- The disappearing agent as an exclusion problem
- A counterfactual account of diachronic structural rationality
- Imagination constrained, imagination constructed
- Credal sensitivism: threshold vs. credence-one
- Troubles for alethic indeterminacy
- Semantic Supervenience
- The perception/cognition distinction
- Concepts and conceptual engineering: answering Cappelen’s challenge
- How to argue with a pragmatist
- The epistemology of intentionality notional constituents vs. direct grasp
- Structures of inner consciousness: Brentano onward
- Intentionality as intentional inexistence
- Thought experiments and experimental ethics
- Deeper into Brentano’s mind: response to critics
- Two problems for Zylstra’s truthmaker semantics for essence
- Anger and riots as collective bargaining
- The ability to do otherwise and the new dispositionalism
- Alternative possibilities in context
- Downplaying the change of subject objection to conceptual engineering
- Control and abilities to do otherwise
- The grounds of our freedom
- How (not) to think about the sense of ‘able’ relevant to free will
- Actual sequences, Frankfurt-cases, and non-accidentality
- Actual Sequences, Frankfurt-Cases, and Non-accidentality
- The Frankfurt-style cases: extinguishing the flickers of freedom
- Moral alternatives, physical determinism & Frankfurt-style counterexamples
- A rich-lexicon theory of slurs and their uses
- Frankfurt cases, alternative possibilities and agency as a two-way power
- Re-engineering knowledge: a case study in pluralist conceptual engineering
- Armchair physics and the method of cases
- Acquaintance, presentation and judgement: from Brentano to Russell and back again
- How to divide a(n individual) mind: ontological complexity instead of mental monism
- Taking empathy online
- Why Frankfurtian all-in can’ts are irrelevant to free will
- Plate’s account of intrinsicality
- Joints and basic ways
- Counterfactual similarity, nomic indiscernibility, and the paradox of quidditism
- Post-truth conceptual engineering
- Metaethics and the conceptual ethics of normativity
- Expressivism, inferentialism, and the status of attitudes
- The bidimensionality of modal variety
- Engineering is not a luxury: Black feminists and logical positivists on conceptual engineering
- Elster’s eclecticism in analyzing emotion
- Humanity and the future: replies to Tina Rulli and Jay Wallace
- How general can theories of ‘why’ and ‘because’ be?
- What is bitcoin?
- Does polysemy support radical contextualism? On the relation between minimalism, contextualism and polysemy
- Humanity as an object of attachment
- Mereological endurantism defined
- Dynamic disagreement
- Carnap meets Foucault: conceptual engineering and genealogical investigations
- A (limited) defence of Priorianism
- Conceptual engineering, speaker-meaning and philosophy
- Moral adjectives, judge-dependency and holistic multidimensionality
- Assertion, expression, experience
- Trivialization of conceptual engineering
- Trivializing Conceptual Engineering
- Metalinguistic negotiations in moral disagreement
- Conceptual engineering is extremely unlikely to work. So what?
- Fully experimental conceptual engineering
- A Nietzschean theory of emotional experience: affect as feeling towards value
- Metasemantics without semantic intentions
- Kant’s conception of life and the limits of a discursive intellect
- Verbal disputes and topic continuity
- Taking control: conceptual engineering without (much) metasemantics
- Properties and a grounding principle
- Suspending judgment the correct way
- The Ravens Paradox and negative existential judgments about evidence
- How to be a compatibilist in metaphysics: the epistemic strategy
- Jon Elster’s ‘Enthusiasm and Anger in History’
- Practical knowledge and shared agency: pluralizing the Anscombean view
- Indexicality, de re belief, and narrow content: A reply to Sawyer
- Knowing others as persons
- Enthusiasm and anger in history
- Permissiveness in morality and epistemology
- Relativism, metasemantics, and the future
- Spontaneous expression and intentional action
- A Bayesian solution to Hallsson’s puzzle
- Do the folk represent time as essentially dynamical?
- Rejoinder to Ainslie, Bourke, Gjelsvik, and Moene
- On enthusiasm in history and elsewhere (enthusiastic comments on Elster)
- Conceptual engineering and the implementation problem
- Copredication, polysemy and context-sensitivity
- The nature of content: a critique of Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne*
- Beyond benefits: gratitude as a response to moral regard
- What is conceptual engineering and what should it be?
- What are the debates on same-sex marriage and on the recognition of transwomen as women about? On anti-descriptivism and revisionary analysis
- Taking Rorty seriously: pragmatism, metaphilosophy, and truth
- Externalist perspectives on meaning change and conceptual stability
- Naturalism without a subject: Huw Price’s pragmatism
- Meaning and framing: the semantic implications of psychological framing effects
- Fake news: the case for a purely consumer-oriented explication
- Temporal externalism, conceptual continuity, meaning, and use
- Truth and objectivity in conceptual engineering
- Semantic burden-shifting and temporal externalism
- Construction and continuity: conceptual engineering without conceptual change
- Conceptual change in perspective
- A norm of aesthetic assertion and its semantic (in)significance
- Features of referential pronouns and indexical presuppositions
- Experimental philosophy within its proper bounds
- Passions: Kant’s psychology of self-deception
- Please pass the peas: psychology, philosophy and welcome boundaries
- Is it identity all the way down? From supersubstantivalism to composition as identity and back again
- Response to Chris Crandall and John Symons
- What is the lexical meaning of polemical terms?
- Blind rule-following and the regress of motivations
- An empirical argument against moral non-cognitivism
- A Kantian quality of will account of excuses
- Other I’s, communication, and the second person
- Encounters of the third kind: performative utterances and forms of life
- Open texture clarified
- Conceptual cartography
- Plural practical knowledge
- Conceptual change and conceptual engineering: the case of colour concepts
- Humanity and personality – what, for Kant, is the source of moral normativity?
- Intentionalism and bald-faced lies
- Must we be perfect?: A case against supererogation
- The limits of acceptance