- Bad beliefs: automaticity, arationality, and intervention
- Becoming closer to one another: Shared emotions and social relationships
- Nothing about collective irrationalities makes sense except in the light of cooperation
- Making life more interesting: Trust, trustworthiness, and testimonial injustice
- Hermeneutical Injustice and Unworlding in Psychopathology
- Are mental disorders brain disorders? – A precis
- The Deep History of Ourselves: The Four-Billion-Year Story of How We Got Conscious Brains
- Conceptualization for intended action: A dynamic model
- The moral source of collective irrationality during COVID-19 vaccination campaigns
- Déjà vécu is not déjà vu: An ability view
- Challenges and achievements for Philosophical Psychology
- The father, the Wager, and the question of psychosis in Lacan’s work
- The Coherent Dual Theory of Addictive Desire
- Where minds begin: a commentary on Joseph LeDoux’s the deep history of ourselves
- Emotion, autonoesis, and the self
- The deep history of affect and consciousness
- Interrogating constructive realism about the self from a Buddhist perspective
- How shallow is fear? Deepening the waters of emotion with a social/externalist account
- Epistemic injustice in psychiatric research and practice
- Is framing irrational?
- Byrne on transparent introspection
- Meaning, will to meaning, and Frankl’s existential psychiatry
- Towards a conative account of mental imagery
- The disunity of moral judgment: Implications for the study of psychopathy
- Are we in need of a philosophy of developmental psychology?
- Intuitions about joint commitment
- Consciousness and its place in epistemology
- Dark personality traits and anti-natalist beliefs: The mediating roles of primal world beliefs
- Bayesian belief protection: A study of belief in conspiracy theories
- A puzzle of epistemic paternalism
- Affective scaffolding and chronic illness
- Radical psychotic doubt and epistemology
- On understanding madness: A paradoxical view
- Negotiating domains of trust
- Integrated information and panpsychism: toward a deep understanding of the nature of consciousness
- Can we break bread with conspiracy theorists?
- The person’s position-taking in the shaping of schizophrenic phenomena
- Disentangling low-value practices from pseudoscience in health service psychology
- Belief in free will: Integration into social cognition models to promote health behavior
- The effect of mental disorders on the autonomy of social beings
- Doing your own research and other impossible acts of epistemic superheroism
- Reality + Reality-
- Distinguishing free will from moral responsibility when measuring free will beliefs: The FWS-II
- Folk metaethics and error
- Studying the mind through its disorders
- Trust as the glue of cognitive institutions
- Predicting ordinary objects into the world
- A philosophical exploration of experience-based expertise in mental health care
- The normativity in psychiatric nosology. An analysis of how the DSM-5’s psychopathology conceptualisation can be integrated
- Facing the uncertainties of being a person: On the role of existential vulnerability in personal identity
- Shadowboxing with Social Justice Warriors. A review of Endre Begby’s prejudice: A Study in non-ideal epistemology
- The Libet paradigm and a dilemma for epiphenomenalism
- The linguistic fallacy & the complex content of emotion
- Sharing in an unequal world: The origins and survival of human cooperation
- Concepts and cognitive structures
- Remembering ‘Ellen West’: What a tragic case reveals about contemporary phenomenological psychopathology
- Understanding human conduct: The innate and acquired meaning of life
- A tragic coalition of the rational and irrational: A threat to collective responses to COVID-19
- Certainty and delusion
- Moral progress, knowledge and error: Do people believe in moral objectivity?
- How accounting for extremism’s different guises remains challenging
- Seeing through the shades of situated affectivity. Sunglasses as a socio-affective artifact
- Connecting the methods of psychology and philosophy: Applying Cognitive-Affective Maps (CAMs) to identify ethical principles underlying the evaluation of bioinspired technologies
- Exploratory hypothesis tests can be more compelling than confirmatory hypothesis tests
- Bad beliefs – a precis
- Inner speech as a cognitive tool—or what is the point of talking to oneself?
