- Games Unlike Life
- Agency, Stability, and Permeability in “Games”
- Coverage Shortfalls at the Library of Agency
- No Disrespect—But That Account Does Not Explain What Is Morally Bad About Discrimination
- When to Start Saving the Planet?
- Is Morality Open to the Free Will Skeptic?
- Slack Taking and Burden Dumping
- The Inherent Tolerance of the Democratic Process
- The Best Available Parent and Duties of Justice
- The Stability of the Just Society
- Moral Disagreement and Practical Direction
- Forgiving the Mote in Your Sister’s Eye
- Moral Vagueness and Epistemicism
- Gender as Name
- The Rent Tax Is Too Damn Low
- Democracy and Social Equality
- What Goes On When We Apologize?
- Children, Partiality, and Equality
- Expecting Equality
- Don’t Be Cruel
- No Grit without Freedom
- Against Being For
- Quality of Will Accounts and Non-Culpably Developed Mental Disorders
- The Sheriff in Our Minds
- Critical Levels, Critical Ranges, and Imprecise Exchange Rates in Population Axiology
- The Value of a Life-Year and the Intuition of Universality
- Evolution, Utilitarianism, and Normative Uncertainty
- Posthumous Repugnancy
- Vice Signaling
- Introduction to ‘Action and Production’
- Action and Production
- Privacy Rights Forfeiture
- Epistemic Trepassing and Expert Witness Testimony
- Discursive Integrity and the Principles of Responsible Public Debate
- Fake News and Democracy
- Deepfakes, Deep Harms
- The Limits of Instrumental Proceduralism
- The Equivalence of Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism
- What is the Incoherence Objection to Legal Entrapment?
- Moral Decision Guides: Counsels of Morality or Counsels of Rationality?
- Law and Violence
- Constrained Fairness in Distribution
- The Goal Problem in the ‘Now What’ Problem
- Normative Uncertainty without Unjustified Value Comparisons
- What is the Bad-Difference View of Disability?
- An Account of Normative Stereotyping
- Well-Being as Need Satisfaction
- Why Paternalists Must Endorse Epistocracy
- Voter Motivation
- On the Normative Connection Between Paternalism and Rights
- Other-Sacrificing Options: Reply to Lange
- Is Epistocracy Irrational?
- The Indefensible Self-Defense Argument
- Freedom to Roam
- Practical Commitment in Normative Discourse
- All Reasons are Fundamentally for Attitudes
- Should Libertarians Reject the Free Market? On Olsaretti’s Positive Answer
- Divine Commands Are Unnecessary for Moral Obligation
- Positive Rights: Two-Person Cases
- Forgiveness and the Significance of Wrongs
- Utilitarianism, Altruism, and Consent
- The Case for Consent Pluralism
- What is Group Well-Being?
- Moral Fetishism and a Third Desire for What’s Right
- How we can make sense of control-based intuitions for limited access-conceptions of the right to privacy
- Realism, Metasemantics, and Risk
- Nonideal Justice, Fairness, and Affirmative Action
- Disagreement, Unilateral Judgment, and Kant’s Argument for Rule by Law
- Religious Reasoning in the Liberal Public from the Second-Personal Perspective
- Overriding Adolescent Refusals of Treatment
- On Emad Atiq’s Inclusive Anti-positivism
- Kant and the Problem of Unequal Enforcement of Law
- Scope Restrictions, National Partiality, and War
- Defending the Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility
- Differentiating Disobedients
- Why Extending Actions through Time Can Violate a Moral Right to Privacy
- Elusive Reasons and the Motivational Constraint
- Friendship as a Non-Relative Virtue
- Does Convergence Liberalism Risk Anarchy?
- Meaning in Life and Becoming More Fulfilled
- The Welfare-Nihilist Arguments against Judgment Subjectivism
- Territorial Exclusion
- Is Deontic Evaluation Capable of Doing What it is For?
- Does Deportation Infringe Rights?
- An Occasionalist Response to Korman and Locke
- Political Disagreement and Minimal Epistocracy
- Supersession, Reparations, and Restitution
- Resisting Wrongful Explanations
- Contractualism, Complaints, and Risk
- The Moral Closure Argument
- Objectified Women and Fetishized Objects
- Blaming for Unreasonableness: Accountability without Ill Will
- Games and the Good Life
- Doing and Allowing Harm to Refugees
- Risking Civilian Lives to Avoid Harm to Cultural Heritage?
