist epistemology meets bounded rationality
- Confidence in Covid-19 models
- Conspiracy theories, epistemic self-identity, and epistemic territory
- Are thick aesthetic predicates assessment-sensitive?
- The pragmatic turn in the scientific realism debate
- Conciliationism and the Peer-undermining Problem
- Normal science: not uncritical or dogmatic
- Experiment-driven rationalism
- Legal concepts and legal expertise
- Correction to: On ways of being true
- Surrogative reasoning in the sciences
- Processes as variable embodiments
- Distinctively generic explanations of physical facts
- Attitude ascriptions: a new old problem for Russell’s theory of descriptions
- Indexicals and communicative affordances
- An idealised account of mechanistic computation
- HOTT and heavy: higher-order thought theory and the theory-heavy approach to animal consciousness
- Exploring, expounding & ersatzing: a three-level account of deep learning models in cognitive neuroscience
- Correction to: Don’t get it wrong! On understanding and its negative phenomena
- Inquiry, reasoning and the normativity of logic
- The consequence argument and ordinary human agency
- Bolzano’s Tortoise and a loophole for Achilles
- Correction to: The implicit decision theory of non-philosophers
- Functionalism, interventionism, and higher-order causation
- What is a mathematical structure of conscious experience?
- Reference in remembering: towards a simulationist account
- Precedent and rest stop convergence in reflective equilibrium
- Rigor and formalization
- Irreplaceable truth
- Consumer-side reference through promiscuous memory traces
- A note on Williamson’s Gettier cases in epistemic logic
- What is gullibility?
- Environmental epistemology
- Lying by explaining: an experimental study
- Authenticity as self-discovery and interpretation of value
- Is there a defensible conception of reflective equilibrium?
- An experimental study on the ontology of relations
- The teleological modal profile and subjunctive background of organic generation and growth
- The distinctly zetetic significance of disagreement
- Practical perceptual representations: a contemporary defense of an old idea