- Quantum probability: a reliable tool for an agent or a reliable source of reality?
- The field and landscape of affordances: Koffka’s two environments revisited
- Free will fallibilism and the “two-standpoints” account of freedom
- Knowledge-how and the problems of masking and finkishness
- The C-word, the P-word, and realism in epidemiology
- Austrian economics without extreme apriorism: construing the fundamental axiom of praxeology as analytic
- Judging machines: philosophical aspects of deep learning
- Can a relational substance ontology be hylomorphic?
- Many, but one
- Knowledge-how and false belief
- Knowledge, evidence, and multiple process types
- The causal situationist account of constitutive relevance
- Getting Gettier straight: thought experiments, deviant realizations and default interpretations
- A pluralistic and socially responsible philosophy of epidemiology field should actively engage with social determinants of health and health disparities
- The epistemic norm of inference and non-epistemic reasons for belief
- Intellectualizing know how
- Epistemic norms, closure, and No-Belief hinge epistemology
- Consciousness, belief, and the group mind hypothesis
- Is self-identity essential to objects?
- Introduction: systematicity, the nature of science?
- The nature of science. A dialogue
- Systematicity theory meets Socratic scientific realism: the systematic quest for truth
- Systematicity is necessary but not sufficient: on the problem of facsimile science
- Tolerance and the distributed sorites
- Axiomatizing non-deterministic many-valued generalized consequence relations
- Modelling deep indeterminacy
- On the explanatory demands of the Special Composition Question
- Bodily awareness and novel multisensory features
- The interpretation of uncertainty in ecological rationality
- Closure, credence and rationality: a problem for non-belief hinge epistemology
- The overlooked ubiquity of first-person experience in the cognitive sciences
- How (not) to think about theory-change in epidemiology
- Epidemiology is ecosystem science
- Approval-directed agency and the decision theory of Newcomb-like problems
- Part, slot, ground: foundations for neo-Aristotelian mereology
- Is the folk concept of luck normative?
- Rethinking natural kinds, reference and truth: towards more correspondence with reality, not less
- Dreaming of a stable world: vision and action in sleep
- Multiscale integration: beyond internalism and externalism
- Evaluating epistemic virtues
- Conservative translations of four-valued logics in modal logic
- Limiting logical pluralism
- Quine on naturalism, nominalism, and philosophy’s place within science
- Why logical pluralism?
- Generalizing empirical adequacy II: partial structures
- Information elaboration and epistemic effects of diversity
- Defeasible normative reasoning
- Enactivism, other minds, and mental disorders
- Fixed-point solutions to the regress problem in normative uncertainty
- Vertical versus horizontal: What is really at issue in the exclusion problem?
- Abduction versus conceiving in modal epistemology
- What we can (and can’t) infer about implicit bias from debiasing experiments
- The ant colony as a test for scientific theories of consciousness
- No universalism without gunk? Composition as identity and the universality of identity
- Aesthetics and action: situations, emotional perception and the Kuleshov effect
- Abduction and styles of scientific thinking
- Logic without metaphysics
- Productive theory-ladenness in fMRI
- Psychophysiological approach to the Liar paradox: Jean Buridan’s virtual entailment principle put to the test
- Intuition, intelligence, data compression
- Towards a dual process epistemology of imagination
- Memory without content? Radical enactivism and (post)causal theories of memory
- World enough and form: why cosmology needs hylomorphism
- Moral disagreement and non-moral ignorance
- Affect, motivational states, and evaluative concepts
- Pragmatism, enactivism, and ecological psychology: towards a unified approach to post-cognitivism
- Kuhn’s two accounts of rational disagreement in science: an interpretation and critique
- Do mathematical explanations have instrumental value?
- Coincidence as parthood
- An evidentialist account of hinges
- Composition as identity, Leibniz’s Law, and slice-sensitive emergent properties
- First person epidemiological measures: vehicles for patient centered care
- Make up your mind: octopus cognition and hybrid explanations
- Counterpossibles for modal normativists
- Extended mathematical cognition: external representations with non-derived content
- Some remarks on the mentalistic reformulation of the measurement problem: a reply to S. Gao
- Metaphysical and absolute possibility
- Kant on the epistemic role of the imagination
- Conceptual engineering, truth, and efficacy
- Against logical generalism
- Externalism and critical reasoning: a reconsideration
- From potency to act: hyloenergeism
- Induction and explanatory definitions in mathematics
- The transmission of knowledge and garbage
- The nonclassical mereology of olfactory experiences
- Experimental ordinary language philosophy: a cross-linguistic study of defeasible default inferences
- Counterfactual knowability revisited
- Authority without privilege: How to be a Dretskean conciliatory skeptic on self-knowledge
- Essence and the inference problem
- Safety, domination, and differential support
- Forces in a true and physical sense: from mathematical models to metaphysical conclusions
- Evil twins and the multiverse: distinguishing the world of difference between epistemic and physical possibility
- Counterfactual reasoning within physical theories
- Ideology and its role in metaphysics
- The polysemy of ‘part’
- Is there a neutral metalanguage?
