- Group blameworthiness and group rights
- The ends of history
- Desubstantializing the critique of forms of life: relationality, subjectivity, morality
- A defense of the veritist account of the goal of inquiry
- Is discrimination wrong because it is undeserved?
- The numbers fallacy: rescuing sufficientarianism from arithmeticism
- Dynamic semantics versus dynamic propositionalism
- Collins (and Elbourne) on free pragmatic processes
- Realism and metanormativity
- Resolving the puzzle of the changing past
- Knowledge of things and aesthetic testimony
- Measuring the self and measuring the world
- Which answers to the now what question collapse into abolitionism (if any)?
- What is self-narrative?
- A serpent in the garden?
- What’s so bad about being a manageress?
- Having the measure of self and world: a response to my critics
- Tanesini on truth and epistemic vice
- Educating for intellectual virtue in a vicious world
- Transcendental and mathematical infinity in Kant’s first antinomy
- Conditionals, supposition, and euthyphro
- Idealism and transparency in Sartre’s ontological proof
- Is lucky belief justified?
- The collegial structure of Kantian public reason
- Methodological deflationism and metaphysical grounding: from because via truth to ground
- Loose talk, the context of assessment, and skeptical invariantism
- Beauvoir on how we can love authentically
- A nonreductive physicalist libertarian free will
- After the Birth: middle and Late Nietzsche on the value of tragedy
- Beyond the Birth: middle and late Nietzsche on the value of tragedy
- Stereotypes and self-fulfilling prophecies in the Bayesian brain
- Virtue in a time of depraved ideals
- Willing and not being able: Nietzsche on akratic action
- Berkeley on whether human sensible ideas are identical to certain divine ideas
- Nietzsche’s critique of guilt
- Who are Nietzsche’s Christians?
- Nietzsche’s conceptual ethics
- Gatekeeping the mind
- ‘What it is like’
- Attitudes and action: against de se exceptionalism
- Ideology: the rejected true
- Conceptual engineering and pragmatism: historical and theoretical perspectives
- One person, one vote and the importance of baseline
- Gradable know-how
- Emotions and their reasons
- Epistemicism and commensurability
- Precis: the mismeasure of the self
- Does singular thought have an epistemic essence?
- Doing philosophy as opening parentheses: quantifying the use of parentheses in Stanley Cavell’s style
- Measuring and mismeasuring the self
- Nietzsche on the value of power and pleasure
- Do you value topic-continuity? The moral foundations of Cappelen’s insistence on ‘topic-continuity’ and reasons for resisting them
- Facts of identity
- Goethe’s Faust and the philosophy of money
- Normative standards and the epistemology of conceptual ethics
- Why causal facts matter: a critique of Jeppsson’s hard-line reply to four-case manipulation arguments
- An old GBT’s new solution
- Digital suffering: why it’s a problem and how to prevent it
- Understanding philosophy
- The collapse of logical contextualism
- Descartes’s argument for modal voluntarism
- A simple solution to the collapse argument for logical pluralism
- Scepticism and the value of distrust
- Answering machines: how to (epistemically) evaluate a search engine
- Reply to Bourget and Mendelovici
- The epistemic import of phenomenal consciousness
- Judges, experiencers, and taste
- Translation and the paradox of analysis: a reflection on Wiredu’s notion of tongue dependency
- Introduction to the special issue: Skepticism, relativism, pluralism
- The desirability of institutionalized rivalry
- Potentially disabled?
- Is knowledge a social phenomenon?
- Gertler’s acquaintance approach to introspective knowledge and internalist requirements for reasons
- Quasi-fideism and epistemic relativism
- Presentism’s persisting problem
- Realism and relativism about the normative
- Feeling and thinking on social media: emotions, affective scaffolding, and critical thinking
- Justice as the constitutive norm of shared agency in Rousseau’s Social Contract
- Is Narrow Content’s ‘narrow content’ narrow content?
- Is Narrow Content’s ‘narrow content’ narrow content?
- Is Narrow Content’s ‘narrow content’ narrow content?
- The argument from accidental truth against deflationism
- Emotional sinking in
- The problem of genre explosion
- Literal and metaphorical meaning: in search of a lost distinction
- What topic continuity problem?
- The illusion of the relevance of difficulty in evaluations of moral responsibility
- Moods: from diffusiveness to dispositionality
- Hegel’s ethical organicism
- Entitlement, calamities and content: an objection to Tyler Burge’s perceptual epistemology
- Responding to the spread of conspiracy theories
- The psychological motives of prevention and promotion focus behind the Kantian conception of practical ideas and ideals: commentary and extension to Englert’s (2022) ‘How a Kantian ideal can be practical’
- Why are emotions epistemically indispensable?
- The will as joy-bringer: Nietzsche’s response to Schopenhauer
- Believing for truth and the model of epistemic guidance
- Mood and Wellbeing
- Existence hedges, neutral free logic and truth
- Future-bias and intuition shifts between moments and lifetimes
- Meaning without content: on the metasemantics of register
- Emotions as states
- Measuring one-dimensional diversity
- Bounded emotionality and our doxastic norms
- Cognitive phenomenology: in defense of recombination
- Knowing value and acknowledging value: on the significance of emotional evaluation
- Solving a puzzle of definition
- The incoherence challenge for subject combination: an analytic assessment
- Who knows what? Epistemic dependence, inquiry, and function-first epistemology
- The end of history
- The subject-as-object problem
- Reply to Gardiner and DiPaolo
- Pragmatism, skepticism, and over-compatibilism: on Michael Hannon’s What’s the Point of Knowledge?
- The boundaries of meaning: a case study in neural machine translation
- Deweyan conceptual engineering: reconstruction, concepts, and philosophical inquiry
- Summary of What’s the Point of Knowledge? Oxford University Press, 2019
- Dispensing with experiential acquaintance
- The phenomenal contribution of attention
- Sex and the city: Rousseau on sexual freedom and its modern discontents
- Time-slice epistemology for Bayesians
- On the connection between lying, asserting, and intending to cause beliefs
- Finding a fundamental principle of democratic inclusion: related, not affected or subjected
- Grounding and properties
- Nonsense: a user’s guide
- Holism about fact and value
- Review of Ken Taylor’s Referring to the World.
- Transformative experiences and the equivocation objection
- In touch with the facts: epistemological disjunctivism and the rationalisation of belief
- Replies to Armstrong, Dennett, the Schroeters, and Stalnaker
- Pistols, pills, pork and ploughs: the structure of technomoral revolutions
- The Limited Phenomenal Infallibility thesis
- From inconsistent obligations to the possibility of legal gluts
- Improving concepts, reshaping values: pragmatism and ameliorative projects
- Haecceitism without individuals
- Making progress: pragmatism, conceptual engineering, and ordinary language
- Identity: this time it’s personal
- The fundamental divisions in ethics
- On justifying case verdicts. A dialectical hypothesis
- Future, truth, and probability
- Pluralist conceptual engineering
- Two notions of resemblance and the semantics of ‘what it’s like’
- Two notions of resemblance and the semantics of ‘what it’s like’
- Two notions of resemblance and the semantics of ‘what it’s like’
- Is there an empirical case for semantic perception?
- Non-ideal philosophy of language
- Rules as constitutive practices defined by correlated equilibria
- There are no uninstantiated words
- Logical contextualism
- Is forgiveness openness to reconciliation?
- And therefore
- How a Kantian ideal can be practical
- Russellians should have a no proposition view of empty names
- On Frege’s supposed hierarchy of senses
- Functionalism about inference
- Why we go wrong: beyond Kant’s dichotomy between duty and self-love
- ‘Trusting-to’ and ‘Trusting-as’: A qualitative account of trustworthiness
- ‘The soul is, in a way, all beings’: Heidegger’s debts to Aristotle in Being and Time
- The problem of uptake
- Stereotyping and generics
- Understanding force cancellation
- Conspiracy Theories and Rational Critique: A Kantian Procedural Approach
- Moral understanding, affect, and the imagination
- Don’t count truth out just yet: a response to Isaac
- Joint attention and communication
- The embodied, relational self: extending or rejecting the mind?
- Towards an ethics of conceptual engineering
- How should we think about linguistic function?
- Mooreanism in metaphysics from Mooreanism in physics
- Animalists on the run
- Marriage and its limits
- Knowledge of language as self-knowledge
- The absentminded professor
- We have reason to think there are reasons for affective attitudes
- The normativity of meaning without the normativity
- Inference, predication and the act-type theory of propositions
- Ameliorating at the joints. A permissive normative framework for conceptual engineering
- The paradox of deterministic probabilities
- Inferentialist conceptual engineering
- On Transparency and self-knowledge
- Edwards on truth pluralism
- The loving state
- Making a vague difference: Kagan, Nefsky and the Sorites Paradox
- Excluded entailments and the de se/de re partition
- Foundational issues in conceptual engineering: Introduction and overview