- How beliefs are like colors
- A radical relationist solution to the problem of intentional inexistence
- Blame as performance
- Justification by acquaintance
- Epistemic utility theory’s difficult future
- Non-standard approaches to emergence: introduction to the special issue
- Practical concepts and productive reasoning
- Imagining the past reliably and unreliably: towards a virtue theory of memory
- Thinking beyond Imagining
- Conditionals and specific links—an experimental study
- System Reliabilism and basic beliefs: defeasible, undefeated and likely to be true
- Bodies in skilled performance: how dancers reflect through the living body
- Conjunctive paraconsistency
- Threats to epistemic agency in young people with unusual experiences and beliefs
- Probabilistic truthlikeness, content elements, and meta-inductive probability optimization
- There is no reason to replace the Razor with the Laser
- Correction to: Coalescent theories and divergent paraphrases: definites, non-extensional contexts, and familiarity
- Weighing the costs: the epistemic dilemma of no-platforming
- Perceptual presentation and the Myth of the Given
- Beliefs and biases
- Illocutionary pluralism
- Unification and mathematical explanation in science
- Untying the knot: imagination, perception and their neural substrates
- Counterpossibles, story prefix and trivialism
- How interventionist accounts of causation work in experimental practice and why there is no need to worry about supervenience
- The Functional Composition of Sense
- Context-sensitivity and the Preface Paradox for credence
- Predicates of personal taste: empirical data
- Pathways of influence: understanding the impact of philosophy of science in scientific domains
- Do we really need a knowledge-based decision theory?
- Emotion as High-level Perception
- First-person representations and responsible agency in AI
- Synthetic a priori judgments and Kant’s response to Hume on induction
- Non-Boolean classical relevant logics II: Classicality through truth-constants
- On the Coherence of Aristotelian Universals
- Newcomb’s problem isn’t a choice dilemma
- Wrongfulness rewarded?
- Comparing the structures of mathematical objects
- Modeling intentional agency: a neo-Gricean framework
- How to have a metalinguistic dispute
- Taking values seriously
- Fundamentality from grounding trees
- Confirmation, Coincidence, and Contradiction
- Where are the chances?
- A puzzle about laws and explanation
- The computational philosophy: simulation as a core philosophical method
- Slurs as ballistic speech
- Rational preference in transformative experiences
- Collective intellectual humility and arrogance
- Frege on intuition and objecthood in projective geometry
- Ethical Mooreanism
- Logic and science: science and logic
- Intensionality in mathematics: problems and prospects
- Yet again, quantum indeterminacy is not worldly indecision
- An epistemic modal norm of practical reasoning
- Do reasons drain away?
- Radical interpretation and decision theory
- Between pebbles and organisms: weaving autonomy into the Markov blanket
- Salience reasoning in coordination games
- The symmetry problem for testimonial conservatism
- I could do that in my sleep: skilled performance in dreams
- The independence of (in)coherence
- Is Husserl guilty of Sellars’ myth of the sensory given
- Mathematical anti-realism and explanatory structure
- Another way logic might be normative
- Explicating the concept of epistemic rationality
- Quick thinking: how Einstein did (and did not) refute the ether frame of reference
- Delusional evidence-responsiveness
- Mechanistic reasoning and the problem of masking
- The visibility of philosophy of science in the sciences, 1980–2018
- The skill of self-control
- Probing theoretical statements with thought experiments
- The presumption of assurance
- A critical analysis of Markovian monism
- Naturalizing the contributory
- Coalescent theories and divergent paraphrases: definites, non-extensional contexts, and familiarity
- The non-existence of institutional facts
- Correction to: Social epistemological conception of delusion
- Representational similarity analysis in neuroimaging: proxy vehicles and provisional representations
- Will I get a job? Contextualism, belief, and faith
- Why understanding-why is contrastive
- “A familiar logical triplet”: on Peirce’s grammar of representation and its relation to scientific inquiry
- Skill and strategic control
- On the possibility of non-eternalism without absolute simultaneity
- Lawful Humean explanations are not circular
- Knowledge is closed under analytic content
- Knowledge, behaviour, and policy: questioning the epistemic presuppositions of applying behavioural science in public policymaking
- Statistical resentment, or: what’s wrong with acting, blaming, and believing on the basis of statistics alone
- Epistemic and poietic intentional processes
- On the plains and prairies of Minnesota: The role of mathematical statistics in biological explanation
- Imaginative immersion, regulation, and doxastic mediation
- Bootstrapping of integer concepts: the stronger deviant-interpretation challenge (and how to solve it)
- Hedging and the ignorance norm on inquiry
- What is deflationism about truth?