- Hyperintensional logics for everyone
- A debunking argument against speciesism
- Reliable group belief
- The possibility of fitting love: irreplaceability and selectivity
- Infinite idealizations in science: an introduction
- Intuitionistic mereology
- A conflict between van Inwagen’s metaontology and his ontology
- Free actions as a natural kind
- The illusion of conscious experience
- Lying, fast and slow
- What’s new: innovation and enculturation of arithmetical practices
- Mathematical developments in the rise of Yang–Mills gauge theories
- A meaning explanation for HoTT
- Is Weak Supplementation analytic?
- Underdetermination of infinitesimal probabilities
- Scientific realism with historical essences: the case of species
- Analysis and decomposition in Peirce
- Historiographic narratives and empirical evidence: a case study
- New frontiers in ground, essence, and modality: introduction
- Putting responsible research and innovation into practice: a case study for biotechnology research, exploring impacts and RRI learning outcomes of public engagement for science students
- The original sin of proof-theoretic semantics
- Reading as a source of knowledge
- The epistemic effects of close entanglements between research fields and activist movements
- Why inference to the best explanation doesn’t secure empirical grounds for mathematical platonism
- How to be an adverbialist about phenomenal intentionality
- How to Ekman a Crabbé-Tennant
- Philosophical methods under scrutiny: introduction to the special issue philosophical methods
- Strange bedfellows: on Pritchard’s disjunctivist hinge epistemology
- Is parthood identity?
- Processes, pre-emption and further problems
- Intensional biases in affordance perception: an explanatory issue for radical enactivism
- Epistemic conservatism and bare beliefs
- Correcting credences with chances
- Structural properties, mereology, and modal magic
- Quasi-canonical systems and their semantics
- Observer memory and immunity to error through misidentification
- The word of a reluctant convert
- Is composition identity?
- On the essence of empty properties
- Why ‘scaffolding’ is the wrong metaphor: the cognitive usefulness of mathematical representations
- How and why we reason from is to ought
- Affordances, context and sociality
- Predictive processing and the representation wars: a victory for the eliminativist (via fictionalism)
- Market epistemology
- Consciousness and the limits of memory
- Lexical-rule predicativism about names
- Paraconsistency in classical logic
- Physicalism and the sortalist conception of objects
- Lessons from the Large Hadron Collider for model-based experimentation: the concept of a model of data acquisition and the scope of the hierarchy of models
- Structures, dynamics and mechanisms in neuroscience: an integrative account
- Brandom and the brutes
- What inductive explanations could not be
- Mental causation via neuroprosthetics? A critical analysis
- Deontology defended
- The response model of moral disgust
- Methodological reflections on Kant’s ethical theory
- Pre-emption cases may support, not undermine, the counterfactual theory of causation
- Scientific deceit
- How does the consideration of Indigenous identities in the US complicate conversations about tracking folk racial categories in epidemiologic research?
- Merleau-Ponty and the radical sciences of mind
- A new proposal how to handle counterexamples to Markov causation à la Cartwright, or: fixing the chemical factory
- Special issue: Inferentialism in philosophy of science and in epistemology—introduction
- It’s one thing to rule them all and another thing to bind them
- A Kantian virtue epistemology: rational capacities and transcendental arguments
- Mindless accuracy: on the ubiquity of content in nature
- Truthmaking and the is–ought gap
- Desirability foundations of robust rational decision making
- The externalist challenge to conceptual engineering
- On experiencing moral properties
- Against global method safety
- Merleau-Ponty’s implicit critique of the new mechanists
- Extensionality for fusions and pluralities
- Correction to: Deduction and definability in infinite statistical systems
- What the progressive aspect tells us about processes
- Truthmaker maximalism and the truthmaker paradox
- A functional naturalism
- Friedman on suspended judgment
- Correction to: Non-rational action in the face of disagreement: an argument against (strong) non-conformism
- Correction to: “Till at last there remain nothing”
- Strategy and the pursuit of truth
- Representationalism is a dead end
- Epistemic harm and virtues of self-evaluation
- Erratum to: Scientific revolutions, specialization and the discovery of the structure of DNA: toward a new picture of the development of the sciences
- Time travel, hyperspace and Cheshire Cats
- Women and ‘the philosophical personality’: evaluating whether gender differences in the Cognitive Reflection Test have significance for explaining the gender gap in Philosophy
- Beyond cognitive myopia: a patchwork approach to the concept of neural function
- Explanatory autonomy: the role of proportionality, stability, and conditional irrelevance
- Causal explanation and the periodic table
- JuDAS: a theory of rational belief revision
- Scientific explanation, unifying mathematics, and indispensability arguments (A new Cicada MES)
- Gestalt structures in multi-person intersubjectivity
- Polarization in groups of Bayesian agents
- Is Hume’s Principle analytic?
