- Confusion and explanation
- Semantic minimalism and the continuous nature of polysemy
- The pragmatic view on dual character concepts and expressions
- Is the wandering mind a planning mind?
- That’s not what you said! Semantic constraints on literal speech
- Fear beyond danger
- Alethic modality is deontic
- Shared semantics: Exploring the interface between human and chimpanzee gestural communication
- The definition of assertion: Commitment and truth
- Generic cognition: A neglected source of context sensitivity
- Replies to E. J. Green, Zoe Jenkin, and Jack Lyons
- Hill on perceptual relativity and perceptual error
- Hill on perceptual contents, Thouless properties, and representational pluralism
- Perception’s objects, border, and epistemic role: Comments on Christopher Hill’s Perceptual experience
- The acquisition of generics
- “All animals are conscious”: Shifting the null hypothesis in consciousness science
- Pictorial syntax
- Hunger, homeostasis, and desire
- Slurs in quarantine
- How words matter: A psycholinguistic argument for meaning revision
- Core knowledge, language learning, and the origins of morality and pedagogy: Reply to reviews of What babies know
- Core morality? Or merely core agents and social beings? A response to Spelke’s what babies know
- Emotions in time: The temporal unity of emotion phenomenology
- Kinds in the cognitive sciences: Reply to Weiskopf, Sullivan, and Robins
- Computation as the boundary of the cognitive
- Kinding memory: Commentary on Muhammad Ali Khalidi’s Cognitive ontology
- Who’s in and who’s out of the cognitive kinding game? Comments on Muhammad Ali Khalidi’s Cognitive ontology: Taxonomic practices in the mind‐brain sciences
- Names are not (always) predicates
- The missing link between core knowledge and language: Review of Elizabeth Spelke’s What babies know, volume 1 (2022)
- Pluralism about introspection
- Design and syntax in pictures
- Underdeterminacy without ostension: A blind spot in the prevailing models of communication
- Interpersonal connection
- Polysemy does not exist, at least not in the relevant sense
- Does the mind care about whether a word is abstract or concrete? Why concreteness is probably not a natural kind
- Conceptual engineering, predictive processing, and a new implementation problem
- Red herrings in experimental semantics: Cultural variation and epistemic perspectives. A critical notice of Jincai Li’s The referential mechanism of proper names
- From the epistemic perspectives in experimental semantics to the ambiguity of proper names: Is the inference warranted? A critical notice of Jincai Li’s The referential mechanism of proper names
- Cross‐cultural variation and perspectivalism: Alignment of two red herrings?
- Creating a large language model of a philosopher
- Motivating empathy
- Why the performance of habit requires attention
- The rejection game
- Mental simulation and language comprehension: The case of copredication
- Reinforcement learning and artificial agency
- Losing the light at the end of the tunnel: Depression, future thinking, and hope
- Teleosemantics and the frogs
- Vividness and content
- On the roles of false belief and recalcitrant fear in anorexia nervosa
- Distributed autobiographical memories, distributed self‐narratives
- Is meaning cognized?
- Should credence be sensitive to practical factors? A cost–benefit analysis
- In defense of epicycles: Embracing complexity in psychological explanations
- How to think about higher‐level perceptual contents
- Assertion, denial, and the evolution of Boolean operators
- How language shapes our minds: On the relationship between generics, stereotypes and social norms
- Backtracking through interventions: An exogenous intervention model for counterfactual semantics
- Notions of arbitrariness
- The rational role of the perceptual sense of reality
- The empirical status of semantic perceptualism
- A vessel without a pilot: Bodily and affective experience in the Cotard delusion of inexistence
- A metacognitive account of phenomenal force
- How we talk about smells
- Self‐signs and intensional contexts
- Language and children’s understanding of knowledge: Epistemic talk in early childhood
- The social epistemology of introspection
- In search of the beat
- Further thoughts on hierarchy and inequality
- How we got stuck: The origins of hierarchy and inequality
- Pragmatic enrichment, issues and domain goals
- Commitments and the sense of joint agency
- Aphantasia: In search of a theory
- Meaning and responsibility
- A Bayesian interpretation of cross‐linguistic ambiguity tests
- “Philosophers care about the truth”: Descriptive/normative generics
- Is pain modular?
- Are machines radically contextualist?
