- Mental disorders in entangled brains
- On the importance of infant carrying for social learning and the development of social cognition
- Mental representation, “standing-in-for”, and internal models
- Blame-validation: Beyond rationality? Effect of causal link on the relationship between evaluation and causal judgment
- Partial realization and biological normality: Jefferson’s account of brain dysfunction reinterpreted
- Apophasis, agency, and ecstasy: reading mysticism and madness in The Book of Margery Kempe
- A philosophical approach to improving empirical research on posttraumatic growth
- Implicit bias, intersectionality, compositionality
- The rabbit-hole of conspiracy theories: An analysis from the perspective of the free energy principle
- Going Dennettian about Gricean communication
- Watching the watchmen: Vigilance-based models of honesty fail to explain it
- Trust’s meno problem: Can the doxastic view account for the value of trust?
- A Journey into the Mind
- Virtue for affective engines
- Sacrificing objects instead of persons: Order effects without emotional engagement
- What is virtue? Using philosophy to refine psychological definition and operationalization
- Must we tolerate hate?
- Probability fixed points, (in)adequate concept possession and COVID-19 irrationalities
- It’s common sense – you don’t need to believe to disagree!
- The normative turn in recent literature on psychotherapy
- Can memory color effects be explained by cognitive penetration?
- Lacan and the language of mania. From language gone mad to the madness of llanguage
- Posthumous autonomy: Agency and consent in body donation
- Are noetic feelings embodied? The case for embodied metacognition
- How to ‘make or break’ a mind: causes and causal difference-makers in developmental psychology
- In need of the general public’s participation in science: commentary on Bad Beliefs
- Speaker trustworthiness: Shall confidence match evidence?
- What is left of irrationality?
- Normativity in studying conspiracy theory belief: Seven guidelines
- Efficient mechanisms
- Response to commentators
- Gunning for affective realism: Emotion, perception and police shooting errors
- Bad beliefs: why they happen to highly intelligent, vigilant, devious, self-deceiving, coalitional apes
- The (higher-order) evidential significance of attention and trust—comments on Levy’s Bad Beliefs
- Implications of the TASI taxonomy for understanding inconsistent effects pertaining to free will beliefs
- Refusing the COVID-19 vaccine: What’s wrong with that?
- Virtually imagining our biases
- Becoming episodic: The Development of Objectivity
- Tracing the origins of consciousness
- Henri Maldiney and the melancholic complaint: The performance of a cry
- Trusting groups
- Echo chambers, polarization, and “Post-truth”: In search of a connection
- Towards a new standard model of concepts?
- Capturing the elusive self
- Social Anxiety in Schizophrenia: The Specificity of the Unspecific
- The new self-advocacy activism in psychiatry: Toward a scientific turn
- Metaethical intuitions in lay concepts of normative uncertainty
- Deep history and beyond: a reply to commentators
- Traumatic retroactivity: The phenomenological significance of Freud’s retroactive trauma
- What’s the Linguistic Meaning of Delusional Utterances? Speech Act Theory as a Tool for Understanding Delusions
- Problems for enactive psychiatry as a practical framework
- The role of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex in moral cognition: A value-centric hypothesis
- Bad beliefs: automaticity, arationality, and intervention
- Becoming closer to one another: Shared emotions and social relationships
- Nothing about collective irrationalities makes sense except in the light of cooperation
- Making life more interesting: Trust, trustworthiness, and testimonial injustice
- Hermeneutical Injustice and Unworlding in Psychopathology
- Are mental disorders brain disorders? – A precis
- The Deep History of Ourselves: The Four-Billion-Year Story of How We Got Conscious Brains
- Conceptualization for intended action: A dynamic model
- The moral source of collective irrationality during COVID-19 vaccination campaigns
- Déjà vécu is not déjà vu: An ability view
- Challenges and achievements for Philosophical Psychology
- The father, the Wager, and the question of psychosis in Lacan’s work
- The Coherent Dual Theory of Addictive Desire
- Where minds begin: a commentary on Joseph LeDoux’s the deep history of ourselves
- Emotion, autonoesis, and the self
- The deep history of affect and consciousness
- Interrogating constructive realism about the self from a Buddhist perspective
- How shallow is fear? Deepening the waters of emotion with a social/externalist account
- Epistemic injustice in psychiatric research and practice
- Is framing irrational?
