- Bearing Witness: The Duty of Non‐indifference and the Case for Reading the News
- Understanding the Relationship Between Disability and Enhancement
- In Defense of Constitutivism About Epistemic Normativity
- Measuring Social Welfare by Proximity to an Optimum Population
- A Partnership for the Ages
- Blameworthiness, Control, and Consciousness Or A Consciousness Requirement and an Argument For It
- Existence and Believability
- Who Reclaims Slurs?
- Structural Rationality and the Property of Coherence
- The Black Box in Stoic Axiology
- Aesthetic Acquaintance
- Fake Dispositional Sentences: Manley and Wasserman’s Misstep
- Creating and Redirecting Threats
- Why I’m not a Humean
- Relationism and the Problem of Publicity
- Introspection of Emotions
- Dreams, Morality and the Waking World
- The Explanatory Demands of Grounding in Law
- Conceptual Engineering and the Politics of Implementation
- Frege’s Critical Arguments for Axioms
- List and Menzies on High‐Level Causation
- ‘True’ as Polysemous
- Causal Accounts of Harming
- Grounding, Understanding, and Explanation
- Arbitrariness and Uniqueness
- Don’t Stop Thinking About Tomorrow: Attitudes De se and De motu
- Cat‐Calls, Compliments and Coercion
- Modeling Descriptive and Deontic Cognition as Two Modes of Relation Between Mind and World
- Responding to the Timing Argument
- Is Normative Uncertainty Irrelevant if Your Descriptive Uncertainty Depends on It?
- The Metaphysical Problem of Other Minds
- Cognitive Instrumentalism about Mental Representations
- Acquittal from Knowledge Laundering
- Aesthetic Autonomy and Norms of Exposure
- Incapacity, Inconceivability, and Two Types of Objectivity
- There Are No Irrational Emotions
- What’s Luck Got to do with the Luck Pincer?
- Growth and the Shape of a Life
- Faith Entails Belief: Three Avenues of Defense Against the Argument from Doubt
- Spinozan Doxasticism About Delusions
- Empirical Studies on Truth and the Project of Re‐engineering Truth
- Thomas Reid on Promises and Social Operations of the Human Mind
- Homophonic Reports and Gradual Communication
- The Virtue of Consistency
- Seeing‐in and Singling Out: How to Reconcile Pictures with Singular Thought
- The Activity of Reasoning: How Reasoning Can Constitute Epistemic Agency
- Intention as Belief
- Well‐Being
- Lucky Ignorance, Modality and Lack of Knowledge
- Thomas Hobbes and Thomas White on Identity and Discontinuous Existence
- Eternalism as Therapy: Mourning the Death of Michael Besso
- Olfactory Amodal Completion
- Epistemic Gradualism Versus Epistemic Absolutism
- Death, Deprivation, and a Sartrean Account of Horror
- More than a Feeling
- On Grief’s Wandering Thought: A Philosophical Exploration
- High‐Fidelity Metaphysics: Ideological Parsimony in Theory Choice
- Human Beings Among the Beasts
- A republic for all sentients: Social freedom without free will
- Meaning Scepticism and Primitive Normativity
- Wading Through the Heraclitean Waters of Experience
- The Mismatch Problem: Why Mele’s Approach to the Puzzle of Synchronic Self‐control Does Not Succeed
- Turning Aboutness About
- Understanding What It’s Like To Be (Dis)Privileged
- Republicanism and Structural Domination
- Otto Said that I am a Fool: Sententialism, Indexicals and Kaplanian Monsters
- Epistemic Analyticity Reconsidered
- Shared Belief and the Limits of Empathy
- There Are No Purely Aesthetic Obligations
- Against Mother’s Day and Employee Appreciation Day and Other Representations of Oppressive Expectations as Opportunities for Excellence and Beneficence
- In Defense of Deliberative Indispensability
- Self‐Authorship and the Claim Against Interference
- Practical Intelligibility and Moral Skepticism: Should Realists Worry About Grass‐Counters and Hand‐Claspers?
- Brandom’s Leibniz
- Being Sympathetic to Bad‐History Wrongdoers
- Are Counterpossibles Epistemic?
- Spinoza on Counterpossible Inferences
- Admiration Over Time
- Kantian Cognitivism
- Glass Panels and Peepholes: Nonhuman Animals and the Right to Privacy
- Keeping It Simple: Rethinking Abilities and Moral Responsibility
- Rethinking Thomas Hobbes on the Passions
- Context Sensitivity and Chance
- Directive Content
- Being Familiar with What One Wants
- HUME’S GENERAL POINT OF VIEW: A TWO‐STAGE APPROACH
- HUME’S GENERAL POINT OF VIEW: A TWO‐STAGE APPROACH
- SCEPTICAL DELIBERATIONS
- Some Hallucinations Are Experiences of the Past
- Hypocrisy, Standing to Blame and Second‐Personal Authority
- The Invisible Thin Red Line
- Some Problems with the Anti‐Luminosity‐Argument
- HIPPOCRATES AT PHAEDRUS 270C
- Why, and to What Extent, Is Sexual Infidelity Wrong?
