- Temporal externalist descriptivism on natural kind terms: beyond the causal–historical analysis
- The Manipulationist Threat to moral responsibility
- Minimal metaphysics in moral and political philosophy
- Higher-order misinformation
- Distinguishing two kinds of fictionalism: metaphor, autism, and the imagination
- The role of causal manipulability in the manifestation of time biases
- The traversal of the infinite: considering a beginning for an infinite past
- Taking the public seriously: the role of respect in interactions between scientific experts and lay publics
- Belief in truthmaker semantics
- Neuroidealism, perceptual acquaintance and the Kantian roots of predictive processing
- The perils of approximate ontology
- Multiple belief states in social learning: an evidence tokens model
- The ontology of videogames
- Is validity circular?
- 3D/4D metaphysical equivalence: lessons from the species debate for the metaphysics of change and persistence
- Staying on-shell: manifest properties and reformulations in particle physics
- On testimony in scenarios with Wigner and Friend
- What we mean as what we said or would have said
- For values in science: Assessing recent arguments for the ideal of value-free science
- Shared emotion without togetherness: the case of shared grief
- Epistemic instrumentalism and the problem of epistemic blame
- Skilled metacognitive self-regulation toward interpretive norms: a non-relativist basis for the social constitution of mental health and illness
- Person-first and identity-first approaches to Autism: metaphysical and linguistic implications
- A dispositional account of technical functions
- Remembering as the same
- The exactness of communication
- Correction to: Deep disagreement across moral revolutions
- The normativity objection and the coloring strategy
- Naïve realism and sensorimotor theory
- Life, sense-making, and subjectivity. Why the enactive conception of life and mind requires phenomenology
- What’s wrong with the counterfactual-based objection to CORNEA?
- The epistemic objection against perdurantism
- Hedging in Discourse
- Partners in crime? Radical scepticism and malevolent global conspiracy theories
- Gricean insinuation and the fake one-way mirror effect
- Do opaque algorithms have functions?
- Epistemic logic with partial grasp
- Macrostructural explanation in the social sciences
- Affective injustice, sanism and psychiatry
- Authenticity in algorithm-aided decision-making
- Persistence conditions: what they are, and what it is to have them
- A non-causalist account of the explanatory autonomy in the psychological sciences
- Realism and the detection of dark matter
- Computational psychiatry and the evolving concept of a mental disorder
- Breaking the stigma around autism: moving away from neuronormativity using epistemic justice and 4E cognition
- Making sense of the doxastic approach to thought insertion
- Must depression be irrational?
- Seeking a reflective equilibrium in the face of disagreement
- Just pluralism: thinking about concepts of mental disorder in global context
- Quantum field theory and the limits of reductionism
- Polarization is epistemically innocuous
- I am no abstract object: a novel challenge to mind uploading
- Event completion: a test case for theories of reference in memory
- Physical vs. numerical approximation in Isaac Newton’s Principia
- Origins of biological teleology: how constraints represent ends
- Knowing how and being able
- Why and how to construct an epistemic justification of machine learning?
- Credo in unam credentiam: religious beliefs are standard beliefs
- Deep disagreement across moral revolutions
- Large language models and linguistic intentionality
- Memory-based reference and immunity to error through misidentification
- Category theory in consciousness science: going beyond the correlational project
- Smellscapes and diachronic olfaction
- Intentional action, knowledge, and cognitive extension
- Scientific understanding in biomedical research
- What does it mean for a duty to be directed in joint action?
- Time traveler confirms five minute hypothesis!
- The private life of the brain: issues and promises in the neuroscientific study of internal states
- The weight of truth
- Having a concept has a cost
- Deferred reference, meaning transfer or coercion? Toward a new principle of accounting for systematic uses of proper names
- Inquiry and reasons
- Journalism and public trust in science
- More than just principles: revisiting epistemic systems
- Non-spatial matters on the possibility of non-spatial material objects
- Event plenitude
- Can contemporary cognitive science coherently accommodate itself?
- To reform or to eliminate an attractor?
- Correction to: The teleological modal profile and subjunctive background of organic generation and growth
- Conjunctive explanations: when are two explanations better than one?
