- Conceptual change and conceptual engineering: the case of colour concepts
- Humanity and personality – what, for Kant, is the source of moral normativity?
- Intentionalism and bald-faced lies
- Must we be perfect?: A case against supererogation
- The limits of acceptance
- Conceptual control: on the feasibility of conceptual engineering
- Linguistic types are capacity-individuated action-types
- Against mythical backward-looking creationism
- How method travels: genealogy in Foucault and Castro-Gómez
- Fake news, conceptual engineering, and linguistic resistance: reply to Pepp, Michaelson and Sterken, and Brown
- Wittgenstein on the pictorial roots of referentialism
- Belief and settledness
- A genealogy of emancipatory values
- Intuitions about cases as evidence (for how we should think)
- The challenge of heritability: genetic determinants of beliefs and their implications
- Free choice effects and exclusive disjunction
- On value dependence and meliorative projects
- Need anything follow from a contradiction?
- The value of genealogies for political philosophy
- What is Nietzsche’s genealogical critique of morality?
- Ground and modality
- Inexact knowledge 2.0
- Uncertain preferences in rational decision
- ‘When you (say you) know, you can’t be wrong’: J.L. Austin on ‘I know’ claims
- I think – Mrs. Smith thinks
- Temporal ontology and joint action
- The threat of the intuition-shaped hole
- Every man has his price: Kant’s argument for universal radical evil
- Preface to Special Issue Logical Pluralism and Normativity
- A dogma of speech act theory
- On the basis of friendship – a reply to Phelan
- Learning from another
- Ethics and epistemic hopelessness
- Fake news, relevant alternatives, and the degradation of our epistemic environment
- Some hazards of motivational internalism: the practical case for externalism
- Author meets critics: Matti Eklund’s choosing normative concepts
- On the distinction between uptake and perlocutionary object: the case of issuing and obeying orders
- The Super Justification Argument for Phenomenal Transparency
- How to conceptually engineer conceptual engineering?
- Moral realism and semantic accounts of moral vagueness
- Stalnaker’s assertoric contents
- Identity display: another motive for metalinguistic disagreement
- Foucault as a kind of realist: genealogical critique and the debunking of the human sciences
- Values in science: assessing the case for mixed claims
- Pornography and accommodation
- On Pictorially mediated mind-object relations
- Motivating and defending the phenomenological conception of perceptual justification
- From recognition to acknowledgement: rethinking the perlocutionary
- Idealisation in semantics: truth-conditional semantics for radical contextualists
- On possibilising genealogy
- Situationism, subjunctive hypocrisy and standing to blame
- A solution to some grounding problems for relationism
- On the individuation of words
- Cognitive propositions and semantic values
- Fundamentality physicalism
- The sense/cognition distinction
- Ideology and normativity: constraints on conceptual engineering
- The normative problem for logical pluralism
- Is understanding reducible?
- Post-perceptual confidence and supervaluative matching profile
- Why incompatibilism about mental causation is incompatible with non-reductive physicalism
- The trouble with Hooligans
- Binding bound variables in epistemic contexts
- Positing covert variables and the quantifier theory of tense
- Operators vs. quantifiers: the view from linguistics
- Confessions of a schmentencite: towards an explicit semantics
- Indexicality and action: why we need indexical beliefs to motivate intentional actions
- Can Worsnip’s strategy solve the puzzle of misleading higher-order apparent evidence?
- Are quantifiers intensional operators?
- The sophisticated kind theory
- A new look at the ‘Generic Overgeneralisation’ effect
- Are generics especially pernicious?
- Generics, race, and social perspectives
- Generics and Weak Necessity
- Agency regarding our reasons
- The grammar of truth
- Is this what democracy looks like? (Never mind epistocracy)
- Can math move matter?
- The shortest way: Kant’s rewriting of the transcendental deduction
- The irrational in the rational, or: John McDowell’s dialectic of enlightenment
- Nietzsche on the necessity of repression
- On Korsgaard’s argument for Kant’s moral law
- Ethics, knowledge, and a procedural approach to wellbeing
- Mathematical platonism meets ontological pluralism?
