- Stop talking about fake news!
- Is this what democracy looks like? (Never mind epistocracy)
- The trouble with Hooligans
- Replies to Hawley, Mikkola, and Hindriks
- Positing covert variables and the quantifier theory of tense
- Responses to Hattiangadi, Wikforss, and Williamson
- The feminist case against pornography: a review and re-evaluation
- Operators vs. quantifiers: the view from linguistics
- Non-reductivism and the metaphilosophy of mind
- Confessions of a schmentencite: towards an explicit semantics
- Indexicality and action: why we need indexical beliefs to motivate intentional actions
- How to endure presentism
- Can Worsnip’s strategy solve the puzzle of misleading higher-order apparent evidence?
- Fichte’s critique of physicalism – towards an idealist alternative
- Liberal naturalism and the scientific image of the world
- An idealist critique of naturalism
- Liberal naturalism, objectivity and the autonomy of the mental
- Hegel, modal logic, and the social nature of mind
- Are quantifiers intensional operators?
- Indicatives at stake
- Does Semantics Need Normativity? Comments on Allan Gibbard, Meaning and Normativity
- Binding bound variables in epistemic contexts
- Reply to Baz
- A reason to be rational
- Necessity of origins and multi-origin art
- Agency regarding our reasons
- No time for powers
- Intrinsic properties and relations
- The normativity of meaning and the hard problem of intentionality
- The edenic theory of reference
- Causation in a timeless world?
- Reasons and practical possibility
- Embedding irony and the semantics/pragmatics distinction
- Kant and the duty to promote one’s own happiness
- Metaphysics of quantity and the limit of phenomenal concepts
- Unconscious perceptual justification*
- Generics and Weak Necessity
- Can mathematical objects be causally efficacious?
- Gibbard on meaning and normativity
- Assessment context-sensitive logical claims
- Replies to Bacon, Eklund, and Greenough on Replacing Truth
- Explaining away temporal flow – thoughts on Prosser’s ‘Experiencing Time’
- If an ontologist could speak we couldn’t understand him
- Knowledgeable assertion in the image of knowledgeable belief
- Absolutely tasty: an examination of predicates of personal taste and faultless disagreement
- What is special about indexical attitudes?
- Questions open and closed: lessons from metaethics for identity arguments for the existence of god
- The ‘should’ in conceptual engineering
- Normativity for alethic-logical pluralists
- Constitutive essence and partial grounding
- Logical pluralism, indeterminacy and the normativity of logic
- Destabilizing the knowledge argument and modal argument
- The rational role of experience
- Assessment sensitivity in legal discourse
- How perception generates, preserves, and mediates justification
- Conceptual engineering for mathematical concepts
- The revisionist’s rubric: conceptual engineering and the discontinuity objection
- The new growing block theory vs presentism
- A defence of experimental philosophy in aesthetics
- Grounding, physicalism and necessity
- Rigid/non-rigid grounding and transitivity
- Knowledge requires belief – and it doesn’t? On belief as such and belief necessary for knowledge
- Replies to Deng, Lee, and Skow
- What is the structure of Genealogy of Morality II?
- Smells, exemplars and evidence: smelling knowledge of the external world
- Russellians can have a no proposition view of empty names
- Virtuous homunculi: Nietzsche on the order of drives
- The illocutionary force of laws
- Cruelty and kinds: Scalia and Dworkin on the constitutionality of capital punishment
- How to water a thousand flowers. On the logic of logical pluralism
- Moral physiology and vivisection of the soul: why does Nietzsche criticize the life sciences?
- ‘Ought implies Can’ and the law
- Pulling oneself up by the hair: understanding Nietzsche on freedom
- Nietzsche as perfectionist
- Molyneux’s question and the amodality of spatial experience
- Phenomenal compositionality and context effects
- Nietzsche and value creation: subjectivism, self-expression, and strength
- Logic isn’t normative
- The real epistemic significance of perceptual learning