- Requiem for logical nihilism, or: Logical nihilism annihilated
- Neural phase: a new problem for the modal account of epistemic luck
- A perceptual theory of moods
- Ignorance, misconceptions and critical thinking
- Truth and ignorance
- Lotteries, knowledge, and inconsistent belief: why you know your ticket will lose
- Evidentialism and belief polarization
- Are the open-ended rules for negation categorical?
- Semantic realism in the semantic conception of theories
- Fictional names and individual concepts
- Does perceptual psychology rule out disjunctivism in the theory of perception?
- Intrinsic local distances: a mixed solution to Weyl’s tile argument
- Reliability of mathematical inference
- Practical reasoning, rule-following and belief revision: an account in terms of Jeffrey’s rule
- Essence, modality, and intrinsicality
- Quasi-realism and normative certitude
- Too much of a good thing: decision-making in cases with infinitely many utility contributions
- Fame in the predictive brain: a deflationary approach to explaining consciousness in the prediction error minimization framework
- Complexity begets crosscutting, dooms hierarchy (another paper on natural kinds)
- Correction to: Kant and the forms of realism
- Calculus as method or calculus as rules? Boole and Frege on the aims of a logical calculus
- Between mechanical clocks and emergent flocks: complexities in biology
- Two approaches to natural kinds
- Revisiting Reichenbach’s logic
- Are we free to imagine what we choose?
- Grounding and a priori epistemology: challenges for conceptualism
- A puzzle about epistemic value and steps towards a solution
- Metaphysics, bullshit, and the analysis of philosophical problems
- What eliminative materialism isn’t
- Group (epistemic) competence
- Degrees of riskiness, falsifiability, and truthlikeness
- Affective shifts: mood, emotion and well-being
- Approaching deterministic and probabilistic truth: a unified account
- Local causation
- On dispositional masks
- A classical way forward for the regularity and normalization problems
- Strategic manipulation in Bayesian dialogues
- The mechanism—the secret—of the given
- Correction to: Another way logic might be normative
- Correction to: Editorial: symmetries and asymmetries in physics
- Perceptual justification in the Bayesian brain: a foundherentist account
- Social constructivism in mathematics? The promise and shortcomings of Julian Cole’s institutional account
- KNOWING HOW as a philosophical hybrid
- The derivation of Poiseuille’s law: heuristic and explanatory considerations
- Understanding scientific progress: the noetic account
- The future ain’t what it used to be
- How (not) to construct worlds with responsibility
- Standing to epistemically blame
- Conceptual engineering and operationalism in psychology
- What is the myth of the given?
- Gappy, glutty, glappy
- Explanation, justification, and egalitarianism
- Opacity thought through: on the intransparency of computer simulations
- Revelation and the intuition of dualism
- Infinite-population approval voting: A proposal
- From speech to voice: on the content of inner speech
- Are bio-ontologies metaphysical theories?
- Approaching probabilistic laws
- Correction to: Constitutive relevance & mutual manipulability revisited
- Natural kinds of mental disorder
- Models, structures, and the explanatory role of mathematics in empirical science
- When to adjust alpha during multiple testing: a consideration of disjunction, conjunction, and individual testing
- “Free rides” in Mathematics
- Reichenbach’s best alternative account to the problem of induction
- The meta-wisdom of crowds
- Making a difference in virtue epistemology
- On glasses half full or half empty: understanding framing effects in terms of default implicatures
- Humeanism in light of quantum gravity
- Wittgenstein, deflationism and moral entities
- A dynamical systems approach to causation
- A new perspective on the relationship between metacognition and social cognition: metacognitive concepts as socio-cognitive tools
- Illocution and accommodation in the functioning of presumptions
- Prosthetic embodiment
- Why can’t what is true be valuable?
- Metaphor, ignorance and the sentiment of (ir)rationality
- Easy Ontology, quantification, and realism
- Are there epistemic conditions necessary for demonstrative thought?
