- Evidentialism as an Historical Theory
- Salient Alternatives in Perspective
- Paradigmatic Metaphysics
- The Explainability of Experience: Realism and Subjectivity in Spinoza’s Theory of the Human Mind
- Cognitive Acts and the Unity of the Proposition
- Explanatory Information in Mathematical Explanations of Physical Phenomena
- In Search of Intuition
- Generalized Revenge
- On the Origins of Old Evidence
- What Matters in the Mirror of Time: Why Lucretius’ Symmetry Argument Fails
- A Defence of Intentionalism about Demonstratives
- You Oughta Know: A Defence of Obligations to Learn
- Quality of Reasons and Degrees of Responsibility
- Cognitivism and Metaphysical Weight: A Dilemma for Relaxed Realism
- Perception, Mind-Independence, and Berkeley
- Superhard Choices
- Functional Beauty, Pleasure, and Experience
- Might all Infinities Be the Same Size?
- Ideal Laws, Counterfactual Preservation, and the Analyses of Lawhood
- Lewis’s Global Descriptivism and Reference Magnetism
- Gratitude for Being
- Many Molyneux Questions
- Dynamic Non-Classicality
- Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind
- Praiseworthiness and Motivational Enhancement: ‘No Pain, No Praise’?
- The Metaphysics of Establishments
- Against the Character Solution to the Problem of Moral Luck
- Kant on Reflection and Virtue
- Phronesis and Techne: The Skill Model of Wisdom Defended
- Pieces of Mind: the Proper Domain of Psychological Predicates
- Resolution in §201 of the Philosophical Investigations
- Sceptical Theism and the Paradox of Evil
- Presuppositions, Attitudes, and Why They Matter
- Authority, Illocutionary Accommodation, and Social Accommodation
- The Common Consent Argument for the Existence of Nature Spirits
- Positional Goods and Upstream Agency
- Redundant Reasons
- Rights and Demands: A Foundational Inquiry
- Ontic Indeterminacy: Chinese Madhyamaka in the Contemporary Context
- Should Current Generations Make Reparation for Slavery?
- Diachronic Self-Making
- Philosophical Progress: In Defence of a Reasonable Optimism
- Scientific Ontology: Integrating Naturalized Metaphysics and Voluntarist Epistemology
- Hoping for Peace
- Making Quasi-Realists Admit of Fundamental Moral Fallibility
- Quick and Easy Recipes for Hypergunk
- Grounding the Domains of Reasons
- Why Play the Notes? Indirect Aesthetic Normativity in Performance
- Taking Emergentism Seriously
- Deception (Under Uncertainty) as a Kind of Manipulation
- Beyond Desire? Agency, Choice, and the Predictive Mind
- The Normative Error Theorist Cannot Avoid Self-Defeat
- Compassionate Moral Realism
- Emotional Perception
- Concern, Respect, and Cooperation, by Garrett Cullity
- Veritism, Epistemic Risk, and the Swamping Problem
- Imprecise Epistemic Values and Imprecise Credences
- On the Varieties of Abstract Objects
- Social Dimensions of Responsibility
- ‘Free Will and Epistemology: A Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom’, by Robert Lockie
- Inferring by Attaching Force
- No Justificatory Closure without Truth
- The Toxin and the Dogmatist
- How To Count 2[math] Oranges
- How To Count 2½ Oranges
- How To Count 2 Oranges
- Quasi-Realism and Inductive Scepticism in Hume’s Theory of Causation
- The Diner’s Defence: Producers, Consumers, and the Benefits of Existence
- On the Grounds of Sums: Reply to Saenz
- Opaque Sweetening and Transitivity
- Serving Two Masters: Ethics, Epistemology, and Taking People at their Word
- A Mark of the Mental: In Defense of Informational Teleosemantics
- Rationality and Synchronic Identity
- ‘Know-how as Competence: A Rylean Responsibilist Account’, by David Löwenstein
- Linguistics and the Parts of the Mind: Or How to Build a Machine Worth Talking To
- Idealizations and Understanding: Much Ado About Nothing?