- Content internalism and testimonial knowledge
- Truth’s dialectical role: from friction to tension
- Pretence fictionalism about the non-present
- Pragmatism, truth, and cognitive agency
- The possible worlds theory of visual experience
- Objectual aboutness
- The significance of Kant’s mere thoughts
- Akiba’s logic of indeterminacy
- Conceptual ethics, metaepistemology, and normative epistemology
- Predicate order and coherence in copredication
- Engineering concepts by engineering social norms: solving the implementation challenge
- Topics, disputes and ‘going meta’
- Transformative experiences, rational decisions and shark attacks
- Libertarian Paternalism And Susan Hurley’s political philosophy
- Monism and heterogeneity: a plural grounding solution
- An individual reality, separate from oneself: alienation and sociality in moral theory
- Are utterance truth-conditions systematically determined?
- Norm manipulation as a condition of friendship
- Nietzsche’s naturalistic account of value and normativity
- Who’s afraid of cognitive diversity?
- Toxic intentions
- Deceptive worlds, skepticism, and axiarchism
- The indeterminate present
- Epistemic sensitivity and evidence
- An argument for ontological nihilism
- The disappearing agent as an exclusion problem
- A counterfactual account of diachronic structural rationality
- Imagination constrained, imagination constructed
- Credal sensitivism: threshold vs. credence-one
- Troubles for alethic indeterminacy
- Semantic Supervenience
- The perception/cognition distinction
- Concepts and conceptual engineering: answering Cappelen’s challenge
- How to argue with a pragmatist
- The epistemology of intentionality notional constituents vs. direct grasp
- Structures of inner consciousness: Brentano onward
- Intentionality as intentional inexistence
- Thought experiments and experimental ethics
- Deeper into Brentano’s mind: response to critics
- Two problems for Zylstra’s truthmaker semantics for essence
- Anger and riots as collective bargaining
- The ability to do otherwise and the new dispositionalism
- Alternative possibilities in context
- Downplaying the change of subject objection to conceptual engineering
- Control and abilities to do otherwise
- The grounds of our freedom
- How (not) to think about the sense of ‘able’ relevant to free will
- Actual sequences, Frankfurt-cases, and non-accidentality
- Actual Sequences, Frankfurt-Cases, and Non-accidentality
- The Frankfurt-style cases: extinguishing the flickers of freedom
- Moral alternatives, physical determinism & Frankfurt-style counterexamples
- A rich-lexicon theory of slurs and their uses
- Frankfurt cases, alternative possibilities and agency as a two-way power
- Re-engineering knowledge: a case study in pluralist conceptual engineering
- Armchair physics and the method of cases
- Acquaintance, presentation and judgement: from Brentano to Russell and back again
- How to divide a(n individual) mind: ontological complexity instead of mental monism
- Taking empathy online
- Why Frankfurtian all-in can’ts are irrelevant to free will
- Plate’s account of intrinsicality
- Joints and basic ways
- Counterfactual similarity, nomic indiscernibility, and the paradox of quidditism
- Post-truth conceptual engineering
- Metaethics and the conceptual ethics of normativity
- Expressivism, inferentialism, and the status of attitudes
- The bidimensionality of modal variety
- Engineering is not a luxury: Black feminists and logical positivists on conceptual engineering
- Elster’s eclecticism in analyzing emotion
- Humanity and the future: replies to Tina Rulli and Jay Wallace
- How general can theories of ‘why’ and ‘because’ be?
- What is bitcoin?
- Does polysemy support radical contextualism? On the relation between minimalism, contextualism and polysemy
- Humanity as an object of attachment
- Mereological endurantism defined
- Dynamic disagreement
- Carnap meets Foucault: conceptual engineering and genealogical investigations
- A (limited) defence of Priorianism
- Conceptual engineering, speaker-meaning and philosophy
- Moral adjectives, judge-dependency and holistic multidimensionality
- Assertion, expression, experience
- Trivialization of conceptual engineering
- Trivializing Conceptual Engineering
- Metalinguistic negotiations in moral disagreement
- Conceptual engineering is extremely unlikely to work. So what?
- Fully experimental conceptual engineering
- A Nietzschean theory of emotional experience: affect as feeling towards value
- Metasemantics without semantic intentions
- Kant’s conception of life and the limits of a discursive intellect
- Verbal disputes and topic continuity
- Taking control: conceptual engineering without (much) metasemantics
- Properties and a grounding principle
- Suspending judgment the correct way
- The Ravens Paradox and negative existential judgments about evidence
- How to be a compatibilist in metaphysics: the epistemic strategy
- Jon Elster’s ‘Enthusiasm and Anger in History’
- Practical knowledge and shared agency: pluralizing the Anscombean view
- Indexicality, de re belief, and narrow content: A reply to Sawyer
- Knowing others as persons
- Enthusiasm and anger in history
- Permissiveness in morality and epistemology
- Relativism, metasemantics, and the future
- Spontaneous expression and intentional action
- A Bayesian solution to Hallsson’s puzzle
- Do the folk represent time as essentially dynamical?
- Rejoinder to Ainslie, Bourke, Gjelsvik, and Moene
- On enthusiasm in history and elsewhere (enthusiastic comments on Elster)
- Conceptual engineering and the implementation problem
- Copredication, polysemy and context-sensitivity
- The nature of content: a critique of Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne*
- Beyond benefits: gratitude as a response to moral regard