- Fundamental non-qualitative properties
- Evolutionary debunking arguments and the explanatory scope of natural selection
- An encoding approach to Ante Rem structuralism
- Super-Humeanism and free will
- Heritability, causal influence and locality
- Arational belief convergence
- Strengthening the exclusion argument
- A new objective definition of quantum entanglement as potential coding of intensive and effective relations
- Deontological decision theory and lesser-evil options
- A challenge to the new metaphysics: deRosset, Priority, and explanation
- Judgementalism about normative decision theory
- Correction to: In defense of pluralist theory
- From structure preserving representation to making worlds with symbols
- Credible Futures
- The strong arm of the law: a unified account of necessary and contingent laws of nature
- Building low level causation out of high level causation
- The time-lag argument and simultaneity
- Metasemantics and boydian synthetic moral naturalism
- Physicalism and the burden of parsimony
- From idealizations to social practices in science: the case of phylogenetic trees
- The epistemic benefits of generalisation in modelling I: Systems and applicability
- Can groups be genuine believers? The argument from interpretationism
- Quantum pointillism with relational identity
- Correction to: When nothing looks blue
- Salience and metaphysical explanation
- Introduction to special issue: Skepticism and Epistemic Angst
- Austrian economics without extreme apriorism: A critical reply
- The clinical significance of anomalous experience in the explanation of monothematic delusions
- Factive inferentialism and the puzzle of model-based explanation
- A psychological theory of reasoning as logical evidence: a Piagetian perspective
- Logic as a methodological discipline
- Knowledge and reasoning
- Phenomenal intentionality, inner awareness, and the given
- Experimental practices and objectivity in the social sciences: re-embedding construct validity in the internal–external validity distinction
- Correction to: Polycratic hierarchies and networks: what simulation-modeling at the LHC can teach us about the epistemology of simulation
- Truthlikeness for probabilistic laws
- Virtue theory of mathematical practices: an introduction
- Conceptualizing causal powers: activity, capacity, essence, necessitation
- Explaining the apocalypse: the end-Permian mass extinction and the dynamics of explanation in geohistory
- Uncertainty, equality, fraternity
- How can representationalism accommodate degrees of belief? A dispositional representationalist proposal
- Unity of the intellectual virtues
- Screening off generalized: Reichenbach’s legacy
- Against Mereological Nominalism: Reply to Effingham
- Epistemicism and response-dependence
- Moderate anti-exceptionalism and earthborn logic
- Resolving empirical controversies with mechanistic evidence
- Coordination in theory extension: how Reichenbach can help us understand endogenization in evolutionary biology
- Should a higher-order metaphysician believe in properties?
- Quantum metametaphysics
- The key to the knowledge norm of action is ambiguity
- The no-free-lunch theorems of supervised learning
- In search of an ontology for 4E theories: from new mechanism to causal powers realism
- Memory, the fork asymmetry, and the initial state
- Enculturation and the historical origins of number words and concepts
- Explaining how to perceive the new: causal-informational teleosemantics and productive response functions
- Inevitable ignorance as a standard for excusability: an epistemological analysis
- Are non-accidental regularities a cosmic coincidence? Revisiting a central threat to Humean laws
- Evidentialism doesn’t make an exception for belief
- Doubting Pritchard’s account of hinge propositions
- Correction to: Non-rational action in the face of disagreement: an argument against (strong) non-conformism
- Theoretical equivalence and duality
- In defence of Higher-Level Plural Logic: drawing conclusions from natural language
- Causal decision theory’s predetermination problem
- Ignorance, norms and instrumental pluralism: Hayekian institutional epistemology
- Humeans are out of this world
- Partial truth versus felicitous falsehoods
- A unified account of information, misinformation, and disinformation
- Correction to: The disvalue of knowledge
- Intellectual virtues and the epistemic value of truth
- Nominalism, contingency, and natural structure
- Don’t forget forgetting: the social epistemic importance of how we forget
- In what sense is understanding an intellectual virtue?
- Revaluing the behaviorist ghost in enactivism and embodied cognition
- How emotions are perceived
- The liberation of nature and knowledge: a case study on Hans Reichenbach’s naturalism
- Empathy with vicious perspectives? A puzzle about the moral limits of empathetic imagination
- Arithmetic, enumerative induction and size bias
- Invariance or equivalence: a tale of two principles
- Moral encroachment and the epistemic impermissibility of (some) microaggressions
- Typing testimony
- Strong knowledge, weak belief?