- Ambient smart environments: affordances, allostasis, and wellbeing
- Physicalism and fundamental mentality
- Powered properties, modal continuity, and the patchwork principle
- Natures, ideas, and essentialism in Kant
- The metaphysics and epistemology of conscious perception
- Against global aims for science: values, epistemic priority, and a local aims approach
- A logic of trust-based beliefs
- The representation and determinable structure of quantum properties
- Salient semantics
- Beliefs, delusions, hinge commitments
- Plain alethic pluralism: the human face of truth
- Imagining as a skillful mental action
- Individual values and inductive risk: remotivating the Bayesian alternative
- A triviality worry for the internal model principle
- A localist solution to the problem of mixed inferences by juxtaposition
- Beyond prediction: a new paradigm for understanding suicide risk
- McDowell’s overlooked argument for disjunctivism – realism, self-consciousness, and knowledge
- The reliability of evidential pluralism in drug regulation
- The metaphysics of mechanisms: an ontic structural realist perspective
- Reflexive awareness and reflexivity: an identity model of reflexive awareness with Korta and Perry’s reflexive-referential theory of content (RRT)
- Mandevillian vices
- Strategic justice, conventions, and game theory: introduction to a Synthese topical collection
- In defense of humean non-universal laws
- Exploring the transition: biology, technology, and epistemic activities
- An all-purpose framework for affordances. Reconciling the behavioral and the neuroscientific stories
- Singular concepts
- Introduction temporal reasoning and tensed truths
- Alternatives to the self-indication assumption are doomed
- “The value-free ideal, the autonomy thesis, and cognitive diversity”
- Extended mentality and ascriptive authority
- Indeterministic grounding
- Are generics quantificational?
- Emotion against reason? Self-control conflict as self-modelling rivalry
- The representation, quantification, and nature of genetic information
- Mental filing, continued
- Compositionality, communication, and commitments
- Salmón, Schiffer and Frege’s Constraint
- Deepfakes: a survey and introduction to the topical collection
- Carving teleology at its joints
- Towards a pragmatist epistemology for theory choice in logic
- Wittgenstein and the liar
- Sounds are broad events
- Indistinguishability as a constraint on priors
- Actions, reasons, and becauses
- Is the fine-tuning evidence for a multiverse?
- The intrapersonal normative twin earth argument
- An invitation to conventionalism: a philosophy for modern (space-)times
- Your red isn’t my red! Connectionist Structuralism and the puzzle of abstract objects
- Present records of the Past Hypothesis
- Developing appropriate emotions
- The power of social norms: Why conceptual engineers should care about implementation
- Once upon a time in superspace: the diegetic ideal for the interpretation of physical theories
- Are generics and negativity about social groups common on social media? A comparative analysis of Twitter (X) data
- Mental causation, interventionism, and probabilistic supervenience
- A story of consistency: bridging the gap between Bentham and Rawls foundations
- Don’t imagine junk! Positive conceivability and modal illusion in mereology
- Learning how to learn by self-tuning reinforcement
- A logic of higher-order preferences
- A logical challenge to correlationism: the Church–Fitch paradox in Husserl’s account of fulfilment, truth, and meaning
- Linguistic politeness in social networks
- What’s so bad about fanaticism?
- Knowing who occupies an office: purely contingent, necessary and impossible offices
- Types of testimony and their reliability
- Two Ships of Theseus
- Values in public health: an argument from trust
- Social learning in models and minds
- Gradual de-idealisation and progress in political science: a case study
- How to act on what you know
- On informational injustice and epistemic exclusions
- The role of scenarios in paradoxes
- Correction to: Motivational pessimism and motivated cognition
- Overlap: on the relation between perceiving and believing
- Normative uncertainty meets voting theory
- The problem of extrinsic grounding
- Naturalness, veritism, and epistemic significance
- Life-mind continuity: untangling categorical, extensional, and systematic aspects
- Logical abductivism on abductive logic
- Consciousness and Perspectival De Se content
- The epistemic value of doombehaviour: beyond the prudential consequences of doomscrolling, doomchecking, and doomsurfing
- Meaning change you can make
- The Monstrous Conclusion
- Safety and dream scepticism in Sosa’s epistemology
- Anti-luminosity and anti-realism in metaethics
- Against zetetic encroachment
- An epistemic distinction among essences, its metaphysical ground, and the role of philosophy
- The nature and difficulty of physical efforts
- “Humanity is another corporeity”: The evolution of human bodily appearance and sociality
- Temporalism and eternalism reconsidered: perceptual experience, memory, and knowledge
- Inquiry, value, and some peculiarities of the Pyrrhonist’s psychology
- How slurs enact norms, and how to retract them
- A credence-based theory-heavy approach to non-human consciousness
- Does the no miracles argument apply to AI?