- Skeptical Hypotheses and Moral Skepticism
- Addressed Blame and Hostility
- What Normativity Cannot Be
- Planning on a prior intention
- Moral Outrage Porn
- The Trouble with Formal Views of Autonomy
- The Normative Pluriverse
- Does Initial Appropriation Create New Obligations?
- Error Theory, Unbelievability and the Normative Objection
- Kidney Exchange and the Ethics of Giving
- False Exemplars: Admiration and the Ethics of Public Monuments
- Disability as Inability
- The Importance of Roles in the Skill Analogy
- Humility and Ethical Development
- The Ambitions of Consequentialism
- Do We Have Reasons to Obey the Law?
- Freedom and Actual Interference
- Social Reform in a Complex World
- It’s Complicated
- Reply to Mark Lance, Ásta, and Marya Schechtman
- Ideological Absorption and Countertechniques
- Counterstories, Stock Characters, and Varieties of Narrative Resistance
- Counter the Counterstory
- The Eligibility of Rule Utilitarianism
- Sorting Out Solutions to the Now-What Problem
- The Demandingness of Virtue
- On Keeping Things in Proportion
- Judicial Corporal Punishment
- There are No Easy Counterexamples to Legal Anti-positivism
- “Fake News” and Conceptual Ethics
- Can Streumer Simply Avoid Supervenience?
- Income Redistribution, Body Part Redistribution, and Respect for the Separateness of Persons
- Can ‘More Speech’ Counter Ignorant Speech?
- Making Peace with Moral Imperfection
- Fittingness and Good Reasoning
- Risk and the Unfairness of Some Being Better Off at the Expense of Others
- Rights, Roles and Interests
- What’s New About Fake News?
- Dietz on Group-Based Reasons
- Basically Deserved Blame and its Value
- The Comparative Nonarbitrariness Norm of Blame
- Are Workers Dominated?
- Against Jeffrey Howard on Entrapment
- Revisiting the Argument from Action Guidance
- The Invisible Hand from the Grave
- The Meaning of a Market and the Meaning of “Meaning”
- Asymmetrism and the Magnitudes of Welfare Benefits
- Not Duties but Needs
- New Shmagency Worries
- Is There Value in Keeping a Promise?
- Helping Buchanan on Helping the Rebels
- Parental Partiality and Future Children
- Reasons: Wrong, Right, Normative, Fundamental
- The Case for Stance Dependent Value
- Prioritarianism: A (Pluralist) Defence
- Culpable Ignorance and Mental Disorders
- What can we learn about romantic love from Harry Frankfurt’s account of love?
- The Contribution of Security to Well-being
- Evolution and Disagreement
- Oppression, Forgiveness, and Ceasing to Blame
- Rationality, Appearances, and Apparent Facts
- Immigration, Adoption, and the Permissibility of Excluding Newcomers by Birth
- Immigrant Selection, Health Requirements, and Disability Discrimination
- Well-being, Opportunity, and Selecting for Disability
- On Ex Ante Contractualism
- In or Out?
- Is Liberalism Committed to Its Own Demise?