- T ruth : a concept unlike any other
- Truth as a relational property
- The objectivity of truth, a core truism?
- Inexact knowledge and dynamic introspection
- Reviving frequentism
- Can happiness measures be calibrated?
- Deep gunk and deep junk
- Evaluative experiences: the epistemological significance of moral phenomenology
- Embodied skillful performance: where the action is
- Phenomenology and the unity of consciousness
- The knowledge norm of apt practical reasoning
- Objectification and vision: how images shape our early visual processes
- Fodor’s guide to the Humean mind
- Perceptual variation and ignorance
- Epistemic evaluation and the need for ‘impure’ epistemic standards
- How autism shows that symptoms, like psychiatric diagnoses, are ‘constructed’: methodological and epistemic consequences
- (A new paradigm for) the problem of the many
- A new anti-expertise dilemma
- Enactive planning in rock climbing: recalibration, visualization and nested affordances
- Enabling mathematical cultures: introduction
- Structural representations do not meet the job description challenge
- Ought-contextualism and reasoning
- Resolutions provide reasons or: “how the Cookie Monster quit cookies”
- An expressivist solution to Moorean paradoxes
- Does general relativity highlight necessary connections in nature?
- A novel approach to equality
- Correction to: Thinking embodiment with genetics: epigenetics and postgenomic biology in embodied cognition and enactivism
- Trope analysis and folk intuitions
- On the imprecision of full conditional probabilities
- Contingent grounding
- Propositions are not representational
- Assertions and future tense semantics
- Structural realism and generative linguistics
- The concreteness of objects: an argument against mereological bundle theory
- Is color experience linguistically penetrable?
- Introduction: Kant’s philosophical method and contemporary perspectives in epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science and ethics
- How signaling conventions are established
- Explaining the differential application of non-symmetric relations
- Carnapian frameworks
- Foundations of applied mathematics I
- Correction to: Practices of remembering a movement in the dance studio: evidence for (a radicalized version of) the REC framework in the domain of memory
- The indeterminate present and the open future
- Indicative and counterfactual conditionals: a causal-modeling semantics
- Dogramaci’s deflationism about rationality
- The psychological aspects of paraconsistency
- Pathological prediction: a top-down cause of organic disease
- Beliefs, make-beliefs, and making believe that beliefs are not make-beliefs
- Is absence of evidence of pain ever evidence of absence?
- Theoretical virtues and theorizing in physics: against the instrumentalist view of simplicity
- A challenge to the second law of thermodynamics from cognitive science and vice versa
- Weighing in on decisions in the brain: neural representations of pre-awareness practical intention
- Challenging the identity theory of properties
- On the epistemic rationality and significance of self-fulfilling beliefs
- Against epistemic absolutism
- Individuating the senses of ‘smell’: orthonasal versus retronasal olfaction
- Grounding ontic structuralism
- Medicine as science. Systematicity and demarcation
- Gendering animals
- Why robots can’t haka: skilled performance and embodied knowledge in the Māori haka
- Can informational thermal physics explain the approach to equilibrium?
- Why subject naturalists need pragmatic genealogy
- Special issue on radical views on cognition: introduction
- Can hinge epistemology close the door on epistemic relativism?
- Prototypes, poles, and tessellations: towards a topological theory of conceptual spaces
- Prospecting performance: rehearsal and the nature of imagination
- “Ought” and intensionality
- Mental imagery and the illusion of conscious will
- Ontology, neural networks, and the social sciences
- First among equals: co-hyperintensionality for structured propositions
- The correctness and relevance of the modal ontological argument
- Realism, reliability, and epistemic possibility: on modally interpreting the Benacerraf–Field challenge
- Probabilistic truth approximation and fixed points
- Lying, speech acts, and commitment
- Eight journals over eight decades: a computational topic-modeling approach to contemporary philosophy of science
- The rotten core of presentism
- Finding a context for objectivity
- Justifying method choice: a heuristic-instrumentalist account of scientific methodology
- Troubles with the Canberra Plan
- Possessing reasons: why the awareness-first approach is better than the knowledge-first approach
- Correction to: How to count biological minds: symbiosis, the free energy principle, and reciprocal multiscale integration
- Safety in Sosa
- Saving safety from counterexamples
- Dreams, agency, and judgement
- The joint aggregation of beliefs and degrees of belief
- Sosa on epistemic value: a Kantian obstacle
- Group virtue epistemology
- Sosa’s theory of knowledge
- Functional belief and judgmental belief
- Action-based versus cognitivist perspectives on socio-cognitive development: culture, language and social experience within the two paradigms
- Higher-order defeat and intellectual responsibility
- Russellians can solve the problem of empty names with nonsingular propositions
- Folk teleology drives persistence judgments
- Performance normativity and here-and-now doxastic agency
- Correction to: Deduction and definability in infinite statistical systems
- Against global method safety
- Can performance epistemology explain higher epistemic value?