- Defending internalism about unconscious phenomenal character
- Defining the method of reflective equilibrium
- The sensitivity of legal proof
- If presentism is false, then I don’t exist. On common-sense presentism
- The two ideals shaping the content of modern science
- Perceptual justification and objectual attitudes
- Values, bias and replicability
- Factivity, hallucination, and justification
- Epistemic ownership and the practical/epistemic parallelism
- Representationalism and rationality: why mental representation is real
- What is mental health and disorder? Philosophical implications from lay judgments
- Gatekeeping should be conserved in the open science era
- The function argument for ascribing interests
- The Adequacy of purposes for data: a paleoecological case study
- Scrutinizing the foundations: could large language models be solipsistic?
- Metaphysical laws and the directionality of grounding
- The puzzle of plausible deniability
- Natural language syntax complies with the free-energy principle
- Rethinking core affect: the role of dominance in animal behaviour and welfare research
- Enacted institutions, participatory sense-making and social norms
- Correction: Legal concepts and legal expertise
- Introduction to the topical collection ‘locating representations in the brain: interdisciplinary perspectives’
- No hope for conciliationism
- Expertise, moral subversion, and climate deregulation
- Singular thought without temporal representation?
- On metaphors of mathematics: Between Blumenberg’s nonconceptuality and Grothendieck’s waves
- Variational propensities: development and ultimate causes
- Can video games be philosophical?
- Metrics in biodiversity conservation and the value-free ideal
- Reflective equilibrium in practice and model selection: a methodological proposal from a survey experiment on the theories of distributive justice
- On the gradability of knowledge how, and its relationship to motor representations and ability
- Bridgman and the normative independence of science: an individual physicist in the shadow of the bomb
- Anatomy’s role in mechanistic explanations of organism behaviour
- ‘I knew all along’: making sense of post-self-deception judgments
- Testimonial justification under epistemic conflict of interest
- Probabilistic epistemic logic based on neighborhood semantics
- The Humean theory of motivation: much ado about nothing?
- Defending the pure causal-historical theory of reference fixing for natural kind terms
- Restricted nominalism about number and its problems
- The metaphysics of puns
- Can episodic memory deter cheating and promote altruism?
- Perceptual occlusion and the differentiation condition
- Logicality and the picture theory of language
- How to lose your memory without losing your money: shifty epistemology and Dutch strategies
- Lagrangian possibilities
- Moving from the mental to the behavioral in the metaphysics of social institutions
- Belief revision in psychotherapy
- Motivational pessimism and motivated cognition
- Bald-faced lying to institutions: deception or manipulation
- The playing field of empirical facts: on the interrelations between moral and empirical beliefs in reflective equilibrium
- The impoverishment problem
- Correction to: Lying by explaining: an experimental study
- Hyperintensionality and overfitting
- Memory-based modes of presentation
- Reliabilist epistemology meets bounded rationality
- Confidence in Covid-19 models
- Conspiracy theories, epistemic self-identity, and epistemic territory
- Are thick aesthetic predicates assessment-sensitive?
- The pragmatic turn in the scientific realism debate
- Conciliationism and the Peer-undermining Problem
- Normal science: not uncritical or dogmatic
- Experiment-driven rationalism
- Legal concepts and legal expertise
- Correction to: On ways of being true
- Surrogative reasoning in the sciences
- Processes as variable embodiments
- Distinctively generic explanations of physical facts
- Attitude ascriptions: a new old problem for Russell’s theory of descriptions
- Indexicals and communicative affordances
- An idealised account of mechanistic computation
- HOTT and heavy: higher-order thought theory and the theory-heavy approach to animal consciousness
- Exploring, expounding & ersatzing: a three-level account of deep learning models in cognitive neuroscience
- Correction to: Don’t get it wrong! On understanding and its negative phenomena
- Inquiry, reasoning and the normativity of logic
- The consequence argument and ordinary human agency
- Bolzano’s Tortoise and a loophole for Achilles
- Correction to: The implicit decision theory of non-philosophers
- Functionalism, interventionism, and higher-order causation
- What is a mathematical structure of conscious experience?