- The rationality of eating disorders
- Perceiving agency
- Stone tools, predictive processing and the evolution of language
- Focus on slurs
- Decomposing relevance in conditionals
- “Must” implies “can”
- Content and phenomenology in The unity of perception
- Susanna Schellenberg on perception
- Capacitism and the transparency of evidence
- The generality and particularity of perception
- The innocuousness of folieism and the need of intentionality where transduction fails: Replies to Adger and to Stainton & Viger
- What are linguistic representations?
- Troubles with Rey’s linguistic Eliminativism
- Consciousness as a natural kind and the methodological puzzle of consciousness
- The Semantics of Fiction
- On Mates’s puzzle
- Inter‐temporal rationality without temporal representation
- Metaphysics of the Bayesian mind
- Misperceiving properties
- Pretend play: More imitative than imaginative
- Metalinguistic effects
- Spatial representations in sensory modalities
- Rules of use
- Public language, private language, and subsymbolic theories of mind
- Tracking representationalism and olfaction
- How (not) to underestimate unconscious perception
- What is diffuse attention?
- The perspective‐sensitivity of presuppositions
- Anorexia nervosa: Illusion in the sense of agency
- Don’t trust Fodor’s guide in Monte Carlo: Learning concepts by hypothesis testing without circularity
- Beyond adverbialism: A new non‐relational theory of perceptual experience
- Teleology beyond explanation
- Imitation and culture: What gives?
- The signaling function of sharing fake stories
- Evaluative theories in psychology and philosophy of emotion
- Accounting for the preference for literal meanings in autism spectrum conditions
- How thirst compels: An aggregation model of sensory motivation
- Articulating a framework for unarticulated constituents
- “I didn’t mean to suggest anything like that!”: Deniability and context reconstruction
- The polysemy view of pain
- The notorious neurophilosophy of pain: A family resemblance approach to idiosyncrasy and generalizability
- Moving beyond content‐specific computation in artificial neural networks
- Moral rationalism on the brain
- Explaining early generics: A linguistic model
- Are sensory experiences contingently representational? A critical notice of David Papineau’s The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience
- A (contingent) content–parthood analysis of indirect speech reports
- Reply to Laura Gow’s critical notice of The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience
- Should the teleosemanticist be afraid of semantic indeterminacy?
- Experiences of linguistic understanding as epistemic feelings
- Signalling, commitment, and strategic absurdities
- Missing persons: Young children’s talk about absent members of their social network
- Essentializing inferences
- First saying, then believing: The pragmatic roots of folk psychology
- What is it like to be colour‐blind? A case study in experimental philosophy of experience
- Interpersonal trust in children’s testimonial learning
- Disgust and the logic of contamination: Biology, culture, and the evolution of norm (over)compliance
- The limits of moral dumbfounding
- Underwhelming force: Evaluating the neuropsychological evidence for higher‐order theories of consciousness
- Assertoric content, responsibility, and metasemantics
- Recognition and the perception–cognition divide
- Spatial content of painful sensations
- Deflationary realism: Representation and idealisation in cognitive science
- Entitativity and implicit measures of social cognition
- Determiners are phrases
- Speaker’s reference, semantic reference, sneaky reference
- Objectivity, perceptual constancy, and teleology in young children
- A new empirical challenge for local theories of consciousness
- Experiments on causal exclusion
- Going on as one ought: Kripke and Wittgenstein on the normativity of meaning
- Solipsistic sentience
- The perceived unity of time
- Semantic polysemy and psycholinguistics
- Insightful artificial intelligence
- Non‐human consciousness and the specificity problem: A modest theoretical proposal
- Integration, lateralization, and animal experience
- Weak neo‐Whorfianism and the philosophy of time
- Normative inferentialism on linguistic understanding
- Perceiving commitments: When we both know that you are counting on me
- Do we see facts?
- Context as knowledge
- Normative folk psychology and decision theory
- Polysemy: Pragmatics and sense conventions
- Cumulative culture and complex cultural traditions
- Experiential holism in time
- Representing shape in sight and touch
- Self‐consciousness in autism: A third‐person perspective on the self
- Extended mind and artifactual autobiographical memory
- Spatial experience and olfaction: A role for naïve topology
- The theory theory of metalinguistic disputes
- How can perceptual experiences explain uncertainty?
- Polysemy and thought: Toward a generative theory of concepts
- Extended active inference: Constructing predictive cognition beyond skulls
- That‐clauses: Some bad news for relationalism about the attitudes
- Can the mind wander intentionally?