- Humanities at the crossroads of technology and corporeality
- A defense of cognitive penetration and the face-race lightness illusion1
- Bodily expressions as gestalts. An argument for grounding direct perception theories
- Why empathy is an intellectual virtue
- The how and why of approximating Bayesian ideals
- Empirical evidence for moral Bayesianism
- Dangerous beliefs, effective signals
- Mental disorders as processes: A more suited metaphysics for psychiatry
- Engaging charitable giving: The motivational force of narrative versus philosophical argument
- Persuasive ethical appeals and climate messaging: A survey of religious Americans’ philosophical preferences
- Mind as magic eight ball: A review of Kahneman, Sibony, and Sunstein’s Noise: A flaw in human judgment
- Against Sethi’s response to the argument from Hallucination
- Vaccine hesitancy and the reluctance to “tempt fate”
- Constructing persons: On the personal–subpersonal distinction
- The heuristics theory of emotions and moderate rationalism
- Character Trouble: Undisciplined Essays on Moral Agency and Personality
- What does it actually mean that Premotor Theory is about embodied attention?
- Understanding phenomenal consciousness while keeping it real
- Reforming responsibility practices without skepticism
- The precision of content characterizations
- Perceived threat of COVID-19, self-assessment of physical health and mental resilience
- Normativity between philosophy and science
- A social account of the vices of self-assessment
- The moral behavior of ethics professors: A replication-extension in Chinese mainland
- Desire versus judgment subjectivism about welfare: A reassessment
- The secrets of the madman are also secrets for the madman
- Radicalizing simulationism: Remembering as imagining the (nonpersonal) past
- Believing badly ain’t so bad
- Hybrid and pluralist accounts of concepts: Processing and long-term storage, two dimensions of agreement
- The affectively embodied perspective of the subject
- Philosophy, realism and psychology’s disciplinary fragmentation
- Alienation and identification in addiction
- Paradoxes in a prism: Reflections on the omnipotent passivity and omniscient oblivion of schizophrenia
- Ontogenetic steps of understanding beliefs: From practical to theoretical
- Animal consciousness and phenomenal concepts
- The role of expectations in transformative experiences
- Reading phenomenology mechanistically: The way through constraints
- Obsessive-compulsive disorder and recalcitrant emotion: relocating the seat of irrationality
- Eyeing up life’s social instincts
- The fanciest sort of intentionality: Active inference, mindshaping and linguistic content
- Against reductivist character realism
- Ontological and conceptual challenges in the study of aesthetic experience
- Adolescents’ and young adults’ practical moral judgments on typical everyday-life moral dilemmas: Gender differences in approach to resolution
- Therapeutic trust
- Group navigation and procedural metacognition
- What underlies death/suicide implicit association test measures and how it contributes to suicidal action
- The shared project, but divergent views, of the Empiricist associationists
- Exploration of self- and world experiences in depersonalization traits
- Phronesis as moral decathlon: contesting the redundancy thesis about phronesis
- Psychedelics and environmental virtues
- The disunity of moral judgment: Evidence and implications
- Developing an objective measure of knowledge of factory farming
- Self-handicapping and self-deception: A two-way street
- Counterfactual cognition and psychosis: adding complexity to predictive processing accounts
- Consider the tumor: Brain tumors decrease punishment via perceptions of free will
- The challenges raised by comorbidity in psychiatric research: The case of autism
- What makes a life meaningful? Folk intuitions about the content and shape of meaningful lives
- Scaling up Predictive Processing to language with Construction Grammar
- Questions about sex with socialist answers
- Understanding implicit bias: A case for regulative dispositionalism
- Conscious vision guides motor action—rarely
- An offloading view of perceptual learning
- Neurocognitive dynamics of spontaneous offline simulations: Re-conceptualizing (dream)bizarreness
- Past-future preferences for hedonic goods and the utility of experiential memories
- Habitual virtuous action and acting for reasons
- Can we read minds by imaging brains?
- Reasoning with knowledge of things
- Thinking through talking to yourself: Inner speech as a vehicle of conscious reasoning
- Explaining the illusion of independent agency in imagined persons with a theory of practice
- Some moral benefits of ignorance
- The form and function of joint attention within joint action
- What does the CRT measure? Poor performance may arise from rational processes
- Brains, trains, and ethical claims: Reassessing the normative implications of moral dilemma research
- Reconsidering perceptual constancy
- Emotion sharing as empathic
- Qualitative methods show that surveys misrepresent “ought implies can” judgments
- Which moral exemplars inspire prosociality?
- The demand and desert functions of moral judgment