- Are emotions necessary and sufficient for moral judgement (and what would it tell us)?
- Narrative, addiction, and three aspects of self-ambiguity
- Psychiatric fictionalism and narratives of responsibility
- Extending knowledge-how
- Moral encroachment and the ideal of unified agency
- The doxastic profile of the compulsive re-checker
- On the importance of breaks: transformative experiences and the process of narration
- Selves hijacked: affects and personhood in ‘self-illness ambiguity’
- Why difference-making mental causation does not save free will
- My Illness, My Self, and I: when self-narratives and illness-narratives clash
- Self-illness ambiguity, affectivity, and affordances
- Collective moral agency and self-induced moral incapacity
- Authoritatively avowing your imaginings by self-ascriptively expressing them
- Comment on ‘What’s special about “not feeling like oneself”?’
- Grief, self and narrative
- Self-implant ambiguity? Understanding self-related changes in deep brain stimulation
- Self-alienation through the loss of heteronomy: the case of bereavement
- What’s special about ‘not feeling like oneself’? A deflationary account of self(-illness) ambiguity
- How simple is the Humean Theory of Motivation?
- Solving the self-illness ambiguity: the case for construction over discovery
- Difficulty & quality of will: implications for moral ignorance
- Revisiting McKay and Johnson’s counterexample to (β)
- Revisiting McKay and Johnson’s counterexample to (β)
- Then again, what is manipulation? A broader view of a much-maligned concept
- Can realists reason with reasons?
- How would you answer this question? Can dispositional analyses of belief account for first-person authority?
- Unsettledness and the intentionality of practical decisions
- Why (getting) the phenomenology of recognition (right) matters for epistemology
- On the fittingness of agential evaluations
- Skepticism about reasons for emotions
- Incompetent perceivers, distinguishable hallucinations, and perceptual phenomenology. Some problems for activity views of perception
- Hyman on intentional explanations and the problem of deviant causal chains