- Enhancing thoughts: Culture, technology, and the evolution of human cognitive uniqueness
- What do plants and bacteria want? Commentary on Carrie Figdor’s Pieces of mind
- Why literalism is still the best game in town: Replies to Drayson, Machery, and Schwitzgebel
- Why I am not a literalist
- Against the mind package view of minds: Comments on Carrie Figdor’s Pieces of mind
- Rainbow’s end: The structure, character, and content of conscious experience
- Against neuroclassicism: On the perils of armchair neuroscience
- A tribal mind: Beliefs that signal group identity or commitment
- Semantics without semantic content
- Coming from a world without objects
- Are psychopaths moral‐psychologically impaired? Reassessing emotion‐theoretical explanations
- Conditionals: Truth, safety, and success
- Weather predicates, binding, and radical contextualism
- Beyond the icon: Core cognition and the bounds of perception
- Discordant knowing: A puzzle about insight in obsessive–compulsive disorder
- Why should syntactic islands exist?
- Implicit bias, stereotype threat, and seeing‐as: An alternative to “alief” as an explanation of reason‐recalcitrant behaviours
- Language without information exchange
- Pain, placebo, and cognitive penetration
- How to ascribe beliefs to animals
- Much at stake in knowledge
- Communication and representation understood as sender–receiver coordination
- Content is pragmatic: Comments on Nicholas Shea’s Representation in cognitive science
- Probabilistic representations in perception: Are there any, and what would they be?
- Where meanings arise and how: Building on Shannon’s foundations
- Representation in Cognitive Science: Replies
- Hypotheses that attribute false beliefs: A two‐part epistemology (Darwin + Akaike)
- Visual indeterminacy and the puzzle of the speckled hen
- The explanatory project of Gricean pragmatics
- (Implicit) Knowledge, reasons, and semantic understanding
- A pluralistic theory of wordhood
- Is the phenomenological overflow argument really supported by subjective reports?
- Socially adaptive belief
- Truth is dead; long live the truth. Commentary on Conjoining Meanings by Paul Pietroski
- Responses to comments on Conjoining meanings
- Whither extensions?
- Conjoining meanings without losing our heads
- Pragmatics and epistemic vigilance: A developmental perspective
- Beyond black dots and nutritious things: A solution to the indeterminacy problem
- Is boredom one or many? A functional solution to the problem of heterogeneity
- Feeling the right way: Normative influences on people’s use of emotion concepts
- Warrant from transsaccadic vision
- New directions in predictive processing
- Reports from Twin Earth: Both deep structure and appearance determine the reference of natural kind terms
- Towards a sensorimotor approach to flavour and smell
- No context, no content, no problem
- Intentional cooperation and acting as part of a single body
- On perceptual expertise
- Factive theory of mind
- Acquiring mathematical concepts: The viability of hypothesis testing
- A cognitive explanation of the perceived normativity of cultural conventions
- Communication and indifference
- Language and embodiment—Or the cognitive benefits of abstract representations
- Extended cognition, the new mechanists’ mutual manipulability criterion, and the challenge of trivial extendedness
- Learning to see
- Not being there: An analysis of expertise‐induced amnesia
- The impure phenomenology of episodic memory
- Getting to know you: Accuracy and error in judgments of character
- Mind–Language = ? The significance of non‐verbal autism
- Minority reports: Consciousness and the prefrontal cortex
- Why don’t we trust moral testimony?
- Obsessive–compulsive akrasia
- The evolution of cultural gadgets
- Did social cognition evolve by cultural group selection?
- Cognitive instincts versus cognitive gadgets: A fallacy
- Testing cognitive gadgets
- Reference and the ambiguity of truth‐value judgments
- Lingering stereotypes: Salience bias in philosophical argument
- Phenomenal contrast arguments: What they achieve
- Attention and encapsulation
- What are natural concepts? A design perspective
- Is the Capgras delusion an endorsement of experience?
- Does modularity undermine the pro‐emotion consensus?
- When and why people think beliefs are “debunked” by scientific explanations of their origins
- Understanding self‐ascription
- Slurs and register: A case study in meaning pluralism
- Concept‐metacognition
- How to do things with modals
- Water is and is not H2O
- Smell’s puzzling discrepancy: Gifted discrimination, yet pitiful identification
- Rational learners and metaethics: Universalism, relativism, and evidence from consensus
- From things to thinking: Cognitive archaeology
- Testing for the phenomenal: Intuition, metacognition, and philosophical methodology
- The role of experience in demonstrative thought
- Is the folk concept of pain polyeidic?
