- Measurement and desert: Why grades cannot be deserved
- Ways of being have no way of being useful
- The inescapability of moral luck
- On performatives being statements too
- A defense of the supervenience requirement on physicalism
- An equivocation in the simple argument for downward causation
- The importance of being Ernie
- Normative generics: Against semantic polysemy
- Reviving the performative hypothesis?
- Seeing and attending wholes and parts: A reply to Prettyman
- Is English consequence compact?
- Against Moral Contingentism
- The consequentialist problem with prepunishment
- Causal emergence from effective information: Neither causal nor emergent?
- When is epistemic dependence disvaluable?
- Plenitude and necessarily unmanifested dispositions
- Separating the evaluative from the descriptive: An empirical study of thick concepts
- Need knowing and acting be SSS‐Safe?
- Disjunctive luminosity
- Sounds as properties
- Myers’ paradox
- Surprise, surprise: KK is innocent
- Nested conditionals and genericity in the de Finetti semantics
- Collective culpable ignorance
- Group nouns and pseudo‐singularity
- A strictly stronger relative must
- A puzzle for evaluation theories of desire
- Concomitant ignorance excuses from moral responsibility
- Supersubstantivalism and the argument from harmony
- Expressing consistency consistently
- Yablo’s paradox and forcing
- Comparing apples to oranges; Is it better to be human than otherwise?
- Beyond good and bad: Reflexive imperativism, not evaluativism, explains valence
- Deixis, demonstratives, and definite descriptions
- Does empirical evidence support perceptual mindreading?
- Redundancy masking and the identity crowding debate
- Desolation sound: Social practices of natural beauty
- An exclusion problem for epiphenomenalist dualism
- Publishing without (some) belief
- Putting the stars in the their places
- Inverse enkrasia and the real self
- Scorekeeping trolls
- Counterfactuals and double prevention: Trouble for the Causal Independence thesis
- Free will as a higher‐level phenomenon?
- Changes to the Board of Editors
- Perceiving indeterminately
- Sincerely, Anonymous
- Whitehead’s principle
- An alternative norm of intention consistency
- How to understand the knowledge norm of assertion: Reply to Schlöder
- Representational indispensability and ontological commitment
- The circularity reading of Frege’s indefinability argument
- Faith, fictionalism and bullshit
- Rejecting the “implicit consensus”: A reply to Jenkins
- A short argument from modal rationalism to fundamental scrutability
- In the logic of certainty, ⊃ is stronger than ⇒
- Ruling out solutions to Prior’s dilemma for Hume’s law
- How to build a thought
- The knowledge norm of belief
- What it takes to be hunky
- The argument from sideways music
- Moral understanding and moral illusions
- The accident of logical constants
- The Structure of Essentialist Explanations of Necessity
- Not a Knot
- Two Tales of Epistemic Models
- Quidditism and Contingent Laws
- Attention and Consciousness: A Comment on Watzl’s Structuring the Mind
- Epistemic Subjectivism in the Theory of Character
- Impredicativity and Paradox
- Removing the Oddity in First Degree Entailment
- Habitual Weakness
- How to Make a Gunky Spritz
- Relativizing Identity
- Immigration and Rights: On Wellman’s “Stark” Conclusion
- Individuating Logics: A Category‐Theoretic Approach
- Knowledge from Falsehood: An Experimental Study
- Why Humean Causation Is Extrinsic
- Establishing Backward Causation on Empirical Grounds: An Interventionist Approach
- The Problem with Person‐Rearing Accounts of Moral Status
- Defending Nonreductionism About Understanding
- Constitutive and Consequentialist Essence
- The No Act Objection: Act‐Consequentialism and Coordination Games
- A Simple Proof of Grounding Internality
- Hedonism, Desirability and the Incompleteness Objection
- Knowing Without Having The Competence to Do So
- Demystifying the Mystery Room
- A Paradox Involving Representational States and Activities
- What’s Wrong with Risk?
