- Supererogation and Optimisation
- Being Me Being You: Adam Smith & Empathy
- Is Consciousness Vague?
- The Neutrality of Life
- Interpolating Decisions
- Skills as Knowledge
- Kant on Reason as the Capacity for Comprehension
- Inquiry and Metaphysical Rationalism
- Conventionalism about Persons and the Nonidentity Problem
- Pundits and Possibilities: Philosophers Are Not Modal Experts
- Action, Presence, and the Specious Present
- Philosophical Expertise Put to the Test
- Challenging the Pursuit of Novelty
- The Shape of Agency: Control, Action, Skill, Knowledge
- Love and Objective Reality in Spinoza’s Account of the Mind’s Power over the Affects
- Knowing When to Stop
- Against the Humean Argument for Extended Simples
- Blameworthiness for Non-Culpable Attitudes
- Towards a Synthesis of Two Research Programmes: Inference to the Best Explanation and Models of Scientific Explanation
- A Hybrid Account of Harm
- What is (Neo-)Pragmatists’ Function?
- Thick and Perceptual Moral Beauty
- Indeterminacy and Triviality
- Infinite Aggregation and Risk
- Self-Control without a Self
- What Justifies Our Bias Toward the Future?
- Engineering Human Beauty
- Locke on Persons and Personal Identity
- Cost and Psychological Difficulty: Two Aspects of Demandingness
- AJP—100*
- The Aleph and Other Alleged Mereological Curiosities
- Rational Norms for Degreed Intention (and the Discrepancy between Theoretical and Practical Reason)
- Coordination, Content, and Conflation
- True Blame
- The Philosophy of Envy
- Uncoordinated Norms of Belief
- Inquiring Minds Want to Improve
- The Statistical Riddle of Induction
- Is Prime Matter Energy?
- Moral Testimony and Collective Moral Governance
- Slurs, Synonymy, and Taboo
- Conventional Evaluativity
- What Is the Folk Concept of Life?
- The Right to Know: Epistemic Rights, and Why We Need Them
- Edenic Idealism
- Evaluative and Metalinguistic Dispute
- Not Excusing Rape: Silencing, Rationality, and Blame
- Goddard and Judge on Tractarian Objects
- Depression, Ataraxia, and the Pig
- The Failures of Philosophy: A Historical Essay
- Doxastic Wronging and Evidentialism
- Inference Is Not a Process
- Experiencing Mandates: Towards A Hybrid Account
- Deflating the Success-Truth Connection
- Aristotle on Melissus on Infinity
- Admiration, Appreciation, and Aesthetic Worth
- Powerful Deceivers and Public Reason Liberalism: An Argument for Externalization
- Epistemic Justification: Probability, Normalcy, and the Functional Theory
- Being Rational Enough: Maximizing, Satisficing, and Degrees of Rationality
- Causal Decision Theory, Two-Boxing, and Deliberation-Compatibilism: A Reply to Sandgren and Williamson
- Aristotle on Reasoning and Rational Animals
- Average Utilitarianism Implies Solipsistic Egoism
- Humean Idealism
- Getting Our Act Together: A Theory of Collective Moral Obligations
- The Structure of Phenomenal Justification
- On Wittgenstein’s Notion of a Surveyable Representation: Rituals, Aesthetics, and Aspect-Perception
- Becoming a Statue
- Coordination and Coming to Be
- Counting Composites
- Maybe Some Other Time
- Closing the Case on Self-Fulfilling Beliefs
- Fifty Shades of Affective Colouring of Perception
- Against Disquotation
- Immortal Beauty: Does Existence Confirm Reincarnation?
- Tolerating Sense Variation
- Tiantai Metaethics
- Can It Be Irrational to Knowingly Choose the Best?
- The Evil Deceiver Strikes Again!
- The Weight of the Past
- Kant on Empirical Self-Consciousness
- How Harms Can Be Better than Benefits: Reply to Carlson, Johansson, and Risberg
- Ontology and Arbitrariness
- Are Organisms Substances or Processes?
- Good Enough? The Minimally Good Life Account of the Basic Minimum
- The Possibility of Emergent Conscious Causal Powers
- Reduction and Mechanism
- Trading on Identity and Singular Thought
- The Rational Dynamics of Implicit Thought
- Interventionism and Non-Causal Dependence Relations: New Work for a Theory of Supervenience
- Really Real Patterns
- Equal Moral Opportunity: A Solution to the Problem of Moral Luck