- How to see invisible objects
- A puzzle about fickleness
- How to count structure
- A Paradox for the Intrinsic Value of Freedom of Choice
- Trusting Moral Intuitions
- Two Kinds of Logical Impossibility
- Conceptual Innovation, Function First
- Interventionist Explanation and the Problem of Single Variable Boundary Constraints
- The Expansion View of Thick Concepts
- Varieties of Cognitive Integration
- Perceptual Pluralism
- Tournament Decision Theory
- A new argument for moral error theory
- A transcendental argument from testimonial knowledge to content externalism
- Mental filing
- From time asymmetry to quantum entanglement: The Humean unification
- Bias and interpersonal skepticism
- An expressivist interpretation of Kant’s “I think”1
- An expressivist interpretation of Kant’s “I think”1
- Losing confidence in luminosity
- The search for invertebrate consciousness
- Putting explanation back into “inference to the best explanation”
- Ramsification and the ramifications of Prior’s puzzle
- Ramsification and the ramifications of prior’s puzzle
- Supervenience, Repeatability, & Expressivism
- Lying with Presuppositions
- Letting others do wrong
- Happiness and desire satisfaction
- Aesthetic testimony, understanding and virtue
- If you don’t know that you know, you could be surprised
- Testimonial contractarianism: A knowledge‐first social epistemology
- Dilating and contracting arbitrarily
- Perceptual Variation and Structuralism
- This paper might change your mind
- The atoms of self‐control
- Could our epistemic reasons be collective practical reasons?
- Chalmers v Chalmers*
- Spatiotemporal functionalism v. the conceivability of zombies*
- Self‐prediction in practical reasoning: Its role and limits
- Where reasons and reasoning come apart
- Neologicism, Frege’s Constraint, and the Frege‐Heck Condition
- Schopenhauer on the content of compassion
- Diamonds are Forever
- Gender and Gender Terms1
- Revolution and Intervention
- Is Every Theory of Knowledge False?
- The limits of rational belief revision: A dilemma for the Darwinian debunker
- No Crystal Balls
- Neologicism, Frege’s Constraint, and the Frege‐Heck Condition
- The Two‐Stage Luck Objection
- Radical Pluralism
- Indistinguishable Senses
- Anthropic Concepts
- The Substitutional Analysis of Logical Consequence
- KILLING KRIPKENSTEIN’S MONSTER
- Addiction and the self
- Praiseworthy Motivations
- On the Substitution of Identicals in Counterfactual Reasoning*
- Three paradoxes of supererogation
- Is there a Bayesian justification of hypothetico‐deductive inference?
- An Accuracy‐Dominance Argument for Conditionalization
- Imagery and Possibility
- Accuracy and Credal Imprecision
- Functions and Health at the Interface of Biology and Technology
- Fatalism and the Logic of Unconditionals
- Why Maximize Expected Choice‐Worthiness?1
- If You Can’t Change What You Believe, You Don’t Believe It
- Carnap’s Noncognitivism about Ontology
- Inductive Knowledge
- Promises as Proposals in Joint Practical Deliberation
- The Necessity of Mathematics
- What is Epistemic Blame?
- Mental structures
- A puzzle about the experience of left and right