- Sosa on knowledge, judgment and guessing
- Correction to: Safety in Sosa
- The unbearable circularity of easy ontology
- Decision-Based Epistemology: sketching a systematic framework of Feyerabend’s metaphilosophy
- Radicalizing numerical cognition
- Do fictions explain?
- Logical abductivism and non-deductive inference
- Four ways of (mis-)conceiving embodiment in tool use
- Your word against mine: the power of uptake
- Hybrid collective intentionality
- Correction to: Disagreement lost
- Bayesianism and self-doubt
- Dispositionality, categoricity, and where to find them
- Perceptualism and the epistemology of normative reasons
- Two dogmas of dynamicism
- Practices of remembering a movement in the dance studio: evidence for (a radicalized version of) the REC framework in the domain of memory
- Bias in science: natural and social
- The place of non-epistemic matters in epistemology: norms and regulation in various communities
- The brittleness of expertise and why it matters
- Explanation by status as empty-base explanation
- Correction to: Fundamental mentality in a physical world
- A substructural analysis of embedded conditionals
- Notes on a complicated relationship: scientific pluralism, epistemic relativism, and stances
- How (not) to judge a theory of causation
- Mathematizing as a virtuous practice: different narratives and their consequences for mathematics education and society
- Probability functions, belief functions and infinite regresses
- Mathematics, ethics and purism: an application of MacIntyre’s virtue theory
- Alethic undecidability and alethic indeterminacy
- Political imagination and its limits
- Model-theoretic semantics as model-based science
- Imagining fictional contradictions
- Information-devoid routes for scale-free neurodynamics
- The conceptual nature of imaginative content
- Deep disagreement and hinge epistemology
- Evidentially embedded epistemic entitlement
- Minkish dispositions
- A physical interpretation of Lewis’ discrepancy between personal and external time in time travels
- JuDAS: a theory of rational belief revision
- (Once again) Lewis on the analysis of modality
- Mereological monism and Humean supervenience
- Causation, absences, and the Prince of Wales
- Inquiry and the doxastic attitudes
- Genuine Modal Realism, the Humean thesis and advanced modalizing
- Bringing back intrinsics to enduring things
- It’s a kind of magic: Lewis, magic and properties
- An elegant universe
- Belief, credence, and evidence
- Deducing false propositions from true ideas: Nieuwentijt on mathematical reasoning
- Correction to: On Lewis against magic: a study of method in metaphysics
- Vividness as a natural kind
- Epistemic repugnance four ways
- Causal necessitarianism and the monotonicity objection
- The essential indexical research program
- Thinking about many
- Many problems of the many
- Explanation and modality: on why the Swampman is still worrisome to teleosemanticists
- New powers for Dispositionalism
- Invariances in transformational emergence
- On Kant and Husserl on transcendental logic
- Neuroscience and teleosemantics
- Humeanism and the epistemology of testimony
- Confirmation bias without rhyme or reason
- Rejecting epiphobia
- Fundamental mentality in a physical world
- What is neurophilosophy: Do we need a non-reductive form?
