- Enhancing thoughts: Culture, technology, and the evolution of human cognitive uniqueness
- What do plants and bacteria want? Commentary on Carrie Figdor’s Pieces of mind
- Why literalism is still the best game in town: Replies to Drayson, Machery, and Schwitzgebel
- Why I am not a literalist
- Against the mind package view of minds: Comments on Carrie Figdor’s Pieces of mind
- Rainbow’s end: The structure, character, and content of conscious experience
- Against neuroclassicism: On the perils of armchair neuroscience
- A tribal mind: Beliefs that signal group identity or commitment
- Semantics without semantic content
- Coming from a world without objects
- Are psychopaths moral‐psychologically impaired? Reassessing emotion‐theoretical explanations
- Conditionals: Truth, safety, and success
- Weather predicates, binding, and radical contextualism
- Beyond the icon: Core cognition and the bounds of perception
- Discordant knowing: A puzzle about insight in obsessive–compulsive disorder
- Why should syntactic islands exist?
- Implicit bias, stereotype threat, and seeing‐as: An alternative to “alief” as an explanation of reason‐recalcitrant behaviours
- Language without information exchange
- Pain, placebo, and cognitive penetration
- How to ascribe beliefs to animals
- Much at stake in knowledge
- Communication and representation understood as sender–receiver coordination
- Content is pragmatic: Comments on Nicholas Shea’s Representation in cognitive science
- Probabilistic representations in perception: Are there any, and what would they be?
- Where meanings arise and how: Building on Shannon’s foundations
- Representation in Cognitive Science: Replies
- Hypotheses that attribute false beliefs: A two‐part epistemology (Darwin + Akaike)
- Visual indeterminacy and the puzzle of the speckled hen
- The explanatory project of Gricean pragmatics
- (Implicit) Knowledge, reasons, and semantic understanding
- A pluralistic theory of wordhood
- Is the phenomenological overflow argument really supported by subjective reports?
- Socially adaptive belief
- Truth is dead; long live the truth. Commentary on Conjoining Meanings by Paul Pietroski
- Responses to comments on Conjoining meanings
- Whither extensions?
- Conjoining meanings without losing our heads
- Pragmatics and epistemic vigilance: A developmental perspective
- Beyond black dots and nutritious things: A solution to the indeterminacy problem
- Is boredom one or many? A functional solution to the problem of heterogeneity
- Feeling the right way: Normative influences on people’s use of emotion concepts
- Warrant from transsaccadic vision
- New directions in predictive processing
- Reports from Twin Earth: Both deep structure and appearance determine the reference of natural kind terms
- Towards a sensorimotor approach to flavour and smell
- No context, no content, no problem
- Intentional cooperation and acting as part of a single body
- On perceptual expertise
- Factive theory of mind
- Acquiring mathematical concepts: The viability of hypothesis testing
- A cognitive explanation of the perceived normativity of cultural conventions
- Communication and indifference
- Language and embodiment—Or the cognitive benefits of abstract representations
- Extended cognition, the new mechanists’ mutual manipulability criterion, and the challenge of trivial extendedness
- Learning to see
- Not being there: An analysis of expertise‐induced amnesia
- The impure phenomenology of episodic memory
- Getting to know you: Accuracy and error in judgments of character
- Mind–Language = ? The significance of non‐verbal autism
- Minority reports: Consciousness and the prefrontal cortex
- Why don’t we trust moral testimony?
- Obsessive–compulsive akrasia
- The evolution of cultural gadgets
- Did social cognition evolve by cultural group selection?
- Cognitive instincts versus cognitive gadgets: A fallacy
- Testing cognitive gadgets
- Reference and the ambiguity of truth‐value judgments
- Lingering stereotypes: Salience bias in philosophical argument
- Phenomenal contrast arguments: What they achieve
- Attention and encapsulation
- What are natural concepts? A design perspective
- Is the Capgras delusion an endorsement of experience?
- Does modularity undermine the pro‐emotion consensus?
- When and why people think beliefs are “debunked” by scientific explanations of their origins
- Understanding self‐ascription
- Slurs and register: A case study in meaning pluralism
- Concept‐metacognition
- How to do things with modals
- Water is and is not H2O
- Smell’s puzzling discrepancy: Gifted discrimination, yet pitiful identification
- Rational learners and metaethics: Universalism, relativism, and evidence from consensus
- From things to thinking: Cognitive archaeology
- Testing for the phenomenal: Intuition, metacognition, and philosophical methodology
- The role of experience in demonstrative thought
- Is the folk concept of pain polyeidic?
