- The moral self and moral duties
- Neurons and normativity: A critique of Greene’s notion of unfamiliarity
- Why do ethicists eat their greens?
- The psychologically rich life
- Dynamicism, radical enactivism, and representational cognitive processes: The case of subitization
- In-between implicit and explicit
- Against Block on attention and mental paint
- Morality and the imagination: Real-world moral beliefs interfere with imagining fictional content
- Biology and subjectivity: Philosophical contributions to non-reductive neuroscience
- The value of emotions for knowledge
- Ambivalence: A philosophical exploration
- Unimpaired abduction to alien abduction: Lessons on delusion formation
- Cognitive structural realism: A radical solution to the problem of scientific representation
- Response to Westra
- When is mindreading accurate? A commentary on Shannon Spaulding’s How We Understand Others: Philosophy and Social Cognition
- A fresh look at the expertise reply to the variation problem
- Self-deception as omission
- Intending to deceive versus deceiving intentionally in indifferent lies
- What can the concept of affective scaffolding do for us?
- Mental time travel: Episodic memory and our knowledge of the personal past
- Determinism and attributions of consciousness
- The reality of autism: On the metaphysics of disorder and diversity
- Is there a confidence condition in the concept of intention?
- Ideological diversity, hostility, and discrimination in philosophy
- Emotion regulation and evaluative understanding
- Belief-like imaginings and perceptual (non-)assertoricity
- The representation of freedom in decisions: Good outcomes or real choice?
- Not all transcendence is created equal: Distinguishing ontological, phenomenological, and subjective beliefs about transcendence
- Concept contextualism through the lens of Predictive Processing
- The nature of desire
- The philosophy of affordances
- On the nature of indifferent lies, a reply to Rutschmann and Wiegmann
- Metapsychology of the creative process
- The mark of the moral: Beyond the sentimentalist turn
- Consequentialism and the boundary of morality
- On ambitious higher-order theories of consciousness
- Not with narratives, not without narratives: A review of “Things That Bother Me: Death, Freedom, The Self, etc.” Galen Strawson
- Holism, conceptual role, and conceptual similarity
- The empathic skill fiction can’t teach us
- Virtues disunited and the folk psychology of character
- Exploring culture from the standpoint of a cognitive architecture
- Lay beliefs in moral expertise
- Experienced wholeness: Integrating insights from gestalt theory, cognitive neuroscience, and predictive processing
- Moral conformity and its philosophical lessons
- The social turn in moral psychology
- Medical nihilism
- Editors’ note
- Research on group differences in intelligence: A defense of free inquiry
- Adopting the intentional stance toward natural and artificial agents
- On the perceived objectivity of some moral beliefs
- Are the folk historicists about moral responsibility?
- Emotion’s influence on judgment-formation: Breaking down the concept of moral intuition
- Reply to Philip Woodward’s review of The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality
- Diagnosis pressure and false positives: Toward a non-reductionist, polytomic approach of child mental problems
- Of integrated information theory: a philosophical evaluation
- What Frege asked Alex the parrot: inferentialism, number concepts, and animal cognition
- Haidt et al.’s case for moral pluralism revisited
- Beyond natural geometry: on the nature of proto-geometry
- Semantic feature dissociation: A new hypothesis concerning autism
- Insights from the inside of empathy: Investigating the experiential dimension of empathy through introspection
- Primer, proposal, and paradigm: A review essay of Mendelovici’s The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality
- Behaving: what’s genetic, what’s not, and why should we care?
- Self-deception and shifting degrees of belief
- Being one of us. Group identification, joint actions, and collective intentionality
- Symbiotic cognition as an alternative for socially extended cognition
- A cognitive perspective on scientific realism
- Ecological psychology is radical enough: A reply to radical enactivists
- The problem of mind and mental acts in the perspective of psychology in the Lvov-Warsaw School
- The content of Marr’s information-processing framework
- The role of nature and brain in demystifying the “unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics”
- Minimal perception: Responding to the challenges of perceptual constancy and veridicality with plants
- An empirical investigation of guilty pleasures
- Payback without bookkeeping: The origins of revenge and retaliation