- When nothing looks blue
- Mind the gap: a more evolutionarily plausible role for technical reasoning in cumulative technological culture
- The epistemology of Ernest Sosa: an introduction
- On Ramsey’s reason to amend Principia Mathematica ’s logicism and Wittgenstein’s reaction
- Visual attention in pictorial perception
- Remembering events and representing time
- Moral improvement through mathematics: Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole’s Nouveaux éléments de géométrie
- The epistemic demands of friendship: friendship as inherently knowledge-involving
- Structure of perceptual objects: introduction to the Synthese topical collection
- Emotions, evidence, and safety
- Does what we dream feel present? Two varieties of presence and implications for measuring presence in VR
- Explaining human altruism
- A computational model of the cultural co-evolution of language and mindreading
- Timelessness and freedom
- Is risk aversion irrational? Examining the “fallacy” of large numbers
- On quantum entanglement, counterfactuals, causality and dispositions
- Lessons from realistic physics for the metaphysics of quantum theory
- Affect, motivational states, and evaluative concepts
- Representation and the active consumer
- A diachronic perspective on peer disagreement in veritistic social epistemology
- Mechanisms for constrained stochasticity
- Why compositional nihilism dissolves puzzles
- Two notions of holism
- What we owe each other, epistemologically speaking: ethico-political values in social epistemology
- Constitutive principles versus comprehensibility conditions in post-Kantian physics
- La Bohume
- Physical models and embodied cognition
- Finding the world in the wave function: some strategies for solving the macro-object problem
- The explanatory role of consistency requirements
- Quantum holism: nonseparability as common ground
- An argument against global no miracles arguments
- Quantum metaphysical indeterminacy and worldly incompleteness
- Correction to: “Till at last there remain nothing”
- Objectivity and orgasm: the perils of imprecise definitions
- My objectivity is better than yours: contextualising debates about gender inequality
- A case for integrative epistemology
- Reference for neo-Fregeans
- A Humean modal epistemology
- A deference model of epistemic authority
- Humanistic interpretation and machine learning
- Other minds are neither seen nor inferred
- A twofold tale of one mind: revisiting REC’s multi-storey story
- An argument for egalitarian confirmation bias and against political diversity in academia
- Everybody else is thinking it, so why can’t we?
- Particles, fields, and the measurement of electron spin
- Objective consequentialism and the plurality of chances
- Trusting in order to inspire trustworthiness
- Epistemic authority: preemption through source sensitive defeat
- Stranger in a strange land: an optimal-environments account of evolutionary mismatch
- A challenge for Super-Humeanism: the problem of immanent comparisons
- Why ‘scaffolding’ is the wrong metaphor: the cognitive usefulness of mathematical representations
- Action models in inquisitive logic
- Phenomenal dispositions
- Meaning relativism and subjective idealism
- A consciousness-based quantum objective collapse model
- Numerals and neural reuse
- The adverbial theory of numbers: some clarifications
- Epistemic injustice in mathematics
- How to stay safe while extending the mind
- Absence perception and the philosophy of zero
- Material representations in mathematical research practice
- Quantity evaluations in Yudja: judgements, language and cultural practice
- How numerals support new cognitive capacities
- What’s new: innovation and enculturation of arithmetical practices
- The cerebral, extra-cerebral bodily, and socio-cultural dimensions of enculturated arithmetical cognition
- Correction to: Numerals and neural reuse
- Epistemology of testimony and values in science
- The Legacy of D. K. Lewis: Introduction to the Special Issue
- A grounding physicalist solution to the causal exclusion problem
- Correction to: A response to the problem of wild coincidences
- Theory choice, non-epistemic values, and machine learning
- The RT formula and its discontents: spacetime and entanglement
- Evolutionary stability of ambiguity in context signaling games
- If consciousness causes collapse, the zombie argument fails
- Selfless assertions and the Knowledge Norm
- The strength of de Finetti’s coherence theorem
- How can necessary facts call for explanation?
- Groups as pluralities
- Beyond linear conciliation
- Correction to: Schmidentity and informativity
- Content internalism and conceptual engineering
- The non-maximality-solution to counterfactual scepticism
- The evidence approach to paraconsistency versus the paraconsistent approach to evidence
- Verbal slips and the intentionality of skills
- Corporeal composition
- Does rationality demand higher-order certainty?
- The ecological rationality of decision criteria
- Erratum to: The Jeffreys–Lindley paradox and discovery criteria in high energy physics
- Normative certitude for expressivists
- Knowledge without safety
- Mini-symposium on Kant and cognition
- An account of truthmaking
- Kant on the place of cognition in the progression of our representations
- Correction to: Happily entangled: prediction, emotion, and the embodied mind
- Should I believe all the truths?
- Knowledge, justification, and (a sort of) safe belief
- On the generality argument for the knowledge norm
- Continuants, identity and essentialism
- Knowledge from scientific expert testimony without epistemic trust
- Knowledge and reasonableness
- An analysis of disposition concepts by the Ramsey test
- The process of linguistic understanding
- Belief, credence, and moral encroachment
- A response to the problem of wild coincidences
- The value of truth: introduction to the topical collection
- Intentional action without knowledge
- Introduction: first principles in science—their status and justification
- Prolegomena to virtue-theoretic studies in the philosophy of mathematics
- It just feels right: an account of expert intuition
- Shopping for truth pluralism
- Speech acts in mathematics
- Future bias in action: does the past matter more when you can affect it?
