- Reasoning and normative beliefs: not too sophisticated
- Making sense of the libertarian’s semantic claim about agential phenomenology
- Circumstantial ignorance and mitigated blameworthiness
- “The Group Knobe Effect”: evidence that people intuitively attribute agency and responsibility to groups
- Tolerant enactivist cognitive science
- Enactivism and predictive processing: a non-representational view
- Making too many enemies: Hutto and Myin’s attack on computationalism
- Explaining embodied emotions – with and without representations
- Predictive minds and small-scale models: Kenneth Craik’s contribution to cognitive science
- Enactive or inactive? Cranially envatted dream experience and the extended conscious mind
- Much ado about nothing? Why going non-semantic is not merely semantics
- Representation and mental representation
- Subject-centred reasons and bestowal love
- Two senses of narrative unification
- Is a bad will a weak will? Cognitive dispositions modulate folk attributions of weakness of will
- Trigger warning: no proximal intentions required for intentional action
- Self-knowledge, belief, ability (and agency?)
- Remarks on the “thickness” of action description: with Wittgenstein, Ryle, and Anscombe
- Action, interaction and inaction: post-Kantian accounts of thinking, willing, and doing in Fichte and Schopenhauer
- Sympathetic action in the seventeenth century: human and natural
- Action, knowledge and embodiment in Berkeley and Locke
- Hume’s better argument for motivational skepticism
- Agents, objects, and their powers in Suarez and Hobbes
- Following the law because it’s the law: obedience, bootstrapping, and practical reason