- Reference in remembering: towards a simulationist account
- Precedent and rest stop convergence in reflective equilibrium
- Rigor and formalization
- Irreplaceable truth
- Consumer-side reference through promiscuous memory traces
- A note on Williamson’s Gettier cases in epistemic logic
- What is gullibility?
- Environmental epistemology
- Lying by explaining: an experimental study
- Authenticity as self-discovery and interpretation of value
- Is there a defensible conception of reflective equilibrium?
- An experimental study on the ontology of relations
- The teleological modal profile and subjunctive background of organic generation and growth
- The distinctly zetetic significance of disagreement
- Practical perceptual representations: a contemporary defense of an old idea
- Scientific explanation as a guide to ground
- Phenomenal character and the epistemic role of perception
- Coordinated ifs and theories of conditionals
- Lying and self-defeating prophecies
- Are life forms real? Aristotelian naturalism and biological science
- Interdisciplinarity in the 17th century? A co-occurrence analysis of early modern German dissertation titles
- An accuracy characterisation of approximate coherence
- The omniscient speaker puzzle
- A deflationary approach to legal ontology
- Bad social norms rather than bad believers: examining the role of social norms in bad beliefs
- How the evaluability bias shapes transformative decisions
- Objectivity, shared values, and trust
- The implicit decision theory of non-philosophers
- A case for animal reference: beyond functional reference and meaning attribution
- Reflective equilibrium in logic
- How (not) to integrate scientific and moral realism
- Computational systems as higher-order mechanisms
- Diseases as social problems
- A defense of Isaacson’s thesis, or how to make sense of the boundaries of finite mathematics
- Bayesian defeat of certainties
- Pragmatist reflective equilibrium
- Infinitism: rival or common ground in answering the epistemic regress?
- Benardete paradoxes, patchwork principles, and the infinite past
- Don’t get it wrong! On understanding and its negative phenomena
- What is an experiment in mathematical practice? New evidence from mining the Mathematical Reviews
- Rational factionalization for agents with probabilistically related beliefs
- Functionalism, integrity, and digital consciousness
- Probabilifying reflective equilibrium
- The social contract for science and the value-free ideal
- Paying attention to attention: psychological realism and the attention economy
- Monadic panpsychism
- Value transparency and promoting warranted trust in science communication
- Memory in two dimensions
- Earning epistemic trustworthiness: an impact assessment model
- Should dualists locate the physical basis of experience in the head?
- The iterative conception of set does not justify ZFC
- Aristotelian universals, strong immanence, and construction
- Perceptual justification and the demands of effective agency
- Radical epistemology, theory choice, and the priority of the epistemic
- Performative updates and the modeling of speech acts
- Components of arithmetic theory acceptance
- The hybrid account of activities
- The once and always possible
- A naturalist approach to social ontology
- Psychophysical neutrality and its descendants: a brief primer for dual-aspect monism
- Definite totalities and determinate truth in conceptual structuralism
- Broken wills and ill beliefs: Szaszianism, expressivism, and the doubly value-laden nature of mental disorder
- Why a Gricean-style defense of the vacuous truth of counterpossibles won’t work, but a defense based on heuristics just might
- Straightening the ‘value-laden turn’: minimising the influence of extra-scientific values in science
- Pregnancy, a test case for immunology
- Tensed truth, temporal particularity, and the fixity of the past
- Propter quid demonstrations: Roger Bacon on geometrical causes in natural philosophy
- Knowledge, the concept know, and the word know: considerations from polysemy and pragmatics
- Functional Concept Proxies and the Actually Smart Hans Problem: What’s Special About Deep Neural Networks in Science
- The ambiguity of BERTology: what do large language models represent?
