- The method(s) of cases
- Question framing effects and the processing of the moral–conventional distinction
- Beyond objectivism: new methods for studying metaethical intuitions
- 4E cognition and the dogma of harmony
- How do we know what babies know? The limits of inferring cognitive representations from visual fixation data
- The seven deadly sins of psychology a manifesto for reforming the culture of scientific practice
- A theory of jerks and other philosophical misadventures
- False procedural memory
- Online education as a “Mental Institution”
- Can hierarchical predictive coding explain binocular rivalry?
- Range content, attention, and the precision of representation
- Intention and empathy
- What is a colleague? The descriptive and normative dimension of a dual character concept
- Folk intuitions and the conditional ability to do otherwise
- Editor’s views
- More than provocative, less than scientific: A commentary on the editorial decision to publish Cofnas (2020)
- Pieces of mind: The proper domain of psychological predicates
- Reply to Figdor
- Beyond the human standard in the cognitive domain a reply to “Cognition beyond the human domain” (Angel Rodriguez’s review of Pieces of Mind OUP 2018)
- The moral self and moral duties
- Neurons and normativity: A critique of Greene’s notion of unfamiliarity
- Why do ethicists eat their greens?
- The psychologically rich life
- Dynamicism, radical enactivism, and representational cognitive processes: The case of subitization
- In-between implicit and explicit
- Against Block on attention and mental paint
- Morality and the imagination: Real-world moral beliefs interfere with imagining fictional content
- Biology and subjectivity: Philosophical contributions to non-reductive neuroscience
- The value of emotions for knowledge
- Ambivalence: A philosophical exploration
- Unimpaired abduction to alien abduction: Lessons on delusion formation
- Cognitive structural realism: A radical solution to the problem of scientific representation
- Response to Westra
- When is mindreading accurate? A commentary on Shannon Spaulding’s How We Understand Others: Philosophy and Social Cognition
- A fresh look at the expertise reply to the variation problem
- Self-deception as omission
- Intending to deceive versus deceiving intentionally in indifferent lies
- What can the concept of affective scaffolding do for us?
- Mental time travel: Episodic memory and our knowledge of the personal past
- Determinism and attributions of consciousness
- The reality of autism: On the metaphysics of disorder and diversity
- Is there a confidence condition in the concept of intention?
- Ideological diversity, hostility, and discrimination in philosophy
- Emotion regulation and evaluative understanding
- Belief-like imaginings and perceptual (non-)assertoricity
- The representation of freedom in decisions: Good outcomes or real choice?
- Not all transcendence is created equal: Distinguishing ontological, phenomenological, and subjective beliefs about transcendence
- Concept contextualism through the lens of Predictive Processing
- The nature of desire
- The philosophy of affordances
- On the nature of indifferent lies, a reply to Rutschmann and Wiegmann
- Metapsychology of the creative process
- The mark of the moral: Beyond the sentimentalist turn
- Consequentialism and the boundary of morality
- On ambitious higher-order theories of consciousness
- Not with narratives, not without narratives: A review of “Things That Bother Me: Death, Freedom, The Self, etc.” Galen Strawson
- Holism, conceptual role, and conceptual similarity
- The empathic skill fiction can’t teach us
- Virtues disunited and the folk psychology of character
- Exploring culture from the standpoint of a cognitive architecture
- Lay beliefs in moral expertise
- Experienced wholeness: Integrating insights from gestalt theory, cognitive neuroscience, and predictive processing
- Moral conformity and its philosophical lessons
- The social turn in moral psychology
- Medical nihilism
- Editors’ note
- Research on group differences in intelligence: A defense of free inquiry
- Adopting the intentional stance toward natural and artificial agents
- On the perceived objectivity of some moral beliefs
- Are the folk historicists about moral responsibility?
- Emotion’s influence on judgment-formation: Breaking down the concept of moral intuition
- Reply to Philip Woodward’s review of The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality
- Diagnosis pressure and false positives: Toward a non-reductionist, polytomic approach of child mental problems
- Of integrated information theory: a philosophical evaluation