- The Rationality of Emotional Change: Toward a Process View
- Conceptual Innovation, Function First
- Two Kinds of Cognitive Expertise
- Interventionist Explanation and the Problem of Single Variable Boundary Constraints
- Causal Inference from Noise
- How Reasoning Aims at Truth
- A Paradox for the Intrinsic Value of Freedom of Choice
- The World is Not Enough
- Varieties of Cognitive Integration
- Hypatia’s silence
- Future Contingents and the Logic of Temporal Omniscience
- Practical Moore Sentences
- On the Expected Utility Objection to the Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism
- Trusting Moral Intuitions
- The Expansion View of Thick Concepts
- Existence Is Evidence of Immortality
- Gödel’s Argument for Cantorian Cardinality
- Absolute Time: The Limit of Kant’s Idealism
- Modal Objectivity1
- Content in a Dynamic Context
- Inquiry and Belief
- Why Take Painkillers?
- A Unified Account of the Moral Standing to Blame
- The Shifting Border Between Perception and Cognition
- The Soritical Centipede
- Willpower Satisficing
- Gödel’s Argument for Cantorian Cardinality
- Normative Explanation And Justification*
- Perceptual Pluralism
- Lying with Presuppositions
- Two Kinds of Logical Impossibility
- Supervenience, Repeatability, & Expressivism
- Diamonds are Forever
- Gender and Gender Terms1
- Revolution and Intervention
- Is Every Theory of Knowledge False?
- Learning the Natural Numbers as a Child
- Axiological Absolutism and Risk1
- Impossibility Results for Rational Belief
- Nothing at Stake in Knowledge*
- Perceptual Consciousness as a Mental Activity
- Free Will, Agent Causation, and “Disappearing Agents”
- The Generalized Integration Challenge in Metaethics
- Actual and Potential Infinity
- Are The Statue and The Clay Mutual Parts?
- Practical Reason, Sympathy and Reactive Attitudes
- On the Substitution of Identicals in Counterfactual Reasoning*
- Praiseworthy Motivations
- Is there a Bayesian justification of hypothetico‐deductive inference?
- Accuracy and Credal Imprecision
- Imagery and Possibility
- What is Epistemic Blame?
- Autonomy of Theories: An Explanatory Problem
- The Good, the Bad, and the Transitivity of Better Than*
- Maximalism and the Structure of Acts*
- Fifty Million Elvis Fans Can’t be Wrong
- Situations and Responsiveness to Reasons*
- W(h)ither Semantics!(?)1
- Self‐Differing, Aspects, and Leibniz’s Law
- Epistemic/Non‐epistemic Dependence
- Nominalist Realism*
- Metaphysical Causation
- Two Paradoxes of Common Knowledge: Coordinated Attack and Electronic Mail
- The Necessity of Mathematics
- Functions and Health at the Interface of Biology and Technology
- Promises as Proposals in Joint Practical Deliberation
- Inductive Knowledge
- Carnap’s Noncognitivism about Ontology
- If You Can’t Change What You Believe, You Don’t Believe It