- Psychopathic personalities and developmental systems
- Rise of the swamp creatures: Reflections on a mechanistic approach to content
- Joint attention without recursive mindreading: On the role of second-person engagement
- The psychology of philosophy: Associating philosophical views with psychological traits in professional philosophers
- On the rationality of emotion regulation
- Folk psychology and proximal intentions
- Against Neo-Cartesianism: Neurofunctional Resilience and Animal Pain
- Does folk disagreement about ambiguous lucky cases warrant an error theory? A response to Hales and Johnson
- Moral framing effects within subjects
- Relationality of intentionality
- Considering the boundaries of intellectual disability: Using philosophy of science to make sense of borderline cases
- Underlying delusion: Predictive processing, looping effects, and the personal/sub-personal distinction
- Conceptualizing consciousness
- Emotion’s role in the unity of consciousness
- The irrationality of folk metaethics
- Emotions and two senses of simulation
- My friend’s true self: Children’s concept of personal identity
- Jokes can fail to be funny because they are immoral: The incompatibility of emotions
- Extended control systems: A theory and its implications
- The aim of belief and suspended belief
- The representations of the approximate number system
- The complexity of neural responses to visual stimuli: On Carruthers’ challenge to Block’s overflow argument
- Can induced reflection affect moral decision-making?
- Tactful animals: How the study of touch can inform the animal morality debate
- Reflective intuition and the Copi card problem
- An intellectual history of psychology
- Strong representationalism and bodily sensations: Reliable causal covariance and biological function
- Lectures on perspective An ecological approach
- The destructive nature of severe and ongoing trauma: Impairments in the minimal-self
- Accounting for cognitive costs: can scientists be creative?
- The first minds: Caterpillars, ‘karyotes and consciousness
- The method(s) of cases
- Question framing effects and the processing of the moral–conventional distinction
- Beyond objectivism: new methods for studying metaethical intuitions
- 4E cognition and the dogma of harmony
- How do we know what babies know? The limits of inferring cognitive representations from visual fixation data
- The seven deadly sins of psychology a manifesto for reforming the culture of scientific practice
- A theory of jerks and other philosophical misadventures
- False procedural memory
- Online education as a “Mental Institution”
- Can hierarchical predictive coding explain binocular rivalry?
- Range content, attention, and the precision of representation
- Intention and empathy
- What is a colleague? The descriptive and normative dimension of a dual character concept
- Folk intuitions and the conditional ability to do otherwise
- Editor’s views
- More than provocative, less than scientific: A commentary on the editorial decision to publish Cofnas (2020)
- Pieces of mind: The proper domain of psychological predicates
- Reply to Figdor
- Beyond the human standard in the cognitive domain a reply to “Cognition beyond the human domain” (Angel Rodriguez’s review of Pieces of Mind OUP 2018)
- The moral self and moral duties
- Neurons and normativity: A critique of Greene’s notion of unfamiliarity
- Why do ethicists eat their greens?
- The psychologically rich life
- Dynamicism, radical enactivism, and representational cognitive processes: The case of subitization
- In-between implicit and explicit
- Against Block on attention and mental paint
- Morality and the imagination: Real-world moral beliefs interfere with imagining fictional content
- Biology and subjectivity: Philosophical contributions to non-reductive neuroscience
- The value of emotions for knowledge
- Ambivalence: A philosophical exploration
- Unimpaired abduction to alien abduction: Lessons on delusion formation
- Cognitive structural realism: A radical solution to the problem of scientific representation
- Response to Westra
- When is mindreading accurate? A commentary on Shannon Spaulding’s How We Understand Others: Philosophy and Social Cognition
- A fresh look at the expertise reply to the variation problem