- The essence of essentialism
- Structural representation and the two problems of content
- Biased by our imaginings
- Assertion: The context shiftiness dilemma
- Triggering domain restriction
- Impoverished or rich consciousness outside attentional focus: Recent data tip the balance for Overflow
- Is tuba masculine or feminine? The timing of grammatical gender
- Memory is a modeling system
- Shared modes of presentation
- Modeling practical thinking
- Gorillas in the missed (but not the unseen): Reevaluating the evidence for attention being necessary for consciousness
- Are false implicatures lies? An empirical investigation
- Pronominal anaphora, coreference, and closed quotation marks
- Is attending a mental process?
- Chess and the conscious mind: Why Dreyfus and McDowell got it wrong
- The enigma is not entirely dispelled: A review of Mercier and Sperber’s The Enigma of Reason
- Why reason? Hugo Mercier’s and Dan Sperber’s The Enigma of Reason: A New Theory of Human Understanding
- The enduring enigma of reason
- Why a modular approach to reason?
- Cognitive phenomenology and metacognitive feelings
- The evolution and development of visual perspective taking
- Remembering Jerry Fodor and his work
- What is the cognitive basis of the side‐effect effect? An experimental test of competing theories
- Underdetermination, domain restriction, and theory choice
- De Pulchritudine non est Disputandum? A cross‐cultural investigation of the alleged intersubjective validity of aesthetic judgment
- Troubles with Bayesianism: An introduction to the psychological immune system
- Reconstructing memories, deconstructing the self
- Flesh matters: The body in cognition
- Third‐person knowledge ascriptions: A crucial experiment for contextualism
- Implicit bias, ideological bias, and epistemic risks in philosophy
- Infer with care: A critique of the argument from animals
- Normativity in joint action
- Children’s attitude problems: Bootstrapping verb meaning from syntax and pragmatics
- The meaning of “I” in “I”‐thought
- From punishment to universalism
- Do as I say and as I do: Imitation, pedagogy, and cumulative culture
- The functions of imitative behaviour in humans
- Two ways of relating to (and acting for) reasons
- Bálint’s syndrome, object seeing, and spatial perception
- Subjectivity in gradable adjectives: The case of tall and heavy
- Do non‐verbal number systems shape grammar? Numerical cognition and Number morphology compared
- Imitation from a joint action perspective
- Singular thoughts and de re attitude reports
- Emotion, deliberation, and the skill model of virtuous agency
- Skepticism and the acquisition of “knowledge”
- Convention and common ground
- The generality problem for intellectualism
- The epistemic innocence of clinical memory distortions
- Episodic memory and theory of mind: A connection reconsidered
- Indeterministic intuitions and the Spinozan strategy
- Knowing why
- Obsessive–compulsive disorder as a disorder of attention
- Crowding, attention and consciousness: In support of the inference hypothesis
- Genericity sans Gen
- A new defence of doxasticism about delusions: The cognitive phenomenological defence
- The psychological representation of modality
- Basic questions
- Conceptual centrality and implicit bias
- A defense of holistic representationalism
- A cognitive account of agentive awareness
- On externalization and cognitive continuity in language evolution
- The emergence of language
- Perceptual expansion under cognitive guidance: Lessons from language processing
- Making sense of language in the light of evolution
- Factive and nonfactive mental state attribution
- Logical Form and the Vernacular Revisited
- Dendrophobia in Bonobo Comprehension of Spoken English
- A Gricean Theory of Malaprops
- The Perception-Action Model: Counting Computational Mechanisms
- Attention and Mental Primer
- On Proprioception in Action: Multimodality versus Deafferentation
- What is the Role of Experience in Children’s Success in the False Belief Test: Maturation, Facilitation, Attunement or Induction?
- ‘I Don’t Know’: Children’s Early Talk About Knowledge
- Does Perceptual Consciousness Overflow Cognitive Access? The Challenge from Probabilistic, Hierarchical Processes
- Morality Without Mindreading
- Grades of Multisensory Awareness
- Motor Intentions: How Intentions and Motor Representations Come Together
- Hume’s Table, Peacocke’s Trees, the Tilted Penny and the Reversed Seeing-in Account
- Intrusive Uncertainty in Obsessive Compulsive Disorder
- Glyn Humphreys: Attention, Binding, Motion-Induced Blindness
- Glyn Humphreys (28 December 1954 – 14 January 2016)
- Knowing the Meaning of a Word: Shared Psychological States and the Determination of Extensions
- Cladistic Parsimony, Historical Linguistics and Cultural Phylogenetics
- Subjective Misidentification and Thought Insertion
- Attentive Visual Reference