- Byrne on transparent introspection
- Meaning, will to meaning, and Frankl’s existential psychiatry
- Towards a conative account of mental imagery
- The disunity of moral judgment: Implications for the study of psychopathy
- Are we in need of a philosophy of developmental psychology?
- Intuitions about joint commitment
- Consciousness and its place in epistemology
- Dark personality traits and anti-natalist beliefs: The mediating roles of primal world beliefs
- Bayesian belief protection: A study of belief in conspiracy theories
- A puzzle of epistemic paternalism
- Affective scaffolding and chronic illness
- Radical psychotic doubt and epistemology
- On understanding madness: A paradoxical view
- Negotiating domains of trust
- Integrated information and panpsychism: toward a deep understanding of the nature of consciousness
- Can we break bread with conspiracy theorists?
- The person’s position-taking in the shaping of schizophrenic phenomena
- Disentangling low-value practices from pseudoscience in health service psychology
- Belief in free will: Integration into social cognition models to promote health behavior
- The effect of mental disorders on the autonomy of social beings
- Doing your own research and other impossible acts of epistemic superheroism
- Reality + Reality-
- Distinguishing free will from moral responsibility when measuring free will beliefs: The FWS-II
- Folk metaethics and error
- Studying the mind through its disorders
- Trust as the glue of cognitive institutions
- Predicting ordinary objects into the world
- A philosophical exploration of experience-based expertise in mental health care
- The normativity in psychiatric nosology. An analysis of how the DSM-5’s psychopathology conceptualisation can be integrated
- Facing the uncertainties of being a person: On the role of existential vulnerability in personal identity
- Shadowboxing with Social Justice Warriors. A review of Endre Begby’s prejudice: A Study in non-ideal epistemology
- The Libet paradigm and a dilemma for epiphenomenalism
- The linguistic fallacy & the complex content of emotion
- Sharing in an unequal world: The origins and survival of human cooperation
- Concepts and cognitive structures
- Remembering ‘Ellen West’: What a tragic case reveals about contemporary phenomenological psychopathology
- Understanding human conduct: The innate and acquired meaning of life
- A tragic coalition of the rational and irrational: A threat to collective responses to COVID-19
- Certainty and delusion
- Moral progress, knowledge and error: Do people believe in moral objectivity?
- How accounting for extremism’s different guises remains challenging
- Seeing through the shades of situated affectivity. Sunglasses as a socio-affective artifact
- Connecting the methods of psychology and philosophy: Applying Cognitive-Affective Maps (CAMs) to identify ethical principles underlying the evaluation of bioinspired technologies
- Exploratory hypothesis tests can be more compelling than confirmatory hypothesis tests
- Bad beliefs – a precis
- Inner speech as a cognitive tool—or what is the point of talking to oneself?
- Humanities at the crossroads of technology and corporeality
- A defense of cognitive penetration and the face-race lightness illusion1
- Bodily expressions as gestalts. An argument for grounding direct perception theories
- Why empathy is an intellectual virtue
- The how and why of approximating Bayesian ideals
- Empirical evidence for moral Bayesianism
- Dangerous beliefs, effective signals
- Mental disorders as processes: A more suited metaphysics for psychiatry
- Engaging charitable giving: The motivational force of narrative versus philosophical argument
- Persuasive ethical appeals and climate messaging: A survey of religious Americans’ philosophical preferences
- Mind as magic eight ball: A review of Kahneman, Sibony, and Sunstein’s Noise: A flaw in human judgment
- Against Sethi’s response to the argument from Hallucination
- Vaccine hesitancy and the reluctance to “tempt fate”
- Constructing persons: On the personal–subpersonal distinction
- The heuristics theory of emotions and moderate rationalism
- Character Trouble: Undisciplined Essays on Moral Agency and Personality
- What does it actually mean that Premotor Theory is about embodied attention?
- Understanding phenomenal consciousness while keeping it real
- Reforming responsibility practices without skepticism
- The precision of content characterizations
- Perceived threat of COVID-19, self-assessment of physical health and mental resilience
- Normativity between philosophy and science
- A social account of the vices of self-assessment
- The moral behavior of ethics professors: A replication-extension in Chinese mainland
- Desire versus judgment subjectivism about welfare: A reassessment
- The secrets of the madman are also secrets for the madman