- Aphantasia reimagined
- What is knowledge by acquaintance?
- Symmetries of value
- Farewell to the modal theory of luck
- Ability as dependence modality
- Expected value, to a point: Moral decision‐making under background uncertainty
- Sleeping Beauty and the demands of non‐ideal rationality
- We have positive epistemic duties
- Judgment’s aimless heart
- Loops and the geometry of chance
- A trope‐theoretic solution to the missing value problem
- The simplicity of physical laws
- The question‐centered account of harm and benefit
- The bayesian and the abductivist
- Heavy‐duty conceptual engineering
- A style guide for the structuralist
- From modality to millianism
- The censor’s burden
- Paradoxes of infinite aggregation
- Invariantism, contextualism, and the explanatory power of knowledge
- The transparency of mental vehicles
- Proleptic praise: A social function analysis
- Superspreading the word
- Just probabilities
- The misapplication dilemma
- The fundamental facts can be logically simple
- Respect for others’ risk attitudes and the long‐run future
- In defense of value incomparability: A reply to Dorr, Nebel, and Zuehl
- Who killed the causality of things?
- Meaning, purpose, and narrative
- Humes definitions of virtue
- Flummoxing expectations
- How do you assert a graph? Towards an account of depictions in scientific testimony
- Kant’s nutshell argument for idealism
- Natural kind reasoning in consciousness science: An alternative to theory testing
- The quest for a qualitative hedonism
- Galileo’s ship and the relativity principle
- Action, passion, power
- On two arguments for fanaticism
- Absolution of a Causal Decision Theorist
- Experience, time, objects, and processes
- Decision theory unbound
- Good people are not like good knives
- How to do things with sunk costs
- Logic will get you from A to B, imagination will take you anywhere
- On the site of predictive justice
- Numbers without aggregation
- Center indifference and skepticism
- Higher‐order evidence and the duty to double‐check
- Disagreement & classification in comparative cognitive science
- Symbolic value and the limits of good‐for theory
- Frege cases and rationalizing explanations
- Meddlesome blame and negotiating standing
- Higher‐order being and time
- Primitive governance
- The slow clap phenomenon
- Do credences model guesses?
- A puzzle about knowledge ascriptions
- Arithmetical pluralism and the objectivity of syntax
- The puzzle of mood rationality
- Metaphysics of risk and luck
- How to be indifferent
- Epistemic practices: A unified account of epistemic and zetetic normativity
- Rigidity and necessary application
- Happiness and well‐being: Is it all in your head? Evidence from the folk
- Moral understanding: From virtue to knowledge
- ‘I didn’t know it was you’: The impersonal grounds of relational normativity
- Knowing what to do
- What is rational belief?
- Imagination as a generative source of justification
- A paradox for tiny probabilities and enormous values
- A risky challenge for intransitive preferences
- Weyl and two kinds of potential domains
- Mathematical pluralism
- Dimensions of value
- What the tortoise should do: A knowledge‐first virtue approach to the basing relation
- The problem of nomological harmony
- When is a concept a priori?
- A false dichotomy in denying explanatoriness any role in confirmation
- Identified person “bias” as decreasing marginal value of chances
- A defense of back‐end doxastic voluntarism
- Indexicality, Bayesian background and self‐location in fine‐tuning arguments for the multiverse
- Does matter mind content?
- The epistemology of interpersonal relations
- Why there are no Frankfurt‐style omission cases
- Evidentialism, justification, and knowledge‐first