- Rivalry, normativity, and the collapse of logical pluralism
- Making sense of logical pluralism
- Logical pluralism, indeterminacy and the normativity of logic
- A defence of experimental philosophy in aesthetics
- How to water a thousand flowers. On the logic of logical pluralism
- Logical pluralism and normativity
- Kant and the duty to promote one’s own happiness
- Assessment context-sensitive logical claims
- Questions open and closed: lessons from metaethics for identity arguments for the existence of god
- Normativity for alethic-logical pluralists
- A new solution to the problem of peer disagreement
- Logic isn’t normative
- The Austerity Framework and semantic normativity
- Looking backwards in type logic
- Substructural logics, pragmatic enrichment, and the inferential role of logical constants
- De se puzzles and Frege puzzles
- Presentism, endurance and object-dependence
- On the relation between modality and tense
- What we can learn from how trivalent conditionals avoid triviality
- What should the idealist critique of naturalism be? Hegel, Smithson, and liberal naturalism
- Why we should keep talking about fake news
- Naïve realism and phenomenal similarity
- Bilateralism and invalidities
- Sharing non-observational knowledge
- Computational beliefs
- Instantaneous self-deception
- Ineliminable underdetermination and context-shifting arguments
- Disqualifying ‘disqualifiers’
- Scharp on inconsistent concepts and their engineered replacements, or: can we mend these broken things?
- Fake news is counterfeit news
- Have Mercier and Sperber untied the knot of human reasoning?
- Strictness and connexivity
- Essence and explanation: a logical mismatch
- The infinite, the indefinite and the critical turn: Kant via Kripke models
- Conceptual engineers shouldn’t worry about semantic externalism
- The pessimistic origin of Nietzsche’s thought of eternal recurrence
- Finean feminist metaphysics
- The individualization of conscience: what Daybreak (9, 10, 544) and The Gay Science (117) tell us about the sovereign individual
- The role of removal and elimination in Nietzsche’s model of self-cultivation
- A matter of taste: Nietzsche and the structure of affective response
- Précis of planning, time, and self-governance
- Nietzsche’s intuitions
- Immoral lies and partial beliefs
- ‘The doing is everything’: a middle-voiced reading of agency in Nietzsche
- ‘Testing for intrinsic value, for us as we are’
- Heidegger’s Nietzsche
- The norm of assertion: a ‘constitutive’ rule?
- Michael Bratman’s planning, time, and self-governance
- Moral ignorance and the social nature of responsible agency
- Acts of desire
- Conceptual engineering via experimental philosophy
- Illocution and understanding
- Normative roles, conceptual variance, and ardent realism about normativity
- Ardent realism without referential normativity
- On self-governance over time
- Planning, time, and self-governance: replies to Andreou, Tenenbaum, and Velleman
- Taking causing out of Bennett’s Making Things Up
- General assessments and attractive exceptions: temptation in Planning, Time, and Self-Governance
- The promise and peril of epistocracy
- Giving epistocracy a Fair Hearing
- Disagreeing about who we are
- Metalinguistic proposals
- The world destruction argument
- Grounding nonexistence
- Primitivism and relative fundamentality
- Disability studies, conceptual engineering, and conceptual activism
- Unicorn agnosticism
- Bennett on building
- On the alleged evidence for non-unpleasant pains
- Grounding as minimal necessitation
- Reply to Audi, Bliss, Rosen, Schaffer, and Wang
- Rethinking friendship
- Buildings and grounds: notes on Karen Bennett’s Making Things Up
- Conceptual responsibility
- Existential risks: a philosophical analysis
- Building and modal recombination
- Choosing normative properties: a reply to Eklund’s Choosing Normative Concepts
- Dummett’s objection to the ontological route to intuitionistic logic: a rejoinder
- Kant on the possibilities of mathematics and the scope and limits of logic
- Disagreement about logic
- Husserl on Kant and the critical view of logic
- The entanglement of logic and set theory, constructively
- Metalinguistic negotiation and speaker error
- The ethics of arguing