- Testimonial contractarianism: A knowledge‐first social epistemology
- Ramsification and the ramifications of Prior’s puzzle
- The atoms of self‐control
- Self‐prediction in practical reasoning: Its role and limits
- Where reasons and reasoning come apart
- Addiction and the self
- Could our epistemic reasons be collective practical reasons?
- This paper might change your mind
- Schopenhauer on the content of compassion
- Losing confidence in luminosity
- If you don’t know that you know, you could be surprised
- Accurate believers are deductively cogent
- Mundane hallucinations and new wave relationalism
- Counterfactual epistemic scenarios
- Blameworthiness, desert, and luck
- How chance explains
- The proper role of history in evolutionary explanations
- There is no measurement problem for Humeans
- Transitional attitudes and the unmooring view of higher‐order evidence
- No fact of the middle
- Ignore risk; Maximize expected moral value
- Communication before communicative intentions
- Problems for factive accounts of assertion
- Indicative conditionals without iterative epistemology
- Mental structures
- Perspectivism
- A puzzle about the experience of left and right
- Justifications and excuses in epistemology
- Rationality as the rule of reason
- The limits of rational belief revision: A dilemma for the Darwinian debunker
- Moral torch fishing: A signaling theory of blame
- Updating for externalists
- Three paradoxes of supererogation
- Freedom, foreknowledge, and dependence
- Humean nomic essentialism
- Explaining normative reasons
- Input and output in distributive theory
- Optimality justifications and the optimality principle: New tools for foundation‐theoretic epistemology
- Arbitrariness and the long road to permissivism
- Democracy within, justice without: The duties of informal political representatives1
- Degrees of commensurability and the repugnant conclusion
- Are reasons normatively basic?
- DOES success entail ability?
- A Kripkean argument for descriptivism
- What is social hierarchy?
- Error, consistency and triviality
- The puzzle of cross‐modal shape experience
- Why are you talking to yourself? The epistemic role of inner speech in reasoning
- Inescapable articulations: Vessels of lexical effects
- Fragmentation and logical omniscience
- Are epistemic reasons normative?
- Eyewitness testimony and epistemic agency
- The paradox of colour constancy: Plotting the lower borders of perception
- Being neutral: Agnosticism, inquiry and the suspension of judgment
- Why does duress undermine consent?1
- The Rationality of Emotional Change: Toward a Process View*
- Endorsement and assertion
- Naming and epistemic necessity
- Two Kinds of Cognitive Expertise
- Modal arguments against materialism
- Carnap and Quine on analyticity: The nature of the disagreement
- Kant, moral overdemandingness and self‐scrutiny
- Respect for persons and the moral force of socially constructed norms
- Russellian monism and mental causation
- Guard against temptation: Intrapersonal team reasoning and the role of intentions in exercising willpower
- Group motivation
- Higher‐order evidence and losing one’s conviction
- An explanatory idealist theory of grounding
- Mary Shepherd on the role of proofs in our knowledge of first principles
- The nomological argument for the existence of God
- Reasoning beyond belief acquisition
- Existence Is Evidence of Immortality
- The authority of pleasure
- The World is Not Enough*
- Future Contingents and the Logic of Temporal Omniscience*
- The dynamics of loose talk
- Hypatia’s silence
- How Reasoning Aims at Truth
- Causal Inference from Noise
- Practical Moore Sentences*
- On the Expected Utility Objection to the Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism*
- Normative Explanation And Justification*
- The dual scale model of weighing reasons
- Making space for the normativity of coherence