- Choosing normative properties: a reply to Eklund’s Choosing Normative Concepts
- Dummett’s objection to the ontological route to intuitionistic logic: a rejoinder
- Kant on the possibilities of mathematics and the scope and limits of logic
- Disagreement about logic
- Husserl on Kant and the critical view of logic
- The entanglement of logic and set theory, constructively
- Metalinguistic negotiation and speaker error
- The ethics of arguing
- Grounding is necessary and contingent
- The regress argument against realism about structure
- Schopenhauerian virtue ethics
- Avner Baz on aspects and concepts: a critique
- Do we hear meanings? – between perception and cognition
- Coordinating perspectives: De se and taste attitudes in communication
- The belief problem for moral error theory
- No, one should not believe all truths
- Nietzsche’s failed engagement with Schopenhauer’s pessimism: an analysis
- Semantic relativism, expressives, and derogatory epithets
- No ground for doomsday
- Method and the speculative sentence in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit
- Demonic despair under the guise of the good? Kierkegaard and Anscombe vs. Velleman
- How to infer what persistent things are up to – a Fregean puzzle for traditional Fregeans
- Epistemic dimensions of gaslighting: peer-disagreement, self-trust, and epistemic injustice
- White tears: emotion regulation and white fragility
- Vague fictional objects
- The moving spotlight(s)
- Hierarchical minds and the perception/cognition distinction
- Embedded taste predicates
- On the normative variability of truth and logic
- Pure awareness experience
- Characterizing generics are material inference tickets: a proof-theoretic analysis
- Much ado about aboutness
- Moral regret and moral feeling(s)
- Semantic contestations and the meaning of politically significant terms
- Conceptual engineering for epistemic norms
- Comments on Peter Ludlow’s the dynamic lexicon
- Comments on Peter Ludlow’s Living Words
- Reply to Collins and Sennet
- The dynamic lexicon in a truth-conditional framework; or how to have Your cake and eat it
- Making semantics for essence
- Moral realism and semantic accounts of moral vagueness
- Stalnaker’s assertoric contents
- Knowing how, basic actions, and ways of doing things
- Carnapian explications, experimental philosophy, and fruitful concepts
- On Pictorially mediated mind-object relations
- Reasons why in normative explanation
- On the individuation of words
- Can Evaluativism about unpleasant pains meet the normative condition?
- Cognitive propositions and semantic values
- The ontology of words: a structural approach
- The sense/cognition distinction
- Ideology and normativity: constraints on conceptual engineering
- The normative problem for logical pluralism
- Is understanding reducible?
- Post-perceptual confidence and supervaluative matching profile
- Why incompatibilism about mental causation is incompatible with non-reductive physicalism
- Why experiments matter
- The Austerity Framework and semantic normativity
- Reply to Øystein Linnebo and Stewart Shapiro
- Substructural logics, pragmatic enrichment, and the inferential role of logical constants
- Looking backwards in type logic
- A new solution to the problem of peer disagreement
- The grammar of truth
- Can math move matter?
- The shortest way: Kant’s rewriting of the transcendental deduction
- The irrational in the rational, or: John McDowell’s dialectic of enlightenment
- Nietzsche on the necessity of repression
- Rumfitt on the logic of set theory
- Possibilities, models, and intuitionistic logic: Ian Rumfitt’s The boundary stones of thought
- On Korsgaard’s argument for Kant’s moral law
- Ethics, knowledge, and a procedural approach to wellbeing
- The innocence of becoming: Nietzsche against guilt
- Gratitude, revenge, and Mitleid: reading Nietzsche’s Daybreak 138
- Nietzsche on creating and discovering values
- Nietzsche contra stoicism: naturalism and value, suffering and amor fati
- Nietzsche on conscious and unconscious thought
- Nietzsche on Kant and teleology in 1868: ‘“life” is something entirely dark … ’