- What have we learned about the engram?
- Propositional and credal accuracy in an indeterministic world
- Imagination, expectation, and “thoughts entangled in metaphors”
- Defending understanding-assent links
- An epistemological problem for minimalist views about composition
- Should one trust experts?
- Reasoning and its limits
- Are knowledge ascriptions sensitive to social context?
- On the role of knowers and corresponding epistemic role oughts
- Dutch Book against Lewis
- Thinking about idealization, abstraction and scientific models: an introduction
- Artifacts and mind-dependence
- Reward tampering problems and solutions in reinforcement learning: a causal influence diagram perspective
- Correction to: Fighting About Frequency
- Evidential pluralism and evidence of mechanisms in the social sciences
- Fitting anxiety and prudent anxiety
- Causation and cognition: an epistemic approach
- The Maxim of Probabilism, with special regard to Reichenbach
- Reichenbach, Russell and scientific realism
- Bodies and minds, heaps and syllables
- Strategic justice, conventionalism, and bargaining theory
- Vacillating time: a metaphysics for time travel and Geachianism
- A kind route from grounding to fundamentality
- Dynamic epistemic logics for abstract argumentation
- Modeling the precautionary principle with lexical utilities
- Reichenbach: scientific realist and logical empricist?
- Philosophy and cognitive science on spatial and temporal experience
- Autism, epistemic injustice, and epistemic disablement: a relational account of epistemic agency
- Non-classical probabilities invariant under symmetries
- Why undermining evolutionary debunkers is not enough
- Constitutive relevance & mutual manipulability revisited
- Composition as identity, now with all the pluralities you could want
- Neighborhood semantics for logic of knowing how
- Extended cognition, assistive technology and education
- Mapping higher-level causal efficacy
- Virtues for agents in directed social networks
- Feyerabend’s rule and dark matter
- The “All Lives Matter” response: QUD-shifting as epistemic injustice
- The distinct existences argument revisited
- A regulative theory of basic intentional omissions
- Practical reasoning and degrees of outright belief
- Intentional mind-wandering as intentional omission: the surrealist method
- Emergence within social systems
- Anti-essentialism, modal relativity, and alternative material-origin counterfactuals
- Perspectives on de se immunity
- Scoring, truthlikeness, and value
- An analysis of Existential Graphs–part 2: Beta
- Causation and fact granularity
- Everything is learnable, once it is settled
- Anti-intellectualism, instructive representations, and the intentional action argument
- Accounting for groups: the dynamics of intragroup deliberation
- The epistemic value of deliberative democracy: how far can diversity take us?
- Observing a superposition
- Bradley Conditionals and Dynamic Choice
- Scientific conclusions need not be accurate, justified, or believed by their authors
- Correction to: First-person representations and responsible agency in AI
- Phenomenal roles: a dispositional account of bodily pain
- The affective and normative intentionality of skilled performance: a radical embodied approach
- Fighting about frequency: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science
- A new paradox and the reconciliation of Lorentz and Galilean transformations
- Barad, Bohr, and quantum mechanics
- The landscape and the multiverse: What’s the problem?