- Grounding theories of powers
- On the ontology of particle mass and energy in special relativity
- Avoiding Dutch Books despite inconsistent credences
- Relevance and risk: How the relevant alternatives framework models the epistemology of risk
- Introduction to the topical collection “True enough? Themes from Elgin”
- Understanding the rationality principle in economics as a functional a priori principle
- The Barcan formulas and necessary existence: the view from Quarc
- Embedding speech-act propositions
- Logic in analytic philosophy: a quantitative analysis
- Contingent a priori truths and performatives
- Evolutionary debunking arguments, commonsense and scepticism
- A Humean explanation of acting on normative reasons
- Why moods change: their appropriateness and connection to beliefs
- Paraphrasing away properties with pluriverse counterfactuals
- Epistemically flawless false beliefs
- Explanations in cognitive science: unification versus pluralism
- The signalman against the glut and gap theorists
- The social fabric of understanding: equilibrium, authority, and epistemic empathy
- The package deal account of laws and properties (PDA)
- Set-theoretic justification and the theoretical virtues
- Being pessimistic about the objective present
- Counterpart theories for everyone
- Varieties of entailment: introduction to the special issue
- Anti-intellectualist motor knowledge
- Exploring people’s beliefs about the experience of time
- Coherence objectivity and measurement: the example of democracy
- Disagreement in science: introduction to the special issue
- Steel and bone: mesoscale modeling and middle-out strategies in physics and biology
- Conceptual analysis without concepts
- The problem of perception and the no-miracles principle
- Two faces of rationality
- Out of habit
- Two morals about a modal paradox
- Pragmatic markers: the missing link between language and Theory of Mind
- Reasoning in physics
- Truthmakers or truthmaking supervenience?
- Is consequentialist perdurantism in moral trouble?
- Editorial: symmetries and asymmetries in physics
- Probability and proximity in surprise
- Mental kinematics: dynamics and mechanics of neurocognitive systems
- Enculturating folk psychologists
- Impure concepts and non-qualitative properties
- The development of renormalization group methods for particle physics: Formal analogies between classical statistical mechanics and quantum field theory
- Disagreement and the division of epistemic labor
- The transmission of knowledge and garbage
- Deformation quantization as an appropriate guide to ontic structure
- Lying, more or less: a computer simulation study of graded lies and trust dynamics
- Goodness, availability, and argument structure
- Scientific self-correction: the Bayesian way
- Multi-field and Bohm’s theory
- Retweeting: its linguistic and epistemic value
- Affective experience in the predictive mind: a review and new integrative account
- Schmidentity and informativity
- A modal analysis of phenomenal intentionality: horizonality and object-directed phenomenal presence
- Impurism, pragmatic encroachment, and the Argument from Principles
- A New Hope: A better ICM to understand human cognitive architectural variability
- A case of shared consciousness
- Preteriception: memory as past-perception
- The reasonable doubt standard as inference to the best explanation
- A modal theory of discrimination
- Humeanisms: metaphysical and epistemological
- Algorithmic bias: on the implicit biases of social technology
- The variety of evidence thesis and its independence of degrees of independence
- Reliability: an introduction
- Levelling counterfactual scepticism
- The dependence of computability on numerical notations
- Spacetime functionalism in general relativity and quantum gravity
- Causal exclusion without causal sufficiency
- A working hypothesis for the logic of radical ignorance
- Relevance first: relocating similarity in counterfactual semantics
- I know how I know: perception, self-awareness, self-knowledge
- Counterfactuals and laws with violations
- The steering thrust phenomenon in action-directed-pragmatics
- Limitation of analogy in the Sleeping Beauty debate: the case of Singer’s argument
- Technologically scaffolded atypical cognition: the case of YouTube’s recommender system
- Degrees of freedom
- Definitions of life as epistemic tools that reflect and foster the advance of biological knowledge
- Introduction: knowing the unknown
- More on pejorative language: insults that go beyond their extension
- Evolution by means of natural selection without reproduction: revamping Lewontin’s account
- The role of testimony in mathematics
- Distinguishing topological and causal explanation
- Logical ignorance and logical learning
- These confabulations are guaranteed to improve your marriage! Toward a teleological theory of confabulation
- In defense of a strong persistence requirement on intention
- Endogenous epistemic factionalization
- Grounding and auto-abstraction
- The placeholder view of assumptions and the Curry–Howard correspondence
- Hume’s “projectivism” explained
- Expected utility theory, Jeffrey’s decision theory, and the paradoxes
- Super-Humeanism and physics: A merry relationship?
