- Moral discourse boosts confidence in moral judgments
- An enactivist reconceptualization of the medical model
- Intuitions about moral relevance—Good news for moral intuitionism
- Continence, temperance, and motivational conflict: Why traditional neo-Aristotelian accounts are psychologically unrealistic
- Exploring the structure of mental action in directed thought
- Moral Judgement and Moral Progress: The Problem of Cognitive Control
- What’s up with anti-natalists? An observational study on the relationship between dark triad personality traits and anti-natalist views
- Teleosemantics and the hard problem of content
- Causal attributions and the trolley problem
- Emotions and the body. Testing the subtraction argument
- Emotion regulation and cooperation
- The nonmoral conditions of moral cognition
- The Universal pure pleasure machine: Suicide or nirvana?
- Empiricism, syntax, and ontogeny
- Interface Theory vs Gibson: An Ontological Defense of the Ecological Approach
- Moral judgments as educated intuitions
- Emotion in imaginative resistance
- Shame, selves, and morality
- How to create a cultural species: Evaluating three proposals
- A dose of reality for moral twin earth
- Psychopathic personalities and developmental systems
- Rise of the swamp creatures: Reflections on a mechanistic approach to content
- Joint attention without recursive mindreading: On the role of second-person engagement
- The psychology of philosophy: Associating philosophical views with psychological traits in professional philosophers
- On the rationality of emotion regulation
- Folk psychology and proximal intentions
- Against Neo-Cartesianism: Neurofunctional Resilience and Animal Pain
- Does folk disagreement about ambiguous lucky cases warrant an error theory? A response to Hales and Johnson
- Moral framing effects within subjects
- Relationality of intentionality
- Considering the boundaries of intellectual disability: Using philosophy of science to make sense of borderline cases
- Underlying delusion: Predictive processing, looping effects, and the personal/sub-personal distinction
- Conceptualizing consciousness
- Emotion’s role in the unity of consciousness
- The irrationality of folk metaethics
- Emotions and two senses of simulation
- My friend’s true self: Children’s concept of personal identity
- Jokes can fail to be funny because they are immoral: The incompatibility of emotions
- Extended control systems: A theory and its implications
- The aim of belief and suspended belief
- The representations of the approximate number system
- The complexity of neural responses to visual stimuli: On Carruthers’ challenge to Block’s overflow argument
- Can induced reflection affect moral decision-making?
- Tactful animals: How the study of touch can inform the animal morality debate
- Reflective intuition and the Copi card problem
- An intellectual history of psychology
- Strong representationalism and bodily sensations: Reliable causal covariance and biological function
- Lectures on perspective An ecological approach
- The destructive nature of severe and ongoing trauma: Impairments in the minimal-self
- Accounting for cognitive costs: can scientists be creative?
- The first minds: Caterpillars, ‘karyotes and consciousness
- The method(s) of cases
- Question framing effects and the processing of the moral–conventional distinction
- Beyond objectivism: new methods for studying metaethical intuitions
- 4E cognition and the dogma of harmony
- How do we know what babies know? The limits of inferring cognitive representations from visual fixation data
- The seven deadly sins of psychology a manifesto for reforming the culture of scientific practice
- A theory of jerks and other philosophical misadventures
- False procedural memory
- Online education as a “Mental Institution”
- Can hierarchical predictive coding explain binocular rivalry?
- Range content, attention, and the precision of representation
- Intention and empathy
- What is a colleague? The descriptive and normative dimension of a dual character concept
- Folk intuitions and the conditional ability to do otherwise
- Editor’s views
- More than provocative, less than scientific: A commentary on the editorial decision to publish Cofnas (2020)
- Pieces of mind: The proper domain of psychological predicates