- Perceiving Smellscapes
- What Must Pro‐Lifers Believe About the Moral Status of Embryos?
- Towards a Hybrid Account of Luck
- Intentions, Intending, and Belief: Noninferential Weak Cognitivism
- Dual Character Art Concepts
- Being in a Position to Know is the Norm of Assertion
- Meeting the Evil God Challenge
- Lost at Sea: A New Route to Metaphysical Skepticism
- Unacknowledged Permissivism
- Understanding Implicit Bias: Putting the Criticism into Perspective
- Universal Gravitation and the (Un)Intelligibility of Natural Philosophy
- KNOWLEDGE AND TRUTH: A SKEPTICAL CHALLENGE
- I See Not Only a Madonna, but Also a Hole, in the Picture
- In Defence of Advance Directives in Dementia
- THE LIMITS OF NEO‐ARISTOTELIAN PLENITUDE (AND ITS CONCEPTUAL NEIGHBORS)
- Skeptical Theism Unscathed: Why Skeptical Objections to Skeptical Theism Fail
- Updating Thought Theory: Emotion and the Non‐Paradox of Fiction
- On Referring: Donnellan versus Strawson
- Being of Two Minds (or of One in Two Ways): A New Puzzle for Constitution Views of Personal Identity
- The Competition Account of Achievement‐Value
- Not as a Means: Killing as a Side Effect in Self‐defense
- On the Rationality of Vow‐making
- Promising’s Neglected Siblings: Oaths, Vows, and Promissory Obligation
- Rescuing Basic Equality
- Upping the Ex Ante Problem for Reliabilism
- Platonic Personal Immortality
- Beliefless Knowing
- Monuments as Commitments: How Art Speaks to Groups and How Groups Think in Art
- Transparency About Painkillers: A Remedy for the Evaluativist’s Headache
- Moral Hedging and Responding to Reasons
- Agent Causation and the Phenomenology of Agency
- Anti‐reductionism and Expected Trust
- Issue information
- The Facts and Practices of Moral Responsibility
- No Reasons to Believe the False
- Hume’s Dual Criteria for Memory
- Emotional Intentionality and the Attitude‐content Distinction
- Deferring to Others about One’s Own Mind
- Ambivalence and Self‐Deception: Reframing the Debate
- Kant, the Third Antinomy and Transcendental Arguments
- Butler’s Stone
- Grounding Thick Normative Facts
- Reflection Without Regress
- Deliberation, Reasons, and Alternatives
- The Agential Point of View
- On The Content and Character of Pain Experience
- Accommodating Options
- Locke on Persons and Other Kinds of Substances
- Perceptual Kinds as Supervening Sortals
- Grounding Nominalism
- Silencing without Convention
- The Tenseless Theory of Time and the Moodless Theory of Modality
- Not Always Worth the Effort: Difficulty and the Value of Achievement
- Knowledge Grounded on Pure Reasoning
- How to Know That Time Travel Is Unlikely Without Knowing Why
- Solving the Interface Problem Without Translation: The Same Format Thesis
- Rejecting Supererogationism
- Multipropositionalism and Necessary a Posteriori identity Statements
- Putting the Ghost Back in the Machine: An Exploration of Somatic Dualism
- Naïve Realism, Seeing Stars, and Perceiving the Past
- Plato’s Revenge: Moral Deliberation As Dialogical Activity
- Emotions, Attitudes, and Reasons
- Can You Lie Without Intending to Deceive?
- Three Arguments to Think that Faith Does Not Entail Belief
- The Affective Experience of Aesthetic Properties
- A Structural Explanation of Injustice in Conversations: It’s about Norms
- The Shape of a Life and Desire Satisfaction
- Knowledge and Temperance in Plato’s Charmides
- What Does ‘Legal Obligation’ Mean?
- Laying Down Hume’s Law
- Ideal Theory and ‘Ought Implies Can’
- Kant’s Critique of Instrumental Reason
- Ambiguity and Zeugma
- Knowledge, Safety, and Meta‐Epistemic Belief
- How to Use Cognitive Faculties You Never Knew You Had
- Rule A
- Why Subjectivists About Welfare Needn’t Idealize
- Flat Emergence
- The Amoralist and the Anaesthetic
- Physical Magnitudes
- Rethinking the Principle of Fair Play
- Mereological Nihilism and Puzzles about Material Objects
- Reid’s Non-Humean Theory of Moral Motives
- The Realization of Qualia, Persons, and Artifacts
- Spinoza’s Formal Mechanism
- On the Asymmetry between Twin Earth and Inverted Earth
- Cogency, Warrant Transmission-Increase and non-Ideal Thinkers
- Disjunctivism and the Epistemological Holy Grail
- Can Moral Realists Deflect Defeat Due to Evolutionary Explanations of Morality?