- Making imagination even more embodied: imagination, constraint and epistemic relevance
- No ground to bridge the gap
- Incompatibility, inconsistency, and logical analysis in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
- Pain and the field of affordances: an enactive approach to acute and chronic pain
- Correction to: Salience reasoning in coordination games
- Modelling ourselves: what the free energy principle reveals about our implicit notions of representation
- There is nothing to identity
- How beliefs are like colors
- A radical relationist solution to the problem of intentional inexistence
- Blame as performance
- Justification by acquaintance
- Epistemic utility theory’s difficult future
- Non-standard approaches to emergence: introduction to the special issue
- Practical concepts and productive reasoning
- Imagining the past reliably and unreliably: towards a virtue theory of memory
- Thinking beyond Imagining
- Conditionals and specific links—an experimental study
- System Reliabilism and basic beliefs: defeasible, undefeated and likely to be true
- Bodies in skilled performance: how dancers reflect through the living body
- Conjunctive paraconsistency
- Threats to epistemic agency in young people with unusual experiences and beliefs
- Probabilistic truthlikeness, content elements, and meta-inductive probability optimization
- There is no reason to replace the Razor with the Laser
- Correction to: Coalescent theories and divergent paraphrases: definites, non-extensional contexts, and familiarity
- Weighing the costs: the epistemic dilemma of no-platforming
- Perceptual presentation and the Myth of the Given
- Beliefs and biases
- Illocutionary pluralism
- Unification and mathematical explanation in science
- Untying the knot: imagination, perception and their neural substrates
- Counterpossibles, story prefix and trivialism
- How interventionist accounts of causation work in experimental practice and why there is no need to worry about supervenience
- The Functional Composition of Sense
- Context-sensitivity and the Preface Paradox for credence
- Predicates of personal taste: empirical data
- Pathways of influence: understanding the impact of philosophy of science in scientific domains
- Do we really need a knowledge-based decision theory?
- Emotion as High-level Perception
- First-person representations and responsible agency in AI
- Synthetic a priori judgments and Kant’s response to Hume on induction
- Non-Boolean classical relevant logics II: Classicality through truth-constants
- On the Coherence of Aristotelian Universals
- Newcomb’s problem isn’t a choice dilemma
- Wrongfulness rewarded?
- Comparing the structures of mathematical objects
- Modeling intentional agency: a neo-Gricean framework
- How to have a metalinguistic dispute
- Taking values seriously
- Fundamentality from grounding trees
- Confirmation, Coincidence, and Contradiction
- Where are the chances?
- A puzzle about laws and explanation
- The computational philosophy: simulation as a core philosophical method
- Slurs as ballistic speech
- Rational preference in transformative experiences
- Collective intellectual humility and arrogance
- Frege on intuition and objecthood in projective geometry
- Ethical Mooreanism
- Logic and science: science and logic
- Intensionality in mathematics: problems and prospects
- Yet again, quantum indeterminacy is not worldly indecision
- An epistemic modal norm of practical reasoning
- Do reasons drain away?
- Radical interpretation and decision theory
- Between pebbles and organisms: weaving autonomy into the Markov blanket
- Salience reasoning in coordination games
- The symmetry problem for testimonial conservatism
- I could do that in my sleep: skilled performance in dreams
- The independence of (in)coherence
- Is Husserl guilty of Sellars’ myth of the sensory given
- Mathematical anti-realism and explanatory structure
- Another way logic might be normative
- Explicating the concept of epistemic rationality
- Quick thinking: how Einstein did (and did not) refute the ether frame of reference
- Delusional evidence-responsiveness
- Mechanistic reasoning and the problem of masking
- The visibility of philosophy of science in the sciences, 1980–2018
- The skill of self-control
- Probing theoretical statements with thought experiments
- The presumption of assurance
- A critical analysis of Markovian monism
- Naturalizing the contributory
- Coalescent theories and divergent paraphrases: definites, non-extensional contexts, and familiarity
- The non-existence of institutional facts
- Correction to: Social epistemological conception of delusion
- Representational similarity analysis in neuroimaging: proxy vehicles and provisional representations
- Will I get a job? Contextualism, belief, and faith
- Why understanding-why is contrastive
- “A familiar logical triplet”: on Peirce’s grammar of representation and its relation to scientific inquiry
- Skill and strategic control
- On the possibility of non-eternalism without absolute simultaneity
- Lawful Humean explanations are not circular
- Knowledge is closed under analytic content
- Knowledge, behaviour, and policy: questioning the epistemic presuppositions of applying behavioural science in public policymaking
- Statistical resentment, or: what’s wrong with acting, blaming, and believing on the basis of statistics alone
- Epistemic and poietic intentional processes
- On the plains and prairies of Minnesota: The role of mathematical statistics in biological explanation
- Imaginative immersion, regulation, and doxastic mediation
- Bootstrapping of integer concepts: the stronger deviant-interpretation challenge (and how to solve it)
- Hedging and the ignorance norm on inquiry
- What is deflationism about truth?