- The Face‐Value Theory, Know‐that, Know‐wh and Know‐how
- Trespassers and Existential Import
- Are Contradictions Believable?
- Should We Use Racial and Gender Generics?
- Modal Combinatorialism is Consistent with S5
- What the Consequence Argument Is an Argument For
- One‐Person Moral Twin Earth Cases
- Conjunction Conditionalization and Irrelevant Semifactuals
- Primitive Recursion and Isaacson’s Thesis
- Metaphysical Vagueness Without Vague Objects
- Solving a Mereological Puzzle
- The Hierarchy of Fregean Senses
- Subjective Unpossessed Reasons
- Agency, Experience, and Future Bias
- Why Imagining Requires Content: A Reply to a Reply to an Objection to Radical Enactive Cognition
- The Feeling of Sincerity: Inner Speech and the Phenomenology of Assertion
- Paradoxes and Restricted Quantification: A Non‐Hierarchical Approach
- Avoid Certain Frustration—Or Maybe Not?
- Fine’s Trilemma and the Reality of Tensed Facts
- Do Judgements about Risk Track Modal Ordering?
- Infinitary Contraction‐Free Revenge
- The Colonized and the Wrong of Colonialism
- Tuples all the Way Down?
- Multilocation and Parsimony
- Currying Omnipotence: A Reply to Beall and Cotnoir
- A Dilemma for ‘Selection‐for‐Action’
- Out of Nothing
- In Defense of the (Moderate) Disunity of Grounding
- A Simple Escape from Moral Twin Earth
- Hardcore Actualism and Possible Non‐Existence
- On a Purported Proof that the Mind Is Not a Machine
- Proving that the Mind Is Not a Machine?
- Seeing the Forest and the Trees: A Response to the Identity Crowding Debate
- Intertranslatability, Theoretical Equivalence, and Perversion
- The Cut-Free Approach and the Admissibility-Curry
- The Logic of the Knowledge Norm of Assertion
- Contrastivism and Negative Reason Existentials
- Emerging (In)Determinacy
- The Role of Judgment in Doxastic Agency
- Against Existential Grounding
- What’s in a Name: A Response to Ramsey
- Mereological Nihilism: Keeping It Simple
- Pejorative Discourse Is Not Fictional
- Commitment in Cases of Trust and Distrust
- What If All Value Were Conferred?
- Atomism and Composition
- How Verbal Reports of Desire May Mislead
- Unanimous Consensus Against AGM?
- Behavioral Circumscription and the Folk Psychology of Belief: A Study in Ethno-Mentalizing
- Against Quantum Indeterminacy
- The Enactive Automaton as a Computing Mechanism
- Motor Intentions and Non-Observational Knowledge of Action: A Standard Story
- No Excuses: Against the Knowledge Norm of Belief
- Deflating the Determination Argument
- Grounding and the Objection from Accidental Generalizations
- Ambivalence for Cognitivists: A Lesson from Chrysippus?
- The Numbers Count
- ‘And’ and ‘But’: A Note
- Acting on Essentially Comparative Goodness
- A Simple Dialogue
- The Perfect Bikini Body: Can We All Really Have It? Loving Gaze as an Antioppressive Beauty Ideal
- Truth and Existence
- What Is the Specificity of Classical Mathematics?
- Biscuit Conditionals and Prohibited ‘Then’
- Time Travel, Ability, and Arguments by Analogy
- A Normative Argument Against Explosion
- A Paradox of Matter and Form
- Homunculi Are People Too! Lewis’s Definition of Personhood Debugged
- Classicality Lost: K3 and LP after the Fall
- Attitude Reports, Cognitive Products, and Attitudinal Objects: A Response to G. Felappi On Product-Based Accounts of Attitudes
- Explanatory Circles, Induction, and Recursive Structures
- Grounding is Not Superinternal
- Seeing and Windows of Integration
- Assertions Only?
- Is the grain of vision finer than the grain of attention? Response to Block