- Perceptual learning and reasons‐responsiveness
- Is there an epistemic advantage to being oppressed?
- In defense of the armchair: Against empirical arguments in the philosophy of perception
- Space, time and parsimony
- Should moral intuitionism go social?
- Credal imprecision and the value of evidence
- Reflection and Conditionalization: Comments on Michael Rescorla
- Criteria of identity without sortals
- A new argument for moral error theory
- A puzzle about fickleness
- The nomological argument for the existence of God
- How to count structure
- Group motivation
- Reasoning beyond belief acquisition
- Mary Shepherd on the role of proofs in our knowledge of first principles
- How to see invisible objects
- Making space for the normativity of coherence
- The dual scale model of weighing reasons
- A transcendental argument from testimonial knowledge to content externalism
- Hedged testimony
- Parity, Moral Options, and the Weights of Reasons
- REFLECTING ON DIACHRONIC DUTCH BOOKS
- Aesthetic testimony, understanding and virtue
- Happiness and desire satisfaction
- The search for invertebrate consciousness
- From time asymmetry to quantum entanglement: The Humean unification
- Putting explanation back into “inference to the best explanation”
- An expressivist interpretation of Kant’s “I think”1
- Dilating and contracting arbitrarily
- Letting others do wrong
- Tournament decision theory
- Bias and interpersonal skepticism
- Mental filing
- The case for comparability
- The many‐worlds theory of consciousness
- The Structure of Analog Representation
- Testimonial contractarianism: A knowledge‐first social epistemology
- Ramsification and the ramifications of Prior’s puzzle
- The atoms of self‐control
- Self‐prediction in practical reasoning: Its role and limits
- Where reasons and reasoning come apart
- Addiction and the self
- Could our epistemic reasons be collective practical reasons?
- This paper might change your mind
- Schopenhauer on the content of compassion
- Losing confidence in luminosity
- If you don’t know that you know, you could be surprised
- Accurate believers are deductively cogent
- Mundane hallucinations and new wave relationalism
- Counterfactual epistemic scenarios
- Blameworthiness, desert, and luck
- How chance explains
- The proper role of history in evolutionary explanations
- There is no measurement problem for Humeans
- Transitional attitudes and the unmooring view of higher‐order evidence
- No fact of the middle
- Ignore risk; Maximize expected moral value
- Communication before communicative intentions
- Problems for factive accounts of assertion
- Indicative conditionals without iterative epistemology
- Mental structures
- Perspectivism
- A puzzle about the experience of left and right
- Justifications and excuses in epistemology
- Rationality as the rule of reason
- The limits of rational belief revision: A dilemma for the Darwinian debunker
- Moral torch fishing: A signaling theory of blame
- Updating for externalists
- Three paradoxes of supererogation
- Freedom, foreknowledge, and dependence
- Humean nomic essentialism
- Explaining normative reasons
- Input and output in distributive theory
- Optimality justifications and the optimality principle: New tools for foundation‐theoretic epistemology
- Arbitrariness and the long road to permissivism
- Democracy within, justice without: The duties of informal political representatives1
- Degrees of commensurability and the repugnant conclusion