- The essence of essentialism
- Structural representation and the two problems of content
- Biased by our imaginings
- Assertion: The context shiftiness dilemma
- Triggering domain restriction
- Impoverished or rich consciousness outside attentional focus: Recent data tip the balance for Overflow
- Is tuba masculine or feminine? The timing of grammatical gender
- Memory is a modeling system
- Shared modes of presentation
- Modeling practical thinking
- Gorillas in the missed (but not the unseen): Reevaluating the evidence for attention being necessary for consciousness
- Are false implicatures lies? An empirical investigation
- Pronominal anaphora, coreference, and closed quotation marks
- Is attending a mental process?
- Chess and the conscious mind: Why Dreyfus and McDowell got it wrong
- The enigma is not entirely dispelled: A review of Mercier and Sperber’s The Enigma of Reason
- Why reason? Hugo Mercier’s and Dan Sperber’s The Enigma of Reason: A New Theory of Human Understanding
- The enduring enigma of reason
- Why a modular approach to reason?
- Cognitive phenomenology and metacognitive feelings
- The evolution and development of visual perspective taking
- Remembering Jerry Fodor and his work
- What is the cognitive basis of the side‐effect effect? An experimental test of competing theories
- Underdetermination, domain restriction, and theory choice
- De Pulchritudine non est Disputandum? A cross‐cultural investigation of the alleged intersubjective validity of aesthetic judgment
- Troubles with Bayesianism: An introduction to the psychological immune system
- Reconstructing memories, deconstructing the self
- Flesh matters: The body in cognition
- Third‐person knowledge ascriptions: A crucial experiment for contextualism
- Implicit bias, ideological bias, and epistemic risks in philosophy
- Infer with care: A critique of the argument from animals
- Normativity in joint action
- Children’s attitude problems: Bootstrapping verb meaning from syntax and pragmatics
- The meaning of “I” in “I”‐thought
- From punishment to universalism
- Do as I say and as I do: Imitation, pedagogy, and cumulative culture
- The functions of imitative behaviour in humans
- Two ways of relating to (and acting for) reasons
- Bálint’s syndrome, object seeing, and spatial perception
- Subjectivity in gradable adjectives: The case of tall and heavy
- Do non‐verbal number systems shape grammar? Numerical cognition and Number morphology compared
- Imitation from a joint action perspective
- Singular thoughts and de re attitude reports
- Emotion, deliberation, and the skill model of virtuous agency
- Skepticism and the acquisition of “knowledge”
- Convention and common ground
- The generality problem for intellectualism
- The epistemic innocence of clinical memory distortions
- Episodic memory and theory of mind: A connection reconsidered
- Indeterministic intuitions and the Spinozan strategy
- Knowing why
- Obsessive–compulsive disorder as a disorder of attention
- Crowding, attention and consciousness: In support of the inference hypothesis
- Genericity sans Gen
- A new defence of doxasticism about delusions: The cognitive phenomenological defence
- The psychological representation of modality
- Basic questions
- Conceptual centrality and implicit bias
- A defense of holistic representationalism
- A cognitive account of agentive awareness
- On externalization and cognitive continuity in language evolution
- The emergence of language
- Perceptual expansion under cognitive guidance: Lessons from language processing
- Making sense of language in the light of evolution
- Factive and nonfactive mental state attribution
- Logical Form and the Vernacular Revisited
- Dendrophobia in Bonobo Comprehension of Spoken English
- A Gricean Theory of Malaprops
- The Perception-Action Model: Counting Computational Mechanisms
- Attention and Mental Primer
- On Proprioception in Action: Multimodality versus Deafferentation
- What is the Role of Experience in Children’s Success in the False Belief Test: Maturation, Facilitation, Attunement or Induction?
- ‘I Don’t Know’: Children’s Early Talk About Knowledge
- Does Perceptual Consciousness Overflow Cognitive Access? The Challenge from Probabilistic, Hierarchical Processes
- Morality Without Mindreading
- Grades of Multisensory Awareness
- Motor Intentions: How Intentions and Motor Representations Come Together
- Hume’s Table, Peacocke’s Trees, the Tilted Penny and the Reversed Seeing-in Account
- Intrusive Uncertainty in Obsessive Compulsive Disorder
- Glyn Humphreys: Attention, Binding, Motion-Induced Blindness
- Glyn Humphreys (28 December 1954 – 14 January 2016)
- Knowing the Meaning of a Word: Shared Psychological States and the Determination of Extensions
- Cladistic Parsimony, Historical Linguistics and Cultural Phylogenetics
- Subjective Misidentification and Thought Insertion
- Attentive Visual Reference