- T ruth : a concept unlike any other
- Truth as a relational property
- The objectivity of truth, a core truism?
- Inexact knowledge and dynamic introspection
- Reviving frequentism
- Can happiness measures be calibrated?
- Deep gunk and deep junk
- Evaluative experiences: the epistemological significance of moral phenomenology
- Embodied skillful performance: where the action is
- Phenomenology and the unity of consciousness
- The knowledge norm of apt practical reasoning
- Objectification and vision: how images shape our early visual processes
- Fodor’s guide to the Humean mind
- Perceptual variation and ignorance
- Epistemic evaluation and the need for ‘impure’ epistemic standards
- How autism shows that symptoms, like psychiatric diagnoses, are ‘constructed’: methodological and epistemic consequences
- (A new paradigm for) the problem of the many
- A new anti-expertise dilemma
- Enactive planning in rock climbing: recalibration, visualization and nested affordances
- Enabling mathematical cultures: introduction
- Structural representations do not meet the job description challenge
- Ought-contextualism and reasoning
- Resolutions provide reasons or: “how the Cookie Monster quit cookies”
- An expressivist solution to Moorean paradoxes
- Does general relativity highlight necessary connections in nature?
- A novel approach to equality
- Correction to: Thinking embodiment with genetics: epigenetics and postgenomic biology in embodied cognition and enactivism
- Trope analysis and folk intuitions
- On the imprecision of full conditional probabilities
- Contingent grounding
- Propositions are not representational
- Assertions and future tense semantics
- Structural realism and generative linguistics
- The concreteness of objects: an argument against mereological bundle theory
- Is color experience linguistically penetrable?
- Introduction: Kant’s philosophical method and contemporary perspectives in epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science and ethics
- How signaling conventions are established
- Explaining the differential application of non-symmetric relations
- Carnapian frameworks
- Foundations of applied mathematics I
- Correction to: Practices of remembering a movement in the dance studio: evidence for (a radicalized version of) the REC framework in the domain of memory
- The indeterminate present and the open future
- Indicative and counterfactual conditionals: a causal-modeling semantics
- Dogramaci’s deflationism about rationality
- The psychological aspects of paraconsistency
- Pathological prediction: a top-down cause of organic disease
- Beliefs, make-beliefs, and making believe that beliefs are not make-beliefs
- Is absence of evidence of pain ever evidence of absence?
- Theoretical virtues and theorizing in physics: against the instrumentalist view of simplicity
- A challenge to the second law of thermodynamics from cognitive science and vice versa
- Weighing in on decisions in the brain: neural representations of pre-awareness practical intention
- Challenging the identity theory of properties
- On the epistemic rationality and significance of self-fulfilling beliefs
- Against epistemic absolutism
- Individuating the senses of ‘smell’: orthonasal versus retronasal olfaction
- Grounding ontic structuralism
- Medicine as science. Systematicity and demarcation
- Gendering animals
- Why robots can’t haka: skilled performance and embodied knowledge in the Māori haka
- Can informational thermal physics explain the approach to equilibrium?
- Why subject naturalists need pragmatic genealogy
- Special issue on radical views on cognition: introduction
- Can hinge epistemology close the door on epistemic relativism?
