- Why (getting) the phenomenology of recognition (right) matters for epistemology
- On the fittingness of agential evaluations
- Skepticism about reasons for emotions
- Incompetent perceivers, distinguishable hallucinations, and perceptual phenomenology. Some problems for activity views of perception
- Hyman on intentional explanations and the problem of deviant causal chains
- The mental in intentional action
- Let me go and try
- Still committed to the normativity of folk psychology
- Are actions bodily movements?
- The modularity of the motor system
- Deciding: how special is it?
- Reason and intuition in Aristotle’s moral psychology: why he was not a two-system dualist
- Free will, determinism, and the right levels of description
- Correspondence and dispositional relations
- Autonomy, enactivism, and psychopathy
- Implicit bias: a sin of omission?
- Adverbialism, the many-property problem, and inference: reply to Grzankowski
- Dual-process reflective equilibrium: rethinking the interplay between intuition and reflection in moral reasoning
- Against moral judgment. The empirical case for moral abolitionism
- Deontic artifacts. Investigating the normativity of objects
- Self-control in action and belief
- Pluralism about practical reasons and reason explanations
- Acting for normative reasons and the correspondence relation
- What should the sensorimotor enactivist say about dreams?
- The guise of good reason
- Complete blockage Frankfurt examples and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities
- From the agent’s point of view: the case against disjunctivism about rationalisation
- Can morally ignorant agents care enough?
- The modern guise of the good
- Spinoza’s guise of the good: getting to the bottom of 3p9s
- Sidgwick and the many guises of the good