- What is rational belief?
- Transitional attitudes and the unmooring view of higher‐order evidence
- Ignore risk; Maximize expected moral value
- Counterfactual epistemic scenarios
- The proper role of history in evolutionary explanations
- Communication before communicative intentions
- Explaining normative reasons
- Input and output in distributive theory
- Problems for factive accounts of assertion
- Humean nomic essentialism
- The structure of analog representation
- Mathematical Pluralism
- Dimensions of Value
- Conditional Intentions and Shared Agency
- The Normativity of Gender
- Ignorance and awareness
- Causal theories of spacetime
- What Is Trustworthiness?
- Tropes and Qualitative Change
- The Boltzmann Brains Puzzle
- Indirect Compatibilism
- Fictional Domains
- How to Perform a Nonbasic Action
- Decision and foreknowledge
- Epistemic Akrasia: No Apology Required
- Why are you talking to yourself? The epistemic role of inner speech in reasoning
- Degrees of commensurability and the repugnant conclusion
- The puzzle of cross‐modal shape experience
- No fact of the middle
- The paradox of colour constancy: Plotting the lower borders of perception
- What is social hierarchy?
- Democracy within, justice without: The duties of informal political representatives
- Optimality justifications and the optimality principle: New tools for foundation‐theoretic epistemology
- Accurate believers are deductively cogent
- Probabilities of conditionals: updating Adams
- Suspending Belief in Credal Accounts
- Constraints, You, and Your Victims
- Moral Uncertainty, Noncognitivism, and the Multi‐Objective Story
- Naturalness by Law
- Consciousness and welfare subjectivity
- Grounding and defining identity
- Virtual terrors
- Are epistemic reasons normative?
- Eyewitness testimony and epistemic agency
- A Kripkean argument for descriptivism
- Higher‐order evidence and losing one’s conviction
- An explanatory idealist theory of grounding
- Error, consistency and triviality
- Guard against temptation: Intrapersonal team reasoning and the role of intentions in exercising willpower
- Are reasons normatively basic?
- Arbitrariness and the long road to permissivism
- Fragmentation and logical omniscience
- Inescapable articulations: Vessels of lexical effects
- DOES success entail ability?
- Controlling our Reasons
- Degrees of Consciousness
- Faith and traditions
- Updating without evidence
- Semantic Reasons
- Conventionalism about mathematics and logic
- Radical parochialism about reference
- Perceptual learning and reasons‐responsiveness
- Is there an epistemic advantage to being oppressed?
- In defense of the armchair: Against empirical arguments in the philosophy of perception
- Space, time and parsimony
- Should moral intuitionism go social?
- Credal imprecision and the value of evidence
- Reflection and Conditionalization: Comments on Michael Rescorla
- Criteria of identity without sortals
- A new argument for moral error theory
- A puzzle about fickleness
- The nomological argument for the existence of God
- How to count structure
- Group motivation
- Reasoning beyond belief acquisition
- Mary Shepherd on the role of proofs in our knowledge of first principles
- How to see invisible objects
- Making space for the normativity of coherence
- The dual scale model of weighing reasons
- A transcendental argument from testimonial knowledge to content externalism
- Hedged testimony
- Parity, Moral Options, and the Weights of Reasons