- How to endorse conciliationism
- Explaining “spatial purport of perception”: a predictive processing approach
- Scepticism, closure and rationally grounded knowledge: a new solution
- Undoing things with words
- Free will and control: a noncausal approach
- The Holmesian logician: Sherlock Holmes’ “Science of Deduction and Analysis” and the logic of discovery
- Counterfactual scepticism and antecedent-contextualism
- What Bergson should have said about special relativity
- The evil demon in the lab: skepticism, introspection, and introspection of introspection
- Prediction versus understanding in computationally enhanced neuroscience
- A grounding-based measure of relative fundamentality
- Anti-luck epistemology and pragmatic encroachment
- Assertion, action, and context
- The strategy of model building in climate science
- Editorial introduction to ‘truth: concept meets property’
- Enactivism and the “problem” of perceptual presence
- Editor’s introduction
- Sensory modalities and novel features of perceptual experiences
- How to be imprecise and yet immune to sure loss
- The stimulus-to-perception connection: a simulation study in the epistemology of perception
- Bringing back the voice: on the auditory objects of speech perception
- Regularity and certainty in Hume’s treatise: a Humean response to Husserl
- Entanglement as the world-making relation: distance from entanglement
- Single-domain free logic and the problem of compositionality
- Hume’s practice theory of promises and its dissimilar descendants
- Understanding others by doing things together: an enactive account
- McDowell’s infallibilism and the nature of knowledge
- Sophistry about symmetries?
- Polycratic hierarchies and networks: what simulation-modeling at the LHC can teach us about the epistemology of simulation
- Debunking conspiracy theories
- Abstract relations: bibliography and the infra-structures of modern mathematics
- Introduction to special issue: knowledge, virtue and action—eastern and western perspectives
- Mathematical practice and epistemic virtue and vice
- Culturally embedded schemata for false belief reasoning
- On the empirical coherence and the spatiotemporal gap problem in quantum gravity: and why functionalism does not (have to) help
- Unrealistic models for realistic computations: how idealisations help represent mathematical structures and found scientific computing
- Emotions, concepts and the indeterminacy of natural kinds
- Sellars’ metaethical quasi-realism
- So close no matter how far: counterfactuals in history of science and the inevitability/contingency controversy
- Concepts and categorization: do philosophers and psychologists theorize about different things?
- Self-ascription and the de se
- Back to the actual future
- Incubating a future metaphysics: quantum gravity
- Extended mind, functionalism and personal identity
- Benacerraf, Field, and the agreement of mathematicians
- Why mental content is not like water: reconsidering the reductive claims of teleosemantics
- Physical modality, laws, and counterfactuals
- Neural correlates without reduction: the case of the critical period
- Credence for conclusions: a brief for Jeffrey’s rule
- Normative commitments, causal structure, and policy disagreement
- Right out of the box: how to situate metaphysics of science in relation to other metaphysical approaches
- Synergic kinds
- Keep the chickens cooped: the epistemic inadequacy of free range metaphysics
- A note on Horwich’s notion of grounding
- How genealogies can affect the space of reasons
- Introduction: new trends in the metaphysics of science
- Anything but the truth
- When clarity and consistency conflicts with empirical adequacy: conceptual engineering, anthropology, and Evans-Pritchard’s ethnography
- Interpretationism and judgement-dependence
- Causation, electronic configurations and the periodic table
- Objectivity, trust and social responsibility
- The problem of creation and abstract artifacts
- Knowledge and cancelability
- Argumentative landscapes: the function of models in social epistemology
- The trouble with standards of proof
- Simplicity of what? A case study from generative linguistics
- Bayesian coherentism
- Bayesian coherentism
- Contra counterfactism
- Episodic memory is not immune to error through misidentification: against Fernández
- The influence of financial practice in developing mathematical probability
- Improving the quality of case-based research in the philosophy of contemporary sciences
- Spacetime functionalism from a realist perspective
- Quantum gravity, timelessness, and the folk concept of time
- Measuring the present: What is the duration of ‘now’?
- Virtue signalling is virtuous
- Correction to: The nature of entailment: an informational approach
- Objectivity in contexts: withholding epistemic judgement as a strategy for mitigating collective bias