- Implicit Bias, Moods, and Moral Responsibility
- The Nurturing Stance: Making Sense of Responsibility without Blame
- Factual Evidence without Knowledge
- Pragmatic Encroachment and Moral Encroachment
- Cares, Identification, and Agency Reductionism
- Past Tense and Past Times in Subjunctive Conditionals
- Virtue Ethics is Empirically Adequate: A Defense of the Caps Response to Situationism
- How Berkeley’s Gardener Knows His Cherry Tree
- Skepticism about Skepticism about Moral Responsibility
- Cartesian Imperativism
- Indeterministic Causation and Two Patches for the Pairing Argument
- You’re Probably Not Really a Speciesist
- Hume on Education
- Luminosity Guaranteed
- Relativism, Disagreement and Testimony
- In Defense of a Probability Based Semantics for Counterfactuals
- A Capacitarian Account of Culpable Ignorance
- Kant’s Conceptualism: a New Reading of the Transcendental Deduction
- Quine against Lewis (and Carnap) on Truth by Convention
- Subjective Rightness and Minimizing Expected Objective Wrongness
- The Compatibility of the Structure-and-Dynamics Argument and Phenomenal Functionalism about Space
- (ANTI)-Anti-Intellectualism and the Sufficiency Thesis
- Maximalism versus Omnism about Permissibility
- Are Fictional Characters and Literary Works Ontologically on a Par?
- Depicting Depictions
- Thisnesses, Propositions, and Truth
- How Doxastic Justification Helps Us Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher-Order Evidence
- Knowledge and Attributability
- Future-Bias: A (Qualified) Defense
- Defending Evidence-Resistant Beliefs
- What The Tortoise Has To Say About Diachronic Rationality
- Perception and the Origins of Temporal Representation
- Visual Feeling of Presence
- Faith, Belief and Fictionalism
- The Virtue of Being Supportive
- God and Dispositional Essentialism: An Account of the Laws of Nature
- Debunking Morality: Lessons from the EAAN Literature
- Advice for Noncognitivists
- Illusions of Optimal Motion, Relationism, and Perceptual Content
- Panpsychism, Emergentism and the Metaphysics of Causation
- Is the Norm on Belief Evaluative? A Response to McHugh
- What’s wrong with promising to try?
- Two Kinds of Feminist Philosophy
- Epistemic Warrants and Higher-Order Theories of Conscious Perception
- Sensitivity and Higher-Order Knowledge
- Higher-Order Defeat is Object-Independent
- Human Nature and Moral Sprouts: Mencius on the Pollyanna Problem
- I, Me, Mine: Body-Ownership and the Generation Problem
- Explaining our Moral Reliability
- Epistemic and non-Epistemic Theories of Remembering
- Philosophical Arguments Against the A-Theory
- Russell’s Revenge: A Problem for Bivalent Fregean Theories of Descriptions
- Libertarianism, the Rollback Argument, and the Objective Probability of Free Choices
- A Dilemma for Non-Analytic Naturalism
- Block’s Overflow Argument
- Enduring Simples and the Stages They Compose
- Emergence for Nihilists
- Semantic Knowledge, Semantic Guidance, and Kripke’s Wittgenstein
- Historical Moral Responsibility: Is The Infinite Regress Problem Fatal?
- Russellian Monism and Epiphenomenalism
- Perceiving Necessity
- On G.E. Moore’s ‘Proof of an External World’
- Better Understanding Through Falsehood
- Do Intentions Set Up Rational Defaults? Commitments, Reasons, and the Diachronic Dimension of Rationality
- Ampliative Transmission and Deontological Internalism
- Think of the Children! Epistemic Justification and Cognitively Unsophisticated Subjects
- Avoiding Vice and Pursuing Virtue: Kant on Perfect Duties and ‘Prudential latitude’
- The Rawls–Harsanyi Dispute: A Moral Point of View
- Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning
- On Whether we Can See Intentions
- Justified Belief from Unjustified Belief
- Introspection, Anton’s Syndrome, and Human Echolocation
- Back to the Unchanging Past
- Testimonial Knowledge Without Knowledge of What Is Said
- Preface Writers are Consistent
- Farewell to Political Obligation: In Defense of a Permissive Conception of Legitimacy
- Hume on Mental Transparency
- Are Propositions Essentially Representational?
- Non-factualism Versus Nominalism
- Keeping it Real: Intentional Inexistents, Fineness-of-Grain, and the Dilemma for Extrinsic Higher-Order Representational Theories
- I Can’t Relax! You’re Driving me Quasi!
- Truth is not (Very) Intrinsically Valuable
- Kant and Women
- How We Hurt The Ones We Love
- An Absolutist Theory of Faultless Disagreement in Aesthetics
- Hypocrisy and the Standing to Blame
- Metaemotional Intentionality
- Is Understanding Epistemic in Nature?
- How is Self-Forgiveness Possible?
- Activity, Passivity, and Normative Avowal
- Worldly Reasons: An Ontological Inquiry into Motivating Considerations and Normative Reasons
- The Evolution of Retribution: Intuitions Undermined
- The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification
- Requesting Belief
- Epistemic Value and the New Evil Demon