- Prototypes, poles, and tessellations: towards a topological theory of conceptual spaces
- Prospecting performance: rehearsal and the nature of imagination
- “Ought” and intensionality
- Mental imagery and the illusion of conscious will
- Ontology, neural networks, and the social sciences
- First among equals: co-hyperintensionality for structured propositions
- The correctness and relevance of the modal ontological argument
- Realism, reliability, and epistemic possibility: on modally interpreting the Benacerraf–Field challenge
- Probabilistic truth approximation and fixed points
- Lying, speech acts, and commitment
- Eight journals over eight decades: a computational topic-modeling approach to contemporary philosophy of science
- The rotten core of presentism
- Finding a context for objectivity
- Justifying method choice: a heuristic-instrumentalist account of scientific methodology
- Troubles with the Canberra Plan
- Possessing reasons: why the awareness-first approach is better than the knowledge-first approach
- Correction to: How to count biological minds: symbiosis, the free energy principle, and reciprocal multiscale integration
- Safety in Sosa
- Saving safety from counterexamples
- Dreams, agency, and judgement
- The joint aggregation of beliefs and degrees of belief
- Sosa on epistemic value: a Kantian obstacle
- Group virtue epistemology
- Sosa’s theory of knowledge
- Functional belief and judgmental belief
- Action-based versus cognitivist perspectives on socio-cognitive development: culture, language and social experience within the two paradigms
- Higher-order defeat and intellectual responsibility
- Russellians can solve the problem of empty names with nonsingular propositions
- Folk teleology drives persistence judgments
- Performance normativity and here-and-now doxastic agency
- Correction to: Deduction and definability in infinite statistical systems
- Against global method safety
- Can performance epistemology explain higher epistemic value?
- Sosa on knowledge, judgment and guessing
- Correction to: Safety in Sosa
- The unbearable circularity of easy ontology
- Decision-Based Epistemology: sketching a systematic framework of Feyerabend’s metaphilosophy
- Radicalizing numerical cognition
- Do fictions explain?
- Logical abductivism and non-deductive inference
- Four ways of (mis-)conceiving embodiment in tool use
- Your word against mine: the power of uptake
- Hybrid collective intentionality
- Correction to: Disagreement lost
- Bayesianism and self-doubt
- Dispositionality, categoricity, and where to find them
- Perceptualism and the epistemology of normative reasons
- Two dogmas of dynamicism
- Practices of remembering a movement in the dance studio: evidence for (a radicalized version of) the REC framework in the domain of memory
- Bias in science: natural and social
- The place of non-epistemic matters in epistemology: norms and regulation in various communities
- The brittleness of expertise and why it matters
- Explanation by status as empty-base explanation
- Correction to: Fundamental mentality in a physical world
- A substructural analysis of embedded conditionals
- Notes on a complicated relationship: scientific pluralism, epistemic relativism, and stances
- How (not) to judge a theory of causation
- Mathematizing as a virtuous practice: different narratives and their consequences for mathematics education and society
- Probability functions, belief functions and infinite regresses
- Mathematics, ethics and purism: an application of MacIntyre’s virtue theory
- Alethic undecidability and alethic indeterminacy
- Political imagination and its limits
- Model-theoretic semantics as model-based science
- Imagining fictional contradictions
- Information-devoid routes for scale-free neurodynamics
- The conceptual nature of imaginative content
- Deep disagreement and hinge epistemology
- Evidentially embedded epistemic entitlement
- Minkish dispositions
- A physical interpretation of Lewis’ discrepancy between personal and external time in time travels
- JuDAS: a theory of rational belief revision
- (Once again) Lewis on the analysis of modality
- Mereological monism and Humean supervenience
- Causation, absences, and the Prince of Wales
- Inquiry and the doxastic attitudes
- Genuine Modal Realism, the Humean thesis and advanced modalizing
- Bringing back intrinsics to enduring things
- It’s a kind of magic: Lewis, magic and properties
- An elegant universe
- Belief, credence, and evidence
- Deducing false propositions from true ideas: Nieuwentijt on mathematical reasoning
- Correction to: On Lewis against magic: a study of method in metaphysics
- Vividness as a natural kind
- Epistemic repugnance four ways
- Causal necessitarianism and the monotonicity objection
- The essential indexical research program
- Thinking about many
- Many problems of the many
- Explanation and modality: on why the Swampman is still worrisome to teleosemanticists
- New powers for Dispositionalism
- Invariances in transformational emergence
- On Kant and Husserl on transcendental logic
- Neuroscience and teleosemantics
- Humeanism and the epistemology of testimony
- Confirmation bias without rhyme or reason
- Rejecting epiphobia
- Fundamental mentality in a physical world
- What is neurophilosophy: Do we need a non-reductive form?
