- The epistemic ought-implies-can principle and the ‘can’ of freedom
- One argument, many interpretations: polysemy and the argument from copredication
- A new epistemic solution to the Surprise Exam Paradox
- On the doxastic constraint on group evidence
- Collective action, work, and partial plans
- Review of resistance money: a philosophical case for bitcoin
- ‘Transparent’ rules and basic self-knowledge: a critical study of Alex Byrne’s transparency and self-knowledge
- Assertoric content, lies, and slips of the tongue
- Imagination as recognition: a recognitional approach to mental imagery
- Practical judgment and the well-rounded life
- Faith and the practical self
- Positional conditional egalitarianism
- The ultra-thin conception of objecthood
- Taking political normativity seriously: legitimacy and political realism
- On the right to be practically sure
- Why thin objects rather than ultra-thin?
- The biological objection against strong AI
- Three grades of self involvement and the deduction of objectivity in The Practical Self
- No reason to doubt desert: reply to Pummer
- Publishing robots
- The proverbial strategy free relatives and logical relations
- Deviance and the literal-metaphorical distinction revisited
- On the possibility of a normative account of corporate trust
- Linguistic understanding: perception and inference
- Collective intentionality: why content matters
- Relevance logic without impossibilities
- Superplurals analyzed away
- Evolutionary debunking arguments, moral knowledge and underdetermination
- Conceptually engineering the post-truth crisis
- On the attribution of confidence to large language models
- Nietzsche’s Greek pessimism
- LLMs are not just next token predictors
- Reference without intentions in large language models
- Nietzsche, Kant, and the unity of the subject
- Nietzsche on natural causality: translating the human back into nature
- LLMs, Turing tests and Chinese rooms: the prospects for meaning in large language models
- Paradigmatically active: why Nietzschean drives are not dispositions
- The beauty of conspiracy
- On the rational evaluability of future-bias
- Artificial consciousness
- Indicative conditionals: Whose context?
- Why AGI could not be (just) a tool: goals, life, and general intelligence
- Trust and inquiry
- Knives out: response to critics
- ‘You do it like this!’: bare impersonals as indefinite singular generics
- New grounds for the possibility of legal gluts
- The agency in language agents
- Chatting with bots: AI, speech acts, and the edge of assertion
- From group to institutional agency
- Agency and theoretical reason in The Practical Self
- Responsibility fictionalism
- How Can We Tell if a Machine is Conscious?
- Gambles between obvious truths
- Simulacra as conscious exotica
- Strategic collective action and the proportionality of reasons to expected benefits
- Who is a reasoner?*
- Genres as rules
- Why ChatGPT doesn’t think: an argument from rationality
- Show, don’t tell! The place of non-cognitive attitudes in moral discourse
- Learning conditionals
- Finite love
- Agency incompatibilism, luck, and intelligibility
- Akratic and beneficial intentional self-deception
- Deep and shallow conditionals – and three alleged counterexamples
- How to understand ‘nonsense’: do not ask what nonsense is, but rather how we show that something is nonsense!
- The event-property view of sounds
- Wholes are fusions
- Artificial agents: responsibility & control gaps
- Kant on doxastic agency, its scope, and the demands of its exercise
- Social kind vs. conferralist approaches to social ontology: ‘race’ as a case study
- Distinguishing semantics, pragmatics, and reasoning in the theory of conditionals
- Absorbed in deceit: modeling intention-driven self-deception with agential layering
- Illusionism about virtual causation
- Adorno’s dynamic theory of ideology
- Conceptual engineering in the Lvov-Warsaw School
- Fake news & bad science journalism: the case against insincerity
- Political friendship as joint commitment: Aristotle on homonoia
- Practical reason as theoretical reason
- Being-there, being-with, and being-a-part: Heidegger’s mereology of Mitsein in Being and Time
- Irony in earnest: rethinking Hegel’s critique of romantic irony
- Integrational creativity: from combining and blending to transforming and resonating
- Does valuing ice cream sandwiches make one a true gourmand and connoisseur of them?