- How to do things with insecure extensions
- The categories of causation
- Overlapping consensus in pluralist societies: simulating Rawlsian full reflective equilibrium
- Realizing impossibilities
- The conceptual foundation of the propensity interpretation of fitness
- Reflective naturalism
- Neural representations unobserved—or: a dilemma for the cognitive neuroscience revolution
- The promise of supersymmetry
- Musical works are mind-independent artifacts
- Liberalism, polarization, and the aggregation problem
- Correction to: Epistemologists of modality wanted
- Possible words: generativity, instantiation, and individuation
- Conceptual change and conceptual enrichment: a frame-based reconstruction of Austin’s theory of speech acts
- Logics of truthmaker semantics: comparison, compactness and decidability
- The successes of reclamation
- Normative realism and Brentanian accounts of fittingness
- Etiological proper function and the safety condition
- Causal scientific explanations from machine learning
- Reinach on the essence of colours
- Suffering is bad: experiential understanding and the impossibility of intrinsically valuing suffering
- Eros and Anxiety
- The operator argument and the case of timestamp semantics
- Praise, objective rightness and extended action
- Why being fragments
- Grounding scientific representation
- Common-sense temporal ontology: an experimental study
- Unzipping the zetetic turn
- Epistemologists of modality wanted
- Tweet acts and quote-tweetable acts
- The topology of persons, and surviving to some degree
- Correction to: Ordinary undetached parts
- Ranking philosophy journals: a meta-ranking and a new survey ranking
- Correction to: Rejecting the extended cognition moral narrative: a critique of two normative arguments for extended cognition
- A theory of advice
- Revisiting stance voluntarism: in defense of an active stance pluralism
- Truth as none and many
- Composing words and non-words
- Novel prediction and the problem of low-quality accommodation
- Processes and events as rigid embodiments
- Potential rationality in collective decision-making
- New challenges to the selected effects account of biological function
- Organized representations forming a computationally useful processing structure
- The unbearable rightness of seeing? Conceptualism, enactivism, and skilled engagement
- Meaningfulness and grief: you don’t know what you got till it’s gone
- The epistemic impossibility of economic calculation
- The academic at the crossroads: a dialectical assessment of Augustinian pragmatic anti-skepticism
- Does reflective equilibrium help us converge?
- Metarepresenting in communication
- Identity and influence
- Correspondence pluralism
- Meta-fictionalism about the non-present
- Risk and theoretical equivalence in mathematical foundations
- Unveiling the philosophical foundations: On Cantor’s transfinite infinites and the metaphorical accounts of infinity
- How to be a hyper-inferentialist
- The true futures
- Compact spaces and privileged times; what the video game asteroids can teach us about the present
- Rejecting the extended cognition moral narrative: a critique of two normative arguments for extended cognition
- Synthesising boredom: a predictive processing approach
- Expecting pain
- A problem with the fixed past fixed
- A virtue reliabilist solution to moore’s paradox
- Characterizing a collaboration by its communication structure
- Why reasons and reasoning don’t come apart
- Affective memory, imagined emotion, and bodily imagery
- Hot-cold empathy gaps and the grounds of authenticity
- First-person constraints on dynamic-mechanistic explanations in neuroscience: The case of migraine and epilepsy models
- On Husserl’s Twin Earth
- Scientific metaphysics and social science
- Hinge commitments and trust
- First-person perspectives and scientific inquiry of autism: towards an integrative approach
- On the zetetic significance of peer disagreement
- Retraction in public settings
- How should predictive processors conceive of practical reason?
- Should ordinary race talk be ontologically privileged? Moving social science into the philosophical mainstream
- Is remembering constructive imagining?
- Virtues of willpower
- Bodily sense and structural content
- Current cases of AI misalignment and their implications for future risks
- Science as a counter to the erosion of truth in society
- Why computational complexity may set impenetrable barriers for epistemic reductionism
- Partisan science and the democratic legitimacy ideal
- Navigating dissent by managing value judgments: the case of Lyme disease
- Deepfakes and trust in technology
- Artifacts and intervention: a persistence theory of artifact functions
- How to make (mathematical) assertions with directives
- Truth and its uses: deflationism and alethic pluralism
- Realism about tense and atemporality
- Symmetries as grounds for induction: the case of the Ω− baryon
- Three kinds of the Lotka–Volterra model transfer from biology to economics
- By(e) enduring? An answer to Wasserman
- Demarcating Descartes’s geometry with clarity and distinctness
- Unconscious transformative experience
- Ordinary undetached parts
- Evidence and the epistemic betterness
- Are models our tools not our masters?
- Compound powerful qualities: properties as compounds of distinct powers and qualities