- Helping the Rebels
- Parfit, Convergence, and Underdetermination
- Shared Intention is Not Joint Commitment
- Practical reason not as such
- A Tripartite Theory of Love
- The Motives for Moral Credit
- Virtuous and Vicious Anger
- Depression and the Problem of Absent Desires
- Non-Naturalism and Reference
- Offsetting Race Privilege
- Irrationality and Happiness: A (Neo-)Schopenhaurian Argument for Rational Pessimism
- Promises and Conflicting Obligations
- Normative Pluralism Worthy of the Name Is False
- Actualism Has Control Issues
- Normative Source and Extensional Adequacy
- The Guise of the Bad
- Quirky Desires and Well-Being
- Reconsidering Resolutions
- Liberalism or Immigration Restrictions, But Not Both
- The Normative Significance of Self
- Reducing Reasons
- Resisting Tracing’s Siren Song
- Is It Bad to Be Disabled? Adjudicating Between the Mere-Difference and the Bad-Difference Views of Disability
- I Might Be Fundamentally Mistaken
- Distributing Collective Obligation
- Side Effects and the Structure of Deliberation
- Moral Explanations, Thick and Thin
- Humean Externalism and the Argument from Depression
- Manipulation Arguments and the Standing to Blame
- How to Solve Prichard’s Dilemma: A Complex Contractualist Account of Moral Motivation
- Unfinished Adults and Defective Children: On the Nature and Value of Childhood
- On the Nature, Existence and Significance of Organic Unities
- Harm
- Moral Disagreement and Epistemic Advantages: A Challenge to McGrath
- The Abductive Case for Humeanism over Quasi-Perceptual Theories of Desire
- “Freedom and Resentment” and Consequentialism: Why ‘Strawson’s Point’ Is Not Strawson’s Point
- The State’s Duty to Ensure Children Are Loved
- Against Institutional Luck Egalitarianism
- Keep Things in Perspective: Reasons, Rationality, and the A Priori
- Anchoring a Revisionist Account of Moral Responsibility
- The Significance of a Duty?s Direction: Claiming Priority Rather than Prioritizing Claims
- Answerability without Answers
- Aggregation, Beneficence and Chance
- Objectivism and Prospectivism about Rightness
- The Human Right to Political Participation
- Moral Error Theory and the Argument from Epistemic Reasons
- Inescapability and Normativity
- Evolutionary Debunking, Moral Realism and Moral Knowledge
- The Normative Significance of Conscience
- Moral Responsibility and Merit
- Objective Morality, Subjective Morality, and the Explanatory Question
- Against the Being For Account of Normative Certitude
- Could Morality Have a Source?
- Gender Justice
- The Locative Analysis of Good For Formulated and Defended
- The Humean Theory of Practical Irrationality
- ‘Ought’ and the Perspective of the Agent
- Self-Evidence and Disagreement in Ethics
- Deviant Formal Causation
- In Defense of the Wide-Scope Instrumental Principle
- Meriting Concern and Meriting Respect
- Saving Lives and Respecting Persons
- Character Traits, Social Psychology, and Impediments to Helping Behavior
- Agent-Relative Value and Agent-Relative Restrictions
- Is a Feminist Political Liberalism Possible?
- The Enforcement Approach to Coercion
- Four Solutions the the Alleged Incompleteness of Virtue Ethics
- Should Desert Replace Equality? Replies to Kagan
- Desire Satisfactionism and the Problem of Irrelevant Desires
- What Knowledge is Necessary for Virtue?
- When Will Your Consequentialist Friend Abandon You for the Greater Good?
- Moral Intuitions, Reliability, and Disagreement
- Rossian Minimalism
- Beyond History: The Ongoing Aspects of Autonomy
- What Is Wrong with Kamm’s and Scanlon’s Arguments Against Taurek
- Preferentism and the Paradox of Desire
- A danger of definition: Polar predicates in moral theory
- In Defense of the Primacy of Virtues
- Implanted Desires, Self-Formation, and Blame
- Moorean Arguments and Moral Revisionism
- Three Millian Ways to Resolve Open Questions
- Saving People and Flipping Coins
- Moral Principles Are Not Moral Laws
- Caring and the Boundary-Driven Structure of Practical Deliberation
- Hume’s Internalism Reconsidered
- Contractualism, Reciprocity, Compensation
- ‘Simply in Virtue of Being Human’: the Whos and Whys of Human Rights
- Welfare, Achievement, and Self-Sacrifice
- Well-Being and Virtue
- A Unified Moral Terrain?
- Egalitarian Justice and Innocent Choice
- Strict Liability and the Mitigation of Moral Luck
- Explaining Reasons: Where Does the Buck Stop?
- First Force
- Cudworth and Normative Explanations
- Is Gibbard a Realist?
- The Good, the Bad, and the Blameworthy
- Essentially Comparative Concepts
- Two Approaches to Instrumental Rationality and Belief Consistency
- “The Government Beguiled Me”: The Entrapment Defense and the Problem of Private Entrapment
- The Myth of Instrumental Rationality