- Talking about Talking About
- ‘Lucifer in person’: on Iris Murdoch’s ‘Heidegger problem’
- Lies are assertions and presuppositions are not
- Explaining systematic polysemy: kinds and individuation
- Hegel, Selbstischkeit, and the experiential self
- A prolegomena to investigating conspiracy theories
- Contingentism and fragile worlds
- Idealization, animals, and democracy
- Investigating conspiracy theories – introduction to the special issue
- Presuppositional epistemic contextualism and non-ideal contexts
- Conceptual engineering and conceptual innovation
- How not to argue for the presumption of liberty
- Decolonizing epistemic justice: on inter-epistemology
- Epistemic (de-)colonization in the midst of Europe
- Conspiracy accusations
- ‘Austin vs. Searle on locutionary and illocutionary acts’
- Room for responsibility: Kant on direct doxastic voluntarism
- How to make conspiracy theory research intellectually respectable (and what it might be like if it were)
- Conceptual engineering, cognitive deficiency, and the foundations of conceptual inquiry
- The size of a lie: from truthlikeness to sincerity
- Ultimate-Humeanism
- The power of second-order conspiracies
- Doubts about an argument from doubt
- Conspiracy theorists are not the problem; Conspiracy liars are
- Should we worry about conspiracy theorists rejecting experts?
- How conspiratorial beliefs spread, and how real conspiracies are covered up
- A new paradox of belief
- Moral responsibility and general ability
- Occurrent knowledge is the sole aim of inquiry
- Where conspiracy theories come from, what they do, and what to do about them
- Resisting the ‘civilising mission’. Analysing Hungarian conspiracy theories through standpoint theory
- Spinoza on the parts of God
- Racist and antiracist conspiracy theories
- Heterodox conspiracy theories and evidence-based theories of error
- Security as a political concept
- Epistemic alienation
- Counting subjects
- Autonomy and knowledge: comments on Adam Carter’s Autonomous Knowledge
- Learning from scams: the target of fake news
- When conspiracy theorists win
- Clinical reasoning and generics
- Talking about: a response to Bowker, Keiser, Michaelson
- Reasons and ‘because’*
- False friends in political dogwhistles
- Fichte’s world of wordless lies
- On the culpable ignorance of group agents: the group justification thesis
- Toward a paradigm shift: corrective trust as a pathway to mitigate biases in healthcare and beyond
- Conceptual engineering and the dynamics of linguistic intervention
- Moral status of believing in races
- From pictures to employments: later Wittgenstein on ‘the infinite’
- On the intrinsic value of diversity
- True lies and attempted lies
- Kant on scientific pedantry and epistemic populism
- Equal desires and self-control
- Social goodness: the ontology of social norms
- Is health the absence of disease?
- Romantic love and the first-person plural perspective
- Lambert on moral certainty and the justification of induction
- How far can genealogies affect the space of reasons? Vindication, justification and excuses
- Comments on Alex Byrne, Transparency and self-knowledge
- Hume on causation: against the quasi-realist interpretation
- Responses to Professors Richardson, Rouse and Lepold
- Slurring individuals
- Democratic disenfranchisement: a relational account
- The self saves the day! Value pluralism, autonomous belief and the dissolution of the value problem through the encroachment of the self on knowledge
- Kant’s account of emotive art
- How can individuals criticise social norms? A commentary on Charlotte Witt’s Social Goodness: The Ontology of Social Norms
- In between impossible worlds
- A quasi-deflationary solution to the problems of mixed inferences and mixed compounds
- Perception and illusion: replies to Sethi, Speaks and Cutter
- Social role normativity: from individualism to institutionalism
- Introduction to the annual Examen Philosophicum lecture
- Social norms and the dynamics of practices
- Future selves, paternalism and our rational powers
- A unificationist approach to wrongful pure risking