- Aristotelian diagrams for semantic and syntactic consequence
- String theory, non-empirical theory assessment, and the context of pursuit
- The two visual systems hypothesis and contrastive underdetermination
- How numerals support new cognitive capacities
- Truthlikeness: old and new debates
- Epistemic injustice in mathematics
- Folk teleology drives persistence judgments
- Action-based versus cognitivist perspectives on socio-cognitive development: culture, language and social experience within the two paradigms
- Replacement and reasoning: a reliabilist account of epistemic defeat
- Inquiry and the doxastic attitudes
- Knowledge of consequences: an explanation of the epistemic side-effect effect
- In defense of the semantic view of computation
- The problem of future contingents: scoping out a solution
- Defining a crisis: the roles of principles in the search for a theory of quantum gravity
- Deep disagreement and hinge epistemology
- Russellians can solve the problem of empty names with nonsingular propositions
- The joint aggregation of beliefs and degrees of belief
- Higher-order defeat and intellectual responsibility
- Peripersonal perception in action
- Correction to: Cognitive penetration and the cognition–perception interface
- The principle of equivalence as a criterion of identity
- Belief, credence, and evidence
- Evidentially embedded epistemic entitlement
- Constitutive principles versus comprehensibility conditions in post-Kantian physics
- Substructural logics, pluralism and collapse
- Critical epidemiological literacy: understanding ideas better when placed in relation to alternatives
- Deducing false propositions from true ideas: Nieuwentijt on mathematical reasoning
- Varieties of responsibility: two problems of responsible innovation
- The epistemological objection to modal primitivism
- Sensorimotor expectations and the visual field
- Stealing Harman’s Thought : knowledge saboteurs and dogmatists
- A partial consequence account of truthlikeness
- The turbulent age of innovation
- Empiricism without magic: transformational abstraction in deep convolutional neural networks
- Knowledge, justification, and (a sort of) safe belief
- Logical pluralism without the normativity
- Contingent composition as identity
- Is risk aversion irrational? Examining the “fallacy” of large numbers
- Representation and the active consumer
- Hyperintensional semantics: a Fregean approach
- The adverbial theory of numbers: some clarifications
- Subject-specific intellectualism: re-examining know how and ability
- The explanatory role of consistency requirements
- Credence as doxastic tendency
- Once you think you’re wrong, you must be right: new versions of the preface paradox
- Finding satisfaction in presentism
- Truth tracking performance of social networks: how connectivity and clustering can make groups less competent
- Perception is not all-purpose
- Ramsey and Joyce on deliberation and prediction
- On the generality argument for the knowledge norm
- What we owe each other, epistemologically speaking: ethico-political values in social epistemology
- A diachronic perspective on peer disagreement in veritistic social epistemology
- On relativist approaches to many-one identity
- Mechanisms for constrained stochasticity
- Manipulation is key: on why non-mechanistic explanations in the cognitive sciences also describe relations of manipulation and control
- Essence and modal knowledge
- Paradoxes and the limits of theorizing about propositional attitudes
- First principles in the life sciences: the free-energy principle, organicism, and mechanism
- Physical models and embodied cognition
- Timelessness and freedom
- How to power encultured minds
- Idealization and abstraction in scientific modeling
- Meaning relativism and subjective idealism
- Why compositional nihilism dissolves puzzles
- Stranger in a strange land: an optimal-environments account of evolutionary mismatch
- Numerals and neural reuse
- How to stay safe while extending the mind
- Phenomenal dispositions
- Public epistemic trustworthiness and the integration of patients in psychiatric classification
- Knowledge from scientific expert testimony without epistemic trust
- Structures as relations
- Visual acquaintance, action and the explanatory gap
- An argument against global no miracles arguments
- Knowledge of things
- Epistemic authority: preemption through source sensitive defeat
- A different kind of dream-based skepticism
- Influence and prioritization of non-epistemic values in clinical trial designs: a study of Ebola ça Suffit trial
- Tolerance, flexibility and the application of kind terms
- A challenge for Super-Humeanism: the problem of immanent comparisons
- Correction to: Safety in Sosa
- Intelligent action guidance and the use of mixed representational formats
- Kinds behaving badly: intentional action and interactive kinds
- Action models in inquisitive logic
- Informative ecological models without ecological forces
- Metaphysical necessity: a skeptical perspective
- Kant and Frege on existence
- Functional individuation, mechanistic implementation: the proper way of seeing the mechanistic view of concrete computation
- Grounding, mental causation, and overdetermination
- Gamma graph calculi for modal logics
- Retractions
- The experience property frame work: a misleading paradigm
- Judgment aggregation in nonmonotonic logic
- Aboutness and negative truths: a modest strategy for truthmaker theorists
- The redundancy of the act
- Rethinking the problem of cognition
- Mental files, concepts, and bodies of information
- De se thoughts and immunity to error through misidentification
- A pluralistic account of epistemic rationality
- Knowing-how, showing, and epistemic norms
- Introduction to the 2nd Synthese Special Issue: trends in philosophy of language and mind
- Visual experience: rich but impenetrable
- Thin versus thick accounts of scientific representation
- Reasons for action, acting for reasons, and rationality
- Explaining doxastic transparency: aim, norm, or function?
- An account of truthmaking
- Correction to: Establishing the teratogenicity of Zika and evaluating causal criteria
- A consciousness-based quantum objective collapse model
- Correction to: Dynamics of lying
- Should I believe all the truths?
- Identity criteria: an epistemic path to conceptual grounding
- Safety in Sosa
- Why pure mathematical truths are metaphysically necessary: a set-theoretic explanation
- A precipice below which lies absurdity? Theories without a spacetime and scientific understanding
- Strong internalism, doxastic involuntarism, and the costs of compatibilism
- Knowing how things might have been
- Structured propositions and trivial composition
- Third factor explanations and disagreement in metaethics
- Life and life only: a radical alternative to life definitionism
- On the non-conceptual content of affective-evaluative experience
- Social aspects of scientific knowledge
- Empirical justification and defeasibility
- The epistemology of modality and the problem of modal epistemic friction
- Impure concepts and non-qualitative properties
- Existence predicates
- Scoring in context
- Connection experiments in neurobiology
- Establishing the teratogenicity of Zika and evaluating causal criteria
- Duhem’s problem revisited: logical versus epistemic formulations and solutions
- The difference between indexicals and demonstratives
- Defeaters and practical knowledge
- Explanationist aid for phenomenal conservatism
- What we choose, what we prefer
- Formulating reductionism about testimonial warrant and the challenge from childhood testimony
- Quinean holism, analyticity, and diachronic rational norms
- Defeating pragmatic encroachment?
- Seemings as sui generis
- What are chronic diseases?
- Anti-luck virtue epistemology and epistemic defeat
- Lay intuitions about epistemic normativity
- Non-rational action in the face of disagreement: an argument against (strong) non-conformism
- A Lewisian taxonomy for deontic logic
- In defense of hearing meanings
- Deductive Cogency, understanding, and acceptance
- Meta-epistemic defeat
- In dialectical tension: realist and instrumentalist attitudes in scientific practice
- Are visuomotor representations cognitively penetrable? Biasing action-guiding vision
- Against rigidity for natural kind terms
- Truth predicates, truth bearers, and their variants
- Merely partial definition and the analysis of knowledge
- Phenomenology and naturalism in autopoietic and radical enactivism: exploring sense-making and continuity from the top down
- Background beliefs and plausibility thresholds: defending explanationist evidentialism
- The epistemic account of faultless disagreement
- Turbulence, emergence and multi-scale modelling
- A critical hermeneutic reflection on the paradigm-level assumptions underlying responsible innovation
- How to solve the knowability paradox with transcendental epistemology
- Infinite idealization and contextual realism
- An introduction to real possibilities, indeterminism, and free will: three contingencies of the debate
- How can we come to know metaphysical modal truths?
- Where health and environment meet: the use of invariant parameters in big data analysis
- Action, affordances, and anorexia: body representation and basic cognition
- Explanation classification depends on understanding: extending the epistemic side-effect effect
- The strategy of endogenization in evolutionary biology
- Multiple realization and compositional variation
- Can we perceive mental states?
- Making best systems best for us
- Beyond mind–body dualism: embracing pluralism in psychiatric research — introduction to the special issue, “Psychiatry and Its Philosophy”
- Abductive inference within a pragmatic framework
- Autopoiesis, free energy, and the life–mind continuity thesis
- Active inference, enactivism and the hermeneutics of social cognition
- What do predictive coders want?
- The Faulty Signal Problem: counterfactual asymmetries in causal decision theory and rational deliberation
- Conceivability and possibility: some dilemmas for Humeans
- Frege’s recognition criterion for thoughts and its problems
- Getting into predictive processing’s great guessing game: Bootstrap heaven or hell?
- Betwixt and between: the enculturated predictive processing approach to cognition
- From cognitivism to autopoiesis: towards a computational framework for the embodied mind
- Systematizing the theoretical virtues
- Singular truth-conditions without singular propositions
- Idealized models, holistic distortions, and universality
- Predictive perceptual systems
- Knowledge, intuition and implicature
- The anticipating brain is not a scientist: the free-energy principle from an ecological-enactive perspective
- Content and misrepresentation in hierarchical generative models
- Happily entangled: prediction, emotion, and the embodied mind
- Leśniewski on metalogic and definitions
- Essential bundle theory and modality
- Making worlds with symbols
- Deflationism about the necessary a posteriori and Twin Earth
- A Bayesian explanation of the irrationality of sexist and racist beliefs involving generic content
- The function of modal judgment and the Kantian gap
- Undoing things with words
- An efficient coding approach to the debate on grounded cognition
- Introduction: new trends in the metaphysics of science
- “Nobody would really talk that way!”: the critical project in contemporary ordinary language philosophy
- Presentism, eternalism and where things are located
- The rational impermissibility of accepting (some) racial generalizations
- No purely epistemic theory can account for the naturalness of kinds
- Why mental content is not like water: reconsidering the reductive claims of teleosemantics
- Back to the actual future
- Against external validity
- Sellars’ metaethical quasi-realism
- Pleonastic propositions and the face value theory
- Concepts and categorization: do philosophers and psychologists theorize about different things?
- Persistence and modality
- Credence for conclusions: a brief for Jeffrey’s rule
- Emotions, concepts and the indeterminacy of natural kinds
- La Bohume
- Luminosity in the stream of consciousness
- A note on Horwich’s notion of grounding
- Knowledge, hope, and fallibilism
- Extended mind, functionalism and personal identity
- Accessibility, implicit bias, and epistemic justification
- What should we believe about the future?
- The argument from convention revisited
- Carnap’s epistemological critique of metaphysics
- Criteria of identity and the hermeneutic goal of ante rem structuralism
- Is imagination too liberal for modal epistemology?
- Strategies of inquiry
- Guidance control and the anti-akrasia chip
- What makes unique hues unique?
- Intervening on structure
- On Lewis against magic: a study of method in metaphysics
- A neuropsychological challenge to the sentimentalism/rationalism distinction
- Philosophical pictures about mathematics: Wittgenstein and contradiction
- In defense of doxastic blame
- Does the normative question about rationality rest on a mistake?
- Embodied cognition and temporally extended agency
- Scientific revolutions, specialization and the discovery of the structure of DNA: toward a new picture of the development of the sciences
- Rigidity and triviality
- Plurivaluationism, supersententialism and the problem of the many languages
- Explanatory schema and the process of model building
- Normative commitments, causal structure, and policy disagreement
- How genealogies can affect the space of reasons
- Explication as a strategy for revisionary philosophy
- Correction to: Ontological commitments of frame-based knowledge representations
- A plenitude of powers
- Natural kinds as nodes in causal networks
- The Prenective View of propositional content
- Prioritised ceteris paribus logic for counterfactual reasoning
- Is there a place in Bayesian confirmation theory for the Reverse Matthew Effect?
- Do we need two notions of natural kind to account for the history of “jade”?
- Causal powers and isomeric chemical kinds
- Is ontology the key to understanding tense?
- The metaphysics of natural kinds
- Metaphysical necessity dualism
- The peculiar case of Lehrer’s lawyer
- Taxonomy, ontology, and natural kinds
- Husserl on completeness, definitely
- Etiology, understanding, and testimonial belief
- Introduction for synthese special issue causation in the metaphysics of science: natural kinds
- Omissions and expectations: a new approach to the things we failed to do
- Anchoring in ecosystemic kinds
- Relativistic frameworks and the case for (or against) incommensurability
- A simple notion of validity for alethic pluralism
- A probabilistic analysis of argument cogency
- Sensory malfunctions, limitations, and trade-offs