- Where reasons and reasoning come apart
- Neologicism, Frege’s Constraint, and the Frege‐Heck Condition
- Schopenhauer on the content of compassion
- Diamonds are Forever
- Gender and Gender Terms1
- Revolution and Intervention
- Is Every Theory of Knowledge False?
- The limits of rational belief revision: A dilemma for the Darwinian debunker
- No Crystal Balls
- Neologicism, Frege’s Constraint, and the Frege‐Heck Condition
- The Two‐Stage Luck Objection
- Radical Pluralism
- Indistinguishable Senses
- Anthropic Concepts
- The Substitutional Analysis of Logical Consequence
- KILLING KRIPKENSTEIN’S MONSTER
- Addiction and the self
- Praiseworthy Motivations
- On the Substitution of Identicals in Counterfactual Reasoning*
- Three paradoxes of supererogation
- Is there a Bayesian justification of hypothetico‐deductive inference?
- An Accuracy‐Dominance Argument for Conditionalization
- Imagery and Possibility
- Accuracy and Credal Imprecision
- Functions and Health at the Interface of Biology and Technology
- Fatalism and the Logic of Unconditionals
- Why Maximize Expected Choice‐Worthiness?1
- If You Can’t Change What You Believe, You Don’t Believe It
- Carnap’s Noncognitivism about Ontology
- Inductive Knowledge
- Promises as Proposals in Joint Practical Deliberation
- The Necessity of Mathematics
- What is Epistemic Blame?
- Mental structures
- A puzzle about the experience of left and right
- Being neutral: Agnosticism, inquiry and the suspension of judgment
- Respect for persons and the moral force of socially constructed norms
- Perspectivism
- Carnap and quine on analyticity: The nature of the disagreement
- Actualism without Presentism? Not by way of the Relativity Objection
- Partial Resemblance and Property Immanence
- Subjective Disagreement
- The Logicality of Language: A new take on Triviality, “Ungrammaticality”, and Logical Form*
- Empirical Vindication of Moral Luck
- Believing for Practical Reasons
- How do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?
- The Explanatory Ambitions of Moral Principles
- Levels: Descriptive, Explanatory, and Ontological
- Modal arguments against materialism
- Moral torch fishing: A signaling theory of blame
- Russellian monism and mental causation
- Freedom, foreknowledge, and dependence
- Why does duress undermine consent?
- Rationality as the rule of reason
- Indicative conditionals without iterative epistemology
- Endorsement and assertion
- The authority of pleasure
- Naming and epistemic necessity
- The dynamics of loose talk
- Kant, moral overdemandingness and self‐scrutiny
- Justifications and excuses in epistemology
- The Asian Disease Problem and the Ethical Implications Of Prospect Theory
- The Linguistic Determination of Conscious Thought Contents
- On the Perception of Structure
- The Only Way To Be
- Fusion First
- Explanatory Roles for Minimal Content
- Rationality as the Capacity for Understanding
- Repugnant Accuracy
- Which Desires Are Relevant to Well‐Being?
- A Theory of Bayesian Groups
- Updating for externalists
- The Rationality of Emotional Change: Toward a Process View
- Conceptual Innovation, Function First
- Two Kinds of Cognitive Expertise
- Interventionist Explanation and the Problem of Single Variable Boundary Constraints
- Causal Inference from Noise
- How Reasoning Aims at Truth
- A Paradox for the Intrinsic Value of Freedom of Choice
- The World is Not Enough
- Varieties of Cognitive Integration
- Hypatia’s silence
- Future Contingents and the Logic of Temporal Omniscience
- Practical Moore Sentences
- On the Expected Utility Objection to the Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism
- Trusting Moral Intuitions
- The Expansion View of Thick Concepts
- Existence Is Evidence of Immortality
- Gödel’s Argument for Cantorian Cardinality
- Absolute Time: The Limit of Kant’s Idealism
- Modal Objectivity1
- Content in a Dynamic Context
- Inquiry and Belief
- Why Take Painkillers?
- A Unified Account of the Moral Standing to Blame
- The Shifting Border Between Perception and Cognition
- The Soritical Centipede
- Willpower Satisficing
- Gödel’s Argument for Cantorian Cardinality
- Normative Explanation And Justification*
- Perceptual Pluralism