- When nothing looks blue
- Mind the gap: a more evolutionarily plausible role for technical reasoning in cumulative technological culture
- The epistemology of Ernest Sosa: an introduction
- On Ramsey’s reason to amend Principia Mathematica ’s logicism and Wittgenstein’s reaction
- Visual attention in pictorial perception
- Remembering events and representing time
- Moral improvement through mathematics: Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole’s Nouveaux éléments de géométrie
- The epistemic demands of friendship: friendship as inherently knowledge-involving
- Structure of perceptual objects: introduction to the Synthese topical collection
- Emotions, evidence, and safety
- Does what we dream feel present? Two varieties of presence and implications for measuring presence in VR
- Explaining human altruism
- A computational model of the cultural co-evolution of language and mindreading
- Timelessness and freedom
- Is risk aversion irrational? Examining the “fallacy” of large numbers
- On quantum entanglement, counterfactuals, causality and dispositions
- Lessons from realistic physics for the metaphysics of quantum theory
- Affect, motivational states, and evaluative concepts
- Representation and the active consumer
- A diachronic perspective on peer disagreement in veritistic social epistemology
- Mechanisms for constrained stochasticity
- Why compositional nihilism dissolves puzzles
- Two notions of holism
- What we owe each other, epistemologically speaking: ethico-political values in social epistemology
- Constitutive principles versus comprehensibility conditions in post-Kantian physics
- La Bohume
- Physical models and embodied cognition
- Finding the world in the wave function: some strategies for solving the macro-object problem
- The explanatory role of consistency requirements
- Quantum holism: nonseparability as common ground
- An argument against global no miracles arguments
- Quantum metaphysical indeterminacy and worldly incompleteness
- Correction to: “Till at last there remain nothing”
- Objectivity and orgasm: the perils of imprecise definitions
- My objectivity is better than yours: contextualising debates about gender inequality
- A case for integrative epistemology
- Reference for neo-Fregeans
- A Humean modal epistemology
- A deference model of epistemic authority
- Humanistic interpretation and machine learning
- Other minds are neither seen nor inferred
- A twofold tale of one mind: revisiting REC’s multi-storey story
- An argument for egalitarian confirmation bias and against political diversity in academia
- Everybody else is thinking it, so why can’t we?
- Particles, fields, and the measurement of electron spin
- Objective consequentialism and the plurality of chances
- Trusting in order to inspire trustworthiness
- Epistemic authority: preemption through source sensitive defeat
- Stranger in a strange land: an optimal-environments account of evolutionary mismatch
- A challenge for Super-Humeanism: the problem of immanent comparisons
- Why ‘scaffolding’ is the wrong metaphor: the cognitive usefulness of mathematical representations
- Action models in inquisitive logic
- Phenomenal dispositions
- Meaning relativism and subjective idealism
- A consciousness-based quantum objective collapse model
- Numerals and neural reuse
- The adverbial theory of numbers: some clarifications
- Epistemic injustice in mathematics
- How to stay safe while extending the mind
- Absence perception and the philosophy of zero
- Material representations in mathematical research practice
- Quantity evaluations in Yudja: judgements, language and cultural practice
- How numerals support new cognitive capacities
- What’s new: innovation and enculturation of arithmetical practices
- The cerebral, extra-cerebral bodily, and socio-cultural dimensions of enculturated arithmetical cognition
- Correction to: Numerals and neural reuse
- Epistemology of testimony and values in science
- The Legacy of D. K. Lewis: Introduction to the Special Issue
- A grounding physicalist solution to the causal exclusion problem
- Correction to: A response to the problem of wild coincidences
- Theory choice, non-epistemic values, and machine learning
- The RT formula and its discontents: spacetime and entanglement
- Evolutionary stability of ambiguity in context signaling games
- If consciousness causes collapse, the zombie argument fails
- Selfless assertions and the Knowledge Norm
- The strength of de Finetti’s coherence theorem
- How can necessary facts call for explanation?
- Groups as pluralities
- Beyond linear conciliation
- Correction to: Schmidentity and informativity
- Content internalism and conceptual engineering
- The non-maximality-solution to counterfactual scepticism
- The evidence approach to paraconsistency versus the paraconsistent approach to evidence
- Verbal slips and the intentionality of skills
- Corporeal composition
- Does rationality demand higher-order certainty?