- Hierarchical minds and the perception/cognition distinction
- Embedded taste predicates
- On the normative variability of truth and logic
- Pure awareness experience
- Characterizing generics are material inference tickets: a proof-theoretic analysis
- Much ado about aboutness
- Moral regret and moral feeling(s)
- Semantic contestations and the meaning of politically significant terms
- Conceptual engineering for epistemic norms
- Comments on Peter Ludlow’s the dynamic lexicon
- Comments on Peter Ludlow’s Living Words
- Reply to Collins and Sennet
- The dynamic lexicon in a truth-conditional framework; or how to have Your cake and eat it
- Making semantics for essence
- Moral realism and semantic accounts of moral vagueness
- Stalnaker’s assertoric contents
- Knowing how, basic actions, and ways of doing things
- Carnapian explications, experimental philosophy, and fruitful concepts
- On Pictorially mediated mind-object relations
- Reasons why in normative explanation
- On the individuation of words
- Can Evaluativism about unpleasant pains meet the normative condition?
- Cognitive propositions and semantic values
- The ontology of words: a structural approach
- The sense/cognition distinction
- Ideology and normativity: constraints on conceptual engineering
- The normative problem for logical pluralism
- Is understanding reducible?
- Post-perceptual confidence and supervaluative matching profile
- Why incompatibilism about mental causation is incompatible with non-reductive physicalism
- Why experiments matter
- The Austerity Framework and semantic normativity
- Reply to Øystein Linnebo and Stewart Shapiro
- Substructural logics, pragmatic enrichment, and the inferential role of logical constants
- Looking backwards in type logic
- A new solution to the problem of peer disagreement
- The grammar of truth
- Can math move matter?
- The shortest way: Kant’s rewriting of the transcendental deduction
- The irrational in the rational, or: John McDowell’s dialectic of enlightenment
- Nietzsche on the necessity of repression
- Rumfitt on the logic of set theory
- Possibilities, models, and intuitionistic logic: Ian Rumfitt’s The boundary stones of thought
- On Korsgaard’s argument for Kant’s moral law
- Ethics, knowledge, and a procedural approach to wellbeing
- The innocence of becoming: Nietzsche against guilt
- Gratitude, revenge, and Mitleid: reading Nietzsche’s Daybreak 138
- Nietzsche on creating and discovering values
- Nietzsche contra stoicism: naturalism and value, suffering and amor fati
- Nietzsche on conscious and unconscious thought
- Nietzsche on Kant and teleology in 1868: ‘“life” is something entirely dark … ’
- Stop talking about fake news!
- Is this what democracy looks like? (Never mind epistocracy)
- The trouble with Hooligans
- Replies to Hawley, Mikkola, and Hindriks
- Positing covert variables and the quantifier theory of tense
- Responses to Hattiangadi, Wikforss, and Williamson
- The feminist case against pornography: a review and re-evaluation
- Operators vs. quantifiers: the view from linguistics
- Non-reductivism and the metaphilosophy of mind
- Confessions of a schmentencite: towards an explicit semantics
- Indexicality and action: why we need indexical beliefs to motivate intentional actions
- How to endure presentism
- Can Worsnip’s strategy solve the puzzle of misleading higher-order apparent evidence?
- Fichte’s critique of physicalism – towards an idealist alternative
- Liberal naturalism and the scientific image of the world
- An idealist critique of naturalism
- Liberal naturalism, objectivity and the autonomy of the mental
- Hegel, modal logic, and the social nature of mind
- Are quantifiers intensional operators?
- Indicatives at stake
- Does Semantics Need Normativity? Comments on Allan Gibbard, Meaning and Normativity
- Binding bound variables in epistemic contexts
- Reply to Baz
- A reason to be rational
- Necessity of origins and multi-origin art